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Voter Kerry favoriserait de nouveaux attentats aux Etats-Unis, selon Dick Cheney

DES MOINES, Iowa (AP) - Le vice-président américain Dick Cheney a affirmé mardi que les Etats-Unis feraient face à une nouvelle menace terroriste si les électeurs faisaient le “mauvais choix” le jour des élections, soulignant que John Kerry adopterait une politique défensive, typique de l’avant-11 septembre.

Le comité de campagne Kerry-Edwards a immédiatement réagi en qualifiant ces propos de “faibles tactiques”, dépassant les bornes.

“Il est primordial que dans huit semaines, le 2 novembre, nous fassions le bon choix, parce que si nous faisons le mauvais choix, il est probable que nous soyons une nouvelle fois attaqués, de façon dévastatrice pour les Etats-Unis”, a affirmé Cheney devant 350 supporters lors d’un meeting à l’hôtel de ville de Des Moines (Iowa).

Si John Kerry était élu, la nation retournerait à “un état d’esprit avant-11 septembre”, selon lequel les attentats terroristes sont des actes criminels qui nécessitent une approche réactive, a expliqué Cheney. Au contraire, l’approche offensive de George Bush vise à débusquer les terroristes là où ils s’organisent et s’entraînent et à faire pression sur les pays qui les abritent.

Le vice-président a pris en exemple l’effort réalisé en Afghanistan pour poursuivre les terroristes, alors que le cerveau des attentats du 11 septembre, Oussama ben Laden court toujours. En Irak, Dick Cheney a rappelé l’arrestation de Saddam Hussein, dirigeant qui utilisait les armes de destruction massive contre son propre peuple et abritait des terroristes.

Le candidat démocrate à la vice-présidence John Edwards a diffusé un communiqué affirmant que “les faibles tactiques de Dick Cheney avaient dépassé les bornes, prouvant une nouvelle fois que lui et George W. Bush feront tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir et diront n’importe quoi pour conserver leurs postes. Protéger l’Amérique des agissements de terroristes dangereux n’est pas un argument démocrate ou républicain, Dick Cheney et George Bush devraient savoir ça.” AP

M. Verheugen promet aux Turcs qu’ils seront “citoyens de la même Europe”
LE MONDE | 07.09.04 | 17h30
Le commissaire européen en charge des questions d’élargissement de l’Union a entamé une ultime visite en Turquie pour vérifier l’application des réformes demandées et finaliser son rapport. L’avis de la Commission, prévu pour le 6 octobre, divise ses membres.

Ankara, Diyarbakir de notre envoyé spécial

Défenseurs des droits de l’homme, dignitaires religieux, élus, hommes d’affaires : telle est l’ultime tournée “sur le terrain” qu’effectue Günter Verheugen, le commissaire à l’élargissement, avant que la Commission ne rende, le 6 octobre, sa recommandation à propos de l’ouverture de négociations d’adhésion avec l’Union européenne, assortie d’un rapport sur l’état d’avancement des réformes.

Lundi 6 septembre à Ankara, il a rencontré, le premier ministre, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, et son ministre des affaires étrangères, Abdullah Gul. Il s’est ensuite entretenu avec des militants associatifs. Puis s’est envolé vers Diyarbakir, dans le sud-est anatolien, où il a croisé dans la soirée l’ancienne députée kurde, Leyla Zana, libérée en juin après dix ans de détention pour liens avec le Parti séparatiste des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK). Mardi, M. Verheugen devait se rendre dans un village où les populations chassées par le conflit kurde tentent peu à peu de revenir.

A chaque rencontre, l’émissaire de Bruxelles fait mine de cultiver le secret, mais il laisse transparaître ses intentions : “C’est l’heure de vérité ; le Conseil nous a donné un mandat clair, il n’est pas question de fuir nos responsabilités”, a-t-il répété à plusieurs reprises. “Nous serons citoyens de la même Europe”, a-t-il répliqué au jeune maire de Diyarbakir, qui a fait placarder pour l’occasion de grandes pancartes dans cette ville à majorité kurde : “Bienvenue au citoyen Verheugen dans la Grande Europe”.

La commission s’apprêterait, selon le vœux de M. Verheugen, à formuler une recommandation “claire et ferme” aux Etats membres, lesquels doivent se prononcer à l’unanimité le 17 décembre. Les diplomates européens considèrent que la Turquie a accompli d’importants progrès sur le chemin des réformes : elle respecterait désormais pour l’essentiel les critères d’adhésion, en particulier sur le plan politique. Pour les experts, la situation a évolué dans le bon sens depuis le début des années 2000, même si de sérieuses difficultés demeurent dans l’application des nouvelles lois.

“La mise en œuvre n’est pas achevée, mais c’est normal”, a dit M. Verheugen, tout en soulignant à plusieurs reprises le lien, “qui ne doit pas être rompu”, entre “démocratisation et intégration européenne”.

La principale inconnue réside plutôt dans le calendrier. Les dirigeants turcs réclament une date précise, la plus rapprochée possible. Aux yeux du commissaire, la question demeure ouverte. La Commission ne serait, selon lui, pas tenue d’avancer une date formelle, mais elle pourrait identifier une période indicative. Deux options sont possibles : soit l’exécutif européen préconise d’ouvrir les pourparlers “sans délai”, c’est-à-dire après quatre à six mois d’ultimes préparatifs. Soit il préconise d’attendre un peu, pour ouvrir les négociations fin 2005 ou début 2006. Cette option pourrait permettre de laisser passer la ratification du traité constitutionnel européen dans un pays comme la France, afin d’éviter que la campagne ne soit polluée par la question turque.

LE SUD-EST EN RETARD
Tout dépendra également des discussions au sein d’une Commission divisée sur le sujet : M. Verheugen espère une décision consensuelle, mais plusieurs commissaires - l’Autrichien Franz Fischler, l’Espagnole Loyola de Palacio, le Néerlandais Frits Bolkestein, et la Luxembourgeoise Viviane Reding - ne cachent pas leurs réserves quant à l’ouverture de négociations. Et pourraient compliquer la rédaction de la recommandation.

M. Verheugen profite de sa tournée turque, qui doit aussi le conduire à Izmir et Istanbul, pour faire un ultime point sur les réformes. Lundi, lors de sa rencontre avec MM. Erdogan et Gul, il a salué l’adoption en cours d’un nouveau code pénal. Mais Bruxelles suggère à la Turquie de renoncer à faire de l’adultère un délit, comme le prévoit le projet. “Une telle législation n’existe pas dans les pays membres ; elle fausserait la perception que l’on se fait dans l’Union des réformes en Turquie”, dit-on dans l’entourage de M. Verheugen.

Autre souci, l’Union européenne s’inquiète du sort des communautés non musulmanes, dont les conditions d’existence - droit de propriété, statut, formation du clergé - sont précaires. Lors de ses entretiens, M. Verheugen met également l’accent sur le harcèlement judiciaire dont sont toujours victimes certains défenseurs des droits de l’homme, des journalistes et des avocats. Enfin, il considère que le sud-est du pays demeure très en retard et que le retour des populations déplacées du fait du conflit avec le PKK reste très lent. Mais ces préoccupations ne semblent pas atténuer la confiance de M. Verheugen dans la capacité des autorités turques à poursuivre le processus de démocratisation… tout en négociant l’adhésion à l’Union. Pour lui, “la Turquie qui intégrera l’Union ne sera pas le pays d’aujourd’hui”.
Philippe Ricard
Les réticences restent fortes en France
“Dans le monde de demain, l’intérêt de l’Union, comme de la Turquie, est d’emprunter un chemin commun” : devant la conférence des ambassadeurs, le 27 août, le président Chirac a réaffirmé sa position de principe en faveur d’une adhésion dès que les conditions seront remplies. Cette position va à contre-pied de celle prise par l’UMP et l’UDF lors des élections européennes. La question turque continue de diviser fortement la classe politique française, dans la majorité comme dans l’opposition.

Chez les socialistes, Laurent Fabius a confirmé fin août, dans une tribune au Monde, une opposition partagée dans la gauche du parti. Une mission de la délégation pour l’Union européenne de l’Assemblée nationale, conduite par l’UMP Pierre Lequillier, adversaire de l’adhésion, va se rendre prochainement en Turquie. Cette hésitation se retrouve dans beaucoup de pays européens, où les gouvernements affrontent des opinions réticentes. Seuls les Britanniques et les Espagnols ne connaissent pas d’états d’âme.
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 08.09.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-378116,0.html

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Neuf personnalités, dont Michel Rocard, plaident la cause d’Ankara
LE MONDE | 07.09.04 | 17h30
Bruxelles de notre bureau européen
“L’avènement d’une Europe aux religions multiples pourrait montrer avec force que le conflit des civilisations n’est pas le destin inéluctable du genre humain” : neuf personnalités politiques européennes ont avancé cet argument, lundi 6 septembre à Bruxelles, pour prôner l’entrée de la Turquie, pays musulman, dans l’Union européenne.

Ces neuf personnalités, qui souhaitent “contribuer à l’émergence d’un débat plus rationnel” sur l’identité européenne, viennent de pays et d’horizons politiques différents. Parmi elles figurent notamment trois députés européens - Michel Rocard, socialiste, ancien premier ministre français, Bronislaw Geremek, libéral, ancien dissident et ministre des affaires étrangères de Pologne, et Emma Bonino, radicale italienne, ancienne commissaire.

L’ancien président social-démocrate de la Finlande, Marti Ahtisaari, a présidé leurs travaux, qui ont obtenu le soutien financier du British Council, institution publique financée par le gouvernement britannique, partisan de l’adhésion turque, et de l’Open Society Institute, fondation privée du milliardaire George Soros.

Pour ces personnalités, l’adhésion de la Turquie démontrerait le caractère “tolérant” de l’Europe, qui n’apparaîtrait plus comme un “club chrétien fermé”. Elle prouverait que l’islam et la démocratie sont “compatibles”. “En proposant un modèle alternatif à la société intolérante, sectaire et fermée sur elle-même que prônent les islamistes radicaux, l’Europe pourrait jouer un rôle majeur dans les relations entre l’Occident et le monde islamique”, affirment-elles. La présence de la Turquie dans l’Union “augmenterait l’influence de celle-ci au Moyen-Orient, influence qui pourrait être utilisée pour pacifier et stabiliser cette région”. A contrario, l’échec du processus pourrait susciter une “grave crise d’identité en Turquie”.

