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Ce qui est le plus etonnant dans ce fameux rapport c est l unanimite de vote des membres republicains et democrates de la Commission. Enfin etonnant .... en apparence.
Car au fond cette unanimite ne pouvait etre gagnee qu en trouvant un bouc emissaire ... autre que GWB II et en identifiant une collaboration implicite entre les regimes irakiens et iraniens: l Iran aurait facilite le transit des membres d Al Qaeda et autres varietes.
En designnat l Iran comme accessoire a l axe du mal ne pouvait qu entrainer l aval de tous les membres de la Commission suivant la bonne tradition senatoriale du compromis et de la co-gerence du pays.
Malgre les efforts tetus d un Nader, il n y aura jamais de troisieme parti politique dans ce pays.

Les plans anti-attentat de Heathrow trouvés au bord d’une route

LONDRES, 19 juil (AFP) - La découverte au bord d’une route de plans confidentiels visant à protéger d’un attentat Heathrow, le principal aéroport de Londres, a relancé lundi la crainte d’une menace terroriste jugée très crédible au Royaume-Uni, tandis que l’Etat multiplie les mesures de sécurité.

Le ministre de l’Intérieur David Blunkett a parlé d’une “très mauvaise” nouvelle et attend les résultats des investigations.

Scotland Yard avait annoncé dimanche soir l’ouverture d’une enquête, après qu’un automobiliste eut retrouvé les plans, et alors que le quotidien populaire The Sun s’apprêtait à révéler le scandale dans son édition de lundi.

Les documents ont été retrouvés près d’une station-service, sur une route longeant le terminal 4 de Heathrow, le plus grand aéroport d’Europe en terme de trafic. Ils contenaient une liste de 62 sites à partir desquels des missiles pourraient être tirés par des terroristes contre des avions.

De nombreuses photos et plans établis par la cellule antiterroriste de Scotland Yard figuraient aussi dans le dossier, selon The Sun.

Le plan, établi en juin et valable jusqu’en décembre, détaillait enfin les horaires de patrouille, le déploiement des tireurs d’élite sur les toits, les fermetures de routes et les itinéraires que des terroristes pourraient emprunter après une attaque.

“La zone autour de Heathrow est la plus construite des zones entourant les grands aéroports”, s’est inquiété lundi John Stewart, un représentant des riverains.

“Si un attentat réussissait ici, il ne toucherait pas que des avions”, a poursuivi M. Stewart sur la BBC radio: “Il toucherait aussi des centaines ou des milliers de maisons. Des milliers de gens, peut-être, se retrouveraient sans abri ou pire”.

“C’est une affaire très inquiétante”, a estimé le professeur Paul Wilkinson, l’un des principaux experts britanniques du terrorisme, ajoutant que “ce genre d’information (...) peut s’avérer extrêmement utile pour des terroristes”.

La découverte des plans révèle à nouveau la vulnérabilité du Royaume-Uni face à l’éventualité d’attaques terroristes—Il y a deux mois jour pour jour, “Fathers 4 Justice”, un groupe de pères divorcés, avait réussi à jeter de la farine sur le Premier ministre Tony Blair en pleine séance de la chambre des Communes.

La plupart des observateurs estiment que Londres et le reste du royaume sont confrontés à une menace précise et constante, en raison de l’engagement du Royaume-Uni en Irak et contre le terrorisme du réseau Al-Qaïda.

Dans son rapport 2004 publié en mai, l’Institut international d’études stratégiques (IISS) décrivait le Royaume-Uni comme l’endroit d’Europe le plus exposé à une attaque du type de celle qui a secoué Madrid le 11 mars, à égalité avec Athènes à la veille des JO-2004.

“De nombreux” projets terroristes ont déjà été déjoués à Londres, insistait il y a quelques jours John Stevens, le chef de Scotland Yard.

L’inquiétude des Britanniques ne devrait pas être diminuée par les résultats médiocres d’un exercice organisé dimanche à Birmingham (centre). Les “victimes” de la plus vaste simulation d’attaque chimique organisée dans le pays ont dû attendre trois heures avant qu’on commence à les secourir.

Le budget de la défense sera, en tout cas, l’un des rares à progresser l’année prochaine.

Cette hausse devrait profiter notamment au MI5, le service de renseignement intérieur, qui va s’implanter dans les régions pour mieux surveiller les islamistes vivant en Grande-Brtagne.

Le gouvernement, qui avait déployé des chars à Heathrow en février 2003 après une alerte terroriste, a enfin exhorté les Britanniques à se tenir prêts face à une menace “sérieuse, crédible et réelle”.

Chaque foyer devrait se constituer un stock d’urgence de nourriture en boîte, d’eau en bouteille et de médicaments en prévision d’attentats terroristes, a ainsi suggéré Hazel Blears, la secrétaire d’Etat chargée du contre-terrorisme, dans un entretien lundi au Daily Telegraph.

Dans les affaires à suivre, les révélations de Hersh vont encore un cran plus loin :

nous renvoyons à ce site http://www.metafilter.com/mefi/34356

la transcription semble bien correspondre à ce que dit la personne dans la vidéo

A suivre donc ...

TURKEY AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: STRATEGY MODELS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

Assist. Prof. Gamze GÜNGÖRMÜÞ KONAYeditepe University Political Science and International Relations Department

