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‘Serious flaws’ in Iraq intelligence
The quality of the intelligence used to make the case for Britain going to war with Iraq has now been thrown into doubt, the Butler inquiry has said.
The 196 page report says MI6 did not check its sources well enough, and sometimes relied on third hand reports.
It says the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) should not have claimed Iraq could use WMD within 45 minutes without explaining what that meant.
But it said JIC chairman John Scarlett should still be the new boss of MI6.
US criticisms
Intelligence chiefs’ warnings about the limits of their information were not made clear enough in the government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the report says.
“This was a weakness,” Lord Butler concludes.
Tony Blair’s statement to MPs may have reinforced the impression that there was “firmer and fuller intelligence”, the report continues.
Lord Butler’s team says ministers and officials and the intelligence agencies should have re-assessed the information as it become increasingly clear that UN Inspectors were not finding any WMD in the months immediately before the war.
The inquiry concludes there was no evidence of “deliberate distortion” of intelligence by politicians.
And the inquiry said it hoped John Scarlett will still take up his job as the new director of MI6.
Lord Butler was asked by No 10 to look at the accuracy of Britain’s pre-war intelligence after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He is now outlining his report, before Tony Blair faces MPs at 1330 BST.
The report follows a US Senate inquiry severely criticising American intelligence agencies for the quality of their pre-war information.
The prime minister last week admitted banned weapons might never be found in Iraq.
In January Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly cleared the government of inserting material it “knew to be probably wrong” against the wishes of the intelligence community in its dossier on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
But the new inquiry has looked at the quality of the intelligence used to justify the case for war.
It is also expected to have re-examined the way that intelligence was presented to the public and MPs.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/3890961.stm

Published: 2004/07/14 12:01:28 GMT

© BBC MMIV
Review of Intelligence
on
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Report of a Committee
of
Privy Counsellors
Chairman:
The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This summary follows the order of the Chapters of our Report. It comprises the passages
we have highlighted in each Section and is intended to convey the gist of our Conclusions.
However, we emphasise the importance of reading the Sections of the Report in full since
the picture of the sources, assessment and use of intelligence is necessarily complicated
and our Conclusions need to be read in context in order to be fully understood.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf
CHAPTER 2 – COUNTRIES OF CONCERN OTHER THAN IRAQ AND GLOBAL
TRADE
1. All four of the case studies we discuss (AQ Khan, Libya, Iran, North Korea) were to a
greater or lesser extent success stories. To a degree, that was inevitable – we chose those
cases where intelligence about nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile
programmes and proliferation activities can be discussed precisely because it has
contributed to disclosure of those activities. But that should not detract from what has
clearly been an impressive performance by the intelligence community and policy-makers
in each case, and overall. (Paragraph 107)
2. A number of common threads have become clear from our examination of each case. The first and most obvious is the powerful effect of exploiting the linkages where they exist between suppliers (AQ Khan; North Korea) and buyers (Iran; Libya; others) for counterproliferation activity. It is in the nature of proliferation that what can be discovered about a supplier leads to information about the customer, and vice versa. The second thread flows from this – the powerful multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) collaboration. Third, this is painstaking work, involving the piecing together over extended timescales of often fragmentary information. There are the surprises and ‘lucky breaks’. But they often come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years. It requires close collaboration between all involved, in agencies and departments, to build the jigsaw, with teams able to have access to available intelligence and to make the most of each clue. It also depends on continuity of shared purpose amongst collectors and analysts, and between the intelligence and policy communities, in gathering, assessing and using intelligence in tackling proliferation and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes which are destabilising in security terms.
(Paragraphs 108/109)
CHAPTER 3 – TERRORISM
3. All of the UK intelligence agencies are developing new techniques, and we have seen
clear evidence that they are co-operating at all levels. (Paragraph 133)
4. JTAC has now been operating for over a year and has proved a success. (Paragraph 134)
5. International counter-terrorism collaboration has also been significantly enhanced in the past six or seven years. Though we understand that other countries have not yet achieved the same level of inter-departmental synthesis, considerable developments have taken place. Staff of the UK intelligence and security agencies are today in much wider contact with their opposite numbers throughout the world. We note these initiatives, but remain concerned that the procedures of the international community are still not sufficiently aligned to match the threat. (Paragraph 136)
CHAPTER 4 – COUNTER-PROLIFERATION MACHINERY
6. Intelligence performs an important role in many aspects of the Government’s counterproliferation work. It helps to identify proliferating countries, organisations and individuals through JIC assessments, DIS proliferation studies and operational intelligence. It can help to interdict or disrupt the activities of proliferators either nationally or in co-operation with other countries. It can support diplomatic activity by revealing states’ attitudes to counter-proliferation or by informing the assessments of international partners. It can also support inspection, monitoring and verification regimes and on occasions military action. Intelligence can play an important part in enforcing export controls, particularly in relation to ‘dual-use’ goods and technologies. (Paragraphs 149/150)
CHAPTER 5 – IRAQ
THE POLICY CONTEXT
7. The developing policy context of the previous four years [see paragraphs 210–217] and
especially the impact of the events of 11 September 2001, formed the backdrop for
changes in policy towards Iraq in early 2002. The Government’s conclusion in the spring
of 2002 that stronger action (although not necessarily military action) needed to be taken
to enforce Iraqi disarmament was not based on any new development in the current
intelligence picture on Iraq. (Paragraph 427)
8. When the Government concluded that action going beyond the previous policy of
containment needed to be taken, there were many grounds for concern arising from Iraq’s past record and behaviour. There was a clear view that, to be successful, any new action to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations would need to be backed with the credible threat of force. But there was no recent intelligence that would itself have given rise to a conclusion that Iraq was of more immediate concern than the activities of some other countries. (Paragraph 427)
9. The Government, as well as being influenced by the concerns of the US Government, saw a need for immediate action on Iraq because of the wider historical and international
context, especially Iraq’s perceived continuing challenge to the authority of the United
Nations. The Government also saw in the United Nations and a decade of Security Council
Resolutions a basis for action through the United Nations to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. (Paragraph 428)
10. The Government considered in March 2002 two options for achieving the goal of Iraqi
disarmament - a toughening of the existing containment policy; and regime change by
military means. Ministers were advised that, if regime change was the chosen policy, only
the use of overriding force in a ground campaign would achieve the removal of Saddam
Hussein and Iraq’s re-integration with the international community. Officials noted that
regime change of itself had no basis in international law; and that any offensive military
action against Iraq could only be justified if Iraq were held to be in breach of its
disarmament obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 or some
new resolution. Officials also noted that for the five Permanent Members of the Security
Council and the majority of the 15 members of the Council to take the view that Iraq was
in breach of its obligations under Resolution 687, they would need to be convinced that
Iraq was in breach of its obligations; that such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity; but that the intelligence then available was insufficiently robust to meet that criterion. (Paragraph 429)
11. Intelligence on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes was
used in support of the execution of this policy to inform planning for a military campaign; to inform domestic and international opinion, in support of the Government’s advocacy of its changing policy towards Iraq; and to obtain and provide information to United Nations inspectors. (Paragraph 431)
12. Iraq was not the only issue on which the intelligence agencies, the JIC and the
departments concerned were working during this period. Other matters, including
terrorism and the activities of other countries of concern, were requiring intensive day-today observation and action. (Paragraph 432)
THE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE
13. Between 1991 and 1998, the bulk of information used in assessing the status of Iraq’s
biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes was derived from UNSCOM
reports. (Paragraph 433)
14. After the departure of the United Nations inspectors in December 1998, information
sources were sparse, particularly on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons
programmes. (Paragraph 433)
15. The number of primary human intelligence sources remained few. Other intelligence
sources provided valuable information on other activity, including overseas procurement
activity. They did not generally provide confirmation of the intelligence received from
human sources, but did contribute to the picture of the continuing intention of the Iraqi
regime to pursue its prohibited weapons programmes. (Paragraphs 434/435)
16. Validation of human intelligence sources after the war has thrown doubt on a high
proportion of those sources and of their reports, and hence on the quality of the
intelligence assessments received by Ministers and officials in the period from summer
2002 to the outbreak of hostilities. Of the main human intelligence sources:
a. One SIS main source reported authoritatively on some issues, but on others
was passing on what he had heard within his circle.
b. Reporting from a sub-source to a second SIS main source that was important
to JIC assessments on Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons
must be open to doubt.
c. Reports from a third SIS main source have been withdrawn as unreliable.
d. Reports from two further SIS main sources continue to be regarded as reliable,
although it is notable that their reports were less worrying than the rest about
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
e. Reports received from a liaison service on Iraqi production of biological agent
were seriously .awed, so that the grounds for JIC assessments drawing on
those reports that Iraq had recently-produced stocks of biological agent no
longer exist. (Paragraph 436)
17. We do not believe that over-reliance on dissident and emigre´ sources was a major cause of subsequent weaknesses in the human intelligence relied on by the UK. (Paragraph 438)
18. One reason for the number of agents whose reports turned out to be unreliable or
questionable may be the length of the reporting chains. Another reason may be that
agents who were known to be reliable were asked to report on issues going well beyond
their usual territory. A third reason may be that, because of the scarcity of sources and the urgent requirement for intelligence, more credence was given to untried agents than
would normally be the case. (Paragraphs 440–442)
19. A major underlying reason for the problems that have arisen was the difficulty of achieving reliable human intelligence on Iraq. However, even taking into account the difficulty of recruiting and running reliable agents on Iraqi issues, we conclude that part of the reason for the serious doubt being cast over a high proportion of human intelligence reports on Iraq arises from weaknesses in the effective application by SIS of its validation procedures and in their proper resourcing. Our Review has shown the vital importance of effective scrutiny and validation of human intelligence sources and of their reporting to the preparation of accurate JIC assessments and high-quality advice to Ministers. We urge the Chief of SIS to ensure that this task is properly resourced and organised to achieve that result, and we think that it would be appropriate if the Intelligence and Security Committee were to monitor this. (Paragraphs 443–445)
ASSESSMENT
20. In general, we found that the original intelligence material was correctly reported in JIC assessments. An exception was the ’45 minute’ report. But this sort of example was rare. (Paragraph 449)
21. We should record in particular that we have found no evidence of deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence. (Paragraph 449)
22. We found no evidence of JIC assessments and the judgements inside them being pulled in any particular direction to meet the policy concerns of senior officials on the JIC.
(Paragraph 450)
23. We conclude in general that the intelligence community made good use of the technical expertise available to the Government. (Paragraph 451)
24. We accept the need for careful handling of human intelligence reports to sustain the
security of sources. We have, however, seen evidence of difficulties that arose from the
unduly strict ‘compartmentalisation’ of intelligence. It was wrong that a report which was
of significance in the drafting of a document of the importance of the dossier was not
shown to key experts in the DIS who could have commented on the validity and credibility of the report. We conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to the most expert available analysis. (Paragraphs 452)
25. We were impressed by the quality of intelligence assessments on Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities. (Paragraphs 453)
26. Partly because of inherent difficulties in assessing chemical and biological programmes,
JIC assessments on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes were less
assured. The most significant is the ‘dual use’ issue – because chemical and biological
weapons programmes can draw heavily on ‘dual use’ materials, it is easier for a
proliferating state to keep its programmes covert. (Paragraph 454/455)
27. There were also Iraq-specific factors. The intelligence community will have had in mind
that Iraq had not only owned but used its chemical weapons in the past. It will inevitably
have been influenced by the way in which the Iraqi regime was engaged in a sustained
programme to try to deceive United Nations inspectors. Most of the intelligence reports
on which assessments were being made were inferential. The Assessments Staff and JIC
were not fully aware of the access and background of key informants, and could not
therefore read their material against the background of an understanding of their
motivations. The broad conclusions of the UK intelligence community (although not some
particular details) were widely-shared by other countries. (Paragraphs 456/457)
28. We detected a tendency for assessments to be coloured by over-reaction to previous
errors. As a result, there was a risk of over-cautious or worst case estimates, shorn of their
caveats, becoming the ‘prevailing wisdom’. The JIC may, in some assessments, also have
misread the nature of Iraqi governmental and social structures. (Paragraph 458/459)
29. We emphasise the importance of the Assessments Staff and the JIC having access to a
wide range of information, especially in circumstances (e.g. where the UK is likely to
become involved in national reconstruction and institution-building) where information on political and social issues will be vital. (Paragraph 459)
THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE
30. The main vehicle for the Government’s use of intelligence in the public presentation of policy was the dossier of September 2002 and accompanying Ministerial statements. The dossier broke new ground in three ways: the JIC had never previously produced a public document; no Government case for any international action had previously been made to the British public through explicitly drawing on a JIC publication; and the authority of the British intelligence community, and the JIC in particular, had never been used in such a public way. (Paragraph 460/461)
31. The dossier was not intended to make the case for a particular course of action in relation to Iraq. It was intended by the Government to inform domestic and international
understanding of the need for stronger action (though not necessarily military action) – the general direction in which Government policy had been moving since the early months of 2002, away from containment to a more proactive approach to enforcing Iraqi
disarmament. (Paragraph 462)
32. The Government wanted an unclassified document on which it could draw in its advocacy of its policy. The JIC sought to offer a dispassionate assessment of intelligence and other material on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes. The JIC, with commendable motives, took responsibility for the dossier, in order that its content should properly reject the judgements of the intelligence community. They did their utmost to ensure this standard was met. But this will have put a strain on them in seeking to maintain their normal standards of neutral and objective assessment. (Paragraph 463)
33. Strenuous efforts were made to ensure that no individual statements were made in the dossier which went beyond the judgements of the JIC. But, in translating material from JIC assessments into the dossier, warnings were lost about the limited intelligence base on which some aspects of these assessments were being made. Language in the dossier may have left with readers the impression that there was fuller and former intelligence behind the judgements than was the case in our view, having reviewed all of the material, is that judgements in the dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available. (Paragraph 464)
34. We conclude that it was a serious weakness that the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of the intelligence underlying its judgements were not made sufficiently clear in the dossier. (Paragraph 465)
35. We understand why the Government felt it had to meet the mounting public and
Parliamentary demand for information. We also recognise that there is a real dilemma
between giving the public an authoritative account of the intelligence picture and
protecting the objectivity of the JIC from the pressures imposed by providing information for public debate. It is difficult to resolve these requirements. We conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that making public that the JIC had authorship of the dossier was a mistaken judgement, though we do not criticise the JIC for taking responsibility for clearance of the intelligence content of the document. However, in the particular circumstances, the publication of such a document in the name and with the authority of the JIC had the result that more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear. The consequence also was to put the JIC and its Chairman into an area of public controversy and arrangements must be made for the future which avoid putting the JIC and its Chairman in a similar position. (Paragraph 466)
36. We believe that there are other options that should be examined for the ownership of drafting, for gaining the JIC’s endorsement of the intelligence material and assessments that are quoted and for subsequent ‘branding’. One is for the government of the day to draft a document, to gain the JIC’s endorsement of the intelligence material inside it and then to publish it acknowledging that it draws on intelligence but without ascribing it to the JIC. Or the Government, if it wishes to seek the JIC’s credibility and authority, could publish a document with intelligence material and the JIC’s endorsement of it shown separately. Or the JIC could prepare and publish itself a self-standing assessment, incorporating all of its normal caveats and warnings, leaving it to others to place that document within a broader policy context. This may make such documents less
persuasive in making a policy case; but that is the price of using a JIC assessment. Our
conclusion is that, between these options, the .rst is greatly preferable. Whichever route is chosen, JIC clearance of the intelligence content of any similar document will be essential. (Paragraph 467)
37. We conclude that, if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public
debate in future, those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations. It will
be essential, too, that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and
advocacy are established when doing so. (Paragraph 468)
38. We realise that our conclusions may provoke calls for the current Chairman of the JIC, Mr Scarlett, to withdraw from his appointment as the next Chief of SIS. We greatly hope that he will not do so. We have a high regard for his abilities and his record. (Paragraph 469)
39. The part played by intelligence in determining the legality of the use of force was limited. (Paragraph 470)
40. We have noted that, despite its importance to the determination of whether Iraq was in further material breach of its obligations under Resolution 1441, the JIC made no further assessment of the Iraqi declaration beyond its ‘Initial Assessment’ provided on 18
December. We have also recorded our surprise that policy-makers and the intelligence
community did not, as the generally negative results of UNMOVIC inspections became
increasingly apparent, re-evaluate in early 2003 the quality of the intelligence.
(Paragraph 472)
VALIDATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
41. Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons.
Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in the looting and disorder that
followed the cessation of hostilities. Other material may be hidden in the sand, including
stocks of agent or weapons. We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at
this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or
even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. But as a result of our
Review, and taking into account the evidence which has been found by the ISG and debriefing of Iraqi personnel, we have reached the conclusion that prior to the war the
Iraqi regime:
a. Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons
programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when
United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded
or lifted.
b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and
procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; but did not have significant – if any – stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state .t for
deployment, or developed plans for using them. (Paragraph 474)
CHAPTER 6 – IRAQ: SPECIFIC ISSUES
LINKS BETWEEN AL QAIDA AND THE IRAQI REGIME
42. The JIC made it clear that the Al Qaida-linked facilities in the Kurdish Ansar al Islam area
were involved in the production of chemical and biological agents, but that they were
beyond the control of the Iraqi regime. (Paragraph 479)
43. The JIC made clear that, although there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaida, there was no evidence of co-operation. (Paragraph 484)
OPERATION MASS APPEAL
44. There were two meetings between British Government officials and UNSCOM
representatives, including Mr Ritter, in May and June 1998 at which there were
discussions about how to make public the discovery of traces of the nerve agent VX on
missile warheads after this fact had been reported to the United Nations Security Council.
(Iraq had previously denied weaponising VX.) Operation Mass Appeal was set up for this
specific purpose and did not exist before May 1998. In the event, before Operation Mass
Appeal could proceed, the UNSCOM report was leaked to the press in Washington.
Because of this, Operation Mass Appeal was abandoned. (Paragraph 489)
URANIUM FROM AFRICA
45. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy
uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources
indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since
uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence
was credible.
c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to
having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.
d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time
its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.
(Paragraph 503)
THE ‘45 MINUTE’ CLAIM
46. The JIC should not have included the ‘45 minute’ report in its assessment and in the
Government’s dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to. The fact that the
reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions
that it had been included because of its eye-catching character. (Paragraph 511)
MOBILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES
47. We consider that it was reasonable for the JIC to include in its assessments of March and September 2002 a reference to intelligence reports on Iraq’s seeking mobile biological agent production facilities. But it has emerged that the intelligence from the source, if it had been correctly reported, would not have been consistent with a judgement that Iraq had, on the basis of recent production, stocks of biological agent. If SIS had had direct access to the source from 2000 onwards, and hence correct intelligence reporting, the main evidence for JIC judgements on Iraq’s stocks of recently-produced biological agent, as opposed to a break-out capacity, would not have existed. (Paragraph 530)
ALUMINIUM TUBES
48. The evidence we received on aluminium tubes was overwhelmingly that they were
intended for rockets rather than a centrifuge. We found this convincing. Despite this, we
conclude that the JIC was right to consider carefully the possibility that the tubes were
evidence of a resumed nuclear programme, and that it properly rejected the doubts
about the use of the tubes in the caution of its assessments. But in transferring its
judgements to the dossier, the JIC omitted the important information about the need for
substantial re-engineering of the aluminium tubes to make them suitable for use as gas
centrifuge rotors. This omission had the effect of materially strengthening the impression
that they may have been intended for a gas centrifuge and hence for a nuclear
programme. (Paragraph 545)
PLAGUE AND DUSTY MUSTARD
49. Plague and ‘dusty mustard’ were just two of the many biological and chemical threats on which the intelligence community had to keep watch in the period before the .rst Gulf war, and subsequently. (Paragraph 562)
50. The intelligence on their availability to Iraq in 1990 and 1991 rested on a small number of reports and the evidence derived from examination of a munition. There were grounds for scepticism both about the reports’ sources and their quality. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Government was right in 1990 and 1991 to act on a precautionary basis. (Paragraph 563)
51. We found it harder to understand the treatment of the intelligence in the ensuing period.
‘Dusty mustard’ disappears from JIC assessments from 1993 onwards. By contrast,
although little new intelligence was received, and most of that was historical or
unconvincing, plague continued to be mentioned in JIC assessments up to March 2003.
Those fluctuated in the certainty of judgements about Iraqi possession of plague between “possibly” and “probably”. (Paragraph 564)
52. We conclude that, in the case of plague, JIC assessments rejected historic evidence, and intelligence of dubious reliability, reinforced by suspicion of Iraq, rather than up-to-date evidence. (Paragraph 565)
DR JONES’S DISSENT
53. Dr Jones was right to raise concerns about the manner of expression of the ‘45 minute’ report in the dossier given the vagueness of the underlying intelligence. (Paragraph 570)
54. Dr Jones was right to raise concerns about the certainty of language used in the dossier on Iraqi production and possession of chemical agents. (Paragraph 572)
55. We recognise that circumstances arise in which it is right for senior officials to take a broad view that differs from the opinions of those with expertise on points of detail. We do not, however, consider that the report held back from Dr Jones and his staff (which Dr Jones’ superiors regarded as justifying the certainty of the language in the dossier) was one to which such considerations should have applied. It was understandable that SIS should have wanted to give greater than normal protection to the human intelligence source on this occasion. But a problem arose because it was kept from the relevant DIS analysts who had a wider perspective. It would have been more appropriate for senior managers in the DIS and SIS to have made arrangements for the intelligence to be shown to DIS experts rather than their making their own judgements on its significance. (Paragraph 576/577)
OIL SUPPLIES
56. We saw no evidence that a motive of the British Government for initiating military action was securing continuing access to oil supplies. (Paragraph 579)
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS ON BROADER ISSUES
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
57. We note that much of what was reliably known about Iraq’s unconventional weapons
programmes in the mid- and late-1990s was obtained through the reports of the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
These international agencies now appear to have been more effective than was realised
at the time in dismantling and inhibiting Iraq’s prohibited weapons programmes. The value of such international organisations needs to be recognised and built on for the future, supported by the contribution of intelligence from national agencies. (Paragraph 584)
CO-ORDINATION OF COUNTER-PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY
58. We consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new
information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of
expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other easily. (Paragraph 585)
THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF
59. We consider that further steps are needed to integrate the relevant work of the DIS more closely with the rest of the intelligence community. We welcome the arrangements now being made to give the Joint Intelligence Committee more leverage through the
Intelligence Requirements process to ensure that the DIS serves wider national priorities
as well as it does defence priorities and has the resources which the rest of the intelligence community needs to support its activities. If that involved increasing the Secret Intelligence Account by a sum to be at the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator’s
disposal to commission such resources, we would support that. (Paragraph 587)
60. We recommend consideration of the provision of proper channels for the expression of dissent within the DIS through the extension of the remit of the Staff Counsellor, who
provides a confidential outlet for conscientious objection or dissent within the intelligence agencies, to cover DIS civilian staff and the Assessments Staff. (Paragraph 589)
61. We recognise the case for the Chief of Defence Intelligence to be a serving officer so that he is fully meshed into military planning. But we consider that the Deputy should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary at the time when a particular appointment is made, be an intelligence specialist. (Paragraph 590)
THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
62. We recommend no change in the JIC’s membership. (Paragraph 596)
63. We see a strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with
experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post. (Paragraph 597)
THE ASSESSMENTS STAFF
64. We recommend that the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator reviews the size of the
Assessments Staff, and in particular considers whether they have available the volume
and range of resources to ask the questions which need to be asked in fully assessing
intelligence reports and in thinking radically. We recommend also that this review should
include considering whether there should be a specialism of analysis with a career
structure and room for advancement, allowing the Assessments Staff to include some
career members. We understand that the Intelligence and Security Committee are
planning to look at this issue. (Paragraph 600)
65 It may be worth considering the appointment of a distinguished scientist to undertake a part-time role as adviser to the Cabinet Office. (Paragraph 601)
THE LANGUAGE OF JIC ASSESSMENTS
66. The JIC has been right not to reach a judgement when the evidence is insubstantial. We believe that the JIC should, where there are significant limitations in the intelligence, state these clearly alongside its Key Judgements. While not arguing for a particular approach to the language of JIC assessments and the way in which alternative or minority
hypotheses, or uncertainty, are expressed, we recommend that the intelligence
community review their conventions again to see if there would be advantage in refreshing them. (Paragraph 604)
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
67. We do not suggest that there is or should be an ideal or unchangeable system of collective Government, still less that procedures are in aggregate any less effective now than in earlier times. However, we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed
character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making
towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgement. Such
risks are particularly significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts
are inherently difficult to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important. (Paragraph 611)
—-

I will risk all on Iraq, says Blair

Blair admits risking his political life over Iraq

Patrick Wintour, chief political correspondent
Tuesday February 4, 2003
The Guardian

Tony Blair yesterday admitted he was risking everything politically on his determination to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, as he briefed MPs on his belief that President George Bush and the rest of the UN security council will endorse a second resolution backing the claim that Iraq is breaching UN resolutions.
Mr Blair’s frank admission of his precarious position came when he gave his report to MPs on his Washington summit with Mr Bush last Friday. Mr Blair came from the summit content that he had won the reluctant support of Mr Bush to seek a second UN resolution before military action.
Mr Blair told MPs: “We are entering the final phase of a 12-year history of the disarmament of Iraq.” He added that there was unmistakable evidence that Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions.
He was speaking ahead of today’s Anglo-French summit with the French president, Jacques Chirac, at Le Touquet. The French are not yet convinced that the UN weapons inspectors have amassed sufficient evidence to justify a war.
Mr Blair made an implicit plea to Mr Chirac to rise to his responsibilities, pointing out that Britain before the second world war had nearly succumbed to appeasement.
He also invested greater authority than before in the ultimate stance of Dr Blix, the chief weapons inspector. Mr Blair argued: “Should Dr Blix continue to report Iraqi non-cooperation, a second resolution should be passed confirming such a mate rial breach.” He said the inspectors had been sent to Iraq in part to certify if the Iraqis were willing to cooperate. He insisted that Mr Bush had agreed with him on the importance of seeking a second UN resolution, but indicated that the resolution might simply report that Iraq is in breach of previous UN resolutions, leaving the response of the international community for each individual country to decide.
At one point Mr Blair said: “When people ask me why am I willing to risk everything on this politically, I do not want to be the prime minister when people point the finger back from history and say: ‘You know those two threats were there and you did nothing about it’.”
Mr Blair came under his strongest attack yet from the Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, who questioned whether intelligence briefings being leaked by the British and the US could be trusted as reliable proof of the need for military action.
Mr Kennedy said: “If the Americans decide to take some form of pre-emptive action before the weapons inspectors are able to complete their task, this country will have to be clear-cut as to where its sense of allegiance lies.”
He went on: “Do you recognise… that by making war appear somehow now to be inevitable it is hard for the public to believe that the president of the US and yourself are actually objective about the task in front of the weapons inspectors?”

Iraq inquiry to deliver verdict
The inquiry into the intelligence used to justify sending UK troops to war in Iraq delivers its verdict on Wednesday.
Former Cabinet secretary Lord Butler’s team has taken evidence in private for the last five months and will publish its findings at 1230 BST.
The report comes amid the continuing failure to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Tony Blair received an advance copy of the report on Tuesday and will make a statement to MPs at 1330 BST.
US criticisms
The Liberal Democrats and Conservatives got their first sight of the report at 0600 BST, prompting complaints that the government has an unfair advantage in preparing for the Commons clash.
Arriving to read the report, Lib Dem leader Charles Kennedy said the inquiry would give an insight into the political judgement which led to a “quite unnecessary war”.
Tory leader Michael Howard said he looked forward to reading a “very important report looking into very important issues”.
BUTLER TIMINGS Wednesday, 0600 BST: Opposition party leaders see report 1230 BST: Lord Butler publishes inquiry findings 1330 BST: Tony Blair leads Commons debate on inquiry report
The report follows a US Senate inquiry severely criticising American intelligence agencies for the quality of their pre-war information.
The prime minister last week admitted banned weapons might never be found in Iraq.
In January Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly cleared the government of inserting material it “knew to be probably wrong” against the wishes of the intelligence community in its dossier on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
But the new inquiry has looked at the quality of the intelligence used to justify the case for war.
It may also re-examine the way that intelligence was presented to the public and MPs.
Among the issues the inquiry is likely to assess are:
· The accuracy of the claim that Iraq could use some weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order and how it was promoted to the media
· The reliability of intelligence sources and whether there was over-reliance on Iraqi defectors
· The claim that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger, something disavowed by the International Atomic Weapons Authority (IAEA)
· Whether there was political pressure on Joint Intelligence Committee chairman John Scarlett.
Lord Butler has said he is focusing on “structures, systems and processes rather than on the actions of individuals”.
That prompted the Tories to withdraw their support for the probe. The Liberal Democrats refused to take part from the start.
War law
There could also be scrutiny of the advice given by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith about the war’s legality and what pressure he faced from fellow ministers.
The BBC’s Panorama programme says it has been told key intelligence on Iraq’s weapons used to back the war had recently been withdrawn.
We are better, safer, more secure without Saddam Hussein in office Tony Blair
Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi told BBC’s Today on Wednesday he did not know how much British intelligence relied on information from his Iraqi National Accord group.
He said the group had possessed some information about Saddam Hussein being able to use weapons within 45 minutes, but this related to weapons which could be used against mutinous Iraqi troops.
Nobody knew whether Saddam Hussein’s weapons programmes were complete but Mr Allawi insisted containment had not been working.
He told Today: “When the moral, ethical decision to go to war against Saddam was taken, Saddam at that stage had already done a lot of harm.
“He was capable of doing more harm. He had programmes to develop his capabilities.”
‘Interference’
Former US President Bill Clinton told Today British intelligence had been “more aggressive” than American agencies and Mr Blair had believed he needed to act on their warnings.
There has been speculation the report may look at Tony Blair’s “informal” style of government, criticised by some as too reliant on ad hoc meetings and “government by sofa”.
But Labour MP James Purnell, a former Downing Street adviser, said the government’s move away from formal meetings had been necessary to respond to today’s “complex world” of 24-hour news coverage.
On Tuesday Mr Blair rejected suggestions that “duff” intelligence had made him look foolish around the world.
And he said he felt the same about Iraq as he had before the war.
“With the history of Saddam and what he did, not just to his own country but to the wider world, we are better, safer, more secure without him in office,” said Mr Blair.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/3890961.stm

Published: 2004/07/14 09:14:50 GMT

© BBC MMIV

Advocates of War Now Profit From Iraq’s Reconstruction
Lobbyists, aides to senior officials and others encouraged invasion and now help firms pursue contracts. They see no conflict.
By Walter F. Roche Jr. and Ken Silverstein
Times Staff Writers

July 14, 2004

WASHINGTON — In the months and years leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, they marched together in the vanguard of those who advocated war.

As lobbyists, public relations counselors and confidential advisors to senior federal officials, they warned against Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, praised exiled leader Ahmad Chalabi, and argued that toppling Saddam Hussein was a matter of national security and moral duty.

Now, as fighting continues in Iraq, they are collecting tens of thousands of dollars in fees for helping business clients pursue federal contracts and other financial opportunities in Iraq. For instance, a former Senate aide who helped get U.S. funds for anti-Hussein exiles who are now active in Iraqi affairs has a $175,000 deal to advise Romania on winning business in Iraq and other matters.

And the ease with which they have moved from advocating policies and advising high government officials to making money in activities linked to their policies and advice reflects the blurred lines that often exist between public and private interests in Washington. In most cases, federal conflict-of-interest laws do not apply to former officials or to people serving only as advisors.

Larry Noble, executive director of the Center for Responsive Politics, said the actions of former officials and others who serve on government advisory boards, although not illegal, can raise the appearance of conflicts of interest. “It calls into question whether the advice they give is in their own interests rather than the public interest,” Noble said.

Michael Shires, a professor of public policy at Pepperdine University, disagreed. “I don’t see an ethical issue there,” he said. “I see individuals looking out for their own interests.”

Former CIA Director R. James Woolsey is a prominent example of the phenomenon, mixing his business interests with what he contends are the country’s strategic interests. He left the CIA in 1995, but he remains a senior government advisor on intelligence and national security issues, including Iraq. Meanwhile, he works for two private companies that do business in Iraq and is a partner in a company that invests in firms that provide security and anti-terrorism services.

Woolsey said in an interview that he was not directly involved with the companies’ Iraq-related ventures. But as a vice president of Booz Allen Hamilton, a consulting firm, he was a featured speaker in May 2003 at a conference co-sponsored by the company at which some 80 corporate executives and others paid up to $1,100 to hear about the economic outlook and business opportunities in Iraq.

Before the war, Woolsey was a founding member of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, an organization set up in 2002 at the request of the White House to help build public backing for war in Iraq. He also wrote about a need for regime change and sat on the CIA advisory board and the Defense Policy Board, whose unpaid members have provided advice on Iraq and other matters to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Woolsey is part of a small group that shows with unusual clarity the interlocking nature of the way the insider system can work. Moving in the same social circles, often sitting together on government panels and working with like-minded think tanks and advocacy groups, they wrote letters to the White House urging military action in Iraq, formed organizations that pressed for invasion and pushed legislation that authorized aid to exile groups.

Since the start of the war, despite the violence and instability in Iraq, they have turned to private enterprise.

The group, in addition to Woolsey, includes:

Neil Livingstone, a former Senate aide who has served as a Pentagon and State Department advisor and issued repeated public calls for Hussein’s overthrow. He heads a Washington-based firm, GlobalOptions, that provides contacts and consulting services to companies doing business in Iraq.

Randy Scheunemann, a former Rumsfeld advisor who helped draft the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 authorizing $98 million in U.S. aid to Iraqi exile groups. He was the founding president of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. Now he’s helping former Soviet Bloc states win business there.

Margaret Bartel, who managed federal money channeled to Chalabi’s exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, including funds for its prewar intelligence program on Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. She now heads a Washington-area consulting firm helping would-be investors find Iraqi partners.

K. Riva Levinson, a Washington lobbyist and public relations specialist who received federal funds to drum up prewar support for the Iraqi National Congress. She has close ties to Bartel and now helps companies open doors in Iraq, in part through her contacts with the Iraqi National Congress.

Other advocates of military action against Hussein are pursuing business opportunities in Iraq. Two ardent supporters of military action, Joe Allbaugh, who managed President Bush’s 2000 campaign for the White House and later headed the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Edward Rogers Jr., an aide to the first President Bush, recently helped set up two companies to promote business in postwar Iraq. Rogers’ law firm has a $262,500 contract to represent Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Neither Rogers nor Allbaugh has Woolsey’s high profile, however.

Soon after the Sept. 11 attacks, he wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal saying a foreign state had aided Al Qaeda in preparing the strikes. He named Iraq as the leading suspect. In October 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz sent Woolsey to London, where he hunted for evidence linking Hussein to the attacks.

At the May 2003 Washington conference, titled “Companies on the Ground: The Challenge for Business in Rebuilding Iraq,” Woolsey spoke on political and diplomatic issues that might impact economic progress. He also spoke favorably about the Bush administration’s decision to tilt reconstruction contracts toward U.S. firms.

In an interview, Woolsey said he saw no conflict between advocating for the war and subsequently advising companies on business in Iraq.

Booz Allen is a subcontractor on a $75-million telecommunications contract in Iraq and also has provided assistance on the administration of federal grants. Woolsey said he had had no involvement in that work.

Woolsey was interviewed at the Washington office of the Paladin Capital Group, a venture capital firm where he is a partner. Paladin invests in companies involved in homeland security and infrastructure protection, Woolsey said.

Woolsey also is a paid advisor to Livingstone’s GlobalOptions. He said his own work at the firm did not involve Iraq.

Under Livingstone, GlobalOptions “offers a wide range of security and risk management services,” according to its website.

In a 1993 opinion piece for Newsday, Livingstone wrote that the United States “should launch a massive covert program designed to remove Hussein.”

In a recent interview, Livingstone said he had second thoughts about the war, primarily because of the failureto find weapons of mass destruction. But he has been a regular speaker at Iraq investmentseminars.

While Livingstone has focused on opportunities for Americans, Scheunemann has concentrated on helping former Soviet Bloc states.

Scheunemann runs a Washington lobbying firm called Orion Strategies, which shares the same address as that of the Iraqi National Congress’ Washington spokesman and the now-defunct Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.

Orion’s clients include Romania, which signed a nine-month, $175,000 deal earlier this year. Among other things, the contract calls for Orion to promote Romania’s “interests in the reconstruction of Iraq.”

Scheunemann has also traveled to Latvia, which is a former Orion client, and met with a business group to discuss prospects in Iraq.

Few people advocated for the war as vigorously as Scheunemann. Just a week after Sept. 11, he joined with other conservatives who sent a letter to Bush calling for Hussein’s overthrow.

In 2002, Scheunemann became the first president of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, which scored its biggest success last year when 10 Eastern European countries endorsed the U.S. invasion. Known as the “Vilnius 10,” they showed that “Europe is united by a commitment to end Saddam’s bloody regime,” Scheunemann said at the time.

He declined to discuss his Iraq-related business activities, saying, “I can’t help you out there.”

Scheunemann, Livingstone and Woolsey played their roles in promoting war with Iraq largely in public. By contrast, Bartel and Levinson mostly operated out of the public eye.

In early 2003, Bartel became a director of Boxwood Inc., a Virginia firm set up to receive U.S. funds for the intelligence program of the Iraqi National Congress.

Today, critics in Congress say the Iraqi National Congress provided faulty information on Hussein’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ties to Osama bin Laden.

Bartel began working for the Iraqi National Congress in 2001. She was hired to monitor its use of U.S. funds after several critical government audits. After the war began, Bartel established a Virginia company, Global Positioning. According to Bartel, the firm’s primary purpose is to “introduce clients to the Iraqi market, help them find potential Iraqi partners, set up meetings with government officials ... and provide on-the-ground support for their business interests.”

Bartel works closely with Levinson, a managing director with the Washington lobbying firm BKSH & Associates. Francis Brooke, a top Chalabi aide, said BKSH received $25,000 a month to promote the Iraqi National Congress, and Levinson “did great work on our behalf.”

In 1999, Levinson was hired by the Iraqi National Congress to handle public relations. She said her contract with the congress ended last year. Before the invasion and in the early days of fighting in Iraq, Chalabi and the congress enjoyed close relations with the Bush administration, but the relationship has cooled.

Levinson told The Times: “We see no conflict of interest in using our knowledge and contacts in Iraq that we developed through our previous work with the INC to support economic development in Iraq. As a matter of fact, we see this as complementary to a shared goal to build a democratic country.”

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-advocates14jul14.story

Lawmaker Doubts U.S. Warnings of Possible Attack to Stop Elections

By John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 13, 2004; Page A13
A Democratic congressman who receives classified briefings on the threat of terrorist attacks said yesterday that top U.S. government officials’ repeated statements that international terrorists want to disrupt the American electoral process this year “appear to have no basis.”
Rep. Jim Turner (Tex.), ranking Democrat on the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, said that after several recent briefings by U.S. intelligence officials about perceived terrorist threats this summer and fall, “I don’t have any information that al Qaeda” plans to attack the election process. “Nobody knows anything about timing” or the exact nature of any possible attack, although U.S. officials say al Qaeda wants to mount an attack this year, Turner said.
Homeland Security Department spokesman Brian Roehrkasse declined to respond to Turner’s remarks. Roehrkasse said the agency stands by comments by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge at a news conference last week.
Ridge and a senior intelligence official who appeared at the news conference repeated statements they have made for months that al Qaeda wants to undermine U.S. elections. The terrorist network has been emboldened by its belief that it enjoyed a massive victory when, days after the March 11 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people, Spanish voters ousted the government, they said.
Although Ridge and the intelligence official said they have no “specific” details on time or place of any attack, the intelligence official said, “Recent and credible information indicates that al Qaeda is determined to carry out these attacks to disrupt our democratic processes.”
Turner’s comments came yesterday as he and the panel’s chairman, Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), spoke to reporters about their proposed legislation to improve the department’s use of intelligence. Cox said in an interview that, based on his reading of the classified briefings he has received, Ridge is accurately reflecting U.S. intelligence conclusions.
Some Democrats have suggested lately that top U.S. officials, by raising fears of a terrorist attack to derail the elections, are trying to get President Bush reelected. But they have not cited evidence.
An example of such statements was one by Rep. Robert Wexler (D-Fla.) after Ridge’s news conference: “This administration has a long track record of using deceptive tactics for political gain. One cannot help but question whether their aim was to deflect attention from the Kerry-Edwards ticket during their inaugural week.”
Ridge said such accusations are “a wrong interpretation. . . . These are not conjectures or mythical statements we are making. These are pieces of information that we could trace comfortably to sources that we deem credible.”
Also yesterday, the Homeland Security Department said it informally told the Justice Department that it received a query about the possibility of postponing the election if there is a risk of it being disrupted by terrorism. But Homeland Security said it did not ask Justice to review the legal issues involved.
[An article yesterday afternoon on washingtonpost.com quoted a Homeland Security spokesman saying that the department had, in fact, referred the legal issues to Justice. The spokesman said last night that he had not meant to suggest that a formal review had been requested.]
The idea was initially suggested by DeForest B. Soaries Jr., chairman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which was created by Congress to help localities improve their voting systems. Soaries told The Washington Post last week that he had written to Homeland Security expressing his concern about the lack of a formal plan to deal with a disruption of elections due to a catastrophe, such as terrorism. He said he never got a response.
Officials yesterday described as overblown an article in Newsweek magazine suggesting U.S. officials were floating a possible “proposal” to postpone the election. The article set off a round of denunciations and news stories.
“The Department of Homeland Security should not instill fear or inject uncertainty into the election,” House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) said in a statement.
Cox and Turner discounted the likelihood of the country canceling Election Day, pointing out that it could require a constitutional amendment and emergency action by Congress and state legislatures. “The last thing we want to do is suppress [voter] turnout because people think Election Day is a dangerous day,” Turner said.
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said the administration is not considering postponing the elections. “We’ve had elections in this country when we were at war, even when we were in civil war. And we should have the elections on time. That’s the view of the president, that’s the view of the administration,” Rice told CNN.
Also yesterday, the Government Accountability Office said in a report to Cox’s panel that Homeland Security’s color-coded threat advisories do not convey enough detail about threats to local governments.
Staff writer Fred Barbash contributed to this report.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A45162-2004Jul12?language=printer

TURQUIE Dans l’attente de la fixation d’une date pour l’ouverture des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union

Sur les rives du Bosphore, l’Europe suscite espoir et irritation
Le premier ministre turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, vient d’indiquer qu’il souhaitait une révision des lois afin d’autoriser le port du foulard dans les universités privées en Turquie, malgré le refus des autorités de l’enseignement supérieur. Il a cependant insisté sur la nécessité d’un «consensus social» sur le sujet très sensible en Turquie, pays musulman au régime laïque.
Istanbul : de notre envoyé spécial Claude Lorieux
[13 juillet 2004]
A six mois du «verdict» du Conseil européen, les Turcs sont tantôt remplis d’espoir, tantôt saisis de perplexité devant les exigences de Bruxelles et la constante bonne volonté du gouvernement de Recep Tayyip Erdogan à son égard. Un dessin de presse et une histoire des rues reflètent ces tiraillements. L’histoire, d’abord : affairée à repasser les chemises de son mari, une ménagère turque lui demande : «Mehmet, pourrais-tu aller chercher le pain ? – Non», grommelle l’homme, le nez plongé dans son journal. Réplique imparable de la dame : «Mais c’est l’UE qui l’exige !» On devine la suite. Le mari obtempère.

La population, élite kémaliste incluse, n’en revient pas de la rapidité et de la profondeur des réformes que le gouvernement AKP (Justice et Développement, conservateur musulman) fait subir à l’appareil législatif et à la pratique politique turque. Dans l’ensemble, elle suit. Et d’autant plus volontiers que la République turque ne se réforme guère autrement que sous la pression extérieure, fait remarquer un éditorialiste d’Ankara…
Soixante-dix pour cent des Turcs ont beau s’être déclarés favorables à l’adhésion, certains s’étonnent un peu de la souplesse d’échine d’Erdogan. Un intellectuel istanbuliote, électeur d’AKP de surcroît, avoue carrément ne pas faire confiance à un homme aussi retors…

Ce genre de réflexion vient d’autant plus spontanément que les Turcs trouvent généralement les Européens injustement exigeants à leur égard. L’histoire court les salles de rédaction et circule sur les réseaux Internet : «Fatigués d’avance des interminables négociations qui s’annoncent, les autorités européennes décident plutôt de faire passer un test de culture générale aux ministres des Affaires étrangères de trois Etats candidats. Au Roumain, ils demandent le nom d’une ville japonaise bombardée à l’arme atomique par l’US Air Force. Ils questionnent le Bulgare sur la date du raid américain. Au Turc, ils demandent le nombre de victimes, leur nom et leur adresse… Les deux premiers sont évidemment admis à entrer dans l’UE, le Turc recalé et exclu pour réponse négative.» Bref – et le président Bush n’a rien fait pour les dissuader lors du dernier sommet de l’Otan –, les Turcs reprochent volontiers aux Vingt-Cinq d’user à leur égard du «deux poids deux mesures».

L’espoir d’un rapport positif de la Commission de Bruxelles en octobre et de la fixation d’une date d’ouverture des négociations d’adhésion par le Conseil européen de décembre est d’autant plus vif que la Grande Assemblée nationale, le Parlement, planche sur le dixième et dernier paquet législatif d’harmonisation européenne qui vient de lui être transmis par le gouvernement.
Ce train de réformes abroge notamment les dernières «échappatoires» à la suppression de la peine capitale, qui fut votée il y a plusieurs années, et prive le chef d’état-major des armées du droit de désigner des représentants au Conseil de l’enseignement supérieur et au Conseil de la radiotélévision. Le président Ahmet Sezer vient en outre de signer le texte supprimant les cours de sûreté de l’Etat, instaurées au lendemain du coup d’Etat militaire de 1980.

Le travail accompli pour mettre la Turquie en conformité avec les critères de Copenhague est jugé si avancé qu’un conseiller du premier ministre, Abdullah Gül, déclare : «C’est comme le chantier d’une maison. Le gros oeuvre est terminé. Ils ne restent que les finitions.» Revenant sur une fermeture vieille de vingt-trois ans, le gouvernement prépare également la réouverture du séminaire orthodoxe de Halki, dans une île du Bosphore, le seul de Turquie. Contraint à former ses prêtres en Grèce, le Patriarcat oecuménique du Phanar (Istanbul) réclame cette décision depuis 1971.

Un éditorialiste de la presse d’Ankara estime que les réformes réalisées sont si importantes que «les Européens sont coincés. Ils doivent dire oui». Sinon ? «Eh bien sinon ce sera la «cata» !», tranche un de ses collègues. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Abdullah Gül, renchérit : «Si le Conseil européen prenait une décision qui n’est ni objective ni honnête – et je n’envisage pas cette possibilité –, il y aura des conséquences sérieuses pour la Turquie et pour l’Union européenne.»

Et pourquoi pas pour le gouvernement lui-même ? Le premier ministre a beau affirmer, bravache, que «les réformes continueront de toute façon. Les «critères d’Ankara» succéderont aux «critères de Copenhague»», certains commentateurs prédisent déjà qu’il devra alors s’expliquer sur le coût politique et financier de sa stratégie à l’égard de Bruxelles…

Un économiste, ancien dirigeant de la Banque centrale, souligne surtout qu’un «niet» de l’Union européenne aurait des conséquences dramatiques sur les investissements étrangers, dont la Turquie a un immense besoin pour lutter contre le chômage et qu’elle attend comme une retombée de l’adhésion. Il fait valoir qu’avec 15 dollars par habitant, le montant des investissements étrangers en Turquie est inférieur à celui constaté dans des pays comme l’Egypte et l’Algérie. Or les Turcs espèrent qu’une dynamique d’adhésion, même tardive, provoquera un appel d’air où s’engouffreront les investissements étrangers.
Mais, encore une fois, personne ne veut croire à un échec. L’antichambre du ministre des Affaires étrangères est décorée d’un grand tableau réunissant autour de lord Raglan des généraux de Saint-Arnaud et Canrobert, et d’un ministre de la Sublime Porte, les vainqueurs de la Russie, lors de la guerre de Crimée. En arrêt devant cette page d’histoire, un diplomate turc s’exclame : «Et il y a des gens, en Europe, qui prétendent que nous n’avons pas d’histoire commune !»

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/20040713.FIG0038.html

Central Europe may host US missile defence

13.07.2004 - 09:33 CET | By Andrew Beatty
Washington is said to be in talks with Poland and the Czech Republic to position the biggest missile defence site outside the US in central Europe.

According to the Guardian newspaper, talks have been in train for eight months over the two countries’ hosting of part of the US’ ballistic missile defence system, dubbed “son of star wars”.

According to the paper, Prague and Warsaw are keen to set up advance radar warning sites and Poland may even play host to interceptor missiles.

The UK and Denmark had previously said they may take part in the plan.

However, Russia has voiced concerns about Washington’s plans and the hosting of sites, particularly missile sites, so close to their borders is likely to increase opposition.

The plan also caused some consternation in Europe when the US unilaterally pulled out of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, seen as a key non-proliferation agreement between Russia and the US
http://euobserver.com/?aid=16880&rk=1
US in talks over biggest missile defence site in Europe

Ian Traynor in Warsaw
Tuesday July 13, 2004
The Guardian

The US administration is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic over its controversial missile defence programme, with a view to positioning the biggest missile defence site outside the US in central Europe.
Polish government officials confirmed to the Guardian that talks have been going on with Washington for eight months and made clear that Poland was keen to take part in the project, which is supposed to shield the US and its allies from long-range ballistic missile attacks.
Senior officials in Prague also confirmed that talks were under way over the establishment of American advanced radar stations in the Czech Republic as part of the missile shield project.
“We’re very interested in becoming a concrete part of the arrangement,” said Boguslaw Majewski, the Polish foreign ministry spokesman. “We have been debating this with the Americans since the end of last year.”
Other sources in Warsaw said Pentagon officers have been scouting the mountain territory of southern Poland, pinpointing suitable sites for two or three radar stations connected to the so-called “Son of Star Wars” programme.
As well as radar sites, the Poles say they want to host a missile interceptor site, a large reinforced underground silo from where long-range missiles would be launched to intercept and destroy incoming rockets.
Under Bush administration plans, two missile interceptor sites are being built in the US - one in California, the other in Alaska. Such a site in Poland would be the first outside America and the only one in Europe.
“An interceptor site would be more attractive. It wouldn’t be a hard sell in Poland,” said Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Polish defence minister.
“This is a serious runner,” said a west European diplomat in Warsaw. “It’s pretty substantial. The Poles are very keen to have an interceptor site. They want a physical American presence on their territory. They wouldn’t be paying anything. It would be a totally American facility.”
“I knew about possible radar sites, but I was surprised to hear talk about missile silos,” said another source in Warsaw.
In the Czech Republic, too, the proposed radar site, extending to 100 sq km, could be declared extraterritorial and a sovereign US base.
The talks are at the exploratory stage and no decisions have been taken, officials stressed. US officials played down talk of central European participation in the missile shield. But the confidential nature of the negotiations, being led on the US side by John Bolton, the hardline under-secretary of state for arms control, has angered senior defence officials in the region who have been kept in the dark.
Milos Titz, deputy chairman of the Czech parliament’s defence and security committee, learned of the talks last week and immediately called the defence minister, Miroslav Kostelka, to demand an explanation. According to the Czech web newspaper, Britske Listy, Mr Kostelka conceded to Mr Titz that the talks were going ahead and promised to supply details to the committee this week.
The committee is to hold an extraordinary session today, apparently to demand more information on the issue from the government.
According to the Washington-based thinktank, the Arms Control Association, the Pentagon has already requested modest funding for preliminary studies on a third missile interceptor site based in Europe.
Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defence Agency (MDA), told Congress this year of plans to construct a missile shield base abroad. “We are preparing to move forward when appropriate to build a third [ground-based interceptor] site at a location outside the United States,” he said.
In addition to Poland and the Czech Republic, the Washington thinktank reported last week that the US was also talking to Hungary about possible involvement in the missile shield which is yet to be properly tested and which many experts believe is unworkable. Sources in Warsaw said the US was also talking to Romania and Bulgaria. Last week, the Australian government signed a 25-year pact with the US on cooperating in the missile shield programme.
The two interceptor sites being built in Alaska and California are primarily to insure against potential ballistic missile attack on the US by North Korea. The possible European site is being widely seen as a shield against missiles from the Middle East, notably Syria or Iran.
But many believe that any such facility in Poland would be concerned mainly and in the long term with Russia. Such concerns appear to be reflected in Polish government thinking.
While the Poles were still waiting for specific proposals from the Americans, said Mr Majewski, they were also insisting that any Polish participation had to be squared first with Moscow for fear of creating military tension in the region.
“The Americans are working quite hard on this,” he said. “They need to clear the path with the Russians and reach a consensus before we will move ahead.”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1260037,00.html

Bush Defends Reasons for War
The president, following a Senate report critical of intelligence, says the U.S. is safer and that perceived threats will keep being targeted.
By Maura Reynolds
Times Staff Writer

July 13, 2004

OAK RIDGE, Tenn. — President Bush insisted Monday that his decision to wage war against Iraq was justified because it had removed a threat to the nation’s security, and said the United States would continue to confront terrorism even when the dangers had not fully developed.

Speaking at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory, Bush made his most elaborate comments on Iraq since the release Friday of a scathing bipartisan report by the Senate Intelligence Committee, which said the United States had gone to war on the basis of flawed intelligence.

The report, which quickly became fodder for new criticisms of the administration by Bush’s election opponents, said warnings about Iraq’s illicit weapons were largely unfounded. It said the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies had made a series of sweeping errors that, among other things, led to incorrect conclusions that Iraq had stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons and was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program.

But Bush continued to raise the prospect that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had he not been forced from power, would have posed a grave threat.

“Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, we were right to go into Iraq,” the president said in an address at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. “We removed a declared enemy of America who had the capability of producing weapons of mass murder and could have passed that capability to terrorists bent on acquiring them.”

Eight times during the 32-minute speech, Bush said America was safer because of his efforts to attack terrorists and control nuclear bomb-making technology.

The president also suggested that the United States remained committed to its policy of preemptive attacks — though he did not use those words — against terrorists and the nations that harbored them. “America is also taking a new approach in the world,” he said. “We’re determined to challenge new threats, not ignore them or simply wait for future tragedy.”

Later he added: “America must remember the lessons of Sept. 11. We must confront serious dangers before they fully materialize.”

The Senate committee report has prompted broad criticisms of U.S. intelligence services, particularly the CIA. Many considered it a key reason for the departure of longtime CIA Director George J. Tenet, who announced his resignation before the findings became public and who left office Sunday.

But in visiting Oak Ridge, a top-secret nuclear weapons manufacturing and storage facility, Bush sought to underscore what he said were successes by the intelligence community.

Calling them “sobering evidence of a great danger,” the president viewed centrifuges and other equipment released by Libya after it agreed to give up its nuclear weapons program late last year. He said Libya abandoned its nuclear ambitions only after the CIA helped break up a network of nuclear plans and equipment suppliers operated by a Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan.

“Breaking this proliferation network was possible because of the outstanding work done by the CIA,” Bush said. “Dedicated intelligence officers were tireless in obtaining vital information, sometimes at great personal risk. Our intelligence services do an essential job for America.”

Bush also spoke directly about the Senate report, using language more muted than have CIA critics. “The Senate Intelligence Committee has identified some shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities,” he said. “The committee’s report will help us in the work of reform.”

Bush said the nation needed more intelligence agents around the world and better coordination among agencies. He did not discuss whom he might choose to replace Tenant.

Bush spoke in front of a backdrop reading “Protecting America,” in line with his central campaign theme that America is “safer, stronger, better” than before he took office.

Polls show that support for the president’s decision to go to war against Iraq has waned significantly since last year. Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry hopes to capitalize on the increased lack of support.

The Massachusetts senator and other Democrats say that countries with more advanced weapons capabilities, such as North Korea and Iran, posed a greater threat to the U.S. than did Iraq, and that the danger of terrorism has increased, not decreased, since the war began.

On a campaign stop in Boston, Kerry responded to the speech by arguing that during Bush’s presidency, a U.S. program to secure nuclear materials from other nations has stored fewer materials, especially those originating in the former Soviet Union, than it did before the Sept. 11 attacks.

“The facts speak for themselves,” Kerry added. “North Korea is more dangerous today than it was when this administration came into power. I have proposed a major new initiative to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism — to reduce nuclear materials falling into the hands of our terrorists.”

Kerry also promised to appoint a national director of intelligence “who will change our ability to be able to gather intelligence that is real, to be accountable, and to make America safe.”

“That’s what Americans want,” Kerry said. “Real results, not speeches.”

Kerry has argued that Bush’s policies have eroded the goodwill of U.S. allies. In an apparent answer to that critique, Bush on Monday highlighted the cooperation of other countries in his anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation policies.

He said 60 nations were taking part in counter-proliferation programs he had promoted, and that 40 nations were aiding in Afghanistan and 30 in Iraq.

Democrats argue that Libya’s decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons capability was set in motion by diplomacy begun in the 1990s by European allies, especially Great Britain.

Bush acknowledged that diplomacy played a central role in Libya’s decision, but also said his own policies were critical. In the past, Bush has argued that the decision to wage war on Iraq last spring sent an unmistakable message to Libya about the consequences of seeking weapons of mass destruction.

“Every potential adversary now knows that terrorism and proliferation carry serious consequences, and that the wise course is to abandon those pursuits,” Bush said Monday.

The president’s departure from McGhee Tyson Air National Guard Base in Knoxville was complicated slightly by a mechanical problem with the plane he used to fly to Tennessee. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said a routine check of the aircraft — a 747 version of Air Force One — discovered that a flap on the left wing had come off its track.

As a precaution, the president returned to Washington on a 757 version of Air Force One.

McClellan said the flap problem was not considered serious and that the 747 was expected to return to Andrews Air Force Base later in the day.

It was the second time this month that a mechanical problem grounded one of the aircraft that carry the “Air Force One” designation when the president is aboard. On July 4, a problem with an engine on the left wing led to a last-minute substitution of an aircraft.

Times staff writer Maria L. La Ganga in Boston contributed to this report.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-bush13jul13,1,4439600,print.story

EDITORIAL
Kerry-Edwards Stonewall

July 13, 2004

If not murder, John F. Kerry and John Edwards have accused President Bush of something close to criminally negligent homicide in Iraq. “They were wrong and soldiers died because they were wrong,” Kerry said of the Bush administration over the weekend.

This is strong language, but not unjustified. Last week’s Senate Intelligence Committee report adds to the pile of studies and reportage that has undermined the key reasons Bush gave for going to war: Saddam Hussein’s imperial designs, links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction and so on.

The trouble is, both Sens. Kerry and Edwards voted yes on the resolution authorizing the war in Iraq. And now they refuse to say whether they would have supported the resolution if they had known what they know today. Both say they can’t be bothered with “hypothetical questions.”

But whether it is a hypothetical question depends on how you phrase it. Do they regret these votes? Were their votes a mistake? These are not hypothetical questions. And they are questions the Democratic candidates for president and vice president cannot duck if they wish to attack Bush on Iraq in such morally charged language.

After all, the issue raised by the Senate Intelligence Committee report is not whether the Bush administration bungled the prosecution of the war, or whether there should have been greater international cooperation, or whether the challenges of occupying and rebuilding the country were grossly underestimated. When Kerry says “they were wrong,” he is referring to the administration’s basic case for going to war. Kerry supported that decision. So did Edwards. Were they wrong? If they won’t answer that question, they have no moral standing to criticize Bush.

Reluctance to answer the question is understandable. If they say they stand by their pro-war votes, this makes nonsense of their criticisms of Bush. If they say they were misled or duped by the administration, they look dopey and weak. Many of their Democratic Senate colleagues were skeptical of the administration’s evidence even at the time. If Kerry and Edwards tell the probable truth — that they were deeply dubious about the war but afraid to vote no in the post-9/11 atmosphere and be tarred as lily-livered liberals — they would win raves from editorial writers for their frankness and courage. And they could stop dreaming of oval offices.

Kerry and Edwards are in a bind. But it is a bind of their own making. The great pity will be if this bind leads the Democratic candidates to back off from their harsh, and largely justified, criticism of Bush. The Democrats could lose a valuable issue, and possibly even the election, because the Democratic candidates were too clever for their own good.

In the past, Kerry has dodged the question of his pro-war vote by saying that he intended to give Bush negotiating leverage and to encourage multilateral action, not to endorse a unilateral American invasion of Iraq. Unfortunately, what he may have intended is not what he voted for. Furthermore, a vote in favor of the war resolution was unavoidably a statement that the various complaints against Hussein did justify going to war against him, if all else failed, whatever caveats and escape hatches were in any individual senator’s head.

Kerry and Edwards would like to fudge the issue by conflating it with questions about how the war was prosecuted. Or they say that what matters is where we go from here. It is true that “what now?” is the important policy question. But that doesn’t make it the only question. How we got here affects how we get out. And even if it had no practical relevance to our future Iraq policy, hearing how Kerry and Edwards explain their votes to authorize a war they now regard as disastrous would be helpful in assessing their character and judgment.

Their continued refusal to explain would be even more helpful, unfortunately.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-kerry13jul13,1,576445,print.story

ENTRETIEN
Zbigniew Brzezinski passe au crible la diplomatie de Jacques Chirac
LE MONDE | 12.07.04 | 13h46
A l’occasion des trente ans du Centre d’analyse et de prévision du Quai d’Orsay, l’ancien conseiller de Jimmy Carter, qui fait autorité en matière de politique étrangère, revient sur les relations entre la France et les Etats-Unis et sur la politique du président de la République.
Washington de notre correspondant
Ancien conseiller du président Jimmy Carter pour la sécurité nationale, Zbigniew Brzezinski est l’un des dirigeants du Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales (CSIS), grand institut politique de Washington. Il est, aussi, professeur de relations internationales à l’université John Hopkins. Né en Pologne, âgé de 76 ans, M. Brzezinski fait autorité, à Washington, sur les questions de politique étrangère. Démocrate, il s’oppose aux néoconservateurs, courant républicain influent dans le gouvernement de George Bush. La version française de son dernier livre, Le Vrai Choix, sous-titré L’Amérique et le reste du monde, vient de paraître aux éditions Odile Jacob.
La politique étrangère de Jacques Chirac se caractérise-t-elle par de fortes orientations, et lesquelles ?
La France est une nation très fière, dotée d’une conscience historique profonde et de grandes ambitions nationales. Chirac reflète ces caractéristiques, avec une détermination considérable, sinon avec une subtilité excessive. Fondamentalement, la France aimerait un monde dans lequel sa parole aurait un écho global, à travers une projection européenne. La plupart des Français comprennent que, réduite à elle-même, la France est, essentiellement, une puissance moyenne. Mais, si la puissance potentielle de l’Europe peut être mise en œuvre, alors la France accédera au rôle mondial auquel, clairement, elle aspire, et je pense que Chirac reflète cette vision.
Que reste-t-il, selon vous, de l’héritage de De Gaulle ?
On doit reconnaître deux aspects très propres à de Gaulle dans la façon dont il a façonné la politique française. Le premier est son adhésion personnelle, intense, aiguë, à l’idée de la France comme puissance mondiale. Le second est son ressentiment devant le déclin de l’influence de la France et l’essor de l’influence anglo-américaine. Il me semble que ces deux impulsions ne sont plus aussi fortes aujourd’hui.
Du point de vue de cet héritage gaullien, voyez-vous une différence entre Mitterrand et Chirac ?
Probablement plus dans le style que dans la substance. Mais, dans les relations interpersonnelles, le style, quelquefois, devient la substance. Le genre d’animosité qui a émergé, dans les relations franco-américaines, au cours des trois dernières années, est aussi, dans une certaine mesure, lié aux personnalités, et cela - je regrette de devoir l’ajouter - des deux côtés de l’Atlantique.
Chirac a fait plusieurs tentatives, depuis 1995, pour normaliser la relation entre la France et les Etats-Unis, particulièrement dans le cadre de l’OTAN. Ont-elles été perçues en Amérique ? Pourquoi ont-elles échoué ?
Il faut tenir compte du ressentiment légué par ce qui s’est passé quand l’OTAN a été expulsée de France -en 1966-, par la rhétorique employée alors. On ne mesure peut-être pas tout à fait, à Paris, les cicatrices laissées par cet épisode.
Au-delà de cette donnée, on discerne, vu d’ici, deux schémas de comportement différents, du côté français, au sujet de l’OTAN. D’un côté, il y a les forces armées françaises, qui sont considérées par nous et, particulièrement, par nos militaires, comme de premier ordre, très professionnelles, de très bons camarades de combat, des soldats vraiment bons, des gens sur lesquels on peut compter. Les militaires français sont vus comme très conscients de l’utilité de l’OTAN.
D’un autre côté, il y a ce qu’on pourrait appeler la mentalité “Quai d’Orsay” ou, peut-être, “Elysée”, qui consiste à faire obstacle, presque automatiquement, à toute initiative venant des Etats-Unis. C’est presque un réflexe conditionnel, qui affecte le climat politique, notamment les délibérations de l’OTAN.
Comment comprenez-vous le fait que la France ait accepté l’engagement de l’OTAN en Afghanistan - et s’y soit engagée elle-même -, mais refusé que l’Organisation atlantique soit présente en Irak ?
Je pense que la distinction entre l’Afghanistan et l’Irak correspond au désaccord fondamental entre la France et les Etats-Unis sur la façon de réagir au 11 Septembre (2001). Aller en Afghanistan, c’était aller à la source des attentats, dans un contexte de solidarité. Aller en Irak, c’était, de fait, étendre l’amplitude territoriale de la guerre contre le terrorisme, avec, probablement, des conséquences négatives et sur la base d’une décision américaine unilatérale.
Pensez-vous que Chirac est allé trop loin quand la France a agi, en mars 2003, pour empêcher les Etats-Unis d’obtenir une majorité, au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, en faveur de l’emploi de la force contre Saddam Hussein ?
C’était une grave erreur de calcul politique. J’ai critiqué l’unilatéralisme de Bush et plaidé pour davantage de patience et d’internationalisme dans le traitement du problème irakien. Mais j’ai pensé, aussi, qu’au moment critique il était vain et contre-productif, pour la France, d’annoncer qu’elle opposerait son veto à une résolution du Conseil de sécurité, à laquelle l’Amérique tenait beaucoup. C’était une attitude excessivement antagonistique.
Chirac a-t-il réussi à placer la France en position de défenseur des victimes de la mondialisation, face à une Amérique qui se bornerait à en profiter de façon égoïste ?
Je pense que si la perception des Etats-Unis est négative, dans les pays pauvres, et si la France y est mieux considérée, ce n’est pas tant à cause de la façon dont Chirac a dirigé la politique française qu’à cause d’une réaction mondialement négative aux politiques menées par Bush depuis le 11 Septembre. L’Irak et, plus généralement, le Proche-Orient se sont ajoutés au rejet du protocole de Kyoto, à celui de la Cour pénale internationale, etc. Par ricochet, cela sert l’image de ceux qui critiquent l’Amérique, parmi lesquels la France est au premier rang.
Que pensez-vous de l’idée d’un monde “multipolaire”? Est-ce un nom de code pour l’anti-américanisme ?
C’est le nom de code de l’affrontement politique pour l’influence. Cela se ramène à deux propositions. Aux yeux des Américains, les Européens devraient partager davantage les efforts entrepris pour créer de la stabilité dans le monde. Aux yeux des Européens, les Américains devraient partager davantage la prise de décision. En réalité, nous avons besoin de partager le fardeau et les décisions.
Bill Clinton dit : “Nous devons faire en sorte que le monde de demain, dans lequel l’Amérique ne jouira plus d’une supériorité écrasante, soit aussi confortable, pour nous, que celui d’aujourd’hui.” Etes-vous d’accord ?
C’est ce que nous pensons, pour la plupart, nous qui ne sommes pas d’accord avec Bush. Quelle sera la hiérarchie probable de la puissance en 2025 ? Il me paraît honnête de dire que, tout au sommet, il y aura toujours les Etats-Unis. Pas très loin derrière, il y aura l’Europe, si elle progresse sur la voie de son unification politique et si elle acquiert un certain degré de capacité militaire. A la troisième place, il y aura la Chine, le Japon à la quatrième et, à la cinquième, l’Inde.
Ce sera un dispositif beaucoup plus complexe que celui d’aujourd’hui, avec une seule superpuissance mondiale et un énorme écart entre le numéro 1 et le numéro 2. L’Europe n’existe pas, et je dirais, avec beaucoup d’hésitation, que le numéro 2, du point de vue de l’influence et du rôle mondial, est toujours, probablement, la Grande-Bretagne. Au troisième rang, je mettrais l’Allemagne, surtout quand elle agit de concert avec la France.
Propos recueillis par Patrick Jarreau
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 13.07.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3222,36-372329,0.html

William Pfaff: Europe should take its own Mideast stand
William Pfaff IHT Monday, July 12, 2004
Last week six senior NATO officials flew from Naples to Baghdad in response to the request from Iraq’s interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization help his country. The delegation’s principal meetings, however, were actually with an American general, David Petraeus, head of the U.S. mission training Iraqi security forces.

The mission was authorized by the NATO summit in Istanbul in early July, when President George W. Bush demanded that the allies support the new Iraq government. There was only grudging and partial consent by the allies, the objectors led by the French. The reasons for this disagreement need examination.

It rested on crucial differences of opinion on the future of the expanded NATO alliance, on Iraq’s future and on the emerging foreign policy and strategic position of the European Union itself, now that the EU has a strategic identity that is supposed to be complementary but is also potentially a rival to that of NATO.

At its simplest, the disagreement is also provoked by hostility to Bush administration policies. Currently, the key difference is between American and European approaches to the Middle East. The proclaimed American program - now on hold, because of the Iraq insurgency - is to replace “axis of evil” governments in the Middle East with U.S.-sponsored Muslim democracies. The Europeans can appreciate the ambition, but they doubt its feasibility, appropriateness and the methods the United States is using. They are, in principle, opposed to destructive actions rationalized by the ideological and utopian confidence that destruction will produce constructive results. Iraq gives them no reason to change this opinion.

They particularly doubt a U.S. policy that gives virtually unqualified support to the Sharon government in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, a position apparently shared by the Democratic presidential challenger, John Kerry. This position is not endorsed by any of the European members of NATO, who are nominally committed to the “Quartet” policy, now seemingly abandoned by Washington. America’s diplomatic priority for months has been to get NATO involved in Iraq, since this would identify the alliance and the European allies with American policy. The U.S. request to NATO is to help Washington “democratize” Iraq and “defeat terrorism.”

Originally Washington wanted NATO combat troops in Iraq to ease the pressure on U.S. forces, but that proved impossible. Now it wants - although it may not get - NATO training for the Iraq interim government’s security forces. It wants enough NATO involvement to lift from the United States the onus of unilateral invasion and occupation of Iraq, and sole responsibility for the currently chaotic consequences for Iraq.

A year ago, the effort to identify the intervention as conducted by “coalition forces” was meant to associate the international community with U.S. policy. But participation by the faithful Blair government, and by European forces from NATO - Poland, Italy and Spain - was not enough to offset popular hostility in Europe to an invasion conducted without a U.N. Security Council mandate. In no European NATO country has there ever been majority popular approval of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

There have been various degrees of government approval from Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Denmark and the Netherlands, based on trans-Atlantic loyalties. Spain since has withdrawn, and most of the others, including the Poles, now have serious reservations about what is going on. Few want to double their stake in Iraq by means of a new NATO commitment.

Today the insurrection is all but out of hand, and Washington is in something of a panic. It wants companions in misery, even if it no longer can see where events will take it after the planned Iraqi national vote next January - or even if the interim government will last long enough to hold that election.

Beyond Iraq, the most important factor in the situation now is the reaction in Islamic and developing-country opinion to what the Bush administration has done. A further commitment by NATO to America’s support could turn this into a conviction that the struggle Washington began is really “the West against the rest,” and that would be a disaster.

The United States itself needs to be rescued from this crisis. Possibly a new U.S. administration can do it. That is what most Europeans are counting on, but they are placing what could prove misplaced confidence in John Kerry - and even in his election.

The European allies have an obligation to themselves, to the Muslim world and indeed to their ally the United States to stop the present slide toward what would amount to a war of societies. To do that it is essential that they do not give more support to current U.S. policies concerning Iraq and Israel-Palestine, and that they maintain an independent approach to the Islamic world. They must demonstrate that western political civilization is plural and open, not a monolith.

Tribune Media Services International

http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=528857.html

Les intellectuels américains sont desespérés et se tournent vers leurs “vieux amis”.
Pensant proposer des concessions acceptables, s’il était jamais en leur pouvoir d’influer sur le cours des choses, ils lancent l’idée d’un “new-deal” transatlantique.
Il est dommage de constater que ceux qui sont censés être des spécialistes de l’Europe ne réalisent pas que celle-ci considère au mieux l’Amérique comme le vecteur d’une dangereuse idéologie, et au pire, comme un corps malade, une cause perdue. Cet appel ne sera donc entendu que par les patriotes du grand-large ou les adeptes des correspondances Mars-Vénus.

On serait cependant tenté de répondre à ce bon monsieur P.H Gordon, qu’un des seuls gestes significatifs que lui et ses amis scribouillards pourraient faire, serait de mettre sous observation le réseau de “madrassas” américaines réfléchissantes et communiquantes qui pourrissent les relations Europe-Etats-Unis ... on n’ose plus dire transatlantiques.

On notera quand même avec amusement l’emploi désormais rituel du terme “american leadership” par ce spécialiste qui propose un “new deal” plus juste et plus modeste.

———————-

Letter to Europe

Prospect, July 2004

Philip H. Gordon, Director, Center on the United States and Europe

(Introduction:)

Dear Friends. How did it come to this? I cannot remember a time when the gulf between Europeans and Americans was so wide. For the past couple of years, I have argued that the Iraq crisis was a sort of “perfect storm” unlikely to be repeated, and that many of the recent tensions resulted from the personalities and shortcomings of key actors on both sides. The transatlantic alliance has overcome many crises before, and given our common interests and values and the enormous challenges we face, I have beenconfident that we could also overcome this latest spat.

Now I just don’t know any more. After a series of increasingly depressing trips to Europe, even my optimism is being tested. I do know this: if we don’t find a new way to deal with each other soon, the damage to the most successful alliance in history could become permanent. We could be in the process of creating a new world order in which the very concept of the “west” will no longer exist.

I am not saying that Europe and America will end up in a military stand-off like that between east and west during the cold war. But if current trends are not reversed, you can be sure we will see growing domestic pressure on both sides for confrontation rather than co-operation. This will lead to the effective end of Nato, and political rivalry in the middle east, Africa and Asia. Europeans would face an America that no longer felt an interest in—and might actively seek to undermine—the united, prosperous Europe that Washington has supported for 60 years. And Americans would find themselves dealing with monumental global challenges not only without the support of their most capable potential partners, but perhaps in the face of their opposition. Britain would finally be forced to choose between two antagonistic camps.

... / ...

————————-

Article complet:
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gordon/20040701.pdf

Finalement, tout compte fait, les insurgés irakiens seraient nettement plus nombreux que ce que l’on disait, et n’auraient pas de liens particuliers avec Al Quaeda. Et il se pourrait bien qu’ils soient extrêmement difficiles à battre…. Mais les militaires américains qui sontsur le terrain semblent avoir bien du mal à faire passer ce constat, tant est puissant le virtualisme en vigueur à Wahington.

Dépèche d’Associated Press reprise par Yahoo!

“AP: Iraq Insurgency Larger Than Thought
Fri Jul 9, 6:54 AM ET
By JIM KRANE, Associated Press Writer
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Contrary to U.S. government claims, the insurgency in Iraq (news - web sites) is led by well-armed Sunnis angry about losing power, not foreign fighters, and is far larger than previously thought, American military officials say.
The officials told The Associated Press the guerrillas can call on loyalists to boost their forces to as high as 20,000 and have enough popular support among nationalist Iraqis angered by the presence of U.S. troops that they cannot be militarily defeated.

That number is far larger than the 5,000 guerrillas previously thought to be at the insurgency’s core. And some insurgents are highly specialized — one Baghdad cell, for instance, has two leaders, one assassin, and two groups of bomb-makers.

Although U.S. military analysts disagree over the exact size, the insurgency is believed to include dozens of regional cells, often led by tribal sheiks and inspired by Sunni Muslim imams.

The developing intelligence picture of the insurgency contrasts with the commonly stated view in the Bush administration that the fighting is fueled by foreign warriors intent on creating an Islamic state.

“We’re not at the forefront of a jihadist war here,” said a U.S. military official in Baghdad, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The military official, who has logged thousands of miles driving around Iraq to meet with insurgents or their representatives, said a skillful Iraqi government could co-opt some of the guerrillas and reconcile with the leaders instead of fighting them.

“I generally like a lot of these guys,” he said. “We know who the key people are in all the different cities, and generally how they operate. The problem is getting actionable information so you can either attack them, arrest them or engage them.”

Even as Iraqi leaders wrangle over the contentious issue of offering a broad amnesty to guerrilla fighters, the new Iraqi military and intelligence corps have begun gathering and sharing information on the insurgents with the U.S. military, providing a sharper picture of a complex insurgency.

“Nobody knows about Iraqis and all the subtleties in culture, appearance, religion and so forth better than Iraqis themselves,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Daniel Baggio, a military spokesman at Multinational Corps headquarters in Baghdad. “We’re very optimistic about the Iraqis’ use of their own human intelligence to help root out these insurgents.”

The intelligence boost has allowed American pilots to bomb suspected insurgent safe houses over the past two weeks, with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi saying Iraqis supplied information for at least one of those airstrikes. But the better view of the insurgency also contradicts much of the popular wisdom about it.

Estimates of the insurgents’ manpower tend to be too low. Last week, a former coalition official said 4,000 to 5,000 Baathists form the core of the insurgency, with other attacks committed by a couple hundred supporters of Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and hundreds of other foreign fighters.

Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the figure of 5,000 insurgents “was never more than a wag and is now clearly ridiculous.”

“Part-timers are difficult to count, but almost all insurgent movements depend on cadres that are part-time and that can blend back into the population,” he said.

U.S. military analysts disagree over the size of the insurgency, with estimates running as high as 20,000 fighters when part-timers are added.

Ahmed Hashim, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, said the higher numbers squared with his findings in a study of the insurgency completed in Iraq.

One hint that the number is larger is the sheer volume of suspected insurgents — 22,000 — who have cycled through U.S.-run prisons. Most have been released. And in April alone, U.S. forces killed as many as 4,000 people, the military official said, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militiamen fighting under the banner of a radical cleric.

There has been no letup in attacks. On Thursday, insurgents detonated a car bomb and then attacked a military headquarters in Samarra, a center of resistance in the Sunni Triangle 60 miles north of the capital, killing five U.S. soldiers and one Iraqi guardsman.

Guerrilla leaders come from various corners of Saddam’s Baath Party, including lawyers’ groups, prominent families and especially from his Military Bureau, an internal security arm used to purge enemies. They’ve formed dozens of cells.

U.S. military documents obtained by AP show a guerrilla band mounting attacks in Baghdad that consists of two leaders, four sub-leaders and 30 members, broken down by activity. There is a pair of financiers, two cells of car bomb-builders, an assassin, separate teams launching mortar and rocket attacks, and others handling roadside bombs and ambushes.

Most of the insurgents are fighting for a bigger role in a secular society, not a Taliban-like Islamic state, the military official said. Almost all the guerrillas are Iraqis, even those launching some of the devastating car bombings normally blamed on foreigners — usually al-Zarqawi.

The official said many car bombings bore the “tradecraft” of Saddam’s former secret police and were aimed at intimidating Iraq’s new security services.

Many in the U.S. intelligence community have been making similar points, but have encountered political opposition from the Bush administration, a State Department official in Washington said, also speaking on condition of anonymity.

Civilian analysts generally agreed, saying U.S. and Iraqi officials have long overemphasized the roles of foreign fighters and Muslim extremists.

Such positions support the Bush administration’s view that the insurgency is linked to the war on terror. A closer examination paints most insurgents as secular Iraqis angry at the presence of U.S. and other foreign troops.

“Too much U.S. analysis is fixated on terms like ‘jihadist,’ just as it almost mindlessly tries to tie everything to (Osama) bin Laden,” Cordesman said. “Every public opinion poll in Iraq ... supports the nationalist character of what is happening.”

Many guerrillas are motivated by Islam in the same way religion motivates American soldiers, who also tend to pray more when they’re at war, the U.S. military official said.

He said he met Tuesday with four tribal sheiks from Ramadi who “made very clear” that they had no desire for an Islamic state, even though mosques are used as insurgent sanctuaries and funding centers.

“‘We’re not a bunch of Talibans,’” he paraphrased the sheiks as saying.

At the orders of Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander of Mideast operations, Army analysts looked closely for evidence that Iraq’s insurgency was adopting extreme Islamist goals, the official said. Analysts learned that ridding Iraq of U.S. troops was the motivator for most insurgents, not the formation of an Islamic state.

The officer said Iraq’s insurgents have a big advantage over guerrillas elsewhere: plenty of arms, money, and training. Iraq’s lack of a national identity card system — and guerrillas’ refusal to plan attacks by easily intercepted telephone calls — makes them difficult to track.

“They have learned a great deal over the last year, and with far more continuity than the rotating U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces,” Cordesman said of the guerrillas. “They have learned to react very quickly and in ways our sensors and standard tactics cannot easily deal with.””

Pentagon Outlines Troop Rotation Plan for Iraq

New units, to be deployed over several months, will include more reservists. The Army denies it is being stretched too thin.

By Esther Schrader
Times Staff Writer

July 8, 2004

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is planning for the “worst-case” scenario in Iraq over the next year, preparing to send in more armored units to battle an unrelenting insurgency, a senior Army official told Congress on Wednesday.

Defense officials laid out a detailed roadmap of how they plan to deploy troops over the next year, replacing 140,000 soldiers and Marines now in Iraq with 135,000 troops being sent from bases in the U.S. and Europe in a third rotation of forces starting in November and lasting four months.

The proportion of reservists in Iraq will increase — from 39% to 42% of U.S. forces — as commanders try to bolster critical specialties where they are short and where civilian contractors can no longer be used because of the dangers. Other gaps will be plugged with the call-up of more than 5,600 recent military retirees.

Meanwhile, commanders are looking for ways to fill thousands of openings in military intelligence operations. Overall, of troops going to Iraq beginning this fall, a majority — 55% — will be serving a second time.

Taken together, the plans presented to members of the House Armed Services Committee portrayed a military scrambling to meet future troop needs for the conflict in Iraq and confronting the recurring criticism that they are trying to do too much with too little.

Gen. Richard A. Cody, the Army’s new deputy chief of staff, and other defense officials testified that the Army did not want or need a permanent troop increase, saying they could make do with the soldiers they have.

Lawmakers continued to question that assessment, with Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, the committee’s ranking Democrat, calling the Pentagon’s announcement last week that it is calling up 5,600 members of the Individual Ready Reserve of military retirees a sign that the Pentagon is “wearing our people out.” The troops, Skelton said, “are not pawns on a chessboard. They are our treasure.”

Rep. John Kline (R-Minn.) called the number of reservists fighting in Iraq “just too high,” saying employers of called-up reservists had complained to members of Congress.

But Pentagon officials defended the use of the ready reserve, a pool of roughly 118,000 former soldiers who are not members of a specific reserve unit and do not train regularly, yet who have unexpired obligations to complete their military service. Ready reserve soldiers have not been called up in significant numbers since 1990, amid preparations for the Persian Gulf War.

“The fact that its use is rare does not mean that it is inappropriate,” David S.C. Chu, undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, told the committee.

Chu said that of the 5,674 Individual Ready Reserve members mobilized to deploy to Iraq, he expected about 4,000 would go. He said the Pentagon opted to mobilize more troops than it needs because of the likelihood that some of the former service personnel, who had not been undergoing training since they left the service, would not be prepared for combat.

The military officials acknowledged that the Army had to scramble to “backfill” in some areas where it is short of qualified people.

“Our entire force,” Cody testified, “is doing missions other than what we designed them for.”

The most acute shortages, he said, are in military intelligence units, where Army planners calculate they are short 9,000 specialists to man the Army’s new Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition units, as well as its new unmanned aerial vehicles.

“We’re looking for some relief there,” Cody said.

The increasing dangers of being in Iraq have also made it more difficult for Army planners to hire contract workers to drive trucks and repair vehicles, Cody said, forcing the Army to reach deeper into the pool of reservists and individual ready reservists.

He said the planned troop rotation was a “worst-case plan” that required more work from combat service support troops, such as heavy-equipment drivers and engineering units.

“We had to keep more engineer units over there because of the roads as well as some of the bridges, and we had to keep more truck drivers over there because the level of violence was such you couldn’t get the civilian contractors to do some of that stuff,” Cody said.

That, “quite frankly, is what drove us to have to go back to more transportation units … that we had not planned on; more engineer units the second time that we hadn’t planned on” in the past several months, Cody said.

With the insurgency making duty in Iraq more dangerous for U.S. troops, Pentagon planners have chosen to outfit the force rotating into the conflict with 200 additional tanks, more than 6,000 Humvees specially equipped with armor plating, and dozens more Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

“The divisions going in will be more lethal,” Cody said.

The 3rd Infantry Division, for example, which fought to take Baghdad and is slated to begin returning to Iraq in November, will be outfitted this time with 48 Apache helicopters, up from 18 the first time around, along with 38 Black Hawk and 12 Chinook helicopters.

Also slated to join the fight in Iraq is the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade; two Marine expeditionary units; a Marine expeditionary force; the Army’s 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, outfitted with new Stryker wheeled vehicles; the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment; and several National Guard combat brigades, including the 42nd Infantry Division from New York, the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi and the 29th Brigade from Hawaii.

*

Troop rotation

Starting in November, 135,000 troops will be sent to Iraq from bases in the United States and Europe, replacing 140,000 soldiers and Marines in Iraq.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-troops8jul08,1,6303323.story?coll=la-headlines-nation

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Army to call up 5,600 IRR Soldiers By Joe Burlas Army News Service July 01, 2004

WASHINGTON—The Army plans to order 5,600 Soldier in the Individual Ready Reserve to active duty for possible deployment with the next Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom rotations.Mailgrams notifying those Soldiers to expect mobilization orders within a week could hit their mailboxes as early as July 6, according to officials who announced the measure in Pentagon press briefing June 30. Those Soldiers called up will have 30 days from the date the orders were issued to take care of personal business before having to report to a mobilization site, officials said. The orders call for 18 months of active duty, but that could be extended for a total of 24 months if needed, they said.The IRR call-up does not impact retired Soldiers, contrary to several civilian media reports on the subject that appeared on television and newspapers June 29 and 30.“We’re dipping into an available manpower pool,” said Robert Smiley, principal assistant for Training, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. “This is just good personnel management.“The IRR primarily consists of Soldiers who have served their contracted time on active duty or in an Army Reserve Troop Program Unit, but still have a military service obligation to fulfill, said Col. Debra Cook, commander for Human Resources Command – St. Louis, the Reserve’s personnel management center.Congress mandates under Title 10 of the U.S. Code that all services have an IRR.Every Soldier, enlisted or commissioned, has an eight-year military service obligation when he or she joins the Army, Cook said. Often, that commitment is divided between active duty or a TPU assignment and the IRR.“You might have one Soldier sign up for four years on active duty, who then has a four-year IRR commitment, and another Soldier who signs up to serve with a Ready Reserve unit for six years and two years in the IRR—both have IRR commitments to meet their military service obligations,” Cook said. “The enlistment contract spells out exactly what the division is between how long they serve on active duty or a Ready Reserve unit and how long in the IRR.“This is not the first time the Army has used the IRR to fill its manpower needs. During the Gulf War, more than 20,000 IRR Soldiers were mobilized and deployed. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Army has called up more than 2,500 IRR Soldiers—the majority through IRR volunteers, though some have been involuntary call-ups.The main purpose of this IRR call-up is to fill personnel shortfalls in a number of Army Reserve and National Guard units that have been tagged to deploy overseas as part of the OIF 3 and OEF 6 rotations planned for late fall, Smiley said. Many of the personnel shortfalls are for Soldiers already assigned to the deploying units who are not deployable due to medical, family or legal issues, he said.The actual mobilization and deployment requirement is for about 4,400 Soldiers, but personnel officials expect to find some of the IRR Soldiers with similar medical, family and legal issues that may keep them from being deployable. Historically speaking, the Army needs to mobilize about 13 IRR Soldiers to get 10 deployable Soldiers, said Raymond Robinson, G1 chief of Operations.The called-up IRR Soldiers will spend about 30 days at a mobilization installation, getting checks to see if they are qualified for deployment, getting individual weapons qualification, conducting Common Task Testing and receiving training in a number of warrior tasks that reflect the realities of today’s operating environment, including how to recognize an improvised explosive devise and reacting to an ambush.Those who do not pass the readiness muster at the mobilization installation for reasons including anything from medical and legal reasons to physical challenges may be disqualified and sent home, Robinson said. Those who pass the muster will be sent on to military occupational specialty schools to get refresher training, normally lasting between two to four weeks. The final stop is joining the deploying unit at least 30 days before deployment for collective training as a unit.While the specific jobs the called-up Soldiers will fill are varied, Cook said the heaviest requirements include truck drivers, mechanics, logistics personnel and administrative specialists.“We will not deploy any Soldier who is not trained or ready,” said Bernard Oliphant, deputy for the Army Operations Center’s Mobilization Division, G3.As of June 22, the IRR contained slightly more than 111,000 Soldiers.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,usa1_070104.00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
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Action Alert: Army to Recall Thousands?

Digging deeper for help in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is recalling about 5,600 people. According to an Associated Press article, the Army is recalling to active duty about 5,600 people who recently left the service and still have a reserve obligation. “In a new sign of the strain the insurgency in Iraq has put on the U.S. military, Army officials said last week the involuntary callups will begin in July and run through December. It is the first sizable activation of the Individual Ready Reserve since the 1991 Gulf War, though several hundred people have voluntarily returned to service since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks.” To read the full Associated Press article, click here. Do you agree or disagree with this action? Let you representatives at the DoD know how you feel—your voice matters! Share your view on this issue. Send an email directly to your representatives now through our system. To read past letters to leaders concerning issues in the military, click here. To read more action alerts, click here.
http://www.military.com/MilitaryReport/0,12914,MR_Action_070504,00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
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Army Recalling Thousands Associated Press June 30, 2004

WASHINGTON - Digging deeper for help in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is recalling to active duty about 5,600 people who recently left the service and still have a reserve obligation. In a new sign of the strain the insurgency in Iraq has put on the U.S. military, Army officials said Tuesday the involuntary callups will begin in July and run through December. It is the first sizable activation of the Individual Ready Reserve since the 1991 Gulf War, though several hundred people have voluntarily returned to service since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. Unlike members of the National Guard and Reserve, individual reservists do not perform regularly scheduled training and receive no pay unless they are called up. The Army is targeting its recall at those who recently left the service and thus have the most up-to-date skills. “This was inevitable when it became clear that we would have to maintain significant combat forces in Iraq for a period of years,” said Dan Goure, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a think tank. The Army is pinpointing certain skills in short supply, like medical specialists, military police, engineers, transportation specialists and logistics experts. Those selected for recall will be given at least 30 days’ notice to report for training, an Army statement said. Vietnam veteran Chuck Luczynski said in an interview Tuesday that he fears his son, Matt, who is getting out of the Army after four years, will be called back to active duty as part of the individual reserves. The son returned home in March after a one-year tour in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, and he’s planning to start a computer programming business. “I think that’s on everybody’s mind right now, that they took their turn and they would hope everybody took a turn so that a few don’t carry the many,” said the elder Luczynski, of Omaha, Neb. The Army is so stretched for manpower that in April it broke a promise to some active-duty units, including the 1st Armored Division, that they would not have to serve more than 12 months in Iraq. It also has extended the tours of other units, including some in Afghanistan. “It is a reflection of the fact that the (active-duty) military is too small for the breadth of challenges we are facing,” Goure said. The men and women recalled from the Individual Ready Reserve will be assigned to Army Reserve and National Guard units that have been or soon will be mobilized for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, unless they successfully petition for exemption based on medical or other limitations. Members of Congress were notified Tuesday and a formal Army announced was scheduled for Wednesday. Those in the Individual Ready Reserve are former enlisted soldiers and officers who have some nonactive-duty military service obligation remaining, under terms they signed when they signed on but who chose not to fulfill it in the Guard or Reserve. The Pentagon had hoped to reduce its troop levels in Iraq to about 105,000 this spring, but because of increasingly effective and deadly resistance the level has risen to about 140,000. Military officials have said they may need to stay at that level for at least another year or two, a commitment of forces that could not be maintained by the active force alone. The Army frequently must integrate reservists with its active-duty forces, but it rarely has to reach into the Individual Ready Reserve. The Army has about 117,000 people in this category of reservist; the Navy has 64,000, the Marine Corps 58,000 and the Air Force 37,000. The military has relied heavily on National Guard and Reserve soldiers in Iraq, in part because some essential specialties like military police are found mainly in the reserves rather than the active-duty force and partly because the mission has required more troops than planned. Reserve troops make up at least one-third of the U.S. force in Iraq, and this month they have accounted for nearly half of all troops killed in combat. In January, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld authorized the Army to activate as many as 6,500 people from the Individual Ready Reserve, drawing on presidential authority granted in 2001. Not until May did the Army begin looking in detail at the available pool of people. At that point some Army recruiters caused a controversy when they contacted members of the Individual Ready Reserve and suggested they would wind up in Iraq unless they joined a Reserve or Guard unit. Some complained that they were being coerced to transfer into a Reserve unit.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_army_063004,00.html

——-Message d’origine——-
De : Marjorie Gibson [mailto:

]
Envoyé : mardi 6 juillet 2004 19:29
À : Undisclosed-Recipient:;
Objet : SUBMISSION FROM JOHN CHUCKMAN

July 6, 2004
A DEAFENING SILENCE OF MEANING
John Chuckman
Recently, John Kerry and his wife held a barbecue at the Pennsylvania White House. Never heard of the Pennsylvania White House? It’s actually the homestead of Kerry’s wife, a white-columned mansion on a tailored estate outside Pittsburgh built from the proceeds of a billion cans of spaghetti and bottles of ketchup. Kerry wants everyone to know he’s an ordinary guy so he’s holding barbecues these days instead of crystal-and-candlelight dinners. People who normally never would get past the front gate have now been allowed on the rolled greens to chomp hot dogs.
Those attending a down-home get-together recently were greeted with hay bales designed by a team of Neiman-Marcus window dressers; a custom-made silk flag, gigantic enough to use for hang-gliding, flapped over the mansion in breezes generated by rented Hollywood wind machines; a band subtly suggested the Marines Corps Band playing “Hail to the Chief”; and, as if in homage to Ronald Reagan, a rented soldier home from occupation-duty in Iraq led the crowd through a heart-rending Pledge of Allegiance. They may well have served jelly beans along with the tapioca pudding, but reports don’t tell us.
The new class of visitors to the estate was not allowed to enjoy the hot dogs without receiving a dose of inspiration from the campaign trail, almost the way poor men at a Salvation Army shelter get scripture between bites of doughnut. Kerry enjoined guests to leave the hallowed grounds “with the spirit in an uplifting sense that we’re going to change this country.” Yes, those were his very words, much as we might have received from that other source of constant inspiration, the President himself, down in Crawford, Texas, over some smoldering cows and cold root beer.
Guests apparently left with puzzled faces over what they were being asked, but they merely joined the swelling ranks of puzzled Americans who have attended Kerry’s rallies and speeches.
Kerry likes to say, “This is the most important election of our lifetime,” and his guests heard it again over dollops of tapioca in Dixie Cups. It’s his best line when he doesn’t muff it, although he never explains why the claim should be true. Its threadbare, re-tread quality begins to suggest Richard Nixon’s “It’s time for a change!” a line that got him elected in 1968 so he could vastly expand the pointless killing and destruction in Vietnam.
Everyone understands, though, that Kerry’s slogan is about “anyone but Bush,” exactly the kind of substitute for thinking that gave the world Bush in the first place. Anybody-but-Bush is about the only positive adjective you can apply to the candidacy of John Kerry.
If you want to read some indigestible stuff, finish whatever it is you’re eating and then go to John Kerry’s Town Hall Meeting Internet site. Other than a few slabs of party boilerplate, there is nothing there, absolutely nothing, to inspire Americans and others in the world about the future. On many of the site’s “on the issues” topics, when you go to subtopics, you find nothing of substance. The headlines themselves are the most encouraging words, and they do not even fairly describe what is contained under them. In several cases, there are statements that are positively depressing.
Here is Kerry’s summary statement on Iraq:
Winning the Peace in Iraq…A Strategy for Success
To establish security and move forward with the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, the President must show true leadership in going to the major powers to secure their support of Lakhdar Brahimi’s mission, the establishment of a high commissioner for governance and reconstruction, and the creation of a NATO mission for Iraq. These steps are critical to creating a stable Iraq with a representative government and secure in its borders. Meeting this objective is in the interests of NATO member states, Iraq’s neighbors and all members of the international community. True leadership means sharing authority and responsibility for Iraq with others who have an interest in Iraq’s success. Sharing responsibility is the only way to gain new military and financial commitments, allowing America to truly share the burden and the risk.
This is Kerry-speak for saying that NATO allies should pay part of the human and material cost for America’s mess in Iraq. Why? In case, Kerry hadn’t noticed, Bush has been trying to accomplish this very thing for some time, applying a good deal of nasty pressure to allies, but Iraq, as Bush was pointedly told recently by Europeans, has nothing whatever to do with NATO’s mandate.
I suspect the phrase “true leadership,” apart from being a totally unwarranted advertising claim about the Senator’s dreary career, means Kerry sees himself playing good cop in the old good cop-bad cop routine used by police to break down suspects, but friends and allies aren’t usually regarded as suspects.
Consider the words, “winning the peace.” At first glance, they suggest heroic purpose like that of World War Two, providing a gloss of worthiness to the utter human and material waste of Iraq. The words were undoubtedly selected also to suggest for some Americans, the Planet-of-the-Apes crowd, slogans like “winning in Vietnam.” The word “peace”
was selected with entirely another group of Americans in mind, mostly wishful thinkers and harmless dreamers.
If putting together the words “winning”
and “peace”
suggests to you George Orwell’s “war is peace,” you are not alone, particularly when you consider that Iraq already had peace and was a genuine threat to no one before the United States smashed it.
Tucked under the topic on Iraq at Kerry’s site is an item “Protecting Our Military Families in Times of War: A Military Family Bill of Rights.” Here’s an advertising pitch for tossing a tiny packet of sugar at each military voter, recalling, at one and the same time, scenes in World War Two films where GIs toss sticks of gum to hungry refugees and microphone reminders to shoppers for today’s special at Wal-Mart - all with a suitably sentimental nod to all the Jimmy Stewarts serving at spots like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo’s human dog cages. Well, a packet of sugar is better than nothing, because God knows Kerry’s view of foreign policy promises a future with plenty of the same duty.
We could analyze the rest of the stuff on Kerry’s site - all of it trying to make it appear he has something new to say and all of it about as helpful and clear as the fine print on a prescription-drug brochure - but it just isn’t worth the effort. I’ll only note further that Kerry had a featured item there about China, accusing Bush of letting Americans down about China. Please, Senator, say that we are not being promised another years-long chorus of American hectoring and carping about a proud but poor people working hard to earn their place in sun. Good God, what hypocrisy that was under Clinton.
It is important to remember that George Bush, while a top contender for title of Biggest Flop in American History, is largely a spent force. It is difficult to see what else he could possibly do to damage the planet. Once, not very long ago, his presidential Brain Trust, the neo-con Nazis, advocated mopping up Syria, Iran, and other places whose names they couldn’t even pronounce as soon as they finished up in Iraq. Well, things are not going to finish up any time soon in Iraq. America has spent herself silly trying to stabilize Iraq after de-stabilizing it.
There is a distasteful quality about Bush that people all over the world instinctively feel, and Bush’s efforts, we may all be thankful, will continue being hindered by that perception. Kerry has the advantage of being utterly boring instead of distasteful, but his ideas about the world are remarkably similar to Bush’s. If Americans elect Kerry, they will get a fresh, new Bush who may actually be able to leverage some of the world’s recent weariness and desperate desire for change to carry right on with more destructive stupidity.

U.S. Response to Insurgency Called a Failure
Some top Bush officials and military experts say the Pentagon has no coherent strategy. Little change is expected with Iraq’s new sovereignty.
By Mark Mazzetti
Times Staff Writer

July 6, 2004

WASHINGTON — Almost a year after acknowledging they were facing a well-armed guerrilla war in Iraq, the Pentagon and commanders in the Middle East are being criticized by some top Bush administration officials, military officers and defense experts who accuse the military of failing to develop a coherent, winning strategy against the insurgency.

Inadequate intelligence, poor assessments of enemy strength, testy relations with U.S. civilian authorities in Baghdad and an inconsistent application of force remain key problems many observers say the military must address before U.S. and Iraqi forces can quell the insurgents.

“It’s disappointing that we haven’t been able to have better insight into the command and control of the insurgents,” said one senior official of the now-dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority, recently returned from Baghdad and speaking on condition of anonymity. “And you’ve got to have that if you’re going to have effective military operations.”

It was July 16, 2003, when Army Gen. John Abizaid stood at a Pentagon podium during his first news conference as head of U.S. Central Command and declared — after weeks of Pentagon denials — that U.S. troops were fighting a “classic guerrilla-type war” in Iraq.

Now, after a year of violence and hundreds of U.S. combat deaths, some officials and experts are frustrated that a more effective counterinsurgency plan has not materialized and that the hand-over of power to an interim Iraqi government last week was unlikely to significantly improve the security situation.

“We’re going to have the same cast of characters in Washington and the same commander [Abizaid] in the field,” said Andrew Krepinevich of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, an expert on counterinsurgency warfare. “What gives you a sense of confidence we’re going to become a lot more competent at something we haven’t shown a great deal of competence at doing for a year?”

Some top American officials bristle at the criticism and say the U.S.-led coalition’s plan has been consistent from the beginning: to bring security to Iraq in preparation for an eventual hand-over to Iraqi forces.

“Our strategy is not complicated. It is to train Iraqis as quickly as we possibly can and as efficiently as we possibly can, and to set the conditions so they can take charge of their own security,” said a senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

And, the administration argues, U.S. forces handed a strategic defeat in April to both Shiite and Sunni Muslim insurgents, forcing them to lower their sights. Rather than confronting U.S. forces, those insurgents have turned to bombing Iraqi infrastructure and attempting to assassinate leaders of the new Iraqi government.

“They now cannot defeat us on the battlefield, so they are changing their tactics,” the official said.

Yet one of the biggest problems for U.S. military and intelligence officials remains the paucity of hard intelligence about the structure of the insurgency.

For example, when Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked recently during Senate testimony whether the Iraqi insurgency was being coordinated from a central hub, he responded: “The intelligence community, as far as I know, will not ... give you an answer, because they can’t give me an answer.”

Military experts point out that a counterinsurgency is the most difficult type of war to wage. With the exception of the successful British effort in Malaya in the 1950s, history is littered with examples of unsuccessful counterinsurgency strategies carried out by great powers. As the French learned in Algeria in the 1950s, the United States in Vietnam a decade later and the British in Northern Ireland, the most difficult part of any such operation is to separate the insurgents from the civilians from whom they draw strength. This, some top Pentagon officials say, has been one of the U.S. military’s difficulties in Iraq.

“The hope that the Iraqi people, upon having Saddam [Hussein] deposed, would step forward enthusiastically and embrace this new opportunity, turned out to be more optimistic than it should have been,” Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told Congress.

“That, I think, has led to the opportunity for the terrorists then to be able to operate without fear of being exposed by the population.”

The three-week desert war during the spring of 2003, ending in the collapse of Hussein’s regime, vindicated the idea that a small U.S. ground force, combined with billions of dollars worth of military technology, could make quick work of a larger, yet hollow, enemy army. It was a conventional war that the U.S. military had trained and been equipped for since emerging from the jungles of Vietnam three decades ago; a strategy executed with success during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

What came afterward was far more difficult, and U.S. commanders over the last year have used what critics call a trial-and-error strategy against the insurgency, with varying degrees of success.

Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. commanders set their sights on capturing the biggest stars in the Baath Party constellation, creating the notorious deck of cards depicting the most wanted people from Hussein’s regime. Brigades of the Army’s 4th Infantry Division carried out raids throughout the so-called Sunni Triangle in search of Hussein loyalists such as Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the Baath Party’s Revolutionary Command Council.

The raids netted some important figures. Yet U.S. officials now concede that focusing too much on the top regime members did not have the expected impact on the insurgency.

“I think there was probably too great a willingness to believe that once we got the 55 people on the blacklist, the rest of those killers would stop fighting,” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz told Congress recently.

Defenders of American counterinsurgency efforts argue that the violence in Iraq over the last year is part of a calculated plan by members of Hussein’s former regime, not the result of missteps by the U.S.-led occupation authority.

“It is the military and intelligence and secret police that never surrendered. And they are continuing the fight,” said the senior administration official.

After a string of bombings last summer — most significantly, the destruction of the United Nations compound in August — U.S. commanders adopted a get-tough approach in central Iraq. Troops used barbed wire to encircle entire villages, including Al Auja, where Hussein was born. In November, the U.S. launched bombing raids on suspected insurgent hide-outs in Baghdad.

Ground troops scored successes during the period, developing better intelligence about the Baathist insurgents. The 4th Infantry Division drew up complex family trees of suspected party loyalists, ultimately leading to Hussein’s capture in December.

With the new year, the Marines began developing a “velvet glove” strategy for their imminent deployment to the Sunni Triangle — in contrast to the more confrontational approach of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, which had responsibility for that area until March. Relying on the Marine Corps “Small Wars Manual,” the 1st Marine Division planned to carry out more foot patrols in cities such as Fallouja and send Marine platoons into villages to live for extended periods. They also planned to shun the use of aerial bombardment or artillery.

But that strategy went by the boards with the killing and mutilation of four American contractors, which precipitated a Marine assault on Fallouja in April. That offensive was cut short after U.S. officials in Baghdad and Washington decided the bloody campaign was having a negative impact on the larger American effort in Iraq. The Marines pulled back, marking another swerve in the counterinsurgency effort.

“We were winning, but we didn’t get a win. It’s a hard pill to swallow,” complained one Marine operations officer who recently returned from Iraq, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Now, nobody knows what’s going on inside the city.”

In many cases, U.S. troops have been able to adapt on the ground over the past year. The Army’s 101st Airborne, which fought to Baghdad, then assumed responsibility for Kurdish territories after the war, is praised by Pentagon officials for bringing Kurdish leaders into the U.S. fold and keeping the level of violence in northern Iraq to a minimum.

More recently, the Army’s 1st Armored Division is credited with successfully putting down revolts by Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr’s militia in Najaf and other southern towns with a comparatively limited use of force.

“It was a strategic defeat for Sadr,” said the senior administration official. The commander of the 1st Armored, Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey, “put that mob action down quickly and decisively,” the official said.

Some top U.S. commanders express optimism that as the U.S. military continues to adjust to the difficult warfare conditions in Iraq, the counterinsurgency efforts will produce more positive results.

“I think we’re in good shape going forward,” said Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. “It will all come out well if we stay the course.”

At the same time, many experts point out that counterinsurgency work is as much a political mission as it is a military one, requiring a comprehensive strategy involving civilian officials planning reconstruction projects and elections and military officers gathering intelligence and carrying out raids against suspected insurgents.

In Iraq, some top military officials say, the relationship between the U.S. military and the Coalition Provisional Authority was often tense, making such close coordination difficult.

“CPA representatives would not get out in the field to get on-the-spot input for assessment,” Swannack said.

Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands the 1st Marine Division in Al Anbar province in western Iraq, has argued for months with U.S. civilians in Baghdad over the pace of reconstruction and the status of U.S. forces after the hand-over of power, Marine sources say. “He did not pull any punches in his communications” to Baghdad, said one Marine operations officer, speaking on condition of anonymity.

U.S. military officials hope dissolution of the CPA and creation of an embassy in Baghdad will help mend fences and engender the cooperation that, experts say, is critical for the counterinsurgency effort.

Although the Army recently has been incorporating counterinsurgency work into its training of young soldiers, experts say that for decades after Vietnam, the Army focused almost entirely on fighting large tank battles in the desert, not armed militias in Third World cities.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, however, when the doctrine of overwhelming force against an enemy became less relevant, the Army found it needed to change course, and quickly. Back it went into the counterinsurgency business.

Said analyst Krepinevich: “It’s like telling General Motors to stop building cars, and then 25 years later telling them you want them to build a car.”

Times staff writers John Hendren and Doyle McManus contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-counterinsurgency6jul06.story

Pour la version STOVL, vous remarquerez qu’elle est censée arriver en 2012 au mieux alors que le porte-avions britannique arrivera en 2013. Pensez donc au confort actuel dans lequel doivent baigner nos amis anglais, puisque l’architecture du porte avions dépend bien de la version de l’avion qui sera in fine embarqué.