SAINT-PAUL ET L’ANATOLIE
Les signataires rejettent les arguments invoqués pour dénier à la Turquie une légitimité européenne : certes, ce pays se trouve “sur la ligne qui sépare l’Asie et l’Europe”. Mais “l’Anatolie, région qui constitue aujourd’hui encore le cœur de la Turquie”, et où “saint Paul fit son premier voyage de missionnaire, portant la chrétienté au-delà des frontières du judaïsme”, a été “l’un des berceaux de la civilisation européenne”, rappellent-ils. Ils soulignent qu’“en cela, le cas de la Turquie diffère de celui des pays d’Afrique du Nord”.

Ces personnalités écartent l’argument selon lequel l’adhésion de la Turquie bloquerait l’intégration politique européenne au profit d’une vaste zone de libre-échange : “En dépit de sa taille, il est improbable que l’adhésion de la Turquie modifie de manière fondamentale le fonctionnement des institutions”, affirment-elles, en soulignant que “le processus décisionnel est fondé sur des alliances qui ne cessent de fluctuer”, que “l’influence politique des Etats membres dépend au moins autant de leur puissance économique que de leur taille ou de leur poids démographique”.

Ces personnalités estiment que les gouvernements européens devront suivre les recommandations que formulera la Commission dans le rapport qu’elle remettra le 6 octobre. Si elle juge que la Turquie remplit suffisamment les critères politiques requis, en matière de droits de l’homme et d’économie de marché, pour que des négociations d’adhésion soient ouvertes, ils devront l’accepter. “Tout nouvel ajournement affaiblirait la crédibilité de l’Union européenne et serait perçu comme une violation du principe selon lequel les accords doivent être respectés”, a insisté Michel Rocard, en présentant le titre de leur ouvrage collectif La Turquie dans l’Europe : plus qu’une promesse ?

Rafaële Rivais
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 08.09.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-378117,0.html
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Rapport d’information fait au nom de la Délégation pour l’Union européenne sur la candidature de la Turquie à l’Union européenne
Robert DEL PICCHIA, Hubert HAENEL
FRANCE. Sénat. Délégation pour l’Union européenne

Paris;Sénat;2004;88 pages;24cm
(Les Rapports du Sénat, n° 279)
En décembre 2004, le Conseil européen décidera si l’Union européenne ouvre des négociations d’adhésion avec la Turquie et déterminera si ce pays satisfait aux critères politiques définis à Copenhague (stabilité des institutions, respect des droits de l’homme, fonctionnement du système judiciaire, droits des minorités et liberté religieuse). Après un voyage en Turquie, les rapporteurs évoquent la perspective des relations entre la Turquie et l’Union européenne, les éléments à prendre en considération et avancent l’idée d’un “partenariat privilégié”.
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r03-279/r03-279.html

September 8, 2004
SCHOOL SIEGE
Russia Grieves for Children and Putin Vents His Fury
By SETH MYDANS and C. J. CHIVERS

MOSCOW, Sept. 7 - Tens of thousands of people massed near Red Square on Tuesday to mourn the slain children of Beslan, while President Vladimir V. Putin vented his anger at their killers and, in unusually strong terms, at critics who call for a moderate response.

“Hands off our children” read a banner in the huge, packed crowd, voicing what seemed to be a universal sentiment that even in the vicious world of terrorism there must be a limit to cruelty.

In remarks reported in the British press, Mr. Putin was more blunt about those who have criticized him for failing to negotiate with separatists in Chechnya.
“Why don’t you meet Osama bin Laden, invite him to Brussels or to the White House and engage in talks, ask him what he wants and give it to him so he leaves you in peace?” he said, according to The Guardian. “You find it possible to set some limitations in your dealings with these bastards, so why should we talk to people who are child-killers?”

Four days after hundreds of children, parents and teachers were killed in a schoolhouse overrun by bomb-wielding hostage-takers in the province of North Ossetia, investigators were gathering new evidence about the episode and the apparently accidental explosion that caused the siege to erupt into sudden violence.
Aslanbek Aslakhanov, the Kremlin adviser on Chechnya, said in a telephone interview that elite Russian commando units were taken by surprise by the explosion and lost valuable minutes as the shooting began. He also described three futile conversations he had with the hostage-takers in an effort to save the children.

A videotape shot by the rebels and shown in part on television also provided chilling images of the days leading up to the disaster. It showed gunmen wiring the school’s crowded gymnasium with explosives as a streak of blood spread across the floor. A boy sat in the foreground with his hands up. A woman among the terrorists, dressed in black, stood in a doorway. Bombs hung on wires from the ceiling and from the basketball nets. A man in a mask stood in the middle of the gymnasium, proudly pointing with his foot on what appeared to be a detonator.

As the images were broadcast around the country, in the fields around Beslan, where the death count is at least 338 with 100 or more still missing, families slipped and stumbled in the mud as they carried still more coffins, large and small, to rows of newly dug graves.

The police in Moscow reported the arrest of two people in another terror attack, saying they had helped two Chechen women suspected of blowing up two passenger airliners last month, killing 90 people. One of those arrested said he had helped the women evade security, although he claimed not to have known that they planned a bombing, the police said.

Together with another suicide bombing near a subway station in Moscow, more than 500 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in the space of about two weeks.
In The Guardian article, Mr. Putin was quoted as saying the 10-year war in Chechnya, which appears now to have affected neighboring North Ossetia, was a war for territorial integrity in the remnants of the Soviet Union, which broke into pieces 13 years ago.

“There are Muslims along the Volga, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan,” he said. “Chechnya isn’t Iraq. It’s not far away. It’s a vital part of our territory. This is all about Russia’s territorial integrity.”

He added: “Just imagine that people who shoot children in the back came to power anywhere on our planet. Just ask yourself that, and you will have no more questions about our policy in Chechnya.”

The Chechen rebel leader, Aslan Maskhadov, hurried to disassociate himself from the torture and killing of the Beslan children, who were given no food or water and were not allowed to use the toilet for two days and were shot when they tried to flee.
In a statement, he sent condolences and “fraternal sympathy” to the president and people of North Ossetia and said, “There cannot be any justification for people who raise their hand against what is most sacred to us - the life of defenseless children!”
The Kremlin has blamed him and the warlord Shamil Basayev for the seizure of the school. One captured raider, identified in the Russian press as a bodyguard of Mr. Basayev named Nur-Pasha Kulayev, 24, was reported to have said he was acting on the orders of the two men.

In the telephone interview, Mr. Aslakhanov described three futile telephone conversations with the terrorists after they took over the school. “They declared that Basayev sent them,” he said. “I asked them what could stop them. They told us only God could stop them, but I am certain that they are godless.”
Nevertheless, he said he did not believe that Mr. Basayev was giving orders as the operation unfolded. “I am certain that they were not in direct contact with him,” he said.

He said it was not clear to him whom he was speaking with.
“I tried to speak Chechen” he said. “But they said, ‘We don’t understand, speak Russian,’ and those who spoke Russian, they spoke with an accent. I was sure it was a Caucasian accent, but I will not name the ethnic group, so as not to offend them.”
He spoke of desperate attempts to obtain the release of the hundreds of trapped children, who had been attending a ceremony for the first day of the school year. “I had more than 400 well-known people, public figures and athletes, champions, who were ready to take the place of the hostages,” he said. “We were ready for the sake of the lives of the children and the other hostages, by proportional means to carry this out.”

Underscoring the local nature of the conflict, a spokesman for the Kremlin, Dmitri Peskov, said in a telephone interview that despite earlier assertions by security officials, no Arabs had yet been found among the dead terrorists. He did not rule out that some of them, as yet unidentified, might be from foreign countries.
The F.S.B., the successor to the K.G.B., had earlier reported that the bodies of nine Arabs had been found. Mr. Peskov said 30 bodies had been confirmed to be those of terrorists - shown on television dumped by the schoolhouse in black garbage bags. Because of the difficulty of identifying the bodies, he said, there could be one more.
Officials are checking now to see whether at least one of the terrorists had been detained by the F.S.B. three years ago and released, he said. “We are trying to check that right now,” Mr. Peskov said. “If he was arrested, why was he able to participate in this kind of terrible terrorist act.”

Some Russian newspapers printed the names of a number of people they identified as hostage-takers, dominated by hardened fighters who were well known to the Russian military from the war in Chechnya.

That war, with its roots in separatist aspirations that go back more than a century, flared a decade ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After a hiatus in the mid-1990’s, Mr. Putin began a new, particularly destructive, chapter that has ripped the life out of the bucolic province. Mr. Aslakhanov denied an earlier report that 20 Russian commandos had been killed in the attempt to rescue hostages, saying that nine had died at the scene and one later at a hospital. Twenty were wounded, he said. Mr. Peskov also said 10 of the elite soldiers had died.

As investigators talk to witnesses and study the scene, Mr. Peskov said, they are coming to the conclusion that the explosion that set off the violence after a two-day standoff was an accident.

Either the raiders had bungled a charge while adjusting the 20 or so bombs that witnesses said they had rigged around the school gymnasium, he surmised, or one of the bombs had simply slipped through the duct tape that was holding it in place.
“Some of the eyewitnesses said that the terrorists were trying to change something in their system of bombs, and at that same time, they made a mistake,” he said. “The explosion, it was accidental. We can say it really for sure.”

Mr. Aslakhanov said Russia’s elite special forces units had been caught off balance by the bomb blasts and had lost crucial minutes in the early, frantic moments of shooting.

“The special services turned out not to be ready for this moment,” he said. “They turned out to be 5, 7, 10 minutes late for the assault.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/08/international/europe/08russia.html
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Tous les pays condamnent, certains responsables interpellent Moscou
LE MONDE | 04.09.04 | 18h26
La communauté internationale a unanimement qualifié, vendredi, de “barbarie” la prise d’otages de Beslan, mais certains responsables se sont interrogés sur les méthodes employées par les forces russes. L’Union européenne a refusé de se prononcer sur la décision des forces russes d’intervenir, mais a réclamé dans la soirée des explications à Moscou.

“Tous les pays du monde doivent coopérer pour prévenir des tragédies comme celle-ci”, a déclaré la présidence néerlandaise de l’UE. “Mais nous aimerions aussi apprendre des autorités russes comment cette tragédie a pu arriver”, a ajouté le chef de la diplomatie de La Haye, Bernard Bot.

“Notre critique contre la guerre en Tchétchénie ne peut, en aucun cas, effacer le caractère atroce de l’utilisation des enfants”, a déclaré la ministre suédoise des affaires étrangères Laila Freivalds. Le premier ministre finlandais Matti Vanhanen a condamné la prise d’otages, et a souligné que la sécurité était de la responsabilité du gouvernement russe.

Le ministre polonais de la défense Jerzy Szmajdzinski a été plus direct, estimant que le moment pour donner l’assaut contre les ravisseurs a été mal choisi et qu’il aurait fallu négocier plus longtemps. “Il faut négocier jusqu’au bout, surtout quand il s’agit d’enfants. Négocier, pour convaincre que se servir d’enfants comme boucliers humains est un crime”, a-t-il dit. Le premier ministre polonais Marek Belka s’est dit aussi “choqué et indigné” par la manière dont l’assaut a été donné.

La France, l’Allemagne, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Italie n’ont pas eu de telles interrogations. Dans un communiqué, le ministère français des affaires étrangères déclare que “la France se tient aux côtés du peuple russe dans cette douloureuse épreuve et appelle à la mobilisation de tous dans la lutte contre le terrorisme”.

“Il est difficile d’exprimer ma révulsion face à la barbarie de terroristes prêts à faire subir à des enfants et leur famille de telles souffrances”, a écrit le premier ministre britannique Tony Blair. Le chancelier allemand Gerhard Schröder a, lui aussi, appelé à lutter contre le terrorisme : “Des terroristes dénués de conscience ont tenté, en assassinant des gens, d’atteindre des objectifs politiques qui, de fait, ont perdu ce caractère.”

“EFFROI ET DOULEUR”
Le chef du gouvernement italien Silvio Berlusconi a fait part “de son effroi et de sa douleur”à l’annonce du dénouement. “Les informations sur les victimes remplissent d’effroi et de douleur, mais aussi de soulagement pour les otages libérés grâce à l’action des forces russes”, a-t-il ajouté. L’Otan, par la voix de son secrétaire général, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, s’est engagée à “continuer à collaborer avec la Russie afin de combattre cette menace”.

Le président George W. Bush a déclaré que la prise d’otages était “un autre sombre rappel” des tactiques terroristes, tout en déplorant la perte de nombreuses vies. La prise d’otages est “un acte barbare de terrorisme et une tragédie dont la responsabilité revient clairement aux terroristes”, a indiqué le département d’Etat américain. Plusieurs dirigeants ont lancé un appel à la mobilisation de la communauté internationale contre les terroristes. Le chef de la diplomatie israélienne Sylvan Shalom a exhorté la communauté mondiale à s’unir contre le terrorisme international.
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 05.09.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-377858,0.html
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Israël et la Russie resserrent leurs liens contre le “Djihad islamique mondial”
LE MONDE | 07.09.04 | 14h25

Prévue de longue date, la visite en Israël, lundi 6 septembre, du chef de la diplomatie russe, Sergueï Lavrov, centrée à l’origine sur le processus de paix et la situation régionale, a vu son ordre du jour bouleversé par la tragédie de Beslan, que les médias israéliens ont largement rapportée, la comparant avec le double attentat qui a fait 16 morts, mardi (jour de la prise d’otages en Ossétie du Nord), à Beersheba, une localité du sud d’Israël.

“Le terrorisme qui a frappé la Russie n’est pas différent de celui qui sévit à New York, à Tel-Aviv ou à Madrid”, a déclaré Sylvan Shalom, le ministre israélien des affaires étrangères, en recevant son homologue russe lundi. La veille, le premier ministre israélien, Ariel Sharon, avait appelé Vladimir Poutine pour lui proposer de faire front face au “Djihad islamique mondial”. “Il est temps pour le monde libre de s’unir”, avait indiqué M. Sharon sur un ton qui tranchait avec les demandes d’explications formulées, dans le même temps, par l’Union européenne envers la Russie, quant au dénouement tragique de la prise d’otages.

S’estimant donc liés par une communauté de destins, les deux Etats souhaitent désormais renforcer leur coopération “dans les domaines de la sécurité, du renseignement et de l’humanitaire”.

COOPÉRATION RENFORCÉE
“Il n’est plus possible de soutenir les soi-disant mouvements de libération nationale, qui recourent au terrorisme tout en condamnant les islamistes extrémistes”, a expliqué, lundi, un proche d’Ariel Sharon à la presse, dans une allusion au soutien sans failles apporté jadis par Moscou à la cause palestinienne.
Cette page a été tournée. Avec la dislocation de l’URSS en 1991, les liens de la direction russe avec les pays arabes se sont effilochés. Les tenants de cette ligne, à l’image de l’ancien maître espion Evgueni Primakov, ne sont plus aux affaires.

Avec l’arrivée d’un nouveau locataire au Kremlin en mars 2000, tout a changé. Cette année-là, l’ancien lieutenant colonel du KGB, Vladimir Poutine invite l’ancien refuznik Nathan Chtcharanski à un déjeuner en tête à tête. Pour la petite histoire, l’ex-dissident - devenu entre temps ministre dans la coalition de droite emmenée par M. Sharon - attendait son vol de retour pour Israël lorsqu’une limousine vint le quérir, direction le Kremlin. Deux ans plus tard, le président du Sénat russe, Sergueï Mironov, proche de Vladimir Poutine, refusa, lors d’une tournée dans la région, de rencontrer le chef de l’autorité palestinienne, Yasser Arafat.

Ces dernières années, les relations entre Israël et la Russie se sont renforcées. Les deux pays coopèrent dans le domaine de l’armement notamment à la fabrication d’un hélicoptère d’assaut Ka-52 et à celle d’un Awacs A-50, un avion de reconnaissance aérienne. Il y a douze jours, au moment du double attentat commis sur deux avions de ligne en Russie, la presse moscovite, fustigeant les insuffisances de la sécurité aérienne locale, avait vanté les mérites de celui d’Israël, “le plus sûr au monde”.

Les échanges commerciaux ont crû, dynamisés par la présence en Israël d’une importante diaspora russophone (1 million de personnes soit 1/6e de la population d’Israël) arrivée en masse entre 1980 et 1990. Restée très attachée à sa culture, cette communauté russe d’Israël lit la presse russe, regarde la télévision russe et, friande de cochonnailles, possède ses propres charcuteries, ce qui n’est pas toujours bien vu.

Elle n’en est pas moins proche des ultra-orthodoxes et constitue un vivier électoral de choix pour les partis de droite. Marqués par la mentalité soviétique, les russophones d’Israël sont généralement partisans d’une ligne dure envers les Palestiniens, assimilés par eux aux “Noirs” (“Tchiornye”), le terme communément employé dans la langue de Pouchkine pour désigner les Caucasiens.

Engagés dans une lutte sans fin contre les guérillas - tchétchène et palestinienne -, les deux Etats échangent depuis longtemps informations et expériences. En 2002, des officiers des forces spéciales russes, dont le général Viatcheslav Ovtchinnikov avait exposé, au Collège israélien de défense nationale, les tactiques de l’armée russe en Tchétchénie. En 2002 également, les forces russes, imitant l’armée israélienne dans les territoires occupés, avaient fait sauter les maisons de kamikazes tchétchènes. La différence, souligne le politologue russe Andreï Riabov, c’est qu’en Israël “une très vive opposition à la politique du gouvernement s’exprime ouvertement, alors que chez nous il n’y a aucun débat”.
Marie Jégo
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 08.09.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-378104,0.html
——

Poutine veut faire taire les critiques
A Moscou, le président russe défend sa politique et rassemble ses partisans • A Beslan, quatre jours après le drame, des enfants sont toujours portés disparus •
Par Libération.fr
mardi 07 septembre 2004 (Liberation.fr - 13:25)

Après les centaines de morts de la prise d’otages de Beslan, Vladimir Poutine ne dévie pas d’un pouce de sa ligne politique. Pas question pour le président russe de négocier une solution politique avec les indépendantistes tchétchènes, même les plus modérés. «Pourquoi ne rencontrez-vous pas Oussama Ben Laden?», a-t-il ironisé mardi devant des journalistes occidentaux, «pourquoi ne l’invitez-vous pas à Bruxelles ou à la Maison Blanche pour engager des pourparlers, lui demander ce qu’il veut et le lui donner afin qu’il vous laisse tranquilles?» Pour le maître du Kremlin, «personne n’a le droit moral de nous dire de parler aux tueurs d’enfants». Et d’enfoncer le clou, en direction de tous ceux qui, en Occident, oseraient émettre une critique de la gestion de la plus sanglante prises d’otages jamais réalisée: «Imaginez simplement que les gens qui tirent dans le dos des enfants arrivent au pouvoir partout sur la planète. Demandez-vous simplement cela, et vous n’aurez plus de questions sur notre politique en Tchétchénie.»

Manifestants pro et anti Poutine
Dans l’après-midi, une énorme manifestation contre le terrorisme doit réunir plus de 100.000 personnes au pied du Kremlin, à Moscou. Ce soutien populaire au président russe a été soigneusement préparé. Les télévisions tenues par le pouvoir diffusent depuis deux jours des appels à s’y rendre. Lundi, plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes rassemblées à Saint-Pétersbourg, au pied de l’Ermitage, exigeaient entre autres la restauration de la peine de mort contre les terroristes.

D’autres rassemblements ont eu lieu mardi, deuxième jour de deuil national, notamment à Ekaterinbourg, grande ville de l’Oural, où 20.000 personnes ont rendu sous la pluie un hommage d’une heure aux victimes de l’école n°1 de Beslan, petite ville de la république caucasienne d’Ossétie du Nord.

A Vladikavkaz, la capitale d’Ossétie du Nord, quelques centaines de manifestants ont dénoncé «le pouvoir corrompu (qui) est la source du terrorisme». Selon les autorités, les ravisseurs auraient déposé armes et explosifs dans l’école de Beslan au mois de juin, lors de travaux de réfection. Préparation rendue possible par le versement de pots-de-vin, notamment à des membres de la police routière, estime la presse russe.

«Pas de plan d’action»
Poutine n’a pas pour autant jugé nécessaire l’ouverture d’une enquête publique sur les événements de Beslan. Un «spectacle» selon lui inutile. Les témoignages sur l’impréparation des forces spéciales russes lors de l’assaut se multiplient pourtant et le déclenchement du massacre n’est toujours pas éclairci. Un vétéran des unités d’élite, Igor Senine, explique par exemple dans un quotidien russe que «ni les positions de tireurs d’élite, ni les étapes d’une intervention» n’avaient été mises au point. «Il n’y avait pas de plan d’action», poursuit-il. Et le plan de l’école, qui était aux mains de la cellule de crise, n’avait pas été distribué aux troupes d’élite.

A Beslan, les familles continuent d’enterrer ou de chercher leurs morts. Officiellement, on compte 366 victimes et 500 blessés, selon le dernier bilan. Soixante-dix enterrements environ étaient prévus mardi. 107 corps n’ont pas encore été identifiés. Selon le correspondant de l’AFP sur place, certaines disparitions restent inexpliquées. Des parents assurent avoir vu leurs enfants vivants après l’assaut vendredi, et ne les ont toujours pas retrouvés. «Actuellement, mon fils n’est pas vivant, et il n’est pas mort non plus!» s’emporte Boris Tigiev, père d’un garçon de 14 ans, que sa petite sœur Alana a vu s’enfuir de l’école vendredi, et qui reste introuvable depuis.

A l’hôpital de Vladikavkaz, le FSB (Service Fédéral de Sécurité) a demandé l’autorisation d’interroger les enfants. Le directeur de l’établissement a interdit aux policiers l’accès au service de chirurgie. Il a accepté que les convalescents soient interrogés «seulement avec l’autorisation et en présence des parents».
http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=236859
——

«En Tchétchénie, Poutine n’a plus de porte de sortie»
Par Judith RUEFF
mardi 07 septembre 2004 (Liberation.fr - 18:15)

Quatre questions à Lilia Chevtsova, analyste politique à la Carnegie Foundation de Moscou.
Où en est le pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine après la prise d’otages de Beslan?
La crise de Beslan laisse le président russe en position de faiblesse. Sa cote de popularité va très certainement baisser, sans doute de plus de 5%. Ensuite, comme cet homme politique intelligent s’en rend compte lui-même, il est enfermé dans un piège en Tchétchénie et dans le Caucase du Nord. Il n’a plus aucune solution en vue et sa marge de manœuvre se rétrécit. L’option militaire ne donne aucun résultat positif, il ne trouve personne avec qui négocier et il exclut toute solution politique. C’est un cercle vicieux. Objectivement, ses positions sont affaiblies, peut-être pas dans l’immédiat mais si la situation actuelle perdure en Russie, le temps joue contre lui.

Dans la presse ou à la Douma, les critiques contre le président se multiplient. Serait-il menacé?
Les langues commencent déjà à se délier. Dans la rue, dans le métro, dans les magasins, on commence à se plaindre à haute voix de l’insécurité dans le pays. Et les gens en rendent Poutine responsable. L’éviction du rédacteur en chef du quotidien «Izvestia» est d’ailleurs le signe qu’il ne veut tolérer aucune de ces critiques. Les Russes ont élu Poutine en mars 2000 pour qu’il ramène la stabilité. S’il ne le fait pas, la population ne le soutiendra plus. Après deux semaines de violence ininterrompue, les gens commencent à se dire qu’il a échoué et que c’était une erreur de voter pour lui. Mais on ne peut pas pour autant parler de crise politique profonde. Poutine tient toujours les leviers du pouvoir, il a encore beaucoup d’influence. Il reste le seul leader dans le désert politique russe et les Russes ont peur de prendre leurs distances. Personnellement, le déclin du pouvoir de Poutine ne me semble pas rassurant, car il risque d’entraîner une déstabilisation encore plus grande de la société. La situation est donc extrêmement complexe.

Les «ministères de force» (services spéciaux, police, armée) qui ont porté l’ancien officier du KGB au pouvoir approuvent-ils toujours sa politique?
Au sein des organes de sécurité, il semble qu’une majorité le soutient toujours, simplement parce qu’il est l’un des leurs. Mais le président ne dispose pas pour autant d’un soutien inconditionnel, unanime, de ses anciens collègues. Certains ne le trouvent pas assez dur et regrettent qu’il ne soit pas un dictateur. Après Beslan, Poutine affronte de très fortes pressions de la part des forces de sécurité, y compris de celles qui lui sont fidèles, pour qu’il fasse tomber les têtes dans les services spéciaux. Or le président déteste se débarrasser des gens, surtout de «ses» gens, mais il ne pourra éviter de sacrifier quelques responsables plus ou moins importants au sein des organes de sécurité. Le problème, c’est que ces évictions donneront peut-être l’impression que tout va désormais mieux alors que la racine du mal est bien plus profonde. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de défaillance des forces de maintien de l’ordre mais de chaos social et économique. A l’heure actuelle, Poutine ne peut pas quitter la Tchétchénie. S’il le faisait, aucune puissance occidentale ne viendrait le remplacer.

Que peut faire Poutine pour sortir de cette impasse?
Aujourd’hui, il n’a plus de porte de sortie. Il va très probablement continuer la stratégie menée jusqu’à présent: attaquer les rebelles tchétchènes quand il le pourra et s’appuyer sur des leaders locaux pro-russes, comme le nouveau président élu en Tchétchénie il y a dix jours. De son côté, la nouvelle génération d’indépendantistes tchétchènes va continuer sa dérive terroriste.
http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=236898
—-
L’Otan et la Russie intensifient leur coopération

Dans un communiqué commun, l’Otan et la Russie se sont engagés mardi à intensifier leur coopération en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, condamnant la récente vague de terrorisme qui a frappé ce pays, dont la prise d’otages de Beslan. «Les Etats membres du Conseil Otan-Russie restent déterminés à renforcer et intensifier leurs efforts communs contre cette menace partagée qui pèse sur la sécurité et le bien-être de leurs peuples», y compris «en élaborant un plan d’action avec des mesures concrètes de lutte contre le fléau du terrorisme», affirme le communiqué. Celui-ci a été adopté à l’issue d’une réunion extraordinaire mardi après-midi des représentants permanents de l’Otan et de la Russie au siège bruxellois de l’Alliance atlantique.  Aucune indication n’a été donnée sur le contenu de ce plan d’action qui doit être discuté ultérieurement avec les Russes.  Le Conseil Otan-Russie avait été convoqué lundi par le secrétaire général de l’Alliance, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, dans le but de témoigner la solidarité de l’organisation avec la Russie après le dénouement tragique de la prise d’otages de Beslan, en Ossétie du Nord, qui a fait selon le dernier bilan officiel 335 morts (sans compter les preneurs d’otages). «Ces atrocités - les attentats visant des avions civils, l’attentat suicide commis dans une station de métro bondée à Moscou, ainsi que la violente prise d’otages et le massacre de tant d’écoliers à Beslan - mettent en évidence le caractère barbare et perfide de la menace terroriste à laquelle nos sommes tous confrontés aujourd’hui», poursuit le communiqué commun. «Aucune cause ne peut justifier de tels actes», souligne encore le texte qui appelle à «une large et urgente mobilisation de tous les pays» dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.  L’Otan et la Russie se déclarent, en outre, «unis dans leur rejet catégorique du terrorisme sous toutes ses formes et dans leur ferme volonté de voir traduire en justice les auteurs de ces atrocités» et appellent enfin «à l’unité d’action de la communauté internationale face à cette menace».  Le Conseil Otan-Russie a été créé en mai 2002 dans le sillage des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 contre les Etats-Unis dans le but d’améliorer le dialogue et la coopération en matière de sécurité entre les deux anciens ennemis du temps de la guerre froide.  (D’après AFP) 
http://www.lesoir.be/rubriques/mond/page_5179_252218.shtml

Les Britanniques pourraient dire “oui” à l’Europe, mais sans Tony Blair…
LE MONDE | 07.09.04 | 17h30
Londres de notre correspondant

Le gouvernement de Tony Blair pourrait remporter, le jour venu, le référendum sur la Constitution européenne, pourvu que… le premier ministre ne joue pas le premier rôle dans la campagne électorale. Tel est le principal enseignement de l’étude conduite par l’institut de sondages MORI pour le compte du Centre de politique étrangère, un “think tank” placé sous le haut patronage de M. Blair lui-même. Cette enquête, réalisée fin juillet et publiée lundi 6 septembre, est la première indication sérieuse sur l’état de l’opinion depuis l’annonce d’un référendum en avril.

La bataille du référendum, lequel selon le calendrier le plus probable aurait lieu dans les premiers mois de 2006, s’annonce, selon ce sondage, beaucoup plus incertaine et sensiblement moins périlleuse pour le pouvoir qu’on ne le prévoyait généralement. Seuls 35 % des électeurs britanniques se sont fait à ce jour une religion définitive sur le traité de Bruxelles : 8 % sont fermement pour, et 27 % farouchement contre. Sur les 65 % d’indécis, 46 % se disent prêts à changer d’avis, et 19 % n’ont pas fait leur choix.

Pour l’instant, le “non” est nettement en tête : 50 % contre 31 % pour le “oui”. Mais l’énorme armée des indécis donne aux pro-européens une marge de manœuvre qu’ils n’espéraient sans doute pas. Le résultat du vote dépendra donc pour l’essentiel de la capacité des partisans de la Constitution à convaincre cette masse d’électeurs, primo de se rendre aux urnes, secundo d’épouser leur cause. L’enquête classe ces hésitants en cinq catégories : “les brebis perdues du parti tory” (7 %), plutôt enclines à voter “oui”; “les sceptiques ouverts à la persuasion” (8 %) ; “les partisans apathiques” (11 %) ; “les opposants apathiques” (9 %) et “les déconnectés de la politique”.

L’ENVIE DE “LUI INFLIGER UNE RACLÉE”

La mauvaise nouvelle de cette enquête pour M. Blair, c’est que la victoire de son gouvernement suppose qu’il se montre le plus discret possible pendant la campagne et qu’il réussisse à constituer en faveur du “oui” un front uni en ratissant large au sein des deux autres grands partis. Ni M. Blair, ni les travaillistes ne sont en mesure de remporter, seuls, cette bataille cruciale. Le plus grand danger pour les pro-européens, observe Mark Leonard, directeur du Centre de politique étrangère, serait de “laisser le vote sur la Constitution se transformer en un référendum pour ou contre Blair” car “une campagne centrée sur le premier ministre perdrait autant de suffrages qu’elle en gagnerait”. En pareille hypothèse, les nombreux électeurs qui lui tiennent rancœur pour être entré en guerre contre l’Irak seraient trop tentés de saisir l’occasion de “lui infliger une raclée”.

Les commanditaires de l’enquête conseillent à M. Blair de désigner Chris Patten, le commissaire européen sortant (conservateur), comme chef de file de la campagne, apte à rallier derrière lui des leaders proeuropéens du parti tory, aujourd’hui marginalisés, comme Kenneth Clarke et Michael Heseltine. Outre l’appui actif de l’ensemble de l’appareil gouvernemental, M. Blair aura aussi besoin du soutien actif du Parti libéral-démocrate, que dirige l’europhile Charles Kennedy.

L’ignorance étant source de confusion et de méfiance, la victoire de M. Blair, souligne l’étude, passe par une campagne d’information sur l’Europe qui doit débuter le plus tôt possible. Elle devrait, entre autres, mettre à la disposition de chaque citoyen un résumé écrit du traité. Mieux les Britanniques connaissent l’Union européenne, confirme le sondage, plus ils lui sont favorables.

Jean-Pierre Langellier
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 08.09.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-378118,0.html

La bataille entre néo-cons semble permettre l’émergence de voix plus critiques dans des organes qui leurs étaient jusqu’ici inféodés:

Un premier article délivre une analyse honnete de la crise des otages français en Iraq et va même jusqu’a suggerer qu’il existerait bien une autre façon que militaire de lutter contre le terrorisme!

“Eugenio Scalfari, a leading Italian columnist wrote in La Repubblica (a newspaper he helped found) Monday that by creating an Arab consensus against the terrorists France has shown “there is another way to fight terrorism without giving in to their blackmail.” A French success - and in Iraq of all places - “would amount to a defeat for Allawi.” Scalfari went on, “Allawi is not interested in showing that such an alternative could exist to (military opposition). And neither is Bush.”“

http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040907-010544-6798r.htm

Le deuxieme exemple de cette libération de la parole est un article d’Arnaud de Borchgrave, faucon à ses heures, qui s’attaque à l’espionnage institutionnel des Etats Unis par le ... Likud (!).

http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040907-104800-9378r.htm

Verheugen promises ‘factual and fair’ report on Turkey

31.08.2004 - 19:06 CET | By Honor Mahony
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement has promised that next month’s assessment report on Turkish membership of the Union will be “thorough, factual and fair”.

Günter Verheugen told MEPs on Tuesday (31 August) that the report, which will look at whether Ankara has met the political criteria for joining the 25-nation bloc, will also contain “one or two surprises”.

The Commissioner went on to say that he was against the idea, proposed recently by the Dutch government’s advisory council, that Turkey be given the green light for EU membership but that negotiations only begin in two years.

“I think that would amount to a further two years delay”, said Mr Verheugen.

Instead, he gave a more definite timeline.

He referred to a statement made by member states in Copenhagen in 2002 which said that if a positive decision is reached on Turkey then negotiations should be opened “without delay”.

“Without delay means between four and six months”, said the Commissioner.

Mr Verheugen rejected calls by some MEPs for a partnership agreement between the EU and Turkey reminding them that Union has committed itself to Ankara’s membership and that the only issue now is whether it fulfils the EU’s political criteria.

Institutional effects
The Commission’s report - due out on 6 October - will also look at the effect of Turkish membership on the EU’s institutions.

One of the big issues is how Turkey and the rest of the member states will fare under the decision-making system foreseen in the new EU Constitution, where decisions will be taken according to a set majority of population and a set majority of member states.

By the time Turkey is likely to join the EU, it is expected that it will have the largest population of all EU member states.

However, Mr Verheugen said that he did not believe that it would have an “unbalancing effect”.
http://euobserver.com/?sid=15&aid=17170

—-

Turkish EU talks should start within two years, Dutch report recommends
26.08.2004 - 09:51 CET | By Lisbeth Kirk
EU membership negotiations with Turkey should open within the next two years, the Dutch government’s Advisory Council on International Affairs has suggested in a new report.

Published on Wednesday (25 August), the report praised Turkey for reforms in recent years but also stressed that new democratic laws were not yet implemented at the lower bureaucratic levels where human rights violations still occur.

“Admitting a Muslim country may be new to the EU, but does not principally differ from earlier expansions. One way or the other, Islam should gain a place within the EU, if only because there are 20 million Muslims” in the EU countries, the report said, according to IHT.

The Dutch advisory council did not, however, recommend setting a date for actual membership

“An accession date should not be set because it could create false expectations and risk compromising careful preparation to an artificial, politically loaded timetable”, the advisors said.

Turkey at the top of the EU agenda
Holding the presidency of the European Union for the rest of this year, the Dutch government will play a central role in running the negotiations on Turkish EU membership.

On 6 October, the European Commission is expected to publish a crucial report on Turkey’s compliance with the standard criteria for EU membership.

This report will largely influence a decision in December by member states on whether or not to start accession talks with Ankara.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AKP has declared Turkey’s EU membership a top priority.

Mr Erdogan is personally preparing for a very busy autumn with planned visits to the European hot spots in a final effort to secure his country a place at the European Union table.

A visit to Brussels on 2 October, only days before the Commission’s report is released, has been planned for the Prime Minister to attend the opening of a Turkish exhibition.

After Brussels, Mr Erdogan continues on to Berlin and ends up in Strasbourg, where he is expected to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 4-5 October. A visit to France on 20-21 October is also scheduled.

Public opinon swings
Mr Erdogan’s party has also called for an extraordinary session of the Ankara Parliament to be held on 14 September to discuss a newly-proposed penal code - expected to come into force in January 2005.

One positive result at the Turkish score board can already be noted.

A fresh opinion poll published on Thursday (26 August) by Kristeligt Dagblad in Denmark reported for the first time that a majority (40 percent) of Danes favour Turkish entry into the EU.

This is a remarkable change in opinion which to date saw only 20-30 percent support Ankara’s membership bid - however 36 percent of those polled were opposed, while 24 percent were undecided.

http://euobserver.com/?sid=15&aid=17146
——
EU hopes are raised for Turkey
~~article_author~~ AP Thursday, August 26, 2004
Dutch advisory panel
THE HAGUE The European Commission should open EU membership talks with Turkey within 24 months, a Dutch advisory body said Wednesday, strengthening the hopes of the first predominantly Muslim country to seek membership in the 25-member union.

But the report to the Dutch government, which holds the rotating EU presidency and will oversee a decision on membership talks in December, said it would be unwise to set a target date for admitting Turkey, arguing that it could create false expectations.

The Advisory Council on International Affairs, presenting its report, praised Turkey for reforms in recent years, but said new democratic laws had not yet trickled down to lower bureaucratic levels, where human rights violations still occur.

The report cited the continued torture and mistreatment of prisoners at police stations, the widespread abuse of women and restrictions on free expression as hurdles to EU integration.

“There are major shortfalls in the area of women’s rights,” said Peter Baehr, a human rights expert and member of the advisory council. “Hundreds of thousands of women are hit, tortured and killed and even forced to commit suicide.”

“Progress has undoubtedly been made, but concerns remain over the follow through of that progress,” Baehr said.

A period of two years was recommended as a maximum time for EU membership negotiations to begin, but commission members said the talks could start sooner if Turkey pressed ahead with reforms.

Ben Knapen, the commission chairman, stressed the need to weigh Turkey’s membership carefully because of its sheer size and potential effect on the union.

Turkey’s differing “cultural history and the fact that it is predominantly Muslim should not prevent the country from joining the EU,” said a summary of the council’s report.

“Admitting a Muslim country may be new to the EU, but does not principally differ from earlier expansions. One way or the other, Islam should gain a place within the EU, if only because there are 20 million Muslims” in the EU countries, it said.

Targets for negotiations should be set, and talks could be suspended if Turkey failed to meet those targets, a council statement said.

Among those targets is whether Turkey’s democracy is judged to be stable and whether it is adequately protecting human rights, the statement said.

Turkey’s entry into the EU is one of the priorities of the Dutch presidency. A decision on when negotiations with Turkey will begin is to be announced before the Dutch presidency ends, in December.

The council recommended against setting a date for actual membership, even though it said Turkey had been waiting since 1959.

“An accession date should not be set because it could create false expectations and risk compromising careful preparation to an artificial, politically loaded timetable,” it said.

The Dutch council advises the government on foreign policy, in particular with respect to human rights, peace and security, development cooperation and European integration.

The council, which also reviewed Turkey’s preparedness to negotiate its EU membership in 1999, based its findings on information provided by the European Commission, European Council and human rights groups, including Amnesty International.

EU leaders are to decide at a December summit meeting in Brussels whether Turkey has reformed sufficiently to begin membership talks - a major policy goal of successive Turkish governments.

Turkey has passed sweeping legal reforms in recent years, including banning the death penalty, allowing greater cultural rights for minority Kurds, limiting the role of the military in politics and broadening freedom of expression. Some of the reforms, however, have yet to be fully carried out.

EU officials have praised the reforms undertaken so far.

http://www.iht.com/articles/535761.html

MEPs consider how to ‘sell’ European Constitution

01.09.2004 - 18:23 CET | By Honor Mahony EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS

The European Parliament is hoping to kick-start a Europe-wide debate on the EU Constitution when it becomes the first parliament to vote on the text at the end of this year.

MEPs will give their opinion on the Constitution on 15 December - just six weeks after the document is formally signed in Rome next month.

“By debating the issue of the new Constitution as soon as possible, we can kick-start a similar debate across the continent”, said UK Labour MEP Richard Corbett on Wednesday (1 September), a member of the Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee.

He said he was convinced that the “overwhelming majority [of MEPs] will endorse the Constitution”.

The European Parliament “should act as a pioneer”, said conservative MEP Inigo Mendez de Vigo, and member of the same committee.

“The people that we represent have not read the Constitution”, he said. “We’re talking about a very basic level of knowledge here”.

How to sell the text?
Starting off the initial debate on the text on Wednesday, MEPs were divided on how best to present the Constitution to European citizens.

Mr de Vigo suggested that it should be stressed that the text will bring “stability” to the EU.

He suggested emphasising that if the text is ratified “there will be no revision of the treaty in the foreseeable future”.

However, others felt that if it was emphasised that the Treaty will not be changed for the next fifty years - a time period suggested by its architect Valéry Giscard d’Estaing - then people might be put off.

Only people who like it 100 per cent would vote for it, said one MEP.

There was also some disagreement about how the message should be brought to national parliaments.

A proposal simply to tell national parliaments how they should vote was dismissed by several.

Travelling to the national parliaments
UK MEP Andrew Duff pushed for the idea that MEPs would travel to national and regional capitals “to sell parliament’s position on the Constitution”.

He said it is likely that MEPs will be “quizzed by people who are slightly less informed and a bit more sceptical than we are”.

Austrian MEP Johannes Voggenhuber also dismissed the idea of simply dictating to national parliaments.

“We will have to clarify [our] role”, he said.

The MEPs’ discussion come as ten countries have said they will have a referendum on the Constitution.

It is such a big and looming political issue that in the new European Commission, starting in November, there will be for the first time a specific commissioner for communication strategy.

Referring to the job, leader of the Liberals Graham Watson called it “the most challenging and certainly the most important PR job in the Union’s history”.

http://euobserver.com/?aid=17176&rk=1

Poland’s vision of EU

Judy Dempsey/IHT IHT
Thursday, September 02, 2004

Pressing for Turkey and Ukraine to join
WARSAW Poland, fresh from joining the European Union four months ago, is going to campaign hard to bring Turkey - and then Ukraine - into the EU as partners of what President Aleksander Kwasniewski calls “a pluralistic, open and new Europe.”

The Polish policy, outlined by Kwasniewski in a one-hour interview with the International Herald Tribune, seems certain to stir up European allies and bureaucrats in Brussels, as well as Poland’s eastern neighbor, Russia.

“The very important question is how we see the future of Europe and who are going to be our partners in the coming years,” Kwasniewski said as he relaxed in his palatial offices in the center of Warsaw after a long day of meetings.

Poland’s push to support Ukraine, which under President Leonid Kuchma is regarded by many Western officials as a corrupt and far from democratic country, is seen by EU diplomats as a bid to shift the European agenda eastward.

The 25 member states are already gearing up for a long, intense - if not bitter - debate over the EU’s new budget in which Poland says it is determined to fight hard for a big share of the regional funds earmarked for modernizing the infrastructure.

But then, Poland is no stranger to differences with EU members. It had no qualms in joining the U.S.-led war against Iraq, which earned it blistering criticism from France and Germany.

It opted to buy Boeing airliners instead of Europe’s Airbus, which France regarded as ingratitude and a lack of solidarity. Last December, Poland and Spain teamed up to block an agreement on a new constitution for Europe, a document eventually agreed to in June.

Kwasniewski clearly signaled that he intended to use his remaining time to fulfill what he termed the last of the grand ambitions he took office with.

He is now 49 and will reach the end of his second five-year term in 2005

“I got a new constitution passed that established very serious fundamentals and institutions for political democracy,” he said. Under that constitution, the president of Poland has considerable political power.

In 1999, he said, Poland joined NATO, and, as a result, for “the first time since World War II we feel secure.” “And now that we are in the EU,” he added, “there is a chance to go forward. Today, the question is how we see the future of Europe and who will be our partners during the next few years. We will have very difficult discussions on front of us, with the first being Turkey and the second, Ukraine. It will be a struggle.”

Indeed, it can only be such, given that public opinion across Europe was even skeptical over last May’s expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 countries.

EU diplomats complain that the latest round of enlargement will do little to further political integration, despite the new constitution, which has yet to be ratified by all member states.

Moreover, the prospect of starting accession talks with Turkey - let alone Ukraine, which is not even on the back burner for membership now - has already been criticized by several conservative political parties, including the opposition Christian Democrats in Germany.

Kwasniewski, president of a staunchly Roman Catholic country that is one of the most Christian in Europe, says some EU countries “have a lot of fears about Turkey,” a predominantly Muslim nation, although a secular one. “But many countries in Europe have fears about Ukraine,” he added.

“Some see Ukraine much more on the side of Russian influence than as a part of a European structure,” he said. “In my opinion, an independent Ukraine, and a country with such a deep sense of self identity, is a good partner for Europe,” he said.

Barring any major setback to planned changes in Turkey, EU leaders are expected to support opening accession negotiations with Turkey at their December summit meeting in Brussels. The exact date for starting those talks, which could take up to 10 years, has yet to be agreed to.

Kwasniewski insists enlargement should not stop with Turkey.

“I am absolutely in favor of Turkey’s membership to the EU,” he said. “We will support it. But it is necessary to say that the issue of Turkey is an open question for all of us. We have to discuss the future of Europe because if we say ‘yes’ to Turkey, which I think is important to say so, it is a question then what we will say to Ukraine.”

Diplomats in Brussels have been loath to even mention the prospect of EU membership for Ukraine, although there have been suggestions of an economic relationship if changes are introduced to make Ukraine a more transparently governed country.

Kuchma faces elections next spring and the opposition is seeking a viable candidate.

Kwasniewski said the EU had fallen short of offering any incentives to the opposition in Ukraine. “The approach from Brussels is the wrong one,” he said. “It says, ‘Please do some reforms and then we will support you.’

“In my opinion it is necessary to give support and then some effort will be made. If you have a passive approach, how can you find new people, new projects, a new mentality?”

The president also made clear that Poland, which fought for its own independence during decades in the Soviet bloc and centuries of outside domination, would support Ukraine’s own struggle, particularly at a time when Russia’s economic influence over this large Slavic country of 50 million people remains as strong as ever.

This support for Ukraine finds broad resonance in Poland. As Polish diplomats explained, Poles remain deeply suspicious over Moscow’s economic hold on Ukraine as well as its political influence in Belarus. They say it shows Russia’s ambitions to try to rebuild part of the empire that collapsed in 1991.

At the same time, few Poles relish the thought of a new Iron Curtain cast down on the EU’s new eastern borders. “That would only lead to insecurity,” said a senior Polish diplomat, quickly dismissing suggestions that Poland wants Ukraine as a buffer between it and Russia.

President Kwasniewski himself says that Russia has yet to come to terms with the collapse of its empire.

The issue of Ukraine will be brought up at the so-called Weimar Triangle meeting of Polish, French and German leaders next month in France, one of a series of summit meetings being held among European leaders as they sketch the face of a new Europe.

President Jacques Chirac of France and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany met President Vladimir Putin of Russia this week in Sochi, the Russian resort on the Black Sea. Next week, the French and German leaders are to meet in Madrid with Spain’s prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

At the summit meeting in France, Kwasniewski said he hoped to discuss Russia, Iraq and the trans-Atlantic relationship.

“In my opinion, and it is a very personal opinion, Russia has problems with all former Soviet countries, not only in the framework of the U.S.S.R., but with us,” he said, referring to the former East European satellites. “Russia is not ready to propose a new chapter in its relations with all of us - the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania. The relationship needs changing. I think Putin realizes this.”

Kwasniewski, who is due to visit Moscow in the coming weeks, is not willing to put Ukraine on the back burner until Putin changes track.

International Herald Tribune

http://www.iht.com/articles/536936.html

Entretien avec Eric Dacheux : “pas de communication européenne sans projet politique”.

par Manfred Ertl
http://www.place-publique.fr

Eric Dacheux est chercheur au laboratoire CNRS “Communication et Politique” où il anime l’équipe “Espace public européen” et enseignant à l’université Jean Monnet (Roanne).
Il a publié, en janvier 2004, “L’impossible défi, la politique de communication de l’Union européenne”.

Place publique : Comment expliquez-vous le faible intérêt des médias et du grand public pour l’Europe ?

Eric Dacheux : Les médias s’intéressent à l’Europe lors des grands événements, par exemple, en France, le 1er mai dernier, lors de l’élargissement, ou à l’occasion des élections européennes, des crises, et, tous les six mois, au moment des grands sommets européens. L’intérêt des médias est donc partiel, partial et irrégulier. Les médias publics ne font pas assez leur travail et les médias privés rechignent à parler de l’Europe parce que cela ne se ” vend ” pas.

L’Europe est paradoxale. Sur le plan institutionnel, l’Europe avance, mais pour suivre cette avancée, il faut être très fortement motivé. Quant à la sociabilité européenne, qui émerge grâce aux échanges d’étudiants, des jumelages, du tourisme et du travail transfrontalier, elle n’est pas visible. Entre cette sphère très lointaine et visible et cette sphère très proche, mais invisible, l’Europe n’existe pas. Le citoyen ne voit pas ce que l’Europe peut lui apporter dans sa vie quotidienne et locale.

P.P. : Alors, sur quelles expériences les médias pourraient-ils s’appuyer pour intéresser les citoyens ?

E.D. : Pour moi, les médias, et en particulier la télévision, sont dans une logique de captation. Avec la ” spectacularisation ” et la simplification, les téléspectateurs restent derrière leur écran. Or, l’Europe n’est ni très spectaculaire ni très simple. Pour moi, les médias ne sont pas de bons vecteurs d’information sur l’Europe. Par contre, ce sont des vecteurs de symboles. Ils peuvent faire prendre conscience de l’importance de certains événements ou donner envie d’en savoir plus.

Lorsque j’interroge mes étudiants sur l’Europe qu’ils voient dans les médias, ils me parlent du sport (par exemple, le foot de haut niveau connaît beaucoup d’échanges de joueurs) et de l’émission de télévision “Union libre”. Celle-ci portait sur les stéréotypes comme la grande blonde allemande, le petit brun italien… La seule culture en commun, ce sont les stéréotypes des uns sur les autres, les Français avec la baguette, les Allemands avec la bière, l’Anglais avec son parapluie. Il ne faut pas les nier, mais il faut essayer d’aller plus loin. Prenons, par exemple, une émission sur la Grèce montrant le soleil, la mer bleue, le sable d’or, et qui, à la fin, nous apprend qu’Athènes est la ville la plus polluée d’Europe.

P.P. : Qu’en est-il de la communication des institutions européennes ou nationales ?

E.D. : La Commission et le Parlement possèdent leur propre service de communication. L’Europe bénéficie d’un serveur Internet, “Europa”, premier serveur en Europe.
La Commission européenne soutient aussi Euronews (chaîne du câble spécialisée dans l’information sur l’Europe) et, tous les jours à la Commission, une conférence de presse est organisée. L’UE édite environ 1 500 brochures d’informations par an, possède des bureaux dans chaque pays membre (“Sources d’Europe” en France), collabore étroitement avec les Maisons de l’Europe et certains réseaux associatifs, et finance des partenaires qui diffusent des informations au niveau local. Enfin, le service “l’Europe directe”, assez méconnu, répond à des questions de vie pratique via un numéro de téléphone (1).

P.P. : Pourriez-vous brièvement caractériser les grandes étapes de la politique de communication de l’UE ?

E.D. : Tout au début de l’Europe, les élites faisaient l’Europe sans communication, sans le citoyen. Parce que les citoyens au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale n’étaient pas capables de faire l’Europe, encore trop imprégnés de souvenirs douloureux.

Cela a changé en 1986, au moment où Jacques Delors a relancé le projet : il fallait informer le citoyen, et notamment les entreprises sur le grand marché unique. Lors du référendum sur Maastricht en 1993, on s’est aperçu que les opinions publiques étaient réticentes : il y a eu un premier “non” danois et, en France, Maastricht est passé de justesse… La stratégie adoptée préconisait alors de “vendre” l’Europe. Mais, le marketing n’a pas fonctionné non plus, car l’Europe n’est pas un produit comme une maison dont on connaît l’architecte et le plan.
Depuis la présidence de Romano Prodi, l’Union européenne poursuit un troisième objectif qui est de dialoguer avec les citoyens. Après le traité de Nice en 2003, il devait y avoir un dialogue public, chaque citoyen devait donner son avis avant de préparer la convention. En réalité, seules 10 000 à15 000 personnes se sont exprimées.

Comme je l’ai expliqué dans mon livre, rapprocher l’Europe du citoyen est un objectif impossible. Car, se rapprocher de quelque chose qui n’existe pas ne veut rien dire. En revanche, il faut, dans un premier temps, faire prendre conscience que l’Europe existe, et dans un deuxième temps, donner envie d’en débattre.

P.P. : Par quels moyens alors pourrait-on davantage donner envie aux Européens de s’intéresser à l’Europe et de s’y impliquer ?

E.D. : Il n’y aura pas de communication européenne sans projet politique. Ce qui fait défaut à l’Europe, c’est d’abord un espace public européen. La communication, en une image, c’est un peu comme les poissons. Il n’y a pas de poissons sans eau. Il faut un milieu pour avoir des poissons. Pour la communication, c’est pareil : il faut un milieu et c’est l’espace public. Il faut donc de la communication entendue comme débat, comme confrontation démocratique.

Or, premièrement, il n’y a pas d’espace public et, deuxièmement, les gens n’ont pas envie de débattre parce qu’il n’y a pas de projets à débattre.

Or, la démocratie suppose, comme le dit Paul Ricœur, une confrontation entre idéologie et utopie.
L’Europe a aussi été une utopie. Pendant des siècles, on s’est tapé dessus. L’Europe, c’est ce défi d’une utopie pacifiste. Mais, elle s’est faite uniquement par le marché ; nous n’avons pas pu nous mettre d’accord sur d’autres moyens de la construire.

Or, il faut se fixer un autre objectif qui ne peut être que politique. La communication ne peut qu’accompagner la création politique de l’Europe, elle ne peut pas créer une Europe politique.

P.P. : Pourquoi l’UE ne change-t-elle pas de stratégie après tant d’années de faible efficacité et d’échec pour légitimer le projet européen ?

E.D. : Le facteur fondamental est le facteur politique. Les élites européennes ne sont pas d’accord sur l’Europe qu’elles veulent construire. Il y a déjà un affrontement historique entre fédéralistes et confédéralistes, un affrontement entre Etats-Nations sur le choix d’une Europe “puissance”, d’une Europe “atlantiste”, d’une Europe “forteresse”, etc.

Au niveau de la société civile, pour l’instant, les éléments utopiques prédominent : les associations écologiques portent une Europe “verte”, les associations féministes une Europe “égalitaire”, etc. En l’absence de fusion entre ces visions, le projet institutionnel ne peut pas se confronter à un projet unique émanant de la société civile ; il n’y a pas un projet idéologique contre un projet utopique clairement identifié. On a, par défaut, un projet libéral qui s’identifie à la mondialisation. Et les anti-mondialisations combattent l’Europe comme si c’était la même chose.

Pourquoi ne change t-on pas de stratégie de communication ?

Premièrement, il n’y a pas de volonté politique de changer. Deuxièmement, il faut se mettre à la place des fonctionnaires européens ; ils sont très peu nombreux. Leur budget pour 4 ans est, par ailleurs, inférieur au budget d’une campagne de communication pour un an de n’importe quelle agence de pub. Troisièmement, ils ne sont pas formés à la communication. On rentre à la Commission par concours, mais il n’y a pas de spécialisation “communication”. Cependant, la stratégie de communication a quand même évolué et elle va dans le bon sens.

Propos recueillis par Manfred Ertl, du collectif “Europe citoyenne”.
(1) 0 0800 67 89 10 11, numéro gratuit
 
P.S. Eric Dacheux est chercheur au laboratoire CNRS “Communication et Politique” où il anime l’équipe “Espace public européen”

http://www.place-publique.fr/article701.html

http://www.place-publique.fr - Le site des initiatives citoyennes

L’Impossible défi La politique de communication de l’Union européenne Auteur : Dacheux Éric         Collection : CNRS Science politique ISBN :  2-271-06208-X Prix :  18 Euros, 22 $US (prix indicatif) 2004 - 17 x 24 - 136 p - br.

La démocratie européenne est malade. Les États se déchirent, les citoyens se méfient, les élites n’ont plus de projet. Pourtant l’Union européenne entre dans une phase cruciale : entrée de dix nouveaux pays, élection du Parlement européen et adoption prochaine d’une constitution. Comment faire en sorte que cette nouvelle étape ne soit pas la dernière ? Comment redynamiser la démocratie européenne ?
En animant un débat européen, répondent les
institutions européennes. Mais peut-on faire dialoguer des peuples n’ayant ni la même langue ni les mêmes partis politiques ni la même histoire ? De quelle manière développer une communication politique à l’échelle d’un continent ? Tel est le défi, impossible, que doit relever l’Union européenne.

La cause première de l’impossibilité actuelle d’une communication
politique européenne n’est ni stratégique ni technique, mais politique : c’est l’équilibre entre idéologie et utopie, intégration politique et critique politique, qui garantit l’équilibre démocratique. Or l’utopie pacifique européenne s’est résorbée dans le marché unique. Quand n’existe pas de projet politique alternatif à la société mondiale de l’information, quand le futur n’est plus riche de promesse, on se tourne vers le passé, et de vieux démons ressurgissent : en l’occurrence, une nostalgie xénophobe qui vient compenser l’insécurité économique par la sécurité identitaire.
Du coup, la démocratie est en danger, moins à cause de la domination d’une idéologie contestable qu’en raison de l’absence d’une utopie forte et formalisée. Notre avenir politique se joue dans les luttes quotidiennes des associations, derniers vecteurs d’utopie.

THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION
Schwarzenegger Wraps His Life Story Around GOP Themes
By Mark Z. Barabak
Times Staff Writer

September 1, 2004

NEW YORK — The Republican National Convention turned on Tuesday from accenting strength to emphasizing opportunity and compassion, as Arnold Schwarzenegger presented his improbable life story — the rise from immigrant bodybuilder to movie star to California governor — as an embodiment of the GOP and its ideals.

In an evening featuring a parade of minority speakers, as well as First Lady Laura Bush, it was the Austrian-born Schwarzenegger who offered one of the most crowd-pleasing testimonials to President Bush.

Borrowing the laconic tagline of the Terminator, perhaps his most famous cinematic character, Schwarzenegger declared: “America is back.”

“Back from the attack on our homeland, back from the attack on our economy, and back from the attack on our way of life,” Schwarzenegger said, standing before the image of a giant, billowing American flag.

“We are back because of the perseverance, character and leadership of the 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush.”

The two men have not had the closest political relationship. Schwarzenegger has criticized Bush as not paying enough attention to Democratic-leaning California and has kept a studied distance from his reelection effort.

But that was not easy to tell Tuesday night as Schwarzenegger, making his national political debut, warmly praised the president. The closest he came to acknowledging their difference on touchy issues such as legalized abortion and gay rights — both of which the governor supports — was a passage observing that not everyone in the party agrees on everything.

“I believe that’s not only OK, that’s what’s great about this country,” Schwarzenegger said. “Here we can respectfully disagree and still be patriotic, still be American and still be good Republicans.”

Schwarzenegger’s remarks offered more sweep than substance and little partisan bite for such a setting. In a 23-minute speech, he mentioned America 47 times, used the word Republican 15 times and referred to Bush by name six times.

He never directly criticized Sen. John F. Kerry, a personal friend and the Democratic presidential nominee. But he took a few humorous jabs.

“To those critics who are so pessimistic about our economy, I say: Don’t be economic girlie men,” Schwarzenegger quipped, drawing a roar with a line from a “Saturday Night Live” spoof that he directed against Democratic state legislators last month.

Laura Bush, who followed Schwarzenegger on the bill, sought to humanize her husband with a peek behind the curtains as he weighed going to war against Iraq.

Recalling “some very quiet nights at the dinner table” and tense times at the White House, Camp David and the couple’s Crawford, Texas, ranch, the first lady sought to refute the Democratic portrayal of a president eager to invade.

“No American president ever wants to go to war,” she said. “And my husband didn’t want to go to war. But he knew the safety and security of America and the world depended on it.”

She took up the same role — helpmate and character witness — that her counterpart, Teresa Heinz Kerry, played at the Democratic convention last month in Boston. Laura Bush did so, however, in far more self-effacing fashion, reflecting the more traditional and reticent role she has taken toward her husband’s reelection campaign.

In contrast to Heinz Kerry, who talked at length about her biography and views on empowering women, the first lady devoted almost her entire remarks to the president and his policies, including a defense of his decision to limit federal funding of stem cell research.

While critics said that had hampered the potential for medical breakthroughs, Laura Bush said her husband was the first president to provide such funding, which is controversial because the research involves destruction of human embryos.

“He did so in a principled way,” she said, “allowing science to explore its potential while respecting the dignity of human life.”

The first lady was introduced by the Bushes’ daughters, Jenna and Barbara, and the president, who spoke via satellite hook-up from a softball diamond in south-central Pennsylvania. As it happened, it was the Pennsylvania delegation that put Bush over the top during the nomination roll call Tuesday night, though his formal nomination will take place today.

Earlier Tuesday, campaigning in Nashville, Tenn., Bush sought to douse a controversy he created the day before by telling a veterans group he believed the war on terrorism was winnable. In an interview broadcast Monday on NBC, he expressed doubt that it was winnable.

“In this different kind of war, we may never sit down at a peace table. But make no mistake about it, we are winning and we will win,” the president told more than 6,000 delegates to the American Legion Convention.

Bush arrives in New York today and plans to meet with a group of firefighters and supporters in Queens. Vice President Dick Cheney will address delegates tonight.

Outside the convention Tuesday, demonstrations peaked with more than 900 arrests. Inside, Republicans continued their efforts to paint Kerry as a candidate far outside the political mainstream.

Maryland Lt. Gov. Michael Steele, the first black statewide elected official in state history, ticked off a number of votes on issues such as defense, tort reform and intelligence spending and noted that a majority of U.S. senators had voted in favor of the programs.

“But not John Kerry,” he said, over and over, in a taunt taken up by cheering delegates.

For the most part, however, Republicans turned away from military themes and harsh rhetoric to offer a softer message as the national TV networks tuned in for the first time.

Inside Madison Square Garden, banners reading “A Nation of Courage” were switched to ones that said, “People of Compassion.”

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, were mentioned, but not nearly as often as Monday, when the terrorist attacks and Bush’s response dominated the program. On Tuesday night, the theme was caring — for immigrants, minorities, women and others striving for a higher rung on America’s opportunity ladder.

Social issues that have split conservatives from the party’s shrinking moderate wing — and pushed some independents and swing voters away from the GOP — received fleeting mention.

Sen. Elizabeth Dole (R-N.C.) offered a nod to antiabortion activists by invoking “the sacred life of … those not yet born” and alluded to the roiling debate over gay marriage by defending traditional wedlock between a man and woman as “the cornerstone of civilization and the foundation of the family.”

“Marriage between a man and a woman isn’t something Republicans invented, but it is something Republicans will defend,” Dole said to a warm response from delegates who had approved a platform that called for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.

Education Secretary Rod Paige lauded Bush’s record on schools, saying his No Child Left Behind law had raised academic standards, imposed accountability and provided “resources to get the job done.”

“He promised results, he delivered results,” Paige said. “This election may be multiple choice, but there’s only one correct choice — to go forward, not back … to elect a true reformer with proven results, not a Johnny-come-lately with mere promises.”

Several Democrats, including Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, voted for the president’s education bill. But they now accuse Bush of breaking his promise to them by failing to couple the student testing requirements with more generous school funding.

The Tuesday night program featured a number of African American and Latino speakers, in contrast to the overwhelmingly white makeup of the audience listening from the convention floor. (Among the delegates, 16.4% are racial or ethnic minorities, the most ever at a Republican convention.)

But the choicest speaking spots — the ones reserved for the sole hour of prime-time national TV — were allotted to the first lady and Schwarzenegger, who had made only limited appearances onto the national political stage since winning office in October’s historic recall vote.

His speech offered his version of “an immigrant’s dream … the American dream.”

He recounted how he saw Soviet tanks growing up in Austria and lived in fear of “the Russian boot.” He recalled watching American movies, “transfixed by my heroes like John Wayne.”

He spoke of coming to America in his early 20s not knowing how to speak English and, as a champion bodybuilder, making his conversion to the Republican Party during the 1968 presidential race when he heard Richard Nixon talk of “free enterprise, getting the government off your back, lowering the taxes and strengthening the military.”

Although immigration has been a controversial issue in the Republican Party — antagonizing some conservatives who believe Bush has been too eager to give legal status to those who have entered the country illegally — Schwarzenegger showed no such qualms, and made no distinction between legal and illegal immigrants.

“To my fellow immigrants listening tonight, I want you to know how welcome you are in this party,” he said. “We Republicans admire your ambition. We encourage your dreams. We believe in your future.”

Schwarzenegger’s speech went through 19 drafts, reflecting the care that went into his maiden national campaign appearance. Still, it contained a good deal that was familiar to California audiences, including a chunk lifted from the speech he gave at the state GOP convention at the height of the recall campaign.

*

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX)

The big donors

The largest industry contributions to President Bush, as of July 31, according to Dwight L. Morris & Associates:

Finance, insurance—$17.4 million

Real estate, development—$11.1 million

Legal, lobby services—$11.1 million

Healthcare, social assistance—$7.9 million

Professional, scientific, tech.—$4.9 million

Manufacturing—$4.4 million

Retail trade—$2.6 million

Energy, utilities, mining—$2.1 million

*

Skittish New Yorkers

With the streets of Midtown Manhattan filled with

protesters, GOP delegates and police, it’s no wonder New Yorkers have personal safety on the brain.

That means good business for Safer America, which specializes in security gear. This week, the firm sold out of “escape hoods,” which are used to protect against chemical and biological weapons.

*

Party tab

Private donors provided a larger chunk of money to pay for both parties’ conventions, compared to 20 years ago. An increase in this year’s spending is due to campaign finance reform in 2002, which limits special-interest donations to parties but not to conventions. The GOP convention’s share of private funding:

*

Raining Republicans

In addition to balloons and streamers that will deluge delegates during the close of the convention

Thursday night, there will be a convention first — hundreds of pounds of quarter-sized confetti with photos of the candidates and their wives.

Source: Republican National Committee

*

Popularity contest

A recent poll by New York magazine showed a marked political schism between 400 New Yorkers and 400 Republican primary voters. But asked to pick between former New York Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, respondents overwhelmingly agreed: Giuliani, 4 to 1.

Times staff writers Nick Anderson, Edwin Chen, Michael Finnegan, James Gerstenzang, Josh Getlin, Joe Heitz, Joe Mathews and David Zucchino contributed to this report.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-gop1sep01.story

THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION
Schwarzenegger’s Close-Up

September 1, 2004

Tony Quinn, a GOP political consultant in Sacramento, raised an intriguing possibility in a newsletter Tuesday, hours before California’s governor stepped onto the podium in New York: The U.S. Constitution doesn’t seem to bar Austrian-born Arnold Schwarzenegger from becoming vice president.

But it’s hard to envision Schwarzenegger as No. 2 in anything, much less worry about how he could constitutionally serve if the presidency went vacant. For all the might-have-beens and could-bes, millions of Americans got a taste Tuesday night of what California knows, that Schwarzenegger is more than a caricature of his film self. He wove a compelling story of “a once-scrawny boy” coming to the United States from the stifling socialism of Austria, seeking opportunity and forging success for himself, from bodybuilder to actor to governor.

“To my fellow immigrants listening tonight, I want you to know how welcome you are in this party,” he said. “We Republicans admire your ambition. We encourage your dreams.”

Those words no doubt were sincere, but Schwarzenegger’s promise to veto a bill that would allow illegal immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses may dim the luster of his speech among Latinos. The governor does occasionally say things one way and do them another.

In his address Schwarzenegger played the loyal warrior, another thoroughgoing moderate finding a way to call unreservedly for President Bush’s reelection, praising the commander in chief in Terminator terms as “a leader who doesn’t flinch and who doesn’t waver.”

He painted a dazzling picture of a prosperous, diverse, strong and generous America under Republican leadership. He emphasized his own pro-business fiscal conservatism and left unmentioned his own awkward, to many Republican leaders, positions on abortion, stem-cell research, protection of the environment and gun control. He did say it was possible to disagree and “still be patriotic … still be good Republicans!”

Schwarzenegger’s in-laws are in the enemy camp, and he worked more closely with majority Democrats in the Legislature this year than with Republicans, who opposed his attempts to find a middle course in closing budget gaps. He infuriated both sides with his combination of full-bore cajoling and half-funny threats.

But the job of an action hero is to get things done. The nation on Tuesday night saw the charm, chutzpah, good humor and determination that Schwarzenