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Dans un bouquin sur Edouard VII et l’empire britannique (André Maurois, paru en 1933), je relève ces quelques phrases. Une réflexion de LLoyd George, d’abord, à propos de la guerre des Boers : “Nous avons commencé cette guerre pour obtenir l’égalité des droits, nous la continuons par une annexion. C’est exactement comme si vous étiez entrés dans une maison pour protéger les enfants et si vous acheviez votre tâche en volant la vaisselle”.
Il paraît qu’aujourd’hui, les Anglais regardent surtout leurs grands “amis” Américains déménager le buffet sans eux.

Axiome de la politique prussienne : “Nécessité n’a pas loi. La force peut créer un droit nouveau”. Monsieur Rumsfeld a du graver cette pensée au dessus de son lit.

Dans un article de Jacques Bainville, daté du 27 mars 1915, ces propos de Gladstone : “Il est impossible d’exempter un peuple de sa responsabilité plénière envers un autre peuple pour les actes de son gouvernement”.

Encore Bainville en 1935, lorsqu’il écrivait à propos de l’Allemagne : “elle peut penser que la possession d’une grande supériorité de forces lui vaudra plus d’amis que d’adversaire. Prenons garde, en tout cas, que les dés sont jetés et qu’ils vont rouler pour tout le monde.”

D’ailleurs, rien ne nous dit que la Grande-Bretagne ne choisiera pas la voie du refoulement.
A vous lire, vu l’impossibilité psychologique dans laquelle se trouve Tony Blair a se réformer, tout va en fait dépendre du prochain gouvernement ministre… qui va avoir un agenda chargé (euro, Bae, JSF, fin ou renégociations des Special Relationships ...)

Suivant la logique du “on ne respecte que la force”, le MoD UK et BAe haussent le ton:
http://www.nytimes.com/financialtimes/business/FT1057562345223.html?pagewanted=print&position=

“If we are going to be fighting side by side, it is in US interests to make sure Britain has access to the same equipment.

“But we don’t think it is in the UK’s interest for BAE to be linked up if our factories will simply end up doing the metal-bashing.”

C’est à propos du JSF/F35 bien sur.

L’extrait de la prose de Dandieu et Aron, que vous proposez, est très intéressant, mais il est peut-être mal mis en perspective, ou du moins, sa postérité l’est-elle. Vous écrivez en effet:

“A partir de là, l’anti-américanisme deviendra idéologique pour l’essentiel (on est anti-américain parce qu’on est pro-soviétique, ou marxiste). Ce n’est qu’aujourd’hui qu’on commence à retrouver des courants de critique de l’américanisme qui rejoignent en ampleur et en ambition ceux de la période Aron-Dandieu”.

Historiquement, vous procédez ainsi à un saut digne des raccourcis politiques, idéologiques et historiques des neo-cons américains. Toute la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle a été remplie de critiques non-marxistes de l’américanisme, critiques qui ne s’intéresaient pas tant au paradigme libéral et capitaliste qu’à la nature réelle du messianisme américain. Ces critiques se situaient pour la plupart à droite: La Nouvelle droite, en particulier, a depuis longtemps analysé la véritable nature de l’imperium américain (voir en particulier les lumineux passages d’Alain de Benoist sur les Etats-unis dans “les idées à l’endroit” (1979). Que certains commentateurs et analystes, revenus de de leurs illusions et de leurs paradis collectivistes s’aperçoivent aujourd’hui des ambitions et surtout de la nature réelle de la psyché américaine, tout cela est bel et bon. Mais il serait honnête intellectuellement de reconnaître que la critique “européenne” et charnelle du rouleau compresseur post-moderne qu’est l’Empire américain, colosse sans identité, sans mémoire et sans but, n’a jamais cessé depuis les efforts des non-conformistes des années trente. Maulnier, Venner, de Benoist et d’autres n’ont pas attendu la mondialisation pour s’en redre compte. Ils eurent le tort d’avoir raison avant tout le monde, et, surtout, d’opérer cette critique salutaire tout en ne cédant pas à l’illusion communiste. Il ne faut jamais avoir raison trop tôt. On peut ajouter que cette critique, tout comme celle des anti-conformistes des années trente, s’est faite au nom de l’émergence nécessaire d’une Europe consciente d’elle-même, de son identité, de son destin et de son histoire. Tout ce qui s’opposait, évidemment aux illusions d’un quelconque “sens de l’histoire”, qu’il soit communiste ou “démocratiste”.

Si nous nous battons aujourd’hui pour ne pas sortir de l’Histoire, c’est pour avoir oscillé entre ces deux illusions, consommé de ces deux opiums, sans nous interroger sur le sens du destin proprement européen.

Ce commentaire voulait simplement rappeler que ce n’est donc pas , comme vous l’écrivez, seulement aujourd’hui que l’on retrouve des courants de critique de l’américanisme d’une ampleur comparable à celui que représentent Dandieu et Aron. Ces courants ont toujours existé, mais ils étaient moins politiquement corrects, vus leurs défenseurs, que l’atlantisme béat ou le communisme buté qui faisaient alors recette.

Vous ferez de ces commentaires ce qu’il vous plaira. Votre site est extrêmement intéressant.

O. Zajec

Nul ne doute que le pétrole soit une importante motivation pour les américains, mais il se trouve que Wolfowitz n’a jamais prononcé d’aussi naïves paroles telles que “si nous sommes allés en Irak, c’est pour le pétrole”.
Le Guardian a retiré l’article déniché par Anamorphose de son site et a publié un mea-culpa:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,973940,00.html

“A report which was posted on our website on June 4 under the heading ‘Wolfowitz: Iraq war was about oil’ misconstrued remarks made by the US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, making it appear that he had said that oil was the main reason for going to war in Iraq. He did not say that. He said, according to the department of defence website, ‘The…difference between North Korea and Iraq is that we had virtually no economic options with Iraq because the country floats on a sea of oil. In the case of North Korea, the country is teetering on the edge of economic collapse and that I believe is a major point of leverage whereas the military picture with North Korea is very different from that with Iraq.’
The sense was clearly that the US had no economic options by means of which to achieve its objectives, not that the economic value of the oil motivated the war. The report appeared only on the website and has now been removed.”

Monsieur Wolfowitz reserve certainement ce genre de remarques pour plus tard dans ses mémoires lorsque l’orage sera passé. Alors juste un peu de patience encore, et je suis sur qu’il s’en vantera tel un Z. Brezinski à qui l’on doit l’intervention soviétique en Afganistan et tout ce qui en découle.

Le site Truthout nous livre un intéressant article sur les procédés rhétoriques de Bush. Ils montrent comment ils entretiennent une culture de la peur et favorisent l’adhésion aveugle au leader (notamment par l’emploi de phrases à très faible contenu informatif et à forte charge émotionnelle). Les procédés que Tchakotine dans sont ouvrage classique “Le viol des foules par la propagande politique” avaient déjà exposés, sont ici encore à l’honneur, raffinés même dans une certaine mesure dans par des techniques communicationnelles telles qu’on utilise en hypnose, mais à des fins thérapeutiques. (Voir par exemple le chapitre sur la rhétorique hypnotique dans “Créer le réel, hypnose et thérapie” de T. Melchior, Le Seuil, ou encore les nombreux livres de l’hypnothérapeute Milton H. Erickson traduits en français, notamment aux éditions SATAS)

Rien d’étonnant à ce que la population nord-américaine soumise à un tel matraquage sémantique et rhétorique soit persuadée à plus de 50% de contre-vérités patentes telles que l’existence indéniable de WMD en Irak ou des liens de ce pays avec Al-Quaeda.
Le virtualisme ne serait probablement rien sans un tel arsenal langagier.

http://truthout.org/docs_03/062403G.shtml

A Nation of Victims
  By Renana Brooks
  The Nation

  Sunday 22 June 2003

  George W Bush is generally regarded as a mangler of the English language. What is overlooked is his mastery of emotional language – especially negatively charged emotional language – as a political tool. Take a closer look at his speeches and public utterances, and his political success turns out to be no surprise. It is the predictable result of the intentional use of language to dominate others.

  President Bush, like many dominant personality types, uses dependency-creating language. He employs language of contempt and intimidation to shame others into submission and desperate admiration. While we tend to think of the dominator as using physical force, in fact most dominators use verbal abuse to control others. Abusive language has been a major theme of psychological researchers on marital problems, such as John Gottman, and of philosophers and theologians, such as Josef Pieper. But little has been said about the key role it has come to play in political discourse, and in such “hot media” as talk radio and television.

  Bush uses several dominating linguistic techniques to induce surrender to his will. The first is empty language. This term refers to broad statements that are so abstract and mean so little that they are virtually impossible to oppose. Empty language is the emotional equivalent of empty calories. Just as we seldom question the content of potato chips while enjoying their pleasurable taste, recipients of empty language are usually distracted from examining the content of what they are hearing. Domina-tors use empty language to conceal faulty generalizations; to ridicule viable alternatives; to attribute negative motivations to others, thus making them appear contemptible; and to rename and “reframe” opposing viewpoints. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union speech contained thirty-nine examples of empty language. He used it to reduce complex problems to images that left the listener relieved that George W Bush was in charge. Rather than explaining the relationship between malpractice insurance and skyrocketing healthcare costs, Bush summed up: “No one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit.” The multiple fiscal and monetary policy tools that can be used to stimulate an economy were downsized to: “The best and fairest way to make sure Americans have that money is not to tax it away in the first place.” The controversial plan to wage another war on Iraq was simplified to: “We will answer every danger and every enemy that threatens the American people.” In an earlier study, I found that in the 2000 presidential debates Bush used at least four times as many phrases containing empty language as Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush Senior or Gore had used in their debates.

  Another of Bush’s dominant-language techniques is personalization. By personalization I mean localizing the attention of the listener on the speaker’s personality. Bush projects himself as the only person capable of producing results. In his post- 9/11 speech to Congress he said, “I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.” He substitutes his determination for that of the nation’s. In the 2003 State of the Union speech he vowed, “I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” Contrast Bush’s “I will not yield” etc. with John F: Kennedy’s “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.”

  The word “you” rarely appears in Bush’s speeches. Instead, there are numerous statements referring to himself or his personal characteristics – folksiness, confidence, righteous anger or determination – as the answer to the problems of the country. Even when Bush uses “we,” as he did many times in the State of the Union speech, he does it in a way that focuses attention on himself. For example, he stated: “Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility.”

  In an article in the Jan. 16 New York Review of Books, Joan Didion highlighted Bush’s high degree of personalization and contempt for argumentation in presenting his case for going to war in Iraq. As Didion writes: “‘I made up my mind,’ he had said in April, ‘that Saddam needs to go.’ This was one of many curious, almost petulant statements offered in lieu of actually presenting a case. I’ve made up my mind, I’ve said in speech after speech, I’ve made myself clear. The repeated statements became their own reason.”

  Poll after poll demonstrates that Bush’s political agenda is out of step with most Americans’ core beliefs. Yet the public, their electoral resistance broken down by empty language and persuaded by personalization, is susceptible to Bush’s most frequently used linguistic technique: negative framework. A negative framework is a pessimistic image of the world. Bush creates and maintains negative frameworks in his listeners’ minds with a number of linguistic techniques borrowed from advertising and hypnosis to instill the image of a dark and evil world around us. Catastrophic words and phrases are repeatedly drilled into the listener’s head until the opposition feels such a high level of anxiety that it appears pointless to do anything other than cower.

  Psychologist Martin Seligman, in his extensive studies of “learned helplessness,” showed that people’s motivation to respond to outside threats and problems is undermined by a belief that they have no control over their environment. Learned helplessness is exacerbated by beliefs that problems caused by negative events are permanent; and when the underlying causes are perceived to apply to many other events, the condition becomes pervasive and paralyzing.

  Bush is a master at inducing learned helplessness in the electorate. He uses pessimistic language that creates fear and disables people from feeling they can solve their problems. In his September 20, 2001, speech to Congress on the 9/11 attacks, he chose to increase people’s sense of vulnerability: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen…. I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight…. Be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.” (Subsequent terror alerts by the FBI, CIA and Department of Homeland Security have maintained and expanded this fear of uknown, sinister enemies.) Contrast this rhetoric with Franklin Roosevelt’s speech delivered the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He said: “No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory…. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces – with the unbounding determination of our people – we will gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God.” Roosevelt focuses on an optimistic future rather than an ongoing threat to Americans’ personal survival.

  All political leaders must define the present threats and problems faced by the country before describing their approach to a solution, but the ratio of negative to optimistic statements in Bush’s speeches and policy declarations is much higher, more pervasive and more long-lasting than that of any other President. Let’s compare “crisis” speeches by Bush and Ronald Reagan, the President with whom he most identifies himself. In Reagan’s October 27, 1983, televised address to the nation on the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, he used nineteen images of crisis and twenty-one images of optimism, evenly balancing optimistic and negative depictions. He limited his evaluation of the problems to the past and present tense, saying only that “with patience and firmness we can bring peace to that strife-torn region and make our own lives more secure.” George W Bush’s October 7, 2002, major policy speech on Iraq, on the other hand, began with forty-four consecutive statements referring to the crisis and citing a multitude of possible catastrophic repercussions. The vast majority of these statements (for example: “Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time”; “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists”) imply that the crisis will last into the indeterminate future. There is also no specific plan of action. The absence of plans is typical of a negative framework, and leaves the listener without hope that the crisis will ever end. Contrast this with Reagan, who, a third of the way into his explanation of the crisis in Lebanon, asked the following: “Where do we go from here? What can we do now to help Lebanon gain greater stability so that our Marines can come home? Well, I believe we can take three steps now that will make a difference.”

  To create a dependency dynamic between him and the electorate, Bush describes the nation as being in a perpetual state of crisis and then attempts to convince the electorate that it is powerless and that he is the only one with the strength to deal with it. He attempts to persuade people they must transfer power to him, thus crushing the power of the citizen, the Congress, the Democratic Party, even constitutional liberties, to concentrate all power in the imperial presidency and the Republican Party.

  Bush’s political opponents are caught in a fantasy that they can win against him simply by proving the superiority of their ideas. However, people do not support Bush for the power of his ideas, but out of the despair and desperation in their hearts. Whenever people are in the grip of a desperate dependency, they won’t respond to rational criticisms of the people they are dependent on. They will respond to plausible and forceful statements and alternatives that put the American electorate back in touch with their core optimism. Bush’s opponents must combat his dark imagery with hope and restore American vigor and optimism in the coming years. They should heed the example of Reagan, who used optimism against Carter and the “national malaise”; Franklin Roosevelt, who used it against Hoover and the pessimism induced by the Depression (“the only thing we have to fear is fear itself”); and Clinton (the “Man from Hope”), who used positive language against the senior Bush’s lack of vision. This is the linguistic prescription for those who wish to retire Bush in 2004.

© Copyright 2003 by TruthOut.org

L’ultra-conservateur Pat Buchanan, (autrement dit une espèce de Le Pen version américaine), n’est pas le dernier des imbéciles dans toutes ses analyses, même si, par ailleurs, il nous propose un programme politique (du genre travail, famille, patrie)dont même l’homme de Neanderthal le plus abruti ne pourrait guère s’empêcher de franchement rigoler.

Bref, dans la dernière livraison de son journal “The American Conservative”, il nous invite à penser que les Neocons n’en ont plus pour longtemps : leur chute a déjà commencé. Pourquoi ? En bonne partie parce qu’ils ont voulu être au plus près du Capitole, en ignorant manifestement que la roche tarpéienne se trouvait juste à côté.

Reste à se demander dans quelle mesure ils entraîneront GW dans leur chute (on peut toujours rêver…).

En tous cas, cet article peut peut-être nous aider à comprendre les déclarations de Wolfie qui reconnaît platement que la guerre, c’était bien pour le pétrole et que les WMD n’étaient qu’un prétexte : peut-être sent-il, tout simplement, que sa fin - comme celle de ses rêves politiques grandioses - est proche, beaucoup plus proche qu’on ne pourrait le penser, et que dans un sursaut de rage impuissante, il cherche effectivement à incendier Rome… avant de se résoudre à boire la coupe de poison. “Que le monde périsse…”.

Enfin ! Si cette bande d’ex-trotskards mal recyclés s’en allait, ce serait dommage, en un sens : au moins, avec eux, les choses étaient claires…

http://www.amconmag.com/06_16_03/print/buchananprint.html

June 16, 2003 issue
Copyright © 2003 The American Conservative

Is the Neoconservative Moment Over?

by Pat Buchanan

The salad days of the neoconservatives, which began with the president’s Axis-of-Evil address in January 2002 and lasted until the fall of Baghdad may be coming to an end. Indeed, it is likely the neoconservatives will never again enjoy the celebrity and cachet in which they reveled in their romp to war on Iraq.

While this is, admittedly, a prediction, it rests on reasonable assumptions. But why should neoconservatism, at the apparent apex of its influence, be on the edge of eclipse?

Answer: the high tide of neoconservatism may have passed because the high tide of American empire may have passed. “World War IV,” the empire project, the great cause of the neocons, seems to have been suspended by the President of the United States.

While we still hear talk of “regime change” in Iran and North Korea, U.S. forces not tied down in occupation duties by the anarchy and chaos in Iraq, are returning home.

The first signal that the apogee of American hegemony in the Middle East has been reached came as U.S. soldiers and marines were completing their triumphant march into Baghdad. Suddenly, all the bellicosity toward Syria from neoconservatives and the Pentagon, stopped, apparently on the orders of the Commander in Chief.

Secretary of State Powell announced he would go to Damascus to talk with President Assad. U.S. ground forces halted at the Syrian border. Our carriers began to sail home from the Gulf. All the talk of Iraqi war criminals hiding out in Syria and Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction being transferred there suddenly ceased. “Mission Accomplished” read the huge banner on the Abraham Lincoln, as the president landed on the carrier deck to address the nation.

When Newt Gingrich, before an audience at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), launched his tirade against Powell and the Department of State, accusing them of appeasing Syria, no echo came out of the Pentagon. Reportedly, Karl Rove gave Newt an earful, and the president himself was prepared to blast Newt, for he saw the attack on Powell as an attack on his own policy. A few editorials and columns praised Newt, but the neocons could sense that they were no longer in step with the White House. So, too, did every other Kremlinologist in this city.

Why did Bush order an end to the threats to Syria? The answer is obvious. He is not prepared to carry them out. With the heavy fighting over in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American people have had enough of invasions and occupations for one presidential term. The United States is now deep into nation building in both countries.

Moreover, Syria is not under any UN sanctions. Its leader did not try to assassinate the president’s father. There is no evidence Damascus is working on nuclear weapons. Assad has not threatened us. A war on Syria would have no Security Council endorsement, no NATO allies, no authorization from Congress. Such a pre-emptive war would be unconstitutional and be seen abroad as the imperial war of a rogue superpower. For all the talk of unilateralism and of our “unipolar moment” President Bush clearly feels a need for allies, foreign and domestic, before launching such a war.

Finally, having assumed paternity of 23 million Iraqis, few Americans are anxious to adopt 17 million Syrians. Damascus is a bridge too far for Bush and Rove, and with two wars and two victories in two years, why press their luck? The re-election that the president’s father did not win—and not an empire—appears to be what they are about.

Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the glory days—of Special Forces galloping on horseback in the Afghan hills, of Abrams tanks dashing like Custer’s cavalry across the Iraqi desert, of statues of Saddam toppling into the streets of Baghdad, and presidents landing on carrier flight decks in fighter-pilot garb —are over, behind us, gone. 

And ahead? Like all empires, once they cease to expand, they go over onto the defensive. Like the Brits before us, we must now secure, consolidate, protect, manage, and rule what we have in the tedious aftermath of our imperial wars. And as we have seen in the terror attacks in Casablanca and Riyadh, al-Qaeda and its allies, not Tommy Franks, now decide the time and place of attack in the War on Terror.

With 25 U.S. soldiers dead and counting since Baghdad fell, what the empire now entails is a steady stream of caskets coming home from Afghanistan and Iraq and tens of billions of American tax dollars going the other way to pay the cost of reconstruction of countries we have defeated and occupied.

Victory has brought unanticipated headaches. Having smashed the forces that held Iraq together—Saddam’s regime, the Ba’ath Party, the Republican Guard, the army—we must now build new forces to police the country, hold it together, and protect it from its predatory neighbors. And there are Islamic and Arab elements in and outside of Iraq determined that we should fail.

Where Tehran and the mullahs colluded in our smashing of a Taliban they hated, and of their old enemy Saddam, they no longer welcome America’s massive military presence in their region.

Most important, it appears the president has shifted roles from war leader to peacemaker. While the neocons are adamant in rejecting the road map to peace, drafted by the “quartet”—the U.S., the EU, the UN, and Russia—as a threat to Israel’s survival, Bush has endorsed it and evidently means to pursue it. The neocons are already carping at him for pressuring Sharon to “negotiate with terrorists” and “creating a new terrorist state in the Middle East.” Where White House and neoconservative agendas coincided precisely in the invasion of Iraq, they are now clearly in conflict.

While it has not happened yet, there is the possibility that our effort at nation building in Iraq will falter and fail, that Americans will tire of pouring men and money into the project, and will demand that the president bring the troops home and turn Iraq over to the allies, the Arabs, or the UN. As one looks at Afghanistan, Iraq, and a Middle East where al-Qaeda is avidly seeking soft targets, it may be that all the good news is behind us and that only bad news lies ahead.

If we have hit the tar baby in Baghdad, the president may be seeking to extricate us before we go to the polls 17 months from now. And should the fruits of victory start to rot, Americans will begin to ask questions of the principal propagandists for war.

It was, after all, the neocons who sold the country on the notion that Iraq had a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, that Iraq was behind 9/11, that Saddam had ties to al-Qaeda, that the war would be a “cakewalk,” that we would be welcomed as liberators, that victory would bring democratic revolution in the Middle East. Should the cream go sour, the neocons will face the charge that they “lied us into war.”

Moreover, for a movement that is small in number and utterly dependent on its proximity to power, the neocons have made major mistakes. They have insulted too many U.S. allies, boasted too much of their connections and influence, attracted too much attention to themselves, and antagonized too many adversaries. In this snake pit of a city, their over-developed penchant for self-promotion is not necessarily an asset.

By now, all their columnists and house organs—Commentary, National Review, the New Republic, the Weekly Standard—are known. Their front groups—AEI, JINSA—have all been identified and bracketed. Their agents of influence—Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Libby, Bolton, Wurmser, Abrams, et alia—have all been outed. Neoconservatives are now seen as separate and apart from the Bush loyalists, with loyalties and an agenda all their own.

If Americans decide they were lied to, that the Iraqi war was not fought for America’s interests, that its propagandists harbored a hidden agenda—as they decided after World War I and exposure of the “merchants of death”—they will know exactly whom to blame and whom to hold accountable.

The weakness of the neocons is that, politically speaking, they are parasites. They achieve influence only by attaching themselves to powerful hosts, be it “Scoop” Jackson, Ronald Reagan, or Rupert Murdoch. When the host dies or retires, they must scramble to find a new one. Thus, they have blundered in isolating themselves from and alienating almost every other once-friendly group on the Right.

Consider the lurid charges laid against all three founding editors of this magazine and four of our writers—Sam Francis, Bob Novak, Justin Raimondo, and Eric Margolis—by National Review in its cover story, “Unpatriotic Conservatives.” Of us, NR writes,

They … excuse terror. They espouse … defeatism. … And some of them explicitly yearn for the victory of their nation’s enemies. …

Only the boldest of them … acknowledge their wish to see the United States defeated in the War on Terror. But they are thinking about defeat, and wishing for it, and they will take pleasure in it should it happen.

They began by hating the neoconservatives. They came to hate their party and their president. They have finished by hating their country.

This screed does not come out of the National Review of Kirk, Burnham, and Meyer we grew up with. It is the language of the radical Left and Trotskyism, the spawning pools of neoconservatism. And rather than confirm the neocons as leaders of the Right, such bile betrays their origins and repels most of the Right. One wonders if the neocons even know how many are waiting in hopeful anticipation of their unhorsing and humiliation.

“There is no telling how far a man can go, as long as he is willing to let someone else get the credit,” read a plaque Ronald Reagan kept in his desk. The neocons’ problem is that they claim more credit than they deserve for Bush’s War and have set themselves up as scapegoats if we lose the peace.

Having enjoyed the prerogative of the courtesan, influence without accountability, the neocons may find themselves with that worst of all worlds, responsibility without power. 

June 16, 2003 issue
Copyright © 2003 The American Conservative

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(Publié avec les réserves d’usage, conformément au droit amérikkkain de ne pas faire ce qu’on ne peut pas parce que ce serait interdit).

après les dégâts collatéraux des WMD, le gouvernement Blair n’a pas d’autre choix sur la question iranienne ... que de quitter la “new Europe” ... que va t’il en rester sans les anglais ???
Il s’agit peut-etre aussi d’une réponse de Blair au faucons après leurs troublantes déclarations déstabilisantes sur les fameuses WMD (cf: http://www.reseauvoltaire.net/article9767.html)

Straw reconnaît un “désaccord sincère” avec Washington sur l’Iran
AFP | 10.06.03 | 20h25

Londres est en “désaccord sincère” avec Washington sur la politique à adopter vis-à-vis de l’Iran soupçonné par les Etats-Unis de vouloir se doter de l’arme nucléaire, a affirmé mardi le ministre britannique des Affaires étrangères Jack Straw.“Il ne fait pas partie de la politique du gouvernement de sa majesté de vouloir un changement de régime en Iran”, a-t-il souligné.“Les amis sont parfois en désaccord. Nous pouvons avoir un désaccord sincère sur notre approche vis-à-vis de l’Iran avec les Etats-Unis”, a déclaré M. Straw devant la commission des Affaires étrangères au parlement.“Nous pouvons avoir des désaccords sincères avec nos amis au sein de pays européens. Parfois, nous ne sommes pas en phase. Et alors ?”, a-t-il ajouté.“Vous noterez aussi que le président (américain George W.) Bush a publiquement dit qu’il n’était pas question d’action militaire américaine contre l’Iran”, a-t-il rappelé.Ces déclarations interviennent après un nouveau durcissement de ton de Washington à l’égard de l’Iran.“L’Iran est un problème. Il continue à soutenir le terrorisme. Il continue à développer, pensons-nous, sa capacité à produire des armes nucléaires, et c’est inquiétant”, a affirmé dimanche le secrétaire d’Etat américain Colin Powell.“J’espère que si nous démontrons à la population iranienne que nous ne sommes pas l’ennemi, qu’il y a une vie meilleure qui l’attend si elle abandonne le terrorisme, le développement d’armes de destruction massive et fait pression sur ses leaders politiques et religieux pour plus d’innovation au sein de la société iranienne et de l’économie iranienne (...) ils (les dirigeants iraniens) vont commencer à répondre à cette forme de pression”, avait ajouté M. Powell.Son homologue iranien a mis en garde mardi les Américains contre toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du pays, en invoquant la tradition de résistance nationale aux interventions étrangères.Washington et Téhéran ont rompu leurs relations diplomatiques en 1980 après la prise d’otages de l’ambassade américaine à Téhéran.L’Iran et la Corée du Nord sont sur la liste des pays de “l’axe du mal” établie par l’administration Bush et à la tête de laquelle figurait l’Irak de Saddam Hussein, renversé par les troupes américano-britanniques en avril.Londres a décidé de renouer un “dialogue constructif” avec Téhéran, comme les autres pays de l’Union européenne.Interrogé pour savoir si cette position était conciliable avec la position américaine, M. Straw a répondu qu’il ne voyait pas cette question en termes de choix entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne.“Nous avons une politique étrangère et nous avons de l’influence sur les Etats-Unis lorsque nous sommes capables de montrer que notre politique étrangère est également soutenue par le reste de l’Union européenne”, a souligné M. Straw.

CPI: Washington accuse l’UE de s’opposer à des accords bilatéraux
AFP | 10.06.03 | 19h47

Les Etats-Unis accusent l’Union européenne de chercher à empêcher la finalisation d’accords entre Washington et des futurs pays membres de l’UE, visant à mettre les Américains à l’abri de poursuites par la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), ont indiqué mardi des responsables américains.Dans une note confidentielle envoyée la semaine dernière aux pays membres de l’UE, Washington a brandi la menace de conséquences “très fâcheuses” sur les relations transatlantiques, a indiqué un de ces responsables sous couvert d’anonymat, confirmant une information du quotidien Washington Post.“Il y a des gens dans l’Union européenne qui font campagne activement contre des membres et candidats à l’adhésion (à l’Union européenne) concernant l’Article 98” relatif à l’exonération des Américains face à la CPI, a déclaré un autre responsable. “Nous pensons que c’est une erreur”, a-t-il ajouté.En vertu de cet “Article 98”, le pays signataire s’engage à ne pas faire traduire devant la CPI des ressortissants américains.En vertu de la législation américaine, les pays n’ayant pas signé l’“Article 98” avec les Etats-Unis avant le 1er juillet risquent de perdre toute aide militaire américaine.Il est difficile de préciser le nombre de ces pays, certains ayant choisi de ne pas rendre publique leur adhésion à “l’Article 98”, d’autres étant exemptés d’un tel accord avant la date du 1er juillet.Mardi, le département d’Etat a annoncé avoir signé deux nouveaux accords, avec la Bolivie et la Thaïlande, respectivement le 19 mai et le 3 juin.Ces signatures portent à 37 le nombre de pays avec lesquels les Etats-Unis ont officiellement conclu un accord, a précisé le département d’Etat.Washington s’oppose à l’Union européenne sur l’interprétation du Statut de Rome du 17 juillet 1998, qui avait mis en place la CPI, en particulier à propos de l’Article 18 permettant aux Etats de réclamer, par le biais d’accords bilatéraux, l’immunité pour leurs soldats engagés dans des opérations de maintien de la paix.L’UE estime que les accords signés par les Etats-Unis avec 37 pays, dont plusieurs d’Europe de l’Est, menacent le pouvoir de la CPI.Dans sa note, Washington regrette que plusieurs ambassadeurs européens aient “fait pression contre les efforts bilatéraux” menés en direction notamment des dix futurs membres de l’UE, a rapporté le Washington Post, selon lequel plane la menace d’une nouvelle détérioration des relations avec la France, l’Allemagne et d’autres pays qui se sont opposés à la guerre en Irak.“Cela va saper tous nos efforts pour rétablir et reconstruire les liens transatlantiques, juste au moment où ceux-ci s’améliorent après plusieurs mois difficiles”, estime cette note.Cinq pays (Canada, Jordanie, Liechtenstein, Nouvelle-Zélande, Suisse), ont réclamé l’organisation d’un débat public devant le Conseil de sécurité de l’Onu pour examiner le renouvellement de la résolution mettant les Américains à l’abri de poursuites devant la CPI. Cette exemption, éventuellement renouvelable, avait été accordée l’an dernier pour un an.Le projet a cependant peu de chances d’être adopté, cinq pays seulement (Grande-Bretagne, Bulgarie, France, Allemagne, Espagne) sur les 15 que compte le Conseil de sécurité ayant ratifié le Statut de Rome.

Je viens de revoir le film JFK d’Oliver Stone et je conseille vivement à tous les lecteurs de le voir ou le revoir.
Ce dernier met en lumière sous un jour nouveau l’époque que nous traversons et nous montre que ce qui se passe aujourd’hui s’est déjà passé il y a 40 ans, sous une autre forme, certes, mais avec des acteurs dotés d’une motivation identique.

Pouvez vous me dire, s’il vous plait, Qui a ecrit l’article: “L’Amérique défile sur les Champs Élysées : un clin d’oeil à l’Histoire et un signe de notre temps” Daté de 27/07/2002.

Merci.

 
Sacré Wolfie, il n’en fera jamais d’autre ! Mais pourquoi diable les fait-il ???
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Le site “Truthout” (Trois étoiles : à visiter régulièrement !) se référant à un article paru dans le Guardian (mais le lien qu’il propose avec le site du Guardian semble erroné) nous apprend que Wolfie, le menteur honnête, décidément, n’éprouve pas trop d’états d’âmes à mettre les pieds dans le plat. Pour les (quelques rares) cons qui imagineraient encore que le pétrole n’avait rien à voir dans la “guerre de libération de l’Iraq”, voici ce qu’il dit :
http://truthout.org/docs_03/060503A.shtml

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Wolfowitz: ‘Iraq War Was About Oil’
  By George Wright
  The Guardian

  Wednesday 04 June 2003

  Oil was the main reason for military action against Iraq, a leading White House hawk has claimed, confirming the worst fears of those opposed to the US-led war.

  The US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz - who has already undermined Tony Blair’s position over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by describing them as a “bureaucratic” excuse for war - has now gone further by claiming the real motive was that Iraq is “swimming” in oil.

  The latest comments were made by Mr Wolfowitz in an address to delegates at an Asian security summit in Singapore at the weekend, and reported today by German newspapers Der Tagesspiegel and Die Welt.

  Asked why a nuclear power such as North Korea was being treated differently from Iraq, where hardly any weapons of mass destruction had been found, the deputy defence minister said: “Let’s look at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil.”

  Mr Wolfowitz went on to tell journalists at the conference that the US was set on a path of negotiation to help defuse tensions between North Korea and its neighbours - in contrast to the more belligerent attitude the Bush administration displayed in its dealings with Iraq.

  His latest comments follow his widely reported statement from an interview in Vanity Fair last month, in which he said that “for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on: weapons of mass destruction.”

  Prior to that, his boss, defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, had already undermined the British government’s position by saying Saddam Hussein may have destroyed his banned weapons before the war.

  Mr Wolfowitz’s frank assessment of the importance of oil could not come at a worse time for the US and UK governments, which are both facing fierce criticism at home and abroad over allegations that they exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in order to justify the war.

  Amid growing calls from all parties for a public inquiry, the foreign affairs select committee announced last night it would investigate claims that the UK government misled the country over its evidence of Iraq’s WMD.

  The move is a major setback for Tony Blair, who had hoped to contain any inquiry within the intelligence and security committee, which meets in secret and reports to the prime minister.

  In the US, the failure to find solid proof of chemical, biological and nuclear arms in Iraq has raised similar concerns over Mr Bush’s justification for the war and prompted calls for congressional investigations.

  Mr Wolfowitz is viewed as one of the most hawkish members of the Bush administration. The 57-year old expert in international relations was a strong advocate of military action against Afghanistan and Iraq.

  Following the September 11 terror attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, Mr Wolfowitz pledged that the US would pursue terrorists and “end” states’ harbouring or sponsoring of militants.

  Prior to his appointment to the Bush cabinet in February 2001, Mr Wolfowitz was dean and professor of international relations at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), of the Johns Hopkins University.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)

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Cela dit, quel est l’agenda caché de Wolfie ? Comment comprendre qu’à deux reprises en quelques jours il fasse preuve de tant de franchise ? Croit-il que la puissance neocon est telle qu’elle puisse tout se permettre ? Ou bien veut-il, à coup de déclarations bien embarrassantes, couler Tony Blair l’emmerdant caniche qui freine le mouvement vers le Grand Reich Amérikkkain ? Ou bien encore veut-il couler Bush lui-même dans l’espoir de lui substituer un leader encore plus radical ? Ou bien enfin, veut-il dans un accès de nihilisme suicidaire, brûler Washington comme jadis Néron brûla Rome ???
Dernière hypothèse : est-il, beaucoup plus simplement, un bougre d’idiot ?
Ah, que la psychologie de l’Homo Americanus est parfois compliquée !

Selon l’agence Associated Press, un sondage du Centre de recherche (américain) Pew montrerait qu’il n’y a guère qu’aux Etats-Unis que la cote de Blair soit en hausse…

http://fr.news.yahoo.com/030603/5/38kee.html

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mardi 3 juin 2003, 20h47
 
L’image des Etats-Unis au plus bas depuis la guerre en Irak

WASHINGTON (AP)

“(...) M. Blair est lui le dirigeant de la planète le plus populaire aux Etats-Unis: il obtient la confiance de 83% des Américains. Il arrive également en tête au Canada et en Australie, mais il n’est pas prophète en son pays, la Grande-Bretagne classant M. Annan en première position avec 72%. Le secrétaire général de l’ONU arrive également premier en Italie et en Espagne.

Dans de nombreux pays généralement favorables aux Etats-Unis comme le Brésil, la Russie, l’Espagne, la France et l’Allemagne, M. Bush ne bénéficie que d’une faible cote de confiance. En revanche, une majorité de sondés soutient le président américain aux Etats-Unis, en Grande-Bretagne, au Canada et en Australie. En outre, il se classe premier en Israël avec 83%. (...)”

(Guère étonnant qu’Israël soit pro-américain, ces temps-ci : reste à voir si ce sentiment perdurera si Bush insiste pour la création d’un Etat palestinien viable d’un seul tenant)...

À part ça le sondage montrerait que la cote des US est en chute libre un peu partout. Comme quoi Descartes aurait quand même eu raison : le bon sens reste une des choses la mieux partagée en ce bas-monde…

À noter au passage pour les ahuris qui continuent à répéter urbi et orbis que les Français sont notoirement et depuis toujours viscéralement anti-américains :

“Les relations franco-américaines sont une autre victime du conflit. Seulement 29% des Américains interrogés ont une opinion favorable de la France, alors qu’ils sont deux fois plus nombreux à exprimer un avis défavorable. Côté français, 31% des sondés ont une opinion favorable des Etats-Unis, contre 63% en 2002. AP”

La cote des US est donc passée de 63% à 31% en un an en France : une chute de plus de 50% en un an : comment continuer à parler d’un anti-américanisme (primaire, bien sûr) “viscéral” en France ??? (Ceci à l’adresse de Glucksman, BHL, et quelques autres…)

La DCN prône des alliances dans la défense navale en Europe
[lundi 02 juin 2003 - 15h52 heure de Paris]

PARIS (AFP) - La Direction des constructions navales (DCN), devenue une société à part entière en sortant du giron du ministère de la Défense, entend nouer des alliances dans la défense navale en Europe, de préférence avec des groupes allemands, italiens ou espagnol.

A peine nommé lundi matin en conseil d’administration PDG de la nouvelle société de droit privé à capitaux publics, Jean-Marie Poimboeuf a affirmé qu’un des buts du changement de statut était de “nouer des alliances en France et en Europe, pour faire de la DCN un acteur majeur du marché naval de défense”.

La préférence du PDG va à des alliances avec de “grands systémiers d’armes” capables de fabriquer les bâtiments (porte-avions, frégates, sous-marins…) et les armes les équipant, comme les chantiers navals allemands HDW ou Blohm und Voss, les Italiens Fincantieri et Finmeccanica, ou l’Espagnol Izar.

“Mais dans ce domaine, je n’ai pas d’architecture d’alliances qui se dégage”, a-t-il précisé.

M. Poimboeuf n’a en revanche pas cité le groupe britannique d’aéronautique et de défense BAE Systems, “car il est actuellement plus dans un positionnement national ou transatlantique qu’européen” et parce qu’il n’a “apparemment pas d’ambitions dans le développement des sous-marins conventionnels”.

Si la DCN a déjà noué des partenariats avec Izar et Finmeccanica, notamment dans les sous-marins et les frégates, et si une coopération franco-italienne est à l’étude dans les torpilles lourdes, le seul chantier naval cité par M. Poimboeuf qui est actuellement à vendre est l’allemand HDW.

“Il semble que (HDW) soit à vendre. On va regarder”, a déclaré M. Poimboeuf, ajoutant qu’un éventuel rachat dépendrait du prix proposé.

En février, le quotidien financier allemand Handelsblatt a indiqué que le fonds américain One Equity Partner (OEP) entendait vendre Howaldtswerke-Deusche Werft (HDW), leader mondial des sous-marins conventionnels.

De sources industrielles et politiques, le journal ajoutait qu’une des solutions envisagées était la création d’un équivalent naval au groupe européen de défense et d’aéronautique EADS, en rassemblant les chantiers allemands HDW, Blohm und Voss et ThyssenKrupp avec la DCN.

Interrogé sur une éventuelle alliance capitalistique, qui passerait donc par une ouverture du capital actuellement détenu à 100% par l’Etat, M. Poimboeuf a répondu que “le jour où ça se posera, ça voudra dire que le changement de statut aura réussi. Donc, j’espère que cela arrivera le plus vite possible”.

Quant au projet de second porte-avions français, le PDG a affirmé que la DCN souhaitait en être le maître d’oeuvre d’industriel, quitte ensuite à sous-traiter certaines parties au meilleur coût.

M. Poimboeuf a aussi affirmé que la nouvelle DCN allait passer de près de 13.400 salariés “à une fourchette de 12.300 à 12.500 d’ici la fin 2005”. Cela se fera via quelque 2.000 départs naturels (à l’initiative des personnels) ou concertés (mobilité externe) et le recrutement d’un millier de personnes.

question: pourquoi les chinois sortent-ils du bois maintenant ... en se rapprochant des russes et en demandant un role “central” de l’ONU en irak ???

élément de réponse: les chinois et les russes ne font que réagir aux poussées US.
En effet, la volonté US de s’attaquer à l’iran se traduit par une pression accrue sur la russie (coopération nucléaire)... et le boycott d’un conglomérat chinois (coopération missiles) ... le PNAC nous explique tout ça très bien !!!

http://www.newamericancentury.org/china-052703.htm
FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: China & US Sanctions on Norinco

I’d like to draw your attention to the following op-ed (“Putting China on Notice”) that appeared in today’s Asian Wall Street Journal by John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation. The op-ed is an analysis of the Bush Administration decision to sanction one of China’s biggest conglomerates, China North Industries Corp. (Norinco), for its assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs.

The decision to impose the sanctions on Norinco is not only the correct decision but, as Tkacik also notes, one long-coming. In the past, Washington has routinely overlooked Beijing’s lack of cooperation on this and related matters because, it was argued, “we needed” China’s cooperation on some more pressing issue. Of course, the fact that full Chinese cooperation rarely, if ever, occurs is never seen as a sufficient reason to cast doubt on the validity of this approach. It would be useful if our China policy were based more on actual behavior rather than never-ending, never-quite-fulfilled expectations.

Putting China on Notice
John Tkacik
Asian Wall Street Journal
May 27, 2003

During my career in the U.S. State Department, I was one of the handwringers when it came to levying economic sanctions on China, even those mandated by U.S. law. We old China hands would always warn that “now is not a good time to antagonize Beijing.” Yet that was just to disguise the fact that we never believed there was a good time to annoy the Chinese. As a result, whenever the department got around to recommending economic sanctions against Chinese firms, they were generally of the harmless, slap-on-the-wrist variety.

Now that has finally changed, ahead of next week’s summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao. On Friday, one of China’s biggest conglomerates, China North Industries Corp. (Norinco), was hit with an unprecedented two-year ban on exports to the U.S. That will affect at least $100 million in goods annually—and possibly close to half a billion dollars if U.S. Customs can identify all of Norinco’s subsidiaries.

The sanctions followed two stern messages the State Department sent to Beijing last year, warning Norinco—China’s premier arms manufacturer—to stop selling rocket fuel and missile components to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Iranian government agency in charge of developing and producing ballistic missiles. But, after years of toothless sanctions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry apparently believed they had little to fear and ignored the warnings.

Yet still the State Department hesitated. Out came the old excuses so common in my day. Last October was said to be a bad time because President Bush was preparing for a summit with then Chinese President Jiang Zemin. November was bad because the U.N. Security Council was about to vote on Iraq. In January, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, providing a fresh excuse for avoiding any action that might complicate resolving this issue. In February, all attention was on Iraq and North Korea. Ditto for March.

But all that temporizing began to change after the U.S.-North Korea negotiation fiasco in Beijing on April 23. On that day, the North Koreans announced (in the presence of a Chinese diplomat) that Pyongyang had “essentially completed the reprocessing plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods.” A few hours later they threatened (this time without a Chinese witness) to export nuclear materials. “What are you going to do about it?” the Pyongyang envoy demanded of his U.S. counterpart.

After an experience like that, even the State Department lost its collective patience. President Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were in no mood for more North Korean threats, and almost as exasperated by Beijing’s failure to do anything about them. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gathered his top advisors and drew up an unprecedented sanctions regime against a Chinese government-owned corporation.

It is unprecedented because, for the first time, these sanctions include a blanket ban on a Chinese state-owned corporation exporting anything to the U.S. And Americans buy quite a bit from Norinco, at least $100 million a year according to the U.S. Commerce Department.

Central Intelligence Agency estimates put the figure far higher, pointing to the more than 4,000 product lines manufactured by Norinco’s vast business empire, from toys and shoes to binoculars and auto parts. The company’s—now-banned—exports to the U.S. reportedly include everything from Turkestani carpets to aluminum siding. It is also the world’s biggest producer of aluminum heat sinks for computers and, given the broad language of the ban, computers and other electronic products which use these components could be affected.

There are so many Norinco subsidiaries in Shenzhen, one U.S. official said, that even Norinco doesn’t know the full impact of the sanctions. In the end, the total amount affected could be nearer half a billion dollars a year.

Never before has a Chinese firm, much less a huge one like Norinco, been subject to a blanket ban on exports to the U.S. After some of its employees were caught helping smuggle 2,000 fully automatic AK-47 assault guns to drug dealers in Oakland, California in 1996, the Clinton administration banned Norinco from selling any more AK-47s—but only for two years. Last week’s sanctions are much more serious, designed to inflict pain and demonstrate that the Bush administration is willing to back its warnings with actions.

Yet there is little fear in Washington that Beijing will retaliate, despite an angry statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry on Friday, denying Norinco had any contracts with Iran. First, Beijing has been chronically in the wrong. It has exported dangerous weapons and technologies to irresponsible regimes, and the U.S. has warned for years that strong counterproliferation sanctions would come. Moreover, China is seen broadly within the Bush administration (though not by the State Department) as having offered relatively little help in dealing with North Korea.

Nor has China been much help in the war on terror where the much-vaunted “cooperation” with Beijing has been a one-way street. The U.S. gave China’s secret police access to Chinese Muslim prisoners at Guantanamo; the Federal Bureau of Investigation trained Chinese police in triaging and analyzing terrorist archives and financial documentation. But there is no evidence of any substantive Chinese contribution to the sum total of counterterrorist intelligence. Typically, State Department officials insist that China’s antiterrorist cooperation has been “good” but they “can’t talk about it.” However one senior CIA officer painted a very different picture, describing China’s help as “close to zero.”

This isn’t surprising. China’s new leaders certainly aren’t committed to helping the U.S. fight terror. As the influential Chinese foreign affairs journal Outlook Weekly explained in February, “China cannot be without any reservations when cooperating with the U.S. in combating terrorism because the U.S. is using the fight against terrorism as an opportunity to pursue its hegemonic strategy, which in turn would harm China’s security environment.”

Nor is there much appreciation for China’s role in the Iraq campaign. Beijing essentially did nothing but complain about American hegemony and line up with Paris, Berlin and Moscow on most major issues. Of course, the Chinese leadership played only a bit part in harassing the American efforts to disarm Baghdad, preferring instead to let the French take the heat of America’s post-Iraq retribution. This is understandable. China is loath to antagonize the U.S. too much—after all, its economic growth is powered by a trade surplus with America that reached $103 billion last year.

President Bush and Mr. Powell have repeatedly stressed the administration’s desire for a “constructive, cooperative, candid” relationship with China, and their policies have generally been consistent with that. China, for whatever reason, has done little to reciprocate. Now, as President Bush winds up three weeks of summits with the leaders of South Korea, Japan and Russia and prepares for his first presidential summit with Mr. Hu, at least the U.S.-China relationship will be candid.

Mr. Tkacik, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., is a retired officer in the U.S. foreign service who served in Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Taipei.