http://www.stradigma.com/english/july2003/vision.html

  This article includes two parts. In the first part, four different strategy models have been developed in order that Turkey could maximize her foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region and the Central Asian republics. In the second part, certain positive and negative scenarios that Turkey would possibly face following the application of the mentioned strategy models have been analyzed. However, after consulting the responsibles of Stradigma, we decided to publish this rather long article in two parts in order to respect for the scholars and other specialists whose papers take place in Stradigma e-journal. So, in this volume of the journal, “Strategy Models”, which is the first part of the article and in the next volume, “Future Scenarios”, the second part of the article, will be published. I hope, the readers will enjoy the article, which is completely based on little mind games.1st PARTIntroductionIn the first part of the article, in order to maximize Turkey’s policies in the Central Asian region, we propose four different “cooperation strategy models”; Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S., Strategy Model II: Turkey - U.S. - Israel; Strategy Model III: Turkey - U.S. - Iran, and Strategy Model IV: Turkey - Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAECO). The strategy models are numbered from the most probable to the least probable. In other words, in the study taking the fact into consideration that cooperating with these five states will not present equal political and economic advantages for Turkey, we include the U.S. in Strategy Model I assuming that cooperating with U.S. would present more political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model I seems the most probable; we include Israel in Strategy Model II assuming that cooperating with Israel would present less political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than U.S. but more than Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model II is less probable than the realization of Strategy Model I but more probable than Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV; we include Iran in Strategy Model III assuming that cooperating with Iran would present less political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than U.S. and Israel but more than India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model III is less probable than the realization of Strategy Model I and Strategy Model II but more probable than Strategy Model IV; we include India, Pakistan and Iran in Strategy Model IV assuming that these three states would present the least political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region, and that the realization of Strategy Model IV is the least probable. Furthermore, we distribute the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan into strategy models according to the intensification of their political and economic interests in the Central Asia region. Depending on this reason, we include the U.S. in Strategy Model I taking its diversified political and economic interests in this region; Israel in Strategy Model II taking its relatively less political and economic interests in the region; Iran in Strategy Model III taking its small scale security and economic doubts in regard to the region; and India and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV taking their only one-sided (economic) interests in the region into consideration. So, depending on these explanations, the detailed answers to be given to the questions “Depending on which criteria we determine/prefer the states for the strategy models?” and “Why we propose only cooperation strategy model but not any other strategy type?” will also explain the basic aim of the first part of this article.“Depending on Which Criteria We Determine/Prefer the States for the Strategy Models?“Our determination in regard to including the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan in strategy models is based on two criteria: Firstly, their economic or political or cultural capabilities and possibilities which can directly facilitate and maximize Turkey’s policies in the Central Asian region in case Turkey cooperates with them and secondly, their direct or indirect interests and benefits in the Central Asian region since national interests of the states bear vital importance in international relations.For example, in Strategy Model I we choose U.S. considering the “political and economic advantages” she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also the U.S.’ political interests in the Central Asian region. We include the U.S. in all Strategy Models assuming that U.S can support Turkey financially through allocating money necessary for the realization of Turkey’s oil politics and some other investments in the Central Asian region, U.S. can support Turkey politically in international platforms in regard to Turkey’s attempts to realize its economic, political and cultural interests in the region; and also taking the U.S.’ “political interests” through Turkey-U.S. cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as breaking the influence of Iran, providing the transportation of oil to world markets via a secure state like Turkey, integrating the Central Asian states into the world community.In Strategy Model II we choose Israel considering the “political and economic advantages” she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Israel’s aim to gain U.S. back in regard to its political interests in the Middle East region. We include Israel in Strategy Model II assuming that Israel can support Turkey’s policies in regard to the Central Asian region, provide necessary fund which would help Turkey realize some investments in the region; and also taking Israel’s “political interests” through Turkey - U.S. -Israel Cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as providing U.S back in her Middle East policies, intensifying bilateral relations with Turkey in order to reinforce its position in the Middle East region.In Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering the “political advantages” she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Iran’s “political and economic interests” in its own region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV assuming that Iran might look for the ways of developing good-neighborly relations with Turkey, behave more carefully in regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist activities on its own territory against Turkey and also taking Iran’s “political and economic interests” through Turkey - U.S.- Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as getting rid of international isolationism prevailing since Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War, improving relations with the U.S. through this strategy model, having a share in oil transportation from the Central Asian region, reinforcing its political and economic position in the Middle East region.In Strategy Model IV we choose India and Pakistan considering the “political and economic advantages” they might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also their “political and economic interests” in Southern Asian region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include India and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV assuming that through this Strategy Model Turkey might eliminate various probable economic and political attempts of these two states (in regard to Central Asia) which might endanger Turkey’s economic and political interests in the Central Asian region and also taking India’s and Pakistan’s “economic and security interests” through Strategy Model IV into consideration such as eliminating nuclear threat against each other in Southern Asian region, benefiting from economic wealth in the Central Asian region and gaining power in world politics through this Strategy Model. “Why We Propose Only “Cooperation Strategy Model” But Not Any Other Strategy Type?“There have been several reasons, which direct us to propose and concentrate on only “cooperation strategy model” in the first part of this article. First of all, in terms of economic possibilities Turkey is not capable of realizing its goals in the region by itself. When we take the importance of “win-win strategy” (the strategy developed by the American strategists is based on the idea that the states should realize economic, political and military investments or attempts in any region or any state and should not refrain from any expense if this region or state is able to present some more advantages to the state who propose cooperation in any field) it can be said that the Central Asian states who are strongly in need of economic support which would facilitate their transition to market economy will improve relations as long as Turkey continues to have share in rehabilitating their economy. Depending on the reasons above, we find it necessary for Turkey that it should cooperate with an economically powerful state, such as the U.S., to realize its economic goals in the Central Asian region.Secondly, it seems obvious that Russia would resist any intimate political, economic and cultural initiatives in the Central Asian region taking its political and economic interests in the same region into consideration. Parallel to this determination, it can be said that Turkey would have difficulties in realizing its political, economic and cultural goals in the region by itself. For this reason, in our study we propose the Turkish decision-makers that in order to realize its political, economic and cultural targets in Central Asia, Turkey should cooperate with the state/s, such as the U.S., which are economically and politically strong enough to overcome Russian resistance. Thirdly, as mentioned before several states have appeared to gain political or economic, or both, or some other advantages in the Central Asian region following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India and global powers such as China, Japan and U.S can be included in this power rivalry in the region. When we take various advantages they can present to the Central Asian states into account, it can be said that neither the Central Asian states, who regard political or economic capabilities of some regional or global powers as vital for their political and economic development, nor the regional or global powers, who take place in the power rivalry in the region for their political and economic advantages, would not leave Turkey to realize its goals independently. Regarding the probable obstacles to be put by some regional or global powers before Turkey, in our study instead of excluding some important regional and global powers we choose some, such as the U.S. and Israel, and integrate them in our cooperation strategy model. Fourthly, culture and history also necessitates adopting cooperation strategy model by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region. Though Turkish decision-makers insist on common features, which Turkish and Central Asian peoples share, in fact these common features diversify immensely. While Anatolian Turks acquired an Islamic-Imperial identity, Central Asian Turks developed differently bearing tribal and mongoloid features. Persian had been the language of the cultural centers of Bukhara and Samarkand, and Turkestani elites were generally equally at ease in Chagatay Turk and Persian. Along with Russian dominance cultural and historical difference grew more and after the Bolshevik Revolution, Central Asian peoples had to follow a different path culturally and the elites of Central Asia had been Russified. In today’s southern Central Asia, the cultural world bears imprint of centuries of Iranian influence. In northern Central Asia, shamanistic rituals are still strong, and Islam is far weaker than in Turkey. Furthermore, the region’s local languages are more distant from Turkish. Lastly, almost half of the residents of the region are Slavs or Persians who are away from Turkish origin. (Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.198) Depending on the explanations above it can be argued that historical and cultural ties are motivative factors which lead Central Asian peoples to regard Turkey as one of the most important cooperation partners in the region and which help Turkey realize its policies in Central Asia. Parallel to this, we find it quite reasonable for Turkish decision-makers to cooperate with the state/s, such as Iran, which is still quite influential culturally and religiously over the Central Asian states. Lastly, geography restricts Turkey to realize its political, economic and cultural goals in regard to the Central Asian region independently since there is no continuity between Central Asia and Turkey. In the newly-emerged geography Iran represents one of the most important routes for the Central Asian states to reach global markets. So, it can be said that regarding the transportation possibilities Iran plays vital role for the Central Asian states and Turkey - Iran cooperation would be a development in favor of Turkey.The following part includes the explanation of four different strategy models, developed for the betterment of relations with the Central Asian republics.1. Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S. Strategy Model In Strategy Model I, we propose Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian region since we believe that this Model would give the most advantageous results for Turkey’s Central Asian policies depending on several reasons.First of all, through cooperating with the only superpower in the world, Turkey will be able to find necessary political and economic support to realize its policies in the Central Asian region. Secondly, Turkish-American cooperation for the Central Asian region will not be the first example of these two states’ cooperation in history. Particularly after the World War II, these two states cooperated with each other several times in order to realize their goals, and both of them became content about these cooperations. Thirdly, it is clear that there is no obstacle before U.S. to refuse this kind of cooperation for the Central Asian region since America has specific political and economic interests in regard to this region. Fourthly, we believe that U.S. will fully back Turkey economically and politically during cooperation process. Fifthly, since the U.S. government has some other expectations from Turkey in regard to realizing its goals related with other regions, in which she has vital interests, we can assume that U.S. would do its best to satisfy Turkey’s needs in the mentioned cooperation process. Sixthly, we support the idea that since the U.S. will have the chance of influencing the states (Iran, India and Pakistan which she has deep-rooted political problems) included in Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV through involving herself in the mentioned strategy models, she will be quite willing to cooperate with Turkey for the Central Asian region.We should also mention that taking U.S. and Turkey’s expectations from each other in this cooperation process into consideration, Strategy Model I is largely based on economic and political concerns of both states.a. Advantages of Strategy Model IProbable Advantages of Strategy Model I for TurkeyFirst of all, Turkish government through cooperating with the only super power like U.S. might automatically enlarge its sphere of action (performance) in the Central Asian region; secondly, with the U.S. back, Turkish government might realize its promises given to the Central Asian republics particularly at the very beginning of their independence. When we remember the economic assistance given to Turkey by the U.S. government after 1945 through Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in order to break the USSR’s possible penetration into the Middle East region, we can easily understand the importance of the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey; thirdly, Turkish government, lack of enough economic and political power in international platforms, might reinforce the U.S. economic and political support necessary for the construction and realization of Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline project through this cooperation. Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline project is one of the oil and gas transportation routes project based on transporting oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region to the world markets following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the largest energy reserves in the Caspian region. Currently, the proven oil reserve in the region accounts for 15-31 billion barrels. However, exploitation and transportation of oil in this region is rather difficult since the Caspian Sea Basin is landlocked. Since the Caspian region has no outlet to the seas, the region is regarded as one of the most difficult and dangerous regions for the exploitation and transportation of hydrocarbon. During 20 years before the year 1914, Caspian region was one of the largest and one of the most developed oil production areas. However, following the 70-year of Soviet rule, Caspian states were left behind oil exploitation technologies. Currently, there have been only two installations in the region, one in Primorsk city in Azerbaijan, and other in Astrakhan city in Russia, which can construct or repair oil wells. Furthermore, it costs rather high to bring modern oil exploitation equipment abroad. Oil exploitation is not the only problem in the Caspian region, the political problems in regard to the construction of new pipelines, and also the high cost of the construction of these new pipelines consist other side of the issue. It is possible to carry Kazakhstan oil over Russia to the port of Novorossisk. However, Russia might use this pipeline in order to increase its control over Kazakhstan. The pipeline from Azerbaijan over Daghistan and Chechenia to Novorossisk is confronted by increasing stability in these states. As for the exportation of Azerbaijan’s oil, there are two alternatives: The pipeline over Turkey and the pipeline over Iran. Although the transportation of Azerbaijan’s oil over Iran would cost cheaper than the transportation of this oil over Turkey, U.S. government opposes the oil pipeline project over Iran since she sees Iran as a terrorist state. U.S. backs Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which would also carry Turkmenistan’s natural gas and Kazakhstan’s oil to the western markets without constructing an additional pipeline, depending on geopolitical reasons. She regards Turkey as her and Israel’s vital ally, and she wants to increase Ankara’s prestige in the Caucasus and Central Asia against Iran and Russia. However, the oil companies of the states (except for the U.S. oil companies), which are involved with the transportation of oil and gas in the Caspian region to the western markets, regard the pipeline project over Iran as less risky than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, which would pass through three problematic regions. According to them, although the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nogorno-Karabakh ended in 1994, it still has the potential or reemergence. Furthermore, PKK factor in Turkey is another problem. And Georgia has also problems with Abkhasia, she could not establish its authority over South Osetia, Cakavetia and (see IISS Strategic Comments in Milliyet, 23 June 1999; Blank, 1994; Forsythe, 1996)Cumhur Ersümer, the then Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, summarized the probable advantages Turkey might gain when the Baku-Ceyhan project is materialized as follows: “When the project reaches the full capacity, 50 million tons of oil will be transported from Baku to Ceyhan annually! We should emphasize that oil consumption in Turkey is 30 million tons in a year, this consumption will be 45 million tons in the year 2010! We should also point out that Turkey will purchase 16 billion m3 natural gas and we will be able to sell the same amount of natural gas to Europe. In addition to these it should also be kept in mind that the construction of 2.4. billion dollars pipeline will have an important positive impact on Turkish economy…” (Milliyet, 18 November 1999) When we take Iranian and Russian governments’ proposals related with alternative transportation routes into consideration, it could be assumed that the U.S. economic and political back might be the most important instrument for the realization of the mentioned oil and gas transportation route.Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for the U.S.First of all, although the U.S. government is extremely interested in the Central Asian region due to the mentioned economic and political reasons, geographical realities restrict the mentioned U.S. desire to become real. Because geographically U.S. is so far from Central Asia that even if she intends to play an active role in the region, she can not do this. For this reason, it can be said that similar to the policy she adopted for the Balkans and Middle East region during the Cold War period; in the new world order, she favors a foreign policy pattern which is based on supporting one of her faithful allies to become actively involved in the regions in which she has vital interests, and by doing so, she has word on these regions. So, through Turkey-U.S. cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might realize its policies in regard to this region; secondly, as mentioned before U.S. has been observing Iranian interest and attempts in the Central Asian region closely since the states in the region gained their independence, and she intends to break the influence of Iran in this region since she believes that any probable Iranian political or economic active involvement in the region will evoke Islamic sentiments, which were suppressed under Soviet regime during 70 years, and parallel to this development Central Asian republics and the Central Asian region will be closed to Western interests. So, it can be assumed that through this cooperation, U.S. might decrease the influence of Iran in this region, and by backing Turkey, she might present laic, secular and democratic model against radical Islamic model before the Central Asian republics; thirdly, through this cooperation, U.S. government might restrict any possible Iranian-Russian coalition aimed at gaining full control over Central Asian republics. When we remember the negative results of Iranian-Russian close relationship in the Middle East region in the period after Shah Reza Pehlevi, the possible negative results of the emergence of Iranian-Russian coalition in the Central Asian region will become clearer; fourthly, through this cooperation, U.S. might reinforce its position in the Middle East region, in which she has vital interests, too; and last, the U.S. government might reinforce Turkish-Israeli relationship/cooperation in the Middle East region. When we take these two states’ presence and roles in Middle East in terms of U.S. into consideration, we can assume that Turkish-U.S. cooperation in the Central Asian region might be quite advantageous for the future projections of the U.S. in some other regions such as Middle East.Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for the Central Asian RepublicsFirst of all, it is quite clear that the independent republics of Central Asia have been attempting to transform the established institutions and rules into western-type democratic institutions and rules. They strongly believe that in order to realize the mentioned transformations they need western political support. At that point we can assume that through the active involvement of the U.S. as the result of Turkish-American cooperation in their region, these republics might obtain the support of a super power, and this kind of development will accelerate the intended transition period; secondly, Central Asian republics are also aimed at transforming their economies into liberal economy. However, largely due to economic reasons they have not succeeded to realize this until now. So, it can be assumed that by the help of U.S. active involvement in their region, they might provide economic assistance from the U.S necessary for the rehabilitation of their economies and transition to liberal economy; last, although the Central Asian republics recognized the fact that the CIS membership would increase the Russian control and authority over their governments, they joined the CIS, set up by Russian Federation, Belorussia and Ukraine, firstly regarding their security and economic concerns and secondly since they did not have any other alternative except for this. For the time being, Russian political approaches toward these republics and Central Asia proved this assumption to be true and Russian Federation began to be regarded as the ideological, social and cultural successor of the Soviet Union by these republics. It can be said that currently, these republics are aware of the fact that Russian officials do have some economic and political plans related with them and for this reason they still face Russian threat. So, it can be assumed that through Turkish active involvement in the Central Asian region, they might gain power before the Russian Federation. When we take common features such as historical, cultural, religious and linguistic ties between the independent republics in Central Asia and Turkey in the past into consideration, the importance of Turkey’s presence in the Central Asian region for these republics will be understood better. b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model IProbable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy IIt should be kept in mind that any serious attempt by any external power in regard to the Central Asian region would face Russian objection. So, it can be argued that the cooperation strategy models to be developed by Turkish officials for the Central Asian region would face Russian objection, too. However, it should be mentioned that the content of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against each of the four cooperation strategy models will be completely different. For example, while the content of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Strategy Model might be more Iran, Armenia and Central Asian- orientated; the content of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkey-Israel-U.S., Turkey-Iran-U.S, and Turkey-CAECO Cooperation Strategy Models might be more diversified. So, it can be said that the most probable contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkish-American cooperation for the Central Asian region might be as follows:Firstly, in order to prevent Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russia might seek the ways for reinforcing the established bi-lateral economic and political relations with Iran for the Central Asian region. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of political science at Pennsylvania, and senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in his article “Moscow and Tehran The Wary Accommodation” explains the reasons which bring Russian Federation and Iran closer in the Central Asian region. According to Rubinstein the causes which lead them to behave commonly in Central Asia are based on shared political, economic and security concerns. The reasons, explained by Rubinstein, can be summarized as follows: - Along with the changes emerged in the geopolitics of Central Asia and Caucasus, both Moscow and Tehran feel insecure before these radical changes; - In the Cold War period both Russia (following the bi-polarization) and Iran (following the Iran Islamic Revolution) observed the U.S. policies closely and adopted common contra-policies against the U.S. increasing influence in the Middle East region; - In order to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East region, Iran backed Russia’s military and political attempts in this region in the Cold War period; - Both the Russian Federation and Iran find the establishment and continuity of stability in Central Asia and Caucasus regarding their economic and security concerns; - Russia does not see Iran as in economically and politically powerful condition which can endanger her projections in regard to Central Asia and Caucasus; - Russian Federation, in order not to lose her influence, and Iran, in order to prevent the emergence of any attempt which might endanger her national security, are in favor of the continuation of status quo in Central Asia and Caucasus; - Both the Russian Federation and Iran support the idea that the U.S. must have a limited influence particularly in the Central Asian region; - In the new world order both the Russian and Iranian governments are in favor of developing good relations with the West particularly with the U.S. (see Rubinstein, 1995, pp.26-57)Furthermore, Ýhsan Çolak, Research Assistant at Fatih University in Ýstanbul, explains the developing relationship between Russia and Iran from a different perspective and tells that “Although Russian - Iran relations have lost its former intimate phase as the result of the dismantlement of Soviet mentality and the Russian attempts to develop relations with the West, both of these two states’ similar stand before the West forces them to behave commonly in regional relations. One of the most important reasons which leads Russia to develop relations with Iran is that the West, particularly the U.S., is in favor of being with Turkey in the attempts in regard to the region (former Soviet geopolitical area)”. (Çolak, 1999, p.211) Disregarding the fear related with the awakening of Islamic sentiments in the Central Asian region, Russian officials might back Iran to play an active role in this region. This might lead the uprise of radical Islam in Central Asia, which in turn would result in the rejection of laic and secular Turkey’s Central Asian-orientated political and economic attempts by the Central Asian republics; secondly, Russian officials might also attempt to benefit from political contradictions and fragility prevailing between Iran and Turkey, and they might use the policy of “double containment”. Double containment is a kind of policy, which is used (particularly by the U.S.) to weaken political, economic and military potentials of any two states, which have problems in several fields by suggesting the use of contradictions between them. U.S. government succeeded to gain advantages from this policy through using the contradictions between Iran and Iraq. The most important aspect of this policy is that the state, which uses the “double containment”, is never actively involved in the process of the mentioned policy. D. Baluev, in his article “Moderation in the National Idea”, published in International Affairs (Moscow), regards the use of double containment policy between Iran and Turkey as a means of weakening Turkey’s role in the Caucasus. (Baluev, 1996, p.107) In order to materialize this policy, Russian officials might develop some strategies. Firstly, they might provoke Iran to violate the rights of Azeris and Turkmens, which consist large proportion of Iran population. Secondly, in order to create obstacles before the U.S. backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, they might give support to Iran to construct an alternative pipeline, which would carry Azerbaijan’s oil to the world markets. Thirdly, they might also increase its support to the activities of illegal groups such as PKK and Hezbollah through backing Iranian policies related with these two groups. Fourthly, they might suggest Iranian government setting up alliances with the states with which Turkish government has deep-rooted political, diplomatic and historical problems. Iran -Syria alliance in the Middle East, or (or both) Iran - Syria - Greek Government of South Cyprus - Armenia - Greece alliance both in the Middle East and Central Asia might be quite well-established alliances determined to restrict Turkey’s influence in the Central Asian region indirectly; thirdly, Russian Federation might restrict economic relations with the Central Asian republics in order to prevent them from joining Turkish-American cooperation in Central Asia. When we take the fact into consideration that Russia has the largest share in Central Asian republics’ foreign trade (these republics realize 80% of their foreign trade with the Russian Federation), the mentioned probable attempt of Russia might affect the political stand of these republics toward Turkish-American cooperation in their region badly; fourthly, Russia might cause conflict in Central Asian region deliberately, as she did in the Caucasus region, and following the internal chaos emerged in these republics she might play peace-keeping role in this region. By doing so, she might automatically increase her control and authority over the states in Central Asia. As the result of this development it is highly possible that the republics in Central Asia might be rather hesitant towards any external initiative which would endanger their relations with the Russian Federation in the region; fifthly, in order to prevent Turkish government from concentrating on Turkish-American cooperation strategy model in the Central Asian region, Russia might establish a “Slavic-Orthodox quasi-coalition” under the aegis of herself. (1) By doing so, she might motivate the Slavic-Orthodox origin nations in the Balkans to adopt negative policies toward the Muslim-origin Turkish population living in the same region; sixthly, Russia might cause an Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in the Caucasus region, which would directly close Turkey’s passing route to the Central Asian region; seventhly, in order to draw Turkish officials’ attention to other issues, Russia might support Syrian policies in regard to the PKK. Furthermore, she might violate Montreux Convention on Straits, which might in turn deprive Turkish officials of focusing on Central Asian region and of conducting strategy models in this region; furthermore, Russia might do her best to transport Azerbaijan’s oil over its own territory but not over Turkey. In order to exclude Turkish option (Baku-Ceyhan pipeline) to carry Azerbaijan’s oil to the world markets, she might emphasize that the mentioned pipeline project, proposed by Turkey depending on political and economic reasons and strongly backed by the U.S. due to geostrategic reasons, is under the risk of Kurdish problem which is confronted by Turkey particularly in southeastern Anatolia through which the Azeri oil will flow when this pipeline project is materialized. Presenting the mentioned handicap in Turkey, Russian officials very often put forth the idea that the flow of Azerbaijan’s oil must be through the Russian pipeline. The planned outlet for the Russian pipeline would be the port of Novorossisk on the Black Sea. According to this plan the oil would be carried by tankers through the Bosphorus Straits. If the Russian pipeline project is materialized, the population living in Istanbul would face serious risks due to the probable environmental problems to be caused by tankers, and the tanker traffic through the Bosphorus Straits would be on the maximum limit; and last, Russia might benefit from Armenian-Kurdish ties in order to provoke Kurdish population living largely in southeastern Anatolia of Turkey. Moreover, she can increase her support to several Moscow-based Kurdish organizations and Kurdish Council, which was set up in Moscow. (2) By doing so, she might strengthen Kurdish separatist movement under the leadership of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which would badly affect Turkey’s internal political order. Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Iran before Strategy IBefore presenting the probable disadvantages to be caused by Iran before Strategy Model I, it should be mentioned that Iran would oppose any external attempt determined to obtain maximum political and economic benefit from the Central Asian region, and particularly she will oppose the attempt actually made by Turkey. However, it should be kept in mind that Iran will not be able to develop any direct contra-policies against the attempts in which the U.S. is actively involved since she has several political and economic expectations from the U.S. after Khomeini period. So, it can be said that probable opposition to be showed by Iranian government against Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian region will be directed towards Turkey, and Iran will develop some policies determined to weaken Turkey’s influence in Central Asia. These would naturally lead the emergence of several disadvantages before Strategy I. The probable disadvantages to be caused by Iran before the mentioned Strategy Model might be as follows:First of all, although the present Iran government’s political ideology in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian states is not based on transporting Iranian-type political model to these republics, Iranian officials might use Islam factor in this region in order to prevent these republics from intensifying relations with Turkey and by doing so, Iran will be able to develop closer relations with them. This development might lead two negative outcomes. Firstly, political order in these states might be destabilized and this might retard the period necessary to transit into democratic system. Secondly, Central Asian republics, provoked by Islamic sentiments, might refrain from cooperating with a laic and secular state such as Turkey in their region; secondly, in order to cause problems before Turkish-American cooperation for the Central Asian region, Iranian government might increase its support for PKK and Hezbollah. (3) This would force Turkish officials to focus on solving internal problems rather than developing strategies for the regions in which Turkish government has political and economic interests; thirdly, parallel to this policy, she might reinforce her relations with Syria in the Middle East; and with Russia and Armenia in the Central Asian region. It can be argued that Iran might look for the ways to turn these relations with the mentioned states into a kind of strategic alliance. In any case, development of any close relations or establishment of any strategic alliance among these states might weaken Turkey politically; and last, Iranian officials might conduct political pressure over Turkish population living in Iran.2. Strategy Model II: Turkey - Israel - U.S. Strategy ModelIn Strategy Model II we propose Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region since we believe that this Model would give secondarily advantageous results (compared to the advantages which Turkey would obtain from Strategy Model I) for Turkey’s Central Asian policies depending on several reasons. First of all, it sounds quite reasonable to prefer Israel and America for Strategy Model II since Turkey and Israel have been close allies in the Middle East region for years depending on similar political, economic and security concerns related with Arab Middle East states; and since both Turkey and Israel have been inevitable allies of the U.S. in regard to her policies in the Middle East. Secondly, Turkish-Israel cooperation in Central Asia would not be the first example of these two states’ cooperation. Particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, both of them have been in favor of developing bi-lateral economic, political and military relations in order to strengthen their economic, political and military stand in their own regions. Thirdly, they are aware of the fact that the probable positive results to be obtained from Strategy Model II would have a multi-dimensional impact on both Israel’s and Turkey’s stand before Arab states in the Middle East region. For example, both Israel and Turkey will be able to foster their political and economic position before Arab Middle East states, with which they have deep-rooted conflicts. In addition to this, via this cooperation, Turkey will be able to prevent Israel state from supporting the realization of a Kurdish state project. Furthermore, Israeli officials, who would have a chance to become closer to the U.S. officials via Strategy Model II, will be able to obtain the U.S. political support more in regard to Arab-Israel conflict, prevailing in the Middle East region for years. As for the U.S., via the mentioned cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. will be able to reinforce relations with Turkey and Israel, which represent vital importance in regard to her stand in the Middle East. It can be assumed that parallel to this cooperation, while Turkey will consist military leg of the U.S. in the Middle East region, Israel will consist political leg of her in the same region. Besides the probable advantages that the U.S. government will obtain from this cooperation in regard to her Middle East policies, she will be able to obtain political back of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which plays an important role in the determination of the U.S. foreign policy.So, taking the mentioned reciprocal political, economic and security expectations of Turkey-Israel and the U.S. from each other, it can be assumed that these three states’ cooperation in the Central Asian region will become quite effective, and Turkey will be able to maximize her policies in the mentioned region through setting up Strategy Model II. This Model is based on political, economic and security concerns of the participating states.a. Advantages of Strategy Model IIProbable Advantages of Strategy Model II for TurkeyFirst of all, via Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Turkey’s political stand before the U.S. might raise gradually. When we remember the strategic importance of Turkey through being one of the most trustable allies of the U.S. related with her counter-policies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War years in terms of America, it can be assumed that Turkey, through cooperating with the U.S. and her historical friend, Israel, in Central Asia, in the region which American and Israeli governments have direct or indirect interests, might obtain the U.S. support more, and this might help Turkish officials be more powerful before the states with which Turkish government has had economic and political problems, and in international platforms; secondly, Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might help Turkish government gain political power before Iran and Syria strategic grouping in the Middle East region. Although this kind of cooperation seems unable to remove these states’ foreign policy attempts, intended to weaken Turkey politically and economically, this might prevent the mentioned three states from developing future projections, which would endanger national security of Turkey; thirdly, parallel to the realization of Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, the policies of fundamentalist Arab Middle East states against Turkey might become less severe; and last; through this cooperation, Turkish government might stop the attempts of the U.S., Israel and the Jewish lobby in U.S. congress in regard to the realization of Kurdish state project. (4)Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for the U.S.Firstly; via this cooperation, the U.S. government might raise the political and economic support of the Jewish lobby in the Congress; secondly, Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might strengthen the U.S. policies on Middle East. When the prevailing conflict between Iran-U.S., Iraq-U.S. and Syria-U.S. in the Middle East region, and also Russia’s political expectations in the Middle East are taken into consideration, it can be assumed that via this cooperation the U.S. might foster its stand in the Middle East before the states mentioned above by the help of Turkey and Israel. Along with developing relations with these two states in the Central Asian region, while Turkey might consist military leg of the U.S. in the Middle East region, Israel might consist political leg of the U.S. in the same region; and last, Turkish-American-Israel cooperation might also have a positive influence on American policies on Central Asian republics. It is obvious that U.S. government strictly backs the continuity of current political systems in these states. By doing so, she believes that Russian policies and probable Iranian fundamentalist attempts in Central Asia will be kept aloof. So, it can be assumed that along with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, an extensive Israeli economic penetration into this region might present a Western, rather than Islamic, orientation for the political systems of the Central Asian states. (Ehteshami, 1994, pp.96-97)Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for IsraelFirstly, Israel, such as Turkey, has lost its strategic importance before the West relatively following the end of the Cold War. However, despite the mentioned downgrade in its strategic position before the West, U.S. is still Israel’s one of the most important allies. So, it can be assumed that by actively involving herself in the Central Asian region, in which the U.S. government has vital interests, and by adopting policies similar to the policies of the U.S. in this region, and by helping the U.S. officials enlarge American sphere of influence in Central Asia, Israeli government might compensate the mentioned loss before the West, and particularly U.S.; secondly, through taking place in Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Israel will be able to develop its relations with the U.S. government. Parallel to the developing relations with the U.S., Israel might realize its policies in the Middle East region more independently. At least, Israeli government might foster its political stand in Arab-Israeli peace process through gaining U.S. support more; thirdly, if Bernard Lewis’ assumption “The emergence of Turkish states world, such as the emergence of Arab world appeared following the disintegration of British and French empires, will be viewed quite important in the following years, and this Turkish states world will have fairly important influence on Middle East.” (Göka, 1999, p.181) becomes real, it can be assumed that Israel, which will have a word in Central Asian policies through participating in this kind of cooperation in the Central Asian region, might gain political power before Arab Middle East states. Parallel to this development, anti-Israel policies of the Middle East Arab states will become less effective on Israel’s political stand in the Middle East, so, the mentioned political burden before Israeli government in the Middle East region might decrease gradually; fourthly, along with Israel-Central Asian states cooperation in the Central Asian region, Islamic world, particularly Muslim-origin peoples in the Middle East region might think that Israeli government will soften her political discourse and political attempts in regard to the Arab Middle East states and particularly to the Palestine conflict. This development might help Israel remove political oppression in its own region gradually; and last, Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might also be advantageous for Israel in regard to solving its problems with Iranian government. The main problem between Iran and Israel is not “Islamic fundamentalism”. Simply, in terms of Israel, the problem is that Iran insistently opposes to the peace process, and to the Israeli government’s enlargement through Jerusalem, and struggles with Israel for this enlargement issue. (Aras, 1999, p.205) So, parallel to developing relations with Turkey, Israel might benefit from Turkey’s potential mediating role in solving the mentioned problem with Iran. Although this possibility seems rather weak, still, it should be kept in mind.Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for the Central Asian RepublicsSince we explained probable advantages which U.S. and Turkey might present for the Central Asian republics in Strategy Model I, we will only explain probable advantages which Israeli government might present for the Central Asian republics along with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region in Strategy Model II.Firstly, along with Israel’s active involvement in the Central Asian region, Central Asian republics might benefit from Israel’s close relations with the West, and particularly with the U.S. These republics might regard Israel as a gateway to the West, and particularly to the U.S.; secondly, Israel’s economic assistance given to the Central Asian states since they gained their independence has been welcomed by them since these states are in need of any economic assistance by any state. So, along with Israel’s developing relations parallel to Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, the states in Central Asia might obtain more economic assistance from Israel, which would in turn help these states rehabilitate their economies; thirdly, it is obvious that the mutual fear shared by Israel and the Central Asian states related with the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and with the increasing influence of Iran in the region has been one of the most important factors which leads these two sides to develop closer relations. b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model II Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by some in the Middle East region Before Strategy Model IIFirst of all, it seems obvious that Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region will have a negative impact on Turkey’s economic and particularly political relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East region because most of these countries have had deep-rooted political problems with Israel since the establishment of this state. So, it can be said that Turkish state’s cooperation attempt with Israel will cause discontent among the Arab Middle East states, and these states will adopt a negative stand against Turkey. Parallel to this development, Turkey might be deprived of these states’ political and economic support which is necessary for the political stability and economic well-being of Turkey in the Middle East region; secondly, along with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Iran might show its reaction in two ways. Firstly, Iran might raise its political opposition against Israeli state’s enlargement policy through Jerusalem, and the mentioned political attempt of Iran might cause problems in Arab-Israeli peace process. Secondly, Iran, in order to create obstacles before Turkish-Israel cooperation attempt in the Central Asian region, might raise its political support for PKK and Hezbollah, which might prevent Turkish officials from concentrating on the mentioned cooperation process; thirdly, such as Iran, Syria might show its reaction against Turkish-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region in two ways, too. Firstly, Syria, in order to break the probable influence of Turkey in the Middle East region as the result of her attempts in the Central Asian region, might foster its political support for PKK. Secondly, Syria might reinforce its relations with Iran, and Greek Government of South Cyprus, and even she might be willingly involved in establishment of Syria-Iran-Armenia-Greece probable quadripartite strategic alliance against Turkish-American-Israel tripartite alliance. Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy Model IIFirst of all, Russian Federation, in order to endanger Turkish-Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, might search the ways for backing Arab states’ anti-Israel policies. By doing so, she might create problems before Arab-Israeli peace process, and this might result in the downgrade in Israel’s concentration on the mentioned cooperation process; secondly, Russian Federation might convince Arab states that Turkish-Israel alliance in the Central Asian region will in turn help Turkish and Israeli states become politically and economically more powerful in the Middle East region before other states in the same region. Arab Middle East states, provoked by Russia, might foster their anti-Turkish and anti-Israeli policies; thirdly, she might develop her relations with the states such as Iran and Syria in the Middle East region, Armenia in the Caucasus, Greece in the Balkans, and Greek Government of South Cyprus, with which Turkish state has had rather fragile political relations for years, and she might suggest these states set up a kind of strategic alliance against Turkish-Israel alliance in the Central Asian region; and last, Russian Federation might continue to house PKK terrorists in order to weaken Turkey politically and economically.Probable Disadvantage to be Caused by Islamist and Nationalist Circles in Turkey Before Strategy Model IIWhen we take rather fanatic political discourses developed, and rather severe political stand adopted by Islamist and nationalist circles in Turkey just after the former Soviet republics in Central Asia had declared their independence in the beginning of 1990s into consideration, it can be assumed that these circles will oppose Turkish officials’ attempt to cooperate with Jewish-populated Israel state. So, the ones who follow either Islamist or nationalist ideologies in Turkey might prevent the emergence of a fully agreed political consensus in Turkey, and this might cause the emergence of some problems in domestic policy, which might in turn lead lack of concentration on Central Asian region and Central Asian republics.3. Strategy Model III: Turkey - Iran - U.S. Strategy ModelIn Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering the “political advantages” she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Iran’s “political and economic interests” in its own region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model III assuming that Iran might look for the ways of developing good-neighborly relations with Turkey, behave more carefully in regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist activities on its own territory against Turkey and also taking Iran’s “political and economic interests” through Turkey - U.S.- Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as getting rid of international isolationism prevailing since Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War, improving relations with the U.S. through this strategy model, having a share in oil transportation from the Central Asian region, reinforcing its political and economic position in the Middle East region.Despite the handicaps before Strategy Model III we believe that along with the realization of Strategy Model III; political, economic and security differences and expectations of these states related with the Central Asian region will become less disturbing, and the mentioned political, economic and military conflicts among them will be taken under control although these conflicts will not be completely removed because the eventual goal of Strategy Model III is to minimize political, economic and security differences and expectations of the states included in this kind of cooperation, and to remove any political, economic or military conflicts among them in the Central Asian region. So, along with the realization of Strategy Model III, Turkish government will be able to realize its goals in Central Asia and foster her economic and social progress at home easier.It should be also mentioned that Strategy Model III is mainly based on political and security concerns of the participating states.a. Advantages of Strategy Model IIIProbable Advantages of Strategy Model III for TurkeyFirst of all, along with Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russian-Iran relations might downgrade gradually. As the result of this development Russia might be deprived of one of its power centers in the Middle East region. Moreover, Russian-Iran close relationship in Central Asia will leave the floor to Turkish-American-Iran partnership; secondly, Iran, accepted to cooperate with Turkey in the Central Asian region, might give up backing PKK and Hezbollah. Parallel to this, Turkey might eliminate one of the states which houses and gives political support to the mentioned illegal groups; thirdly, probability of the emergence of Russia-Iran-Armenia tripartite strategic partnership in the Central Asian region, which is uttered very often recently by the Russian officials in order to break the influence of Turkey in this region, might be removed parallel to Turkish-American-Iran partnership in Central Asia. As for the probability of the emergence of Russian-Armenian strategic partnership in the Central Asian region, it can be claimed that these two sides’ partnership will not be as effective as Russia-Iran-Armenia strategic partnership since both Russian Federation and Armenia have been busy with internal political and economic problems; fourthly, along with the realization of Strategy Model III, Iran might refrain from taking place in Iran-Syria-Armenia-Greece-Greek Government of South Cyprus strategic alliance; fifthly, as mentioned before, Turkey and Central Asian republics are not geographically contiguous. Access to these republics is rather problematic. Overland routes, which connect Turkey with Central Asia, traverse Iran, or pass through the Transcaucasus and Russia, or run via Transcaucasus and the Caspian Sea. (Winrow, 1996, p.129) So, it can be said that along with Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Turkey might safeguard its transportation route which traverses Iran; and last, Iranian government expecting to obtain various political and economic advantages from the U.S. as the result of Turkish-American-Iran cooperation might no longer oppose Baku-Ceyhan route which is supported by Turkey and America.Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for the U.S.Firstly, it seems possible that U.S. foreign policy on Central Asia, which is mainly based on isolating Iran from the Central Asian region, will lead the mentioned state to cooperate economically and politically with the Russian Federation, and in the end to become politically marginalized. So, the U.S. government through accepting to cooperate with Iran might prevent this state from developing close relations with Russia, and so, Iran might no longer remain as a political threat against the U.S. in the Middle East and Central Asian regions; secondly, by the help of Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might eliminate one of the most important negative factors such as Iran in the Middle East region. Taking the importance of economic and political advantages to be obtained through U.S.-Iran cooperation into consideration, Iran might soften its anti-American policies, and adopt more cooperative political stand in its own region. This development might bring two different practical ends. First of all, U.S. political maneuvers in the Middle East region might face less Iranian opposition. Secondly, Iran might support the Middle East peace process through obeying the rules of law, refraining from backing the activities of illegal groups, removing its negative political stand against Arab-Israel peace process. These both might lead the U.S. government to enlarge its sphere of influence in the Middle East; and thirdly, through Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. will have a chance to become involved in Central Asia with these two Muslim countries, which have deep-rooted cultural, historical and social ties with the Central Asian republics. By doing so, U.S. might realize its Central Asian policies more easily.Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for IranFirstly, Iran, through taking place in Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region might have a chance to remove political conflicts with the U.S. As the result of this promising development Iran might convince the U.S. government to cancel the prevailing embargo, get rid of isolation through reintegrating itself into the world community, and rehabilitate its economy. So, it can be assumed that the probable advantages that Iran will obtain from Turkish-American-Iran cooperation might be larger than the probable advantages that the same state will obtain from Iran-Russian strategic alliance in the Central Asian region; secondly, because of the immense power of Russia which extends to the north, historically Iran has always sought to balance off Russia with other potentially balancing powers. France (under Napoleon), Germany, America, and even Japan and China have functioned as these potentially balancing powers in some ways in more recent periods. (Fuller, 1991, p.182) So, through cooperating with the only superpower of the world, Iran might also have the chance of ensuring that she will not be entirely at the mercy of a state such as Russian Federation, which the political and economic future is unforeseen; thirdly, as mentioned before, Iranian Azeris living in northwest of Iran consist 20% or 30% of Iran population, and Iran has always had some concerns about this Azeri population. This concern is based on Iranian assumption that Azeris living in Iran might attempt to unite with the Azeris living in Azerbaijan, or visa versa. So, through developing relations with Turkey for the Central Asian region, Iran might benefit from close relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and remove this threat; and last; although Iran has deep-rooted historical ties with the peoples of Central Asian republics, there are still some limits which prevent Iran from enlarging its ideological, cultural influence through the Central Asian republics fully. Firstly, Iranians are Shiites while the peoples of Central Asian states are Sunnis, secondly, Iranians strictly follow Islamic traditions while the peoples of Central Asian states prefer more ‘Asiatic’ traditions, thirdly, historically the states which existed in the Central Asian region never belonged to the sphere of influence of Persia. (Zagorski, Zlobin, Solodovnik, Khrustalev, 1992, p.8) When compared to Iran, Turkey has more detailed ties with the Central Asian peoples in terms of religion and tradition. So, depending on these explanations it can be assumed that through Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Iran might be more influential on the republics in this region. b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model IIIProbable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy Model IIIFirst of all, as mentioned before although Russian officials do not declare openly that Russia houses and gives political and economic support to PKK, they do this in a hidden way. So, it seems highly probable that Russian Federation, in order to weaken Turkey politically and economically, and in order to break the influence of Turkish state on Central Asian republics, might begin to house and give political and economic support to PKK supporters, who might probably be isolated from Iran following Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region; secondly, Russian Federation; which might think that Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian region might revive Islamic sentiments in the region, and that this development might endanger Russian political stand before these republics; might upgrade its influence on them, and force the Central Asian states to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran actual involvement in the region; thirdly, Russian Federation, which will lose one of her most important partners in the Middle East region, might concentrate on developing closer relations with other Middle East states, such as Syria, with which Turkey has harsh problems, and might help these state develop anti-Turkish policies.Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Israel Before Strategy Model IIIFirstly, Israel, surprised before the U.S.’ involvement in a cooperation process in the Central Asian region with Iran, might show its reaction against the U.S. government through affecting the Jewish lobby in the U.S. congress; secondly, parallel to Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Israel might also criticize Turkish political preference, based on including Iran in such a cooperation process. And she might not favor the development of multi-lateral relations with Turkey, and suspend these relations.Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Central Asian Republics Before Strategy Model IIIFirstly, as mentioned before Central Asian republics have some concerns about Islamic penetration into the region, and see some Islamic states, such as Iran, as potential states which favors to increase their sphere of political and economic influence in Central Asia through using Islamic sentiments. So, it can be said that the fear that these republics do ha

Turkey as a new geopolitical actor in Central Asia by L. Laumulin, Central Asia’s Affairs n°3

http://www.kisi.kz/English/Geopolitics/12-11-03Laumulin.pdf

Long Live NATO
by Tom Barry

The cold war is long over, but with the support of U.S. supremacists in both parties NATO lives on as America’s global cop.

Seven more nations are joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and three more Central European nations have their applications pending. Although the Bush administration has set an overall course in foreign and military policy of treaty-breaking and unilateralism, it remains a strong proponent of NATO expansion.

Founded in 1949 as a security buffer against the Soviet Union, NATO has not only survived the end of the cold war. It is flourishing. Despite criticism that a post-cold war NATO would unnecessarily propagate the West-East security divide that shaped international relations for the four decades of the cold war, the U.S. government has led the drive to energize and expand NATO. In 1999, after contentious debate in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. approved the accession of Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. Leading the NATO enlargement lobby was the neoconservative Committee to Expand NATO, which brought together several prominent neocons now serving in the Bush administration, along with conservative Democrats such as Will Marshall of the Progressive Policy Institute and the Democratic Leadership Council.

After succeeding in advancing the first post-cold war round of enlargement, the Committee to Expand NATO (renamed U.S. Committee on NATO) launched its “Big Bang” strategy to bring ten more nations into the NATO fold. After an initial meeting of the ten new prospects in Vilnius, Lithuania, with the aid of the U.S. Committee on NATO the so-called Vilnius Group began pressuring Washington and NATO headquarters for membership.
Among the first board members of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO were Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Peter Rodman, and Stephen Hadley, all of whom later joined the Bush administration.1 All of these neocons were associates of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Bruce Jackson sits on the five-member board of PNAC. Randy Scheunemann, who was an officer of the NATO expansion committee, is also a PNAC board member. Both Jackson and Scheunemann were cofounders of the Project on Transitional Democracies, which continues to work with the countries of New Europe to foster economic and military ties with the United States.

The U.S. Committee on NATO was not, however, purely a neocon venture. It reached out to and included Democrats such as Will Marshall, founder and president of the Progressive Policy Institute. Marshall was also a founder of the Democratic Leadership Council, another organization of “New Democrats.” In 2002 Marshall also joined the advisory committee to the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, a bipartisan pro-war group founded by Jackson at the urging of the Bush administration.
The U.S. Senate in May 2003 unanimously approved the accession to NATO of three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and four other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia). In a White House ceremony on March 29, 2004, President Bush hailed the accession of seven additional nations to NATO, which will formally admit the new members at a ceremony at NATO headquarters in Brussels on April 2. Bush noted that all the new NATO members are “helping to bring lasting freedom to Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Three other nations of the New Europe bloc – Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania – are next in line to receive an accession invitation from NATO. Although it was Donald Rumsfeld who is credited with first using the term “New Europe,” the term has long been circulating among neoconservatives who view with deep disgust Western Europe’s tendency to support diplomacy over war and its deep commitment to multilateralism and the international rule of law. As the White House began laying the groundwork for the “coalition of the willing” against Iraq, President Bush himself repeatedly used the term “New Europe” in statements about NATO enlargement. In a July 5, 2002 speech hailing the leaders of the Vilnius group, the president declared, “Our nations share a common vision of a new Europe, where free European states are united with each other, and with the United States through cooperation, partnership, and alliance.”

President Bush told the newest NATO members that “all member nations must be willing, and able, to contribute to the common defense of our alliance.” Many of the new members have joined NATO in the belief that it will lead to economic prosperity and shield them against any future extraterritorial ambitions of the Russian Federation. But President Bush regards the new members as enlistees in Washington’s own global ambitions in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. During the White House welcoming ceremony, President Bush noted that NATO’s mission extended far beyond the perimeter of the alliance. “NATO members are reaching out to the nations of the Middle East, to strengthen our ability to fight terror, and to provide for our common security,” he said. But NATO’s mission extends beyond global security. “We’re discussing,” said Bush, “how we can support and increase the momentum of freedom in the greater Middle East.”

At a time when it appears that the U.S. is becoming increasingly isolated, the Bush administration is exercising strong leadership over what the president describes as the “most successful military alliance in history.” The Bush administration has lashed out at European critics of its neo-imperial policies and dismissed the dissident Western European nations as representatives of the “old Europe,” but it rests secure in the knowledge that U.S. military leadership and America’s military dominance are central to NATO and that NATO is the centerpiece of transatlantic relations. Given that most European nations lack strong militaries of their own and that EU still lacks a unified security infrastructure, the ever-expanding NATO operating under U.S. direction will likely remain an effective instrument of U.S. hegemony, not only in North Atlantic but also from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea, and from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf.

President Clinton supported the first phase of NATO enlargement, as did the internationalists of both political parties. The driving ideological force behind NATO expansion, however, has been the neocon polemicists and operatives who see an expanded NATO as one in which the power of mainland Western European nations is diminished and U.S. hegemonic power is consolidated. But it’s unlikely that NATO expansion would have proceeded so quickly without the concerted backing of the U.S. military-industrial complex. For its part, the U.S. military was eager to establish U.S. military bases and forward-deployment sites in the “transitional states” of the former Soviet bloc. And U.S. military contractors had an eye on the new markets for their latest weaponry when the new NATO partners militarized to meet the compatibility requirements of the alliance. Integration into NATO requires integrating weapons systems – creating a multibillion-dollar market for jet fighters, electronics, attack helicopters, military communication networks, and all the gadgets needed by a modern fighting force.

Until 2002 Bruce Jackson was planning and strategy vice president at Lockheed Martin, where he served as the advance man for global corporate development projects. One prominent neocon described Bruce Jackson as “the nexus between the defense industry and the neoconservatives. He translates us to them, and them to us.” Two other members of the U.S. Committee on NATO who had ties to Lockheed Martin were Stephen Hadley and Randy Scheunemann. Stephen Hadley, who serves in the Bush administration as deputy national security adviser to Condoleezza Rice, was a partner in the Shea & Gardner law firm, whose clients included Boeing and Lockheed Martin.2 Another link to Lockheed Martin at the U.S. Committee on NATO was Randy Scheunemann, the president of Orion Strategies, whose clients include the largest defense contractor in the United States.
NATO expansion cannot be written off as a neocon conspiracy. But neither should one assume that the neoconservatives are so dismissive of the “appeasers” in Europe and so preoccupied with the Middle East (and especially the security of Israel) that they don’t have a grand strategy for a restructured Europe. “Strengthen America, Secure Europe. Defend Values. Expand NATO” was the motto of the U.S. Committee on NATO. The committee’s slogan concisely summarizes the main arguments of the NATO expansion lobby in the United States.

In the estimation of John Laughland, a trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group and a close observer of Jackson’s proconsul operations in Eastern Europe: “Far from promoting democracy in eastern Europe, Washington is promoting a system of political and military control not unlike that once practiced by the Soviet Union. Unlike that empire, which collapsed because the center was weaker than the periphery, the new NATO is both a mechanism for extracting Danegeld [tribute levied to support Danish invaders in medieval England] from new member states for the benefit of the U.S. arms industry and an instrument for getting others to protect U.S. interests around the world, including the supply of primary resources such as oil.”3

The U.S. Committee on NATO and the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, both of which were organized by PNAC’s Bruce Jackson, were disbanded in late 2003, apparently because its members believed that they had accomplished their mission. But the neocon camp continues working to shape the transatlantic political and military agenda. Jackson and Scheunemann continue their work in Eurasia through their Project on Transitional Democracies. Another ideological partner in the neoconservative effort to restructure the transatlantic alliance is the New Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute, whose goal is “the admission of Europe’s fledgling democracies into institutions of Atlantic defense.” Like the AEI itself, the New Atlantic Initiative is dominated by neocons such as William Kristol, Samuel Huntington, Norman Podhoretz, Joshua Muravchick, Richard Perle, and Daniel Pipes. AEI’s New Atlantic Initiative also includes on its advisory board military hard-liners such as Donald Rumsfeld, right-wing political figures like Newt Gingrich, and realpolitikers such as Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, as well a few Democrats such as Thomas Foley – all of whom share the neocon vision of a “New Europe.”4

The cold war is long over, but with the support of U.S. supremacists in both parties NATO lives on as America’s global cop.
Endnotes
1. Judis, “Minister Without Portfolio, American Prospect.
2. “Stephen Hadley,” Right Web Profile (Interhemispheric Resource Center, November 2003). Hadley was one of the original members of the self-identified “Vulcans” who advised then-candidate George W. Bush.
3. John Laughland, “The Prague Racket,” The Guardian ( London), November 22, 2002. Other journalistic accounts of Jackson’s activities include: Stephen Gowans, “War, NATO expansion, and the other rackets of Bruce P. Jackson,” What’s Left, November 25, 2002; Brian McGrory, “Battle Lines Forming over NATO Expansion,” Boston Globe, July 5, 1997.
4. See American Enterprise Institute, New Atlantic Initiative.
April 2, 2004

Tom Barry is policy director of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC). Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig4/barry-tom4.html

Spymasters or spinmeisters?
Jul 16th 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda

British and American inquiries into intelligence failures over Saddam Hussein’s supposed illegal weapons have both found that their countries’ spy chiefs hyped up questionable evidence, which happened to help their political masters make the case for war

SADDAM HUSSEIN’S supposed active pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear “weapons of mass destruction” was the main justification that President George Bush and the British prime minister, Tony Blair, gave for launching the invasion of Iraq last year. However, when America’s then chief weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay, gave his interim report to Congress earlier this year, he had to admit that months of post-war searching had turned up precious little evidence of such weapons programmes. The American intelligence reports claiming they did exist were “almost all wrong”, he admitted. By implication, so were the similar claims made by British intelligence. Mr Bush, and in turn Mr Blair, were thus forced to launch separate inquiries into where their spies went wrong.

On Wednesday July 14th, five days after its American equivalent, the British inquiry, led by Lord Butler, a former senior civil servant, announced its findings. Both inquiries reached essentially the same conclusion: that spy chiefs’ reports, on which the case for war was based, had reached unjustifiably strong conclusions and failed to admit that these were based on pretty shaky evidence. This means that the two intelligence dossiers presented to the American and British people by their leaders, just before the war, exaggerated the likelihood that Saddam’s regime was a serious threat to the West.

However, there were notable differences in the tone of the two inquiries’ reports. The American report, written by a bipartisan committee of senators, was quite scathing. A few weeks before its publication, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced his resignation, for “personal reasons”. By contrast, Lord Butler’s report, in characteristic British civil-service fashion, went out of its way to insist that no individuals could be blamed for the misleading contents of the now-notorious “September dossier”, since its failings were “collective”. Lord Butler specifically recommended that the government reject any calls for the resignation of John Scarlett. As the chairman of Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Mr Scarlett was the dossier’s lead author. He has since been appointed director of the Secret Intelligence Service (familiarly known as MI6).

Lord Butler was not asked to look at how politicians and their advisers used the reports provided by the intelligence agencies—the American Senate inquiry, by contrast, will now go on to look into this question. However, both inquiries have said that they found no evidence that spy chiefs had been pressured to produce assessments that suited policy decisions their political masters had already taken.

No direct pressure, perhaps, but as the Butler report noted, the Blair government’s desire for a dossier that supported its policy on Iraq “put a strain” on the JIC as it tried to uphold “normal standards of neutral and objective assessment”. Furthermore, the Butler inquiry’s assertion that spymasters had not been under political pressure is somewhat undermined by its failure to question Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair’s former chief spin-doctor. An earlier official inquiry, by Lord Hutton—into how one of the September dossier’s main assertions had led to the suicide of David Kelly, a British expert on Iraqi weapons—had expressed concerns about the closeness of the working relationship between Mr Campbell and Mr Scarlett.

The British dossier’s most controversial assertion was that Saddam had biological and chemical weapons that could be deployed within 45 minutes. At the time, the Blair government did little to discourage the widespread assumption that this meant long-range weapons could reach British targets, such as the military base on Cyprus. However, the Butler inquiry (like an earlier inquiry by a parliamentary committee) said the dossier ought not to have included the 45-minute claim without making it clear that intelligence chiefs thought it in fact referred to short-range, battlefield weapons—or at least it should have admitted that it was unclear what sort of weapons it referred to.

In general, both the British and American inquiries criticised their countries’ intelligence chiefs for omitting the strong caveats and doubts they ought to have attached to their assertions, especially in the dossiers. Another example of this was the aluminium tubes that Saddam had been seeking, supposedly to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. The Butler inquiry criticises the British dossier for failing to admit that the tubes would have had to be substantially re-engineered to make them suitable for centrifuges. The American Senate inquiry criticised the CIA for implying in the public version of its dossier that the tubes probably were for making bomb materials, whereas in a second, secret version of the dossier shown to congressmen, it admitted that the Department of Energy had concluded they probably were not.

The two inquiries reiterate some of the weaknesses of intelligence-gathering that have become widely recognised since the September 11th 2001 attacks in America. The CIA, MI6 and other agencies had a poor reading of threats because they had too few first-hand sources in the region. Those sources they did have were not properly confirmed. Since both British and American intelligence were found to have underestimated Saddam’s weapons programmes in the run-up to the first Gulf war in the early 1990s, they may have over-compensated for this by overstating the evidence this time round.

Over to the voters

The latest inquiries—which will be followed in the next few days by a separate inquiry report on the intelligence failures relating to the September 11th attacks—will give opponents of Mr Bush and Mr Blair plenty of ammunition. The failure to find any illegal weapons programmes in Iraq has helped undermine Mr Bush’s reputation and he now faces a struggle to get himself re-elected in November. Mr Blair, who will probably face the voters’ verdict next year, is also weakened—in the days before the Butler report there was renewed speculation that he has been thinking of stepping down. The day after the report, in two by-elections in hitherto safe parliamentary seats for Mr Blair’s Labour Party, it lost one to the anti-war Liberal Democrats and only narrowly held the other.

However, the two leaders’ principal opponents are not in such a strong position to attack: Senator John Kerry, Mr Bush’s Democratic challenger, read the more detailed, classified version of the CIA dossier and yet still backed the war. Michael Howard, the leader of Britain’s main opposition Conservative Party, also supported the war.

Senator Pat Roberts, the Republican chairman of America’s version of the Butler inquiry, said he did not know if Congress would have let the war go ahead if it had known what is now known about the quality of the intelligence. If the British dossier had been more frank, Mr Blair might also have been unable to persuade Parliament and the British public of the case for war. But both leaders have responded to their respective inquiries by arguing that, illegal weapons or not, the world is better off without Saddam’s regime.

And, who knows, the fabled illegal arms might yet turn up. A senior official in the new Iraqi government suggested this week that some materials for making such weapons may have been shifted into neighbouring countries. Meanwhile American inspectors continue to search for them in Iraq, which Lord Butler noted is a very large country, with “lots of sand” in which to hide things.

http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2920850

Bonjour,

Fidèle lecteur de votre site (depuis deux ans maintenant), je souhaite vous posez une question au sujet du forum et suite à votre “article” sur ce thème:

Pourquoi ne pas proposer un véritable forum de discussion (organisé), où le débat et l’échange entre lecteurs pourait avoir lieu ?

Evidemment cela demande du travail, peut être les lecteurs et membres du forum pourraient y participer.

Merci

François ;o)

Tony Blair est épargné malgré la faillite de ses services sur l’Irak

LE MONDE | 15.07.04 | 13h45

Des renseignements “sérieusement défectueux”, des sources “peu fiables”: le rapport d’enquête de Lord Butler, rendu public le 14 juillet, accable le Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Mais le premier ministre est blanchi de toute accusation de pression ou de manipulation.
Londres de notre correspondant

Les services secrets britanniques ont failli, mais pas le premier ministre Tony Blair. Telle est la conclusion essentielle à laquelle est parvenue la commission d’enquête présidée par Lord Butler, dans son rapport publié à Londres mercredi 14 juillet.  La commission critique le Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) pour avoir fait une fausse estimation de l’arsenal irakien, fondée sur des renseignements “sérieusement défectueux” fournis par des sources “peu fiables”, et qui a offert au gouvernement la justification légale de l’entrée en guerre contre l’Irak. Mais elle exonère Tony Blair et ses principaux collaborateurs de toute responsabilité dans ces défaillances.

Selon le rapport Butler, le MI6 a, dans la crise irakienne, gravement manqué de rigueur dans ses analyses, de prudence dans ses déductions et de clarté dans la manière de les présenter au pouvoir politique. L’indigence de ses sources, la fragilité de ses informations, le manque de moyens humains pour les vérifier, la légèreté dans sa manière de transformer des soupçons en quasi-certitudes, l’oubli de recourir au doute - cette vertu cardinale du métier - révèlent des carences propres à désespérer tous ceux qui portaient au pinacle les Services de Sa Majesté.

Rien n’illustre mieux ces faiblesses d’analyse et de présentation que la fameuse affaire des “45 minutes”, un délai suffisant à l’Irak, affirmait Londres, pour déployer ses armes de destruction massive (ADM). Cette information a été transmise à Tony Blair le 10 septembre 2002 par le chef du MI6 en personne, sur la base d’une seule source, nouvelle et “non testée”.

L’information n’a pas été soumise aux experts compétents mais a suffi pour durcir le dossier gouvernemental en préparation sur l’armement irakien. Le dossier en question, publié deux semaines plus tard, ne soufflait mot de ces deux détails majeurs.

Lord Butler ne blâme, pour ces erreurs, “aucun individu en particulier”. “C’était une opération collective, a-t-il déclaré mercredi dans sa conférence de presse, où nous avons identifié des échecs. Mais il n’y a eu, de la part du gouvernement, aucune tentative de tromperie délibérée.”

“PERSONNE N’A MENTI”

Dans quelle mesure les chefs du renseignement se sont-ils laissé contaminer par l’ambiance politique du moment, en particulier par le désir de Tony Blair d’épauler George Bush dans sa croisade anti-Saddam ? Les maîtres-espions ont-ils fauté gravement en présentant, consciemment ou non, au premier ministre ce qu’il souhaitait entendre, comme l’avait déjà suggéré en janvier dernier, dans son propre rapport, le juge Hutton ?

Les termes de sa mission empêchaient Lord Butler de répondre à ces questions. Il relève néanmoins qu’une “certaine tension"existait entre le désir du gouvernement de produire un dossier convaincant et le souci d’objectivité des services. Il souhaite qu’à l’avenir, la responsabilité de ce genre de document soit assumée par le pouvoir politique, et non par les professionnels du renseignement. Il déplore que le caractère trop “informel” des procédures de travail au sein du cabinet lors de cette crise - par exemple l’absence de prise de notes - ait réduit les chances d’“un jugement politique collectif informé”. Lorsqu’il était à la tête de la fonction publique, Lord Butler critiquait l’influence accrue des conseillers au style débridé aux dépens des hauts fonctionnaires.

En l’absence de coupable, aucune tête ne devrait donc a priori “rouler”. Tony Blair ne sera pas contraint de voler au secours de John Scarlett, le président du Comité conjoint des services de renseignements (JIC), responsable de la rédaction du dossier controversé. L’intéressé avait, lors de l’enquête Hutton, largement contribué à innocenter le premier ministre. Il prendra les rênes du MI6 début août.

Le contraste est frappant entre la promotion de John Scarlett et le sort de George Tenet, le patron de la CIA récemment démissionnaire. Le MI6 a déclaré “accepter pleinement” les recommandations de Lord Butler.

Tony Blair, lui, sort blanchi d’une nouvelle enquête, la quatrième sur la guerre en Irak. “Personne n’a menti. Personne n’a manipulé des renseignements. Personne n’a inséré des choses dans le dossier contre l’avis des services secrets”,a-t-il souligné lors du débat aux Communes qui a suivi la publication du rapport. M. Blair a dit “assumer l’entière responsabilité des erreurs commises dans la présentation du problème” et espéré que le débat sur sa “bonne foi” serait désormais clos. Il a amorcé - mais sans plus - un mea culpa en admettant que “les preuves concernant les ADM de Saddam étaient moins fondées qu’il n’avait été dit à l’époque”.

Faute de pouvoir mettre en cause l’intégrité de M. Blair, le chef conservateur Michael Howard a sévèrement mis en doute sa compétence : “Le premier ministre est-il encore crédible ?” Quant à la seule question qui importe à de nombreux Britanniques - “M. Blair a-t-il vu juste en entraînant son pays dans la guerre ?” -, et à laquelle Lord Butler n’était pas chargé de répondre, elle sera tranchée par les électeurs et le jugement de l’Histoire.

Jean-Pierre Langellier

• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 16.07.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3218,36-372644,0.html

July 16, 2004
A Pause for Hindsight
ver the last few months, this page has repeatedly demanded that President Bush acknowledge the mistakes his administration made when it came to the war in Iraq, particularly its role in misleading the American people about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and links with Al Qaeda. If we want Mr. Bush to be candid about his mistakes, we should be equally open about our own.

During the run-up to the war, The Times ran dozens of editorials on Iraq, and our insistence that any invasion be backed by “broad international support” became a kind of mantra. It was the administration’s failure to get that kind of consensus that ultimately led us to oppose the war.

But we agreed with the president on one critical point: that Saddam Hussein was concealing a large weapons program that could pose a threat to the United States or its allies. We repeatedly urged the United Nations Security Council to join with Mr. Bush and force Iraq to disarm.

As we’ve noted in several editorials since the fall of Baghdad, we were wrong about the weapons. And we should have been more aggressive in helping our readers understand that there was always a possibility that no large stockpiles existed.

At the time, we believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding large quantities of chemical and biological weapons because we assumed that he would have behaved differently if he wasn’t. If there were no weapons, we thought, Iraq would surely have cooperated fully with weapons inspectors to avoid the pain of years under an international embargo and, in the end, a war that it was certain to lose.

That was a reasonable theory, one almost universally accepted in Washington and widely credited by diplomats all around the world. But it was only a theory. American intelligence had not received any on-the-ground reports from Iraq since the Clinton administration resorted to punitive airstrikes in 1998 and the U.N. weapons inspectors were withdrawn. The weapons inspectors who returned in 2002 found Iraq’s records far from transparent, and their job was never made easy. But they did not find any evidence of new weapons programs or stocks of prohibited old ones. When American intelligence agencies began providing them tips on where to look, they came up empty.

It may be that Saddam Hussein destroyed his stockpiles of banned weapons under the assumption that he could restart his program at a later date. His cat-and-mouse game with the weapons inspectors may have been the result of paranoia, or an attempt to flaunt his toughness before the Iraqi people. But we’re not blaming ourselves for failing to understand the thought process of an unpredictable dictator. Even if we had been aware before the war of the total bankruptcy of the American intelligence estimates on Iraq, we could not have argued with any certainty that there were no chemical and biological weapons.

But we do fault ourselves for failing to deconstruct the W.M.D. issue with the kind of thoroughness we directed at the question of a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, or even tax cuts in time of war. We did not listen carefully to the people who disagreed with us. Our certainty flowed from the fact that such an overwhelming majority of government officials, past and present, top intelligence officials and other experts were sure that the weapons were there. We had a groupthink of our own.

By the time the nation was on the brink of war, we did conclude that whatever the risk of Iraq’s weaponry, it was outweighed by the damage that could be done by a pre-emptive strike against a Middle Eastern nation that was carried out in the face of wide international opposition. If we had known that there were probably no unconventional weapons, we would have argued earlier and harder that invading Iraq made no sense.

Saddam Hussein was indisputably a violent and vicious tyrant, but an unprovoked attack that antagonized the Muslim world and fractured the international community of peaceful nations was not the solution. There were, and are, equally brutal and potentially more dangerous dictators in power elsewhere. Saddam Hussein and his rotting army were not a threat even to the region, never mind to the United States.

Now that we are in Iraq, we must do everything possible to see that the country is stabilized before American forces are withdrawn. But that commitment should be based on honesty. Just as we cannot undo the invasion, we cannot pretend that it was a good idea — even if it had been well carried out.

Congress would never have given President Bush a blank check for military action if it had known that there was no real evidence that Iraq was likely to provide aid to terrorists or was capable of inflicting grave damage on our country or our allies. Many politicians who voted to authorize the war still refuse to admit that they made a mistake. But they did. And even though this page came down against the invasion, we regret now that we didn’t do more to challenge the president’s assumptions.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/16/opinion/16FRI1.html?th

Ce thème majeur pour l’Europe doit être discuté plus ouvertement qu’il ne l’est et nos ministres de la Defense questionnés

Guai a chi tocca i Signori del Denaro

Dietro l?uscita di scena di Tremonti c?è il volere dei poteri forti, attuato su commissione dai soliti picciotti. Non a caso per il posto lasciato vuoto è subito saltata fuori la candidatura di Mario Monti, eurocrate affiliato
al Bilderberg. L’usurocrazia è il nostro destino ineluttabile?

di Mario Consoli

>
> Le dimissioni da ministro dell?Economia imposte a
> Giulio Tremonti la notte
> tra venerdì e sabato 3 luglio, rappresentano molto di
> più che il punto d?arrivo
> di una verifica tra forze che compongono una
> maggioranza di governo frastornata
> per i risultati delle elezioni europee.
> Si scrive ?dimissioni?, ma si deve leggere ?esecuzione
> su commissione?.
> Killer, il solito Gianfranco Fini, intento a

> collezionare cambiali di benemerenza
> tratte dai ?poteri forti?, convinto di poterle mettere
> un giorno tutte all?incasso
> e così ottenere quella poltrona che attualmente ospita
> le terga del signor
> Berlusconi.
> A noi sembra che, tra gente di mafia, raramente il
> picciotto che esegue
> riesca ad arrivare alla cupola. Generalmente è
> destinato a rimanere picciotto
> a vita, condannato a ubbidire per non essere eliminato
> a sua volta. Ma,
> sinceramente, questo è un problema di Fini e a noi non
> interessa granché.
> In questa occasione, il lavoro di killeraggio peraltro
> è risultato molto
> agevole, anche grazie all?assenza di quel Bossi che
> prima di ammalarsi ha
> ripetutamente svolto una preziosa opera di
> ?contrappeso? e di ?cane da guardia?
> in quel caravanserraglio che è il governo Berlusconi.
> Con il ?senatur?,
> probabilmente, non si sarebbe giunti così facilmente
> alle dimissioni di
> Tremonti.
> Intendiamoci, non è certo nostra intenzione farci
> avvocati difensori di
> un ministro di un governo il cui operato certamente
> non condividiamo.
> A noi però le notizie piace leggerle per quello che
> sono e non per quello
> che sembrano. A noi piace vederci chiaro. Ci chiediamo
> quindi da dove è
> partito l?ordine.
> A chi Tremonti ha pestato i piedi con tanta insistenza
> da meritarsi di essere
> sbattuto giù dal treno in corsa?
> In molte occasioni l?ex ministro ha manifestato un
> legittimo fastidio per
> la soggezione che il mondo politico dimostra di fronte
> alla tirannide bancaria
> e monetaria. E, conseguentemente, ha lasciato
> intravvedere l?intenzione
> di trasferire alcuni poteri dalla Banca d?Italia a
> nuovi organi di controllo
> di nomina politica e governativa.
> Bankitalia, sarà utile ricordarlo, non è una vera e
> propria istituzione
> dello Stato, ma uno strano Ente i cui proprietari sono
> soprattutto le Banche,
> quindi i privati, e il placet, quello reale, quello
> che conta veramente,
> per la scelta del suo Governatore spetta alla Banca
> dei Regolamenti Internazionali
> di Basilea, il cui massimo azionista è la Federal
> Reserve USA.
> Nel 2003 scoppia il caso Cirio i cui bond erano stati
> offerti a piene mani
> dagli Istituti di Credito agli ignari risparmiatori.
> Il dito accusatore del ministro dell?Economia indica
> allora, con prontezza,
> la Banca d?Italia per i mancati controlli e delinea
> con insistenza una Commissione
> da istituire per tutelare il risparmio degli italiani.
> Da allora Tremonti, per non dimenticarsi della
> questione, ha utilizzato
> come portapenne sulla sua scrivania al ministero, un

> barattolo di pelati
> Cirio.
> Si arriva alla fine del 2003 e scoppia, con un botto
> ancora più forte, il
> caso Parmalat. Il duello Fazio-Tremonti, appena
> sopito, si riaccende ancor
> più violento.
> Dov?erano i controllori? Quali interessi copre Fazio?
> ?Occorre costruire
> un?authority unica per la tutela del risparmio,
> togliendo molti poteri alla
> Banca d?Italia?. Con urgenza.
> Fazio snobba il governo e non si presenta nemmeno per
> dare spiegazioni del
> suo operato.
> Le sentinelle dell?usurocrazia scattano, come morse
> dalla tarantola: ?Attenti.
> Bankitalia non si tocca? tuona Fassino.
> ?L?indipendenza della Banca d?Italia è una questione
> costituzionale?, non
> può essere messa in discussione; fa sapere l?ex
> banchiere Carlo Azeglio
> Ciampi.
> I mesi passano, chiarimenti non si raggiungono.
> Ignoriamo se Tremonti abbia
> messo, sulla sua scrivania, accanto al barattolo di
> pelati, anche una bottiglia
> di latte, fattostà che i suoi toni non si

> addolciscono. Il 27 marzo denuncia
> che Bankitalia ?ha perso 4,6 miliardi sui cambi con il
> dollaro perché ha
> dimenticato di fare la copertura… Qualcosa non gira.
> Invece Bank of Austria
> finanzia la ricerca e Bundesbank propone al suo
> governo di finanziarla mettendo
> a disposizione le riserve auree?.
> Apriti Cielo! Si possono immaginare il livore e la
> rabbia sui volti di chi
> occupa i grigi palazzi del potere monetario e
> usurario.
> Nella Festa del 2 giugno, al Quirinale, è invitata
> tutta la cupola bancaria,
> a scapito degli altri, in netta minoranza. Molti più
> banchieri che politici
> e imprenditori contati assieme. Una svista di chi ha
> redatto gli inviti,
> una combinazione, un fatto preoccupante? O una
> minaccia?
> Fatto sta che passa un mese e la testa di Giulio
> Tremonti, il ?nemico? di
> Fazio, è bella che saltata.
> Il killer ha agito con calma, ha atteso con la sua
> lupara, ben appostato,
> l?occasione più propizia; ha perfino preferito agire
> in piena notte come
> in tutti i gialli che si rispettino.

> Ha agito con tale efficacia da beccarsi addirittura un
> rimbrotto ?dall?alto?,
> per eccesso di zelo. ?Il Governatore Antonio Fazio -
> riferisce l?informatissimo
> Corriere della Sera - si aspettava piuttosto un
> ridimensionamento del ministro
> dell?Economia Giulio Tremonti. Visto che il voto alle
> elezioni europee aveva
> premiato all?interno della maggioranza le forze, come
> UDC e AN, più benevole
> nei confronti della Banca d?Italia. O comunque più
> restie ad assecondare
> il braccio di ferro tra il ministero di via XX
> Settembre e l?istituto di

> via Nazionale. Le dimissioni di Tremonti avrebbero
> dunque un po? sorpreso
> Fazio. Ma c?è da scommettere che non gli abbiano fatto
> dispiacere?.
> E poi, alla fin fine, Tremonti se l?è cavata con poco.
> In passato altri
> scontri col mondo della moneta e dell?usura hanno
> avuto epiloghi più drastici.
> Nel 1989, al crollo del muro di Berlino, il governo
> tedesco affidò il nuovo
> corso dell?economia, quello della riunificazione, ad
> Alfred Herrnhausen.
> Un ?patriota tedesco?, come lo definì il Cancelliere
> Kohl, dalle idee chiare
> e dalla volontà di ferro. Lui voleva il risanamento
> delle aziende, garantire

> posti di lavoro, ma al tempo stesso realizzare un
> buono sviluppo tecnologico:
> ?Entro 10 anni la Germania Est sarà il complesso
> industriale tecnologicamente
> più avanzato d?Europa?.
> Chiese al Fondo Monetario Internazionale e alla Banca
> Mondiale di dimezzare
> il peso del debito che gravava sui paesi dell?Est,
> concedendo una moratoria
> di almeno 5-7 anni, grazie alla quale questi paesi
> avrebbero potuto investire
> i propri capitali nella ricostruzione. I due
> interlocutori mondialisti risposero
> picche.
> Herrnhausen allora si preparò ad affrontare
> l?argomento a viso aperto, a
> New York, proprio di fronte alla nomenklatura
> finanziaria internazionale.
> Preparò un discorso pieno di nuove proposte e di nuove
> soluzioni: una ?Banca
> dello sviluppo?, un energico dirigismo finanziario,
> una nuova forma di capitalismo
> ?della volontà?. Praticamente tutto il contrario
> dell?attuale ?libero mercato?.
> Il discorso era previsto per il 4 dicembre 1989.
> Quattro giorni prima, mentre
> Herrnhausen usciva dalla sua villa nella periferia di
> Francoforte, si udì
> un assordante boato. Una bomba radiocomandata l?aveva
> fatto saltare in aria
> assieme alla sua Mercedes.
> Il governo allora mise a capo del nascente Ente che
> raccoglieva tutte le
> industrie della ex Germania dell?Est - la
> Treuhandanstalt - l?economista
> Detlev Rohwedder.
> Mentre già i finanzieri internazionali si stavano
> preparando al saccheggio
> di tutte quelle aziende che, considerandole
> ?obsolete?, volevano rilevare
> con pochi spiccioli, Rohwedder oppose un netto
> rifiuto.
> ?Un liberismo di mercato di tipo dottrinario non
> funziona, dobbiamo privilegiare
> una politica di risanamento rispetto alle
> privatizzazioni. Non sono venuto
> a dirigere la Treuhand come un uomo d?affari. Lo
> faccio per amore della
> mia patria?, affermò in un?intervista il 30 marzo
> 1991.
> Il 2 aprile fu colpito a morte, a casa sua, a
> Dusseldorf, da un colpo di
> carabina a raggi infrarossi che lo raggiunse
> attraverso la finestra.
> A questo punto il suo posto fu affidato a Brigit
> Brenel, figlia di banchiere
> e amica di banchieri. Con lei cominciò la svendita
> delle aziende e il saccheggio
> ebbe luogo.
> Un importante insegnamento può trarsi dunque dalla
> vicenda Tremonti come
> - ancor di più - da quelle di Herrnhausen e di
> Rohwedder.
> I padroni del mondo ci sono davvero. Sono gli uomini
> del denaro e dell?usura.
> E sono forti, e vendicativi. E come tutti i poteri
> mafiosi sono soliti mandare
> i propri killer che, alla bisogna, sanno anche
> uccidere.
> E spargono per il mondo tutti i loro affiliati, i loro
> servi, insomma i
> loro ?picciotti?. Che corrompono, controllano,
> ricattano, minacciano e ?riferiscono?.
> Sono grigi, viscidi e appiccicosi come quei giochini
> schifosi che andarono
> di moda qualche anno fa. Si attaccano ovunque ed è
> difficilissimo disfarsene.
> Non può illudersi, un ministro di un governo sempre
> disposto a porgersi
> prono ai desideri di ogni potente, di aver facoltà di
> fare impunemente la
> guerra a qualche signore del denaro. Una guerra così,
> a tarallucci e vino.
> Si tratta invece di una cosa molto, molto seria con
> cui l?Europa, ben dolorosamente,
> soprattutto nell?ultimo secolo, sta facendo i conti.
> E? ancora di più: è e sarà la storia di questo
> millennio appena iniziato.
> E? lo scontro tra i popoli e gli attuali padroni del
> mondo.
> E? il duello, che necessariamente sarà combattuto
> all?ultimo sangue, tra
> gli uomini liberi e i signori del denaro e dell?usura.
> E? una guerra vera.

Un petit aperçu du ton chez les durs. Avec pub pour Cryptome au passage :
http://cryptome.org/terror-coup.htm

TERRORISM AND THE ELECTION:

NO POSTPONEMENT, JUST BEDLAM AT THE POLLS AND A LOW TURNOUT ON THE WEST COAST IS BUSH’S PLAN FOR “VICTORY”

By Wayne Madsen

  Wayne Madsen is a Washington, DC-based investigative journalist and columnist. He served in the National Security Agency (NSA) during the Reagan administration and wrote the introduction to “Forbidden Truth”. He is the co-author, with John Stanton, of “America’s Nightmare: The Presidency of George Bush II.” His forthcoming book is titled: “Jaded Tasks: Big Oil, Black Ops, and Brass Plates.” Madsen can be reached at:

You have to give the right-wingers credit. The fear tactics they learned from arch-Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels remain at the front of their political playbook. First, they put out the notion that in the event of a terrorist attack around the time of the November 2 election, a postponement of the vote may be necessary. Second, they start talking about the Federal government’s response to such a scenario. It’s the second item we must all be focused upon.

The idea of terrorism affecting the election was first proffered by Reverend DeForest B. Soaries Jr, the Bush-appointed chairman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Soaries is a right-wing New Jersey Republican Secretary of State who has been living under the small “fanatics only” revival tent of the Christian fundamentalist crowd for some time. Soaries’s job is to ensure that there is no repeat of the 2000 Florida fiasco. However, he and his friends in the Bush administration (read that as Karl Rove and Tom DeLay primarily) may have their eyes set on causing a major West coast electoral disruption in 2004 that will make Florida 2000 look like a minor glitch by comparison.

As expected, suspecting a Bush conspiracy to cancel the election and remain in power until a determination would be made by Homeland Fuhrer Tom Ridge that an election was safe, the moderate, liberal, progressive, and libertarian communities cried foul. Postponing an election without a constitutional amendment would be a major breach of the Constitution (not that Bush has ever worried about his constitutional oath) and that would be impossible with only a little over three months before Election Day. Those who respect our Constitution pointed to the fact that President Abraham Lincoln did not cancel the 1864 presidential election during the Civil War – a war which saw this nation more at danger than it is during the current cable news bite-driven and somewhat sensationalist “Global War on Terrorism.”

The right wing had a different take on the possibility of an election postponement. Neo-fascist babble mongers like Rush Limbaugh said, “No!” to a postponement of the election. They argued that if a terrorist alert or attack were to occur, the election should go on and only those votes cast should be counted. Bingo! The plan for a second Bush administration became clear as day. And that plan’s target is California, with its whopping 54 electoral votes, and possibly Washington State’s 11 electoral votes, at stake.

In 2000, Bush and the election fraud cabal that included his brother, Florida Governor “Jebbie” Bush, and Jebbie’s old flame, Florida Secretary of State (now Congresswoman) Katherine Harris and Fox News election analyst John Ellis (Bush’s first cousin), engineered Bush’s phony Florida “win” using a combination of scrubbed electoral rolls that disenfranchised almost 100,000 African-Americans, confusing “butterfly ballots,” an early Fox projected Bush “win” in the Sunshine State, and voter intimidation at mainly rural polling places. As with Osama bin Laden and his band of zealots, the Bush team never uses the same tactic twice. Therefore, all eyes should shift from Florida this Election Day, to California, where one of Bush’s new minions, the Nazi-admiring Arnold Schwarzenegger, engineered a gubernatorial coup d’etat with the help of Enron’s Ken Lay and his Texas oil cronies, to seize control of the governorship from the reelected Democrat Gray Davis.

Clues to Republican motives are found back during that awful day in 2001. On September 11, the day of the terrorist attacks, New Yorkers were heading to the polls to vote in their mayoral primary. Under the direction of the outgoing incumbent mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, city election officials quickly postponed the election.  Giuliani, one who never misses an opportunity to emulate the former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, toyed with the idea of amending New York City’s term limits law so that he could run for mayor for a third consecutive term. Another Giuliani plan would have postponed the primary and regular mayoral election for one year, giving him at least one more year in office with the possibility of a change in the city law to allow him to run for a third term. Another plan would have made Giuliani a write-in candidate. Wary of Giuliani’s various proposed election contrivances and his intention to use the attack on the World Trade Center for his own political advantage, New York’s City Council and the New York State Legislature quickly put the kibosh to Giuliani postponing the election indefinitely, extending his term for one year, or amending the city’s term limit statute. The mayoral primary took place on September 25, two weeks after the terrorist attack, and the general election occurred on schedule on November 6. Michael Bloomberg was sworn in as the new mayor on January 1, 2002.

After having Tom Ridge drop the media bomb that an election cancellation was a possibility and then having National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice declare that no such plan existed, the cat was out of the bag. No, do not expect an election cancellation but be prepared for a terrorist “event” during the election. That is what the Bush White House and their media prostitutes are spinning.

Here’s the scenario we must be all be prepared for:

If the pre-election internal tracking polls and public opinion polls show the Kerry-Edwards ticket leading in key battleground states, the Bush team will begin to implement their plan to announce an imminent terrorist alert for the West Coast for November 2 sometime during the mid afternoon Pacific Standard Time. At 2:00 PST, the polls in Kentucky and Indiana will be one hour from closing (5:00 PM EST – the polls close in Indiana and Kentucky at 6:00 PM EST). Exit polls in both states will be known to the Bush people by that time and if Kentucky (not likely Indiana) looks too close to call or leaning to Kerry-Edwards, the California plan will be implemented. A Bush problem in Kentucky at 6:00 PM EST would mean that problems could be expected in neighboring states and that plans to declare a state of emergency in California would begin in earnest at 3:00 PM PST.

The U.S. Northern Command, which has military jurisdiction over the United States, will, along with the Department of Homeland Security and Schwarzenegger’s police and homeland security officials in Sacramento, declare an “imminent” terrorist threat – a RED ALERT—affecting California’s major urban areas.

Although the polls in California will not be closed as a result of the declaration, the panic that sets in and the early rush hour will clog major traffic arteries and change the plans of many voters to cast their ballot after work.

That terrorist emergency declaration could be made around 5:00 PM PST and with only three hours left for voting throughout the state, a number of working class voters in urban centers will either be caught up in California’s infamous freeway traffic and be too late to get to their polling places or be more concerned about their families and avoid voting altogether.

Without a doubt, many Democratic voters might simply opt to pick their kids up from day care centers or relatives and then go home without voting. These would tend to be the lower and middle income Californians and the Democratic base. The affluent voters in California who vote Republicans and can easily vote early (and be late for work) or have the option of leaving work at any time during the day to vote will have likely already cast their ballots. Therefore, the recipe of a White House-induced California terrorist alert and a low Democratic turnout could toss 54 electoral votes into Bush’s lap, especially if the scare tactics affect the turnout in such urban and typically pro-Democratic vote-rich areas as Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Sacramento.

At 7:00 PM EST (4:00 PM PST), the polls will close in Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. A half hour later, they close in North Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia. If Kerry-Edwards wins Florida and that is coupled with similar pickups in Ohio, West Virginia and too-close-to-call races in Virginia and maybe North Carolina, the Bush team may seek to extend the terror alert to other Western or even Midwestern states, particularly Washington State (since Oregon votes by mail, it would be largely immune from any polling manipulation on Election Day). A terrorist alert for the Seattle area after 5:00 PM PST would result in a similar situation to that of California’s, with the exception that many potential voters could be trapped on Seattle’s commuter ferries. Washington’s polls close at 8:00 PM PST (11:PM EST). A low Democratic turnout in the vote-rich Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton area could be offset by a large Republican turnout in eastern Washington, thus possibly throwing the state’s 11 electoral votes to Bush – a net pick up 65 electoral votes from the West Coast, adding those votes to California’s. If Kerry picks up Ohio and some border states, the Bush team will be looking for a West Coast electoral offset and a terrorist alert would be the key to replacing lost Bush electoral votes in Ohio (21 votes), Florida (25), and West Virginia (5), a total of 51 electoral votes for Kerry.

With the stage set for a terrorist alert on the West Coast and with the polls closing at 8 PM EST (5:00 PM PST and launch time for the terrorist alert) in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas, we might be looking at the following electoral vote tally:

Kerry:

Florida (25); New Hampshire (4); Vermont (3); Ohio (21); West Virginia (5); Connecticut (8); Delaware (3); DC (3); Illinois (22); Maine (4); Maryland (10); Massachusetts (12); Michigan (18); New Jersey (15); Pennsylvania (23). Total: 176 (needed to win: 270).

Bush:

Indiana (12); Kentucky (8); Georgia (13); South Carolina (8); Virginia (13); North Carolina (14); Alabama (9); Kansas (6); Mississippi (7); Missouri (11); Oklahoma (8); Tennessee (11); Texas (32). Total: 152 (needed to win: 270).

At 8:30 PM EST (and a half hour into the West Coast terror alert), the polls close in Arkansas and its 6 electoral votes are added to Bush’s column, giving him 158 to Kerry’s 176.

At 9:00 PM EST, the polls close in Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. With Kerry picking up Louisiana (9 votes), Minnesota (10), New Mexico (5), New York (33), Rhode Island (4), and Wisconsin (11), his vote total would stand at 248.

With Bush picking up Arizona (8), Colorado (8), Nebraska (5), North Dakota (3), South Dakota (3), and Wyoming (3), his vote count would stand at 188.

At 10:00 PM EST, the polls will close in mainly Bush states. With Bush picking up Idaho (4 votes); Montana (3); Nevada (4); and Utah (5) and with Kerry likely grabbing Iowa (7), the vote count would stand at: Kerry: 255 and Bush: 204.

With an hour to go before polls close on the West Coast and the region enmeshed in a major terrorist alert with cops and National Guardsmen now adding to the mix and possibly closing roads and delaying traffic to the polling places, Bush’s team in Washington and Sacramento would be poised to deliver the death blow to Kerry-Edwards.

At 11:00 PM EST and 8:00 PM PST, the polls close in California, Oregon, and Washington. The fix is in: with California (the mother lode of 54 votes) and Washington (11 votes) going to Bush and Oregon (7 votes) possibly going to Kerry, the vote count stands at: Kerry: 262 and Bush: 269. Sometime in the wee hours of the morning of November 3, Alaska (3 votes) is declared for Bush and he is declared the winner with 272 votes to Kerry’s 266 (with Kerry’s pickup of Hawaii’s 4 electoral votes). It’s a down-to-the wire race with Bush being declared a winner without a Supreme Court fight but using his “homeland security” powers to ensure his re-election and Alaska putting him over the top.

That is what all this talk about a terrorist attack on Election Day is about. It is to prime the population and allow Bush surrogates at Fox News, CNN, and MS-NBC to begin their perception management campaign that an attack will occur around the election. But there will be no postponement of the election or cancellation – this is simply another plan to manipulate the public through the use of phony threats and fear tactics. The problem is that it just might work for Bush and his cabal of “the ends justify the means” manipulators.

This article is a wakeup call to all those who can try to forestall such a series of events. California’s Democratic majority in the state legislature and its Democratic Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General must take steps now to ensure Schwarzenegger does not conspire with his fellow Republicans in Washington to do to California in 2004 what Jebbie Bush and his people did to Florida in 2000. Similarly, Washington’s Democratic Governor Gary Locke and all the Democratic officials, including the two Democratic U.S. Senators, must take similar action to avoid a similar scenario in their state.

Action needed now includes:

1. Informing all state election officials about such a scenario and its potential impact on voter turnout.

2. Making contingency plans now to keep the polling places open to ensure that people can vote later or after any state of emergency is lifted.

3. Prevent the National Guard from being used to facilitate such a state of emergency.

4. Close coordination by the Democratic Party, smaller parties, and minority and labor rights organizations to respond to such a scenario.

To paraphrase James Carville, “It’s California and the voter turnout, stupid!” Forget about canceling or postponing the election. Keep your eye on a “Red Terrorist Alert” on the West Coast for Election Day. That doesn’t take a constitutional amendment, merely an okay from Bush and his homeland security team. They must be stopped – the future of this nation is at stake!

THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ
Spy Agencies in Britain Erred as Well
By Janet Stobart and Sebastian Rotella

LATimes Staff Writers

July 15, 2004

LONDON — British spy agencies used unreliable sources and exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq, but the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair did not deliberately mislead the public in making the case for war, an investigative commission concluded Wednesday.

The 196-page report by Robin Butler, a former head of the civil service, was less critical than a similar U.S. Senate document last week that scolded U.S. spy agencies for erroneously describing Iraq’s weapons programs as active and dangerous.

Blair’s critics said Wednesday that the prime minister had benefited from a “whitewash.”

But Blair told Parliament that although he took full responsibility for intelligence failures, the report confirmed that his decision to go to war was justified, even if no weapons of mass destruction had been found and evidence of their existence looked increasingly weak.

“No one lied, no one made up intelligence…. That issue of good faith should be at an end,” said Blair, who remained bruised but defiant after the fourth official inquiry into his unpopular decision to join the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

He added: “I cannot honestly say that I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all.”

Despite the gentlemanly tone of Butler’s report, he and the four other commission members nonetheless reached some damaging conclusions. The report found that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq “did not have significant — if any — stocks of biological and chemical weapons in a state fit for deployment or developed plans for using them.”

The report criticized the government for making allegations based on intelligence data without including vital caveats and doubts expressed by British spies. The pressure to provide an analysis that could help the government advocate its aggressive policy toward Iraq put a “strain” on the intelligence community, Butler said.

He singled out the government’s unprecedented public presentation of intelligence data in September 2002, which gave the inaccurate impression that Hussein could unleash long-range chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes.

“We conclude that it was a serious weakness that … warnings on the limitations of the intelligence underlying its judgments were not made sufficiently clear,” the report said.

Recent inquiries by British officials have raised questions about the validity of the source behind the much-debated 45-minute claim, according to the report.

The U.S. Senate report last week found that the CIA and other agencies relied heavily on dubious information from exile groups. British and U.S. intelligence agencies have worked together on Iraq and other trouble spots.

But British spies did not fall prey to manipulation by Iraqi defectors or exiles whose claims have been largely discredited, according to the Butler report.

Butler said three of five main agents working for Britain inside Iraq before the war turned out to be either unreliable or of limited value. The two other agents provided solid intelligence, and “tended to present a less worrying view of the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capability than that from the sources whose reporting is now subject to doubt,” the report said.

The government’s erroneous portrayal of Hussein’s arsenal was compounded by a shortage of experienced intelligence analysts and a failure to share some information with the Defense Ministry’s arms experts, according to the report.

“The report highlights a failure of the interface between the intelligence community and the government,” said Charles Heyman, editor of Jane’s World Armies. “The government was interpreting the intelligence in the wrong way. The culture was that this is what Tony [Blair] wants to hear, so they were able to cherry-pick the intelligence analysis.”

Critics said this blurring of the line between politics and intelligence resembled the aggressive White House campaign for military action against Iraq that now has become a liability for the Bush administration.

Michael Howard, leader of the Conservative opposition, charged that Blair misled Britons when he called Iraq an urgent threat.

“The prime minister said he was in no doubt and that the intelligence was beyond doubt,” Howard said during the parliamentary debate, contrasting Blair’s impassioned prewar speeches with Wednesday’s report.

“It’s now clear that in many ways the intelligence services got it wrong. But their assessments included serious caveats, qualifications and cautions. When presenting his case to the country, the prime minister chose to leave out those qualifications, caveats and cautions,” he said.

Howard then addressed Blair directly. “I hope we will not face in this country another war in the foreseeable future,” Howard said, “but if we did and you identified the threat, would the country believe you?”

The Iraq crisis has weakened Blair, Britain’s most dominant politician since Margaret Thatcher. Nonetheless, the splintered opposition parties have not yet produced a challenger who seems capable of taking him on, pundits say. Blair’s most serious opposition comes from within his Labor Party, whose left wing vigorously opposed the war and feels both betrayed and vindicated.

“It’s clear we went to war on a false premise, on George Bush’s say-so,” said Alice Mahon, a Labor member of Parliament who voted against the war. “Who is responsible? Why was intelligence so flawed? Why did so many people die?”

Geraldine Smith of the Labor Party, a reluctant supporter of the decision to attack Iraq, seemed to articulate the view of fellow lawmakers who felt disappointed.

“I would not have voted for regime change in Iraq if I had known there were no weapons of mass destruction,” Smith told a television interviewer.

Dissatisfaction with Blair has led to speculation that he might eventually step aside for Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, the other powerhouse in the Labor Party. But there were no immediate signs that Wednesday’s events had further endangered Blair or his key aides.

Butler took pains to defend John Scarlett, chief of the MI6 intelligence service. Before the war, Scarlett headed the Joint Intelligence Committee, an agency that coordinates intelligence analysis and acts as a bridge between the prime minister and spy agencies.

Scarlett’s committee prepared the public dossier about Iraq in September 2002 that generated allegations of distortion. It also set off a scandal last summer when a Defense Ministry scientist, who had criticized the Iraq dossier in an off-the-record interview with a BBC reporter, committed suicide after he was later publicly identified by the government.

Butler concluded in his report that the decision to push the intelligence community into the public spotlight was ill-advised.

“It was asked to do things that I don’t think it should have been doing in the sense that I think that intelligence and public relations need to be kept separate,” said Field Marshal Peter Inge, a member of the commission.

Butler told reporters that he hoped Scarlett would not resign because he shared only part of the blame.

Infiltrating Hussein’s regime was difficult, Butler noted, and many other countries believed that Iraq had a lethal arsenal even though they opposed military action.

Britain’s intelligence on Iraq also suffered because many top Middle East specialists were assigned to gather intelligence on the Al Qaeda terrorist network and were shifted belatedly to Iraq as the war approached, said Heyman and other analysts.

Butler’s apparent reluctance to assign individual blame led some critics to dismiss the report as a case of a government insider protecting his bosses. But Heyman said the inquiry was relatively tough within the context of British political culture.

“It barks up the same tree as the Senate report, but it’s not so cutting,” Heyman said. “It’s far more bland. But it’s not a fudge. We have seen a report in the American fashion with some pretty stark conclusions drawn. And we have seen a report in the British fashion where the conclusions don’t have the same cutting edge.”

——
Stobart reported from London and Rotella from Paris.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-britintel15jul15.story

‘Serious flaws’ in Iraq intelligence
The quality of the intelligence used to make the case for Britain going to war with Iraq has now been thrown into doubt, the Butler inquiry has said.
The 196 page report says MI6 did not check its sources well enough, and sometimes relied on third hand reports.
It says the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) should not have claimed Iraq could use WMD within 45 minutes without explaining what that meant.
But it said JIC chairman John Scarlett should still be the new boss of MI6.
US criticisms
Intelligence chiefs’ warnings about the limits of their information were not made clear enough in the government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the report says.
“This was a weakness,” Lord Butler concludes.
Tony Blair’s statement to MPs may have reinforced the impression that there was “firmer and fuller intelligence”, the report continues.
Lord Butler’s team says ministers and officials and the intelligence agencies should have re-assessed the information as it become increasingly clear that UN Inspectors were not finding any WMD in the months immediately before the war.
The inquiry concludes there was no evidence of “deliberate distortion” of intelligence by politicians.
And the inquiry said it hoped John Scarlett will still take up his job as the new director of MI6.
Lord Butler was asked by No 10 to look at the accuracy of Britain’s pre-war intelligence after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He is now outlining his report, before Tony Blair faces MPs at 1330 BST.
The report follows a US Senate inquiry severely criticising American intelligence agencies for the quality of their pre-war information.
The prime minister last week admitted banned weapons might never be found in Iraq.
In January Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly cleared the government of inserting material it “knew to be probably wrong” against the wishes of the intelligence community in its dossier on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.
But the new inquiry has looked at the quality of the intelligence used to justify the case for war.
It is also expected to have re-examined the way that intelligence was presented to the public and MPs.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/3890961.stm

Published: 2004/07/14 12:01:28 GMT

© BBC MMIV
Review of Intelligence
on
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Report of a Committee
of
Privy Counsellors
Chairman:
The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This summary follows the order of the Chapters of our Report. It comprises the passages
we have highlighted in each Section and is intended to convey the gist of our Conclusions.
However, we emphasise the importance of reading the Sections of the Report in full since
the picture of the sources, assessment and use of intelligence is necessarily complicated
and our Conclusions need to be read in context in order to be fully understood.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf
CHAPTER 2 – COUNTRIES OF CONCERN OTHER THAN IRAQ AND GLOBAL
TRADE
1. All four of the case studies we discuss (AQ Khan, Libya, Iran, North Korea) were to a
greater or lesser extent success stories. To a degree, that was inevitable – we chose those
cases where intelligence about nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile
programmes and proliferation activities can be discussed precisely because it has
contributed to disclosure of those activities. But that should not detract from what has
clearly been an impressive performance by the intelligence community and policy-makers
in each case, and overall. (Paragraph 107)
2. A number of common threads have become clear from our examination of each case. The first and most obvious is the powerful effect of exploiting the linkages where they exist between suppliers (AQ Khan; North Korea) and buyers (Iran; Libya; others) for counterproliferation activity. It is in the nature of proliferation that what can be discovered about a supplier leads to information about the customer, and vice versa. The second thread flows from this – the powerful multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) collaboration. Third, this is painstaking work, involving the piecing together over extended timescales of often fragmentary information. There are the surprises and ‘lucky breaks’. But they often come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years. It requires close collaboration between all involved, in agencies and departments, to build the jigsaw, with teams able to have access to available intelligence and to make the most of each clue. It also depends on continuity of shared purpose amongst collectors and analysts, and between the intelligence and policy communities, in gathering, assessing and using intelligence in tackling proliferation and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes which are destabilising in security terms.
(Paragraphs 108/109)
CHAPTER 3 – TERRORISM
3. All of the UK intelligence agencies are developing new techniques, and we have seen
clear evidence that they are co-operating at all levels. (Paragraph 133)
4. JTAC has now been operating for over a year and has proved a success. (Paragraph 134)
5. International counter-terrorism collaboration has also been significantly enhanced in the past six or seven years. Though we understand that other countries have not yet achieved the same level of inter-departmental synthesis, considerable developments have taken place. Staff of the UK intelligence and security agencies are today in much wider contact with their opposite numbers throughout the world. We note these initiatives, but remain concerned that the procedures of the international community are still not sufficiently aligned to match the threat. (Paragraph 136)
CHAPTER 4 – COUNTER-PROLIFERATION MACHINERY
6. Intelligence performs an important role in many aspects of the Government’s counterproliferation work. It helps to identify proliferating countries, organisations and individuals through JIC assessments, DIS proliferation studies and operational intelligence. It can help to interdict or disrupt the activities of proliferators either nationally or in co-operation with other countries. It can support diplomatic activity by revealing states’ attitudes to counter-proliferation or by informing the assessments of international partners. It can also support inspection, monitoring and verification regimes and on occasions military action. Intelligence can play an important part in enforcing export controls, particularly in relation to ‘dual-use’ goods and technologies. (Paragraphs 149/150)
CHAPTER 5 – IRAQ
THE POLICY CONTEXT
7. The developing policy context of the previous four years [see paragraphs 210–217] and
especially the impact of the events of 11 September 2001, formed the backdrop for
changes in policy towards Iraq in early 2002. The Government’s conclusion in the spring
of 2002 that stronger action (although not necessarily military action) needed to be taken
to enforce Iraqi disarmament was not based on any new development in the current
intelligence picture on Iraq. (Paragraph 427)
8. When the Government concluded that action going beyond the previous policy of
containment needed to be taken, there were many grounds for concern arising from Iraq’s past record and behaviour. There was a clear view that, to be successful, any new action to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations would need to be backed with the credible threat of force. But there was no recent intelligence that would itself have given rise to a conclusion that Iraq was of more immediate concern than the activities of some other countries. (Paragraph 427)
9. The Government, as well as being influenced by the concerns of the US Government, saw a need for immediate action on Iraq because of the wider historical and international
context, especially Iraq’s perceived continuing challenge to the authority of the United
Nations. The Government also saw in the United Nations and a decade of Security Council
Resolutions a basis for action through the United Nations to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. (Paragraph 428)
10. The Government considered in March 2002 two options for achieving the goal of Iraqi
disarmament - a toughening of the existing containment policy; and regime change by
military means. Ministers were advised that, if regime change was the chosen policy, only
the use of overriding force in a ground campaign would achieve the removal of Saddam
Hussein and Iraq’s re-integration with the international community. Officials noted that
regime change of itself had no basis in international law; and that any offensive military
action against Iraq could only be justified if Iraq were held to be in breach of its
disarmament obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 or some
new resolution. Officials also noted that for the five Permanent Members of the Security
Council and the majority of the 15 members of the Council to take the view that Iraq was
in breach of its obligations under Resolution 687, they would need to be convinced that
Iraq was in breach of its obligations; that such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity; but that the intelligence then available was insufficiently robust to meet that criterion. (Paragraph 429)
11. Intelligence on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes was
used in support of the execution of this policy to inform planning for a military campaign; to inform domestic and international opinion, in support of the Government’s advocacy of its changing policy towards Iraq; and to obtain and provide information to United Nations inspectors. (Paragraph 431)
12. Iraq was not the only issue on which the intelligence agencies, the JIC and the
departments concerned were working during this period. Other matters, including
terrorism and the activities of other countries of concern, were requiring intensive day-today observation and action. (Paragraph 432)
THE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE
13. Between 1991 and 1998, the bulk of information used in assessing the status of Iraq’s
biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes was derived from UNSCOM
reports. (Paragraph 433)
14. After the departure of the United Nations inspectors in December 1998, information
sources were sparse, particularly on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons
programmes. (Paragraph 433)
15. The number of primary human intelligence sources remained few. Other intelligence
sources provided valuable information on other activity, including overseas procurement
activity. They did not generally provide confirmation of the intelligence received from
human sources, but did contribute to the picture of the continuing intention of the Iraqi
regime to pursue its prohibited weapons programmes. (Paragraphs 434/435)
16. Validation of human intelligence sources after the war has thrown doubt on a high
proportion of those sources and of their reports, and hence on the quality of the
intelligence assessments received by Ministers and officials in the period from summer
2002 to the outbreak of hostilities. Of the main human intelligence sources:
a. One SIS main source reported authoritatively on some issues, but on others
was passing on what he had heard within his circle.
b. Reporting from a sub-source to a second SIS main source that was important
to JIC assessments on Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons
must be open to doubt.
c. Reports from a third SIS main source have been withdrawn as unreliable.
d. Reports from two further SIS main sources continue to be regarded as reliable,
although it is notable that their reports were less worrying than the rest about
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
e. Reports received from a liaison service on Iraqi production of biological agent
were seriously .awed, so that the grounds for JIC assessments drawing on
those reports that Iraq had recently-produced stocks of biological agent no
longer exist. (Paragraph 436)
17. We do not believe that over-reliance on dissident and emigre´ sources was a major cause of subsequent weaknesses in the human intelligence relied on by the UK. (Paragraph 438)
18. One reason for the number of agents whose reports turned out to be unreliable or
questionable may be the length of the reporting chains. Another reason may be that
agents who were known to be reliable were asked to report on issues going well beyond
their usual territory. A third reason may be that, because of the scarcity of sources and the urgent requirement for intelligence, more credence was given to untried agents than
would normally be the case. (Paragraphs 440–442)
19. A major underlying reason for the problems that have arisen was the difficulty of achieving reliable human intelligence on Iraq. However, even taking into account the difficulty of recruiting and running reliable agents on Iraqi issues, we conclude that part of the reason for the serious doubt being cast over a high proportion of human intelligence reports on Iraq arises from weaknesses in the effective application by SIS of its validation procedures and in their proper resourcing. Our Review has shown the vital importance of effective scrutiny and validation of human intelligence sources and of their reporting to the preparation of accurate JIC assessments and high-quality advice to Ministers. We urge the Chief of SIS to ensure that this task is properly resourced and organised to achieve that result, and we think that it would be appropriate if the Intelligence and Security Committee were to monitor this. (Paragraphs 443–445)
ASSESSMENT
20. In general, we found that the original intelligence material was correctly reported in JIC assessments. An exception was the ’45 minute’ report. But this sort of example was rare. (Paragraph 449)
21. We should record in particular that we have found no evidence of deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence. (Paragraph 449)
22. We found no evidence of JIC assessments and the judgements inside them being pulled in any particular direction to meet the policy concerns of senior officials on the JIC.
(Paragraph 450)
23. We conclude in general that the intelligence community made good use of the technical expertise available to the Government. (Paragraph 451)
24. We accept the need for careful handling of human intelligence reports to sustain the
security of sources. We have, however, seen evidence of difficulties that arose from the
unduly strict ‘compartmentalisation’ of intelligence. It was wrong that a report which was
of significance in the drafting of a document of the importance of the dossier was not
shown to key experts in the DIS who could have commented on the validity and credibility of the report. We conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to the most expert available analysis. (Paragraphs 452)
25. We were impressed by the quality of intelligence assessments on Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities. (Paragraphs 453)
26. Partly because of inherent difficulties in assessing chemical and biological programmes,
JIC assessments on Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes were less
assured. The most significant is the ‘dual use’ issue – because chemical and biological
weapons programmes can draw heavily on ‘dual use’ materials, it is easier for a
proliferating state to keep its programmes covert. (Paragraph 454/455)
27. There were also Iraq-specific factors. The intelligence community will have had in mind
that Iraq had not only owned but used its chemical weapons in the past. It will inevitably
have been influenced by the way in which the Iraqi regime was engaged in a sustained
programme to try to deceive United Nations inspectors. Most of the intelligence reports
on which assessments were being made were inferential. The Assessments Staff and JIC
were not fully aware of the access and background of key informants, and could not
therefore read their material against the background of an understanding of their
motivations. The broad conclusions of the UK intelligence community (although not some
particular details) were widely-shared by other countries. (Paragraphs 456/457)
28. We detected a tendency for assessments to be coloured by over-reaction to previous
errors. As a result, there was a risk of over-cautious or worst case estimates, shorn of their
caveats, becoming the ‘prevailing wisdom’. The JIC may, in some assessments, also have
misread the nature of Iraqi governmental and social structures. (Paragraph 458/459)
29. We emphasise the importance of the Assessments Staff and the JIC having access to a
wide range of information, especially in circumstances (e.g. where the UK is likely to
become involved in national reconstruction and institution-building) where information on political and social issues will be vital. (Paragraph 459)
THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE
30. The main vehicle for the Government’s use of intelligence in the public presentation of policy was the dossier of September 2002 and accompanying Ministerial statements. The dossier broke new ground in three ways: the JIC had never previously produced a public document; no Government case for any international action had previously been made to the British public through explicitly drawing on a JIC publication; and the authority of the British intelligence community, and the JIC in particular, had never been used in such a public way. (Paragraph 460/461)
31. The dossier was not intended to make the case for a particular course of action in relation to Iraq. It was intended by the Government to inform domestic and international
understanding of the need for stronger action (though not necessarily military action) – the general direction in which Government policy had been moving since the early months of 2002, away from containment to a more proactive approach to enforcing Iraqi
disarmament. (Paragraph 462)
32. The Government wanted an unclassified document on which it could draw in its advocacy of its policy. The JIC sought to offer a dispassionate assessment of intelligence and other material on Iraqi nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes. The JIC, with commendable motives, took responsibility for the dossier, in order that its content should properly reject the judgements of the intelligence community. They did their utmost to ensure this standard was met. But this will have put a strain on them in seeking to maintain their normal standards of neutral and objective assessment. (Paragraph 463)
33. Strenuous efforts were made to ensure that no individual statements were made in the dossier which went beyond the judgements of the JIC. But, in translating material from JIC assessments into the dossier, warnings were lost about the limited intelligence base on which some aspects of these assessments were being made. Language in the dossier may have left with readers the impression that there was fuller and former intelligence behind the judgements than was the case in our view, having reviewed all of the material, is that judgements in the dossier went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available. (Paragraph 464)
34. We conclude that it was a serious weakness that the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of the intelligence underlying its judgements were not made sufficiently clear in the dossier. (Paragraph 465)
35. We understand why the Government felt it had to meet the mounting public and
Parliamentary demand for information. We also recognise that there is a real dilemma
between giving the public an authoritative account of the intelligence picture and
protecting the objectivity of the JIC from the pressures imposed by providing information for public debate. It is difficult to resolve these requirements. We conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that making public that the JIC had authorship of the dossier was a mistaken judgement, though we do not criticise the JIC for taking responsibility for clearance of the intelligence content of the document. However, in the particular circumstances, the publication of such a document in the name and with the authority of the JIC had the result that more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear. The consequence also was to put the JIC and its Chairman into an area of public controversy and arrangements must be made for the future which avoid putting the JIC and its Chairman in a similar position. (Paragraph 466)
36. We believe that there are other options that should be examined for the ownership of drafting, for gaining the JIC’s endorsement of the intelligence material and assessments that are quoted and for subsequent ‘branding’. One is for the government of the day to draft a document, to gain the JIC’s endorsement of the intelligence material inside it and then to publish it acknowledging that it draws on intelligence but without ascribing it to the JIC. Or the Government, if it wishes to seek the JIC’s credibility and authority, could publish a document with intelligence material and the JIC’s endorsement of it shown separately. Or the JIC could prepare and publish itself a self-standing assessment, incorporating all of its normal caveats and warnings, leaving it to others to place that document within a broader policy context. This may make such documents less
persuasive in making a policy case; but that is the price of using a JIC assessment. Our
conclusion is that, between these options, the .rst is greatly preferable. Whichever route is chosen, JIC clearance of the intelligence content of any similar document will be essential. (Paragraph 467)
37. We conclude that, if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public
debate in future, those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations. It will
be essential, too, that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and
advocacy are established when doing so. (Paragraph 468)
38. We realise that our conclusions may provoke calls for the current Chairman of the JIC, Mr Scarlett, to withdraw from his appointment as the next Chief of SIS. We greatly hope that he will not do so. We have a high regard for his abilities and his record. (Paragraph 469)
39. The part played by intelligence in determining the legality of the use of force was limited. (Paragraph 470)
40. We have noted that, despite its importance to the determination of whether Iraq was in further material breach of its obligations under Resolution 1441, the JIC made no further assessment of the Iraqi declaration beyond its ‘Initial Assessment’ provided on 18
December. We have also recorded our surprise that policy-makers and the intelligence
community did not, as the generally negative results of UNMOVIC inspections became
increasingly apparent, re-evaluate in early 2003 the quality of the intelligence.
(Paragraph 472)
VALIDATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
41. Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons.
Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in the looting and disorder that
followed the cessation of hostilities. Other material may be hidden in the sand, including
stocks of agent or weapons. We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at
this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or
even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. But as a result of our
Review, and taking into account the evidence which has been found by the ISG and debriefing of Iraqi personnel, we have reached the conclusion that prior to the war the
Iraqi regime:
a. Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons
programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when
United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded
or lifted.
b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and
procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; but did not have significant – if any – stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state .t for
deployment, or developed plans for using them. (Paragraph 474)
CHAPTER 6 – IRAQ: SPECIFIC ISSUES
LINKS BETWEEN AL QAIDA AND THE IRAQI REGIME
42. The JIC made it clear that the Al Qaida-linked facilities in the Kurdish Ansar al Islam area
were involved in the production of chemical and biological agents, but that they were
beyond the control of the Iraqi regime. (Paragraph 479)
43. The JIC made clear that, although there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaida, there was no evidence of co-operation. (Paragraph 484)
OPERATION MASS APPEAL
44. There were two meetings between British Government officials and UNSCOM
representatives, including Mr Ritter, in May and June 1998 at which there were
discussions about how to make public the discovery of traces of the nerve agent VX on
missile warheads after this fact had been reported to the United Nations Security Council.
(Iraq had previously denied weaponising VX.) Operation Mass Appeal was set up for this
specific purpose and did not exist before May 1998. In the event, before Operation Mass
Appeal could proceed, the UNSCOM report was leaked to the press in Washington.
Because of this, Operation Mass Appeal was abandoned. (Paragraph 489)
URANIUM FROM AFRICA
45. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy
uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources
indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since
uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence
was credible.
c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to
having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.
d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time
its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.
(Paragraph 503)
THE ‘45 MINUTE’ CLAIM
46. The JIC should not have included the ‘45 minute’ report in its assessment and in the
Government’s dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to. The fact that the
reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions
that it had been included because of its eye-catching character. (Paragraph 511)
MOBILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES
47. We consider that it was reasonable for the JIC to include in its assessments of March and September 2002 a reference to intelligence reports on Iraq’s seeking mobile biological agent production facilities. But it has emerged that the intelligence from the source, if it had been correctly reported, would not have been consistent with a judgement that Iraq had, on the basis of recent production, stocks of biological agent. If SIS had had direct access to the source from 2000 onwards, and hence correct intelligence reporting, the main evidence for JIC judgements on Iraq’s stocks of recently-produced biological agent, as opposed to a break-out capacity, would not have existed. (Paragraph 530)
ALUMINIUM TUBES
48. The evidence we received on aluminium tubes was overwhelmingly that they were
intended for rockets rather than a centrifuge. We found this convincing. Despite this, we
conclude that the JIC was right to consider carefully the possibility that the tubes were
evidence of a resumed nuclear programme, and that it properly rejected the doubts
about the use of the tubes in the caution of its assessments. But in transferring its
judgements to the dossier, the JIC omitted the important information about the need for
substantial re-engineering of the aluminium tubes to make them suitable for use as gas
centrifuge rotors. This omission had the effect of materially strengthening the impression
that they may have been intended for a gas centrifuge and hence for a nuclear
programme. (Paragraph 545)
PLAGUE AND DUSTY MUSTARD
49. Plague and ‘dusty mustard’ were just two of the many biological and chemical threats on which the intelligence community had to keep watch in the period before the .rst Gulf war, and subsequently. (Paragraph 562)
50. The intelligence on their availability to Iraq in 1990 and 1991 rested on a small number of reports and the evidence derived from examination of a munition. There were grounds for scepticism both about the reports’ sources and their quality. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Government was right in 1990 and 1991 to act on a precautionary basis. (Paragraph 563)
51. We found it harder to understand the treatment of the intelligence in the ensuing period.
‘Dusty mustard’ disappears from JIC assessments from 1993 onwards. By contrast,
although little new intelligence was received, and most of that was historical or
unconvincing, plague continued to be mentioned in JIC assessments up to March 2003.
Those fluctuated in the certainty of judgements about Iraqi possession of plague between “possibly” and “probably”. (Paragraph 564)
52. We conclude that, in the case of plague, JIC assessments rejected historic evidence, and intelligence of dubious reliability, reinforced by suspicion of Iraq, rather than up-to-date evidence. (Paragraph 565)
DR JONES’S DISSENT
53. Dr Jones was right to raise concerns about the manner of expression of the ‘45 minute’ report in the dossier given the vagueness of the underlying intelligence. (Paragraph 570)
54. Dr Jones was right to raise concerns about the certainty of language used in the dossier on Iraqi production and possession of chemical agents. (Paragraph 572)
55. We recognise that circumstances arise in which it is right for senior officials to take a broad view that differs from the opinions of those with expertise on points of detail. We do not, however, consider that the report held back from Dr Jones and his staff (which Dr Jones’ superiors regarded as justifying the certainty of the language in the dossier) was one to which such considerations should have applied. It was understandable that SIS should have wanted to give greater than normal protection to the human intelligence source on this occasion. But a problem arose because it was kept from the relevant DIS analysts who had a wider perspective. It would have been more appropriate for senior managers in the DIS and SIS to have made arrangements for the intelligence to be shown to DIS experts rather than their making their own judgements on its significance. (Paragraph 576/577)
OIL SUPPLIES
56. We saw no evidence that a motive of the British Government for initiating military action was securing continuing access to oil supplies. (Paragraph 579)
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS ON BROADER ISSUES
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
57. We note that much of what was reliably known about Iraq’s unconventional weapons
programmes in the mid- and late-1990s was obtained through the reports of the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
These international agencies now appear to have been more effective than was realised
at the time in dismantling and inhibiting Iraq’s prohibited weapons programmes. The value of such international organisations needs to be recognised and built on for the future, supported by the contribution of intelligence from national agencies. (Paragraph 584)
CO-ORDINATION OF COUNTER-PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY
58. We consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new
information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of
expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other easily. (Paragraph 585)
THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF
59. We consider that further steps are needed to integrate the relevant work of the DIS more closely with the rest of the intelligence community. We welcome the arrangements now being made to give the Joint Intelligence Committee more leverage through the
Intelligence Requirements process to ensure that the DIS serves wider national priorities
as well as it does defence priorities and has the resources which the rest of the intelligence community needs to support its activities. If that involved increasing the Secret Intelligence Account by a sum to be at the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator’s
disposal to commission such resources, we would support that. (Paragraph 587)
60. We recommend consideration of the provision of proper channels for the expression of dissent within the DIS through the extension of the remit of the Staff Counsellor, who
provides a confidential outlet for conscientious objection or dissent within the intelligence agencies, to cover DIS civilian staff and the Assessments Staff. (Paragraph 589)
61. We recognise the case for the Chief of Defence Intelligence to be a serving officer so that he is fully meshed into military planning. But we consider that the Deputy should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary at the time when a particular appointment is made, be an intelligence specialist. (Paragraph 590)
THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
62. We recommend no change in the JIC’s membership. (Paragraph 596)
63. We see a strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with
experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post. (Paragraph 597)
THE ASSESSMENTS STAFF
64. We recommend that the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator reviews the size of the
Assessments Staff, and in particular considers whether they have available the volume
and range of resources to ask the questions which need to be asked in fully assessing
intelligence reports and in thinking radically. We recommend also that this review should
include considering whether there should be a specialism of analysis with a career
structure and room for advancement, allowing the Assessments Staff to include some
career members. We understand that the Intelligence and Security Committee are
planning to look at this issue. (Paragraph 600)
65 It may be worth considering the appointment of a distinguished scientist to undertake a part-time role as adviser to the Cabinet Office. (Paragraph 601)
THE LANGUAGE OF JIC ASSESSMENTS
66. The JIC has been right not to reach a judgement when the evidence is insubstantial. We believe that the JIC should, where there are significant limitations in the intelligence, state these clearly alongside its Key Judgements. While not arguing for a particular approach to the language of JIC assessments and the way in which alternative or minority
hypotheses, or uncertainty, are expressed, we recommend that the intelligence
community review their conventions again to see if there would be advantage in refreshing them. (Paragraph 604)
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
67. We do not suggest that there is or should be an ideal or unchangeable system of collective Government, still less that procedures are in aggregate any less effective now than in earlier times. However, we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed
character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making
towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgement. Such
risks are particularly significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts
are inherently difficult to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important. (Paragraph 611)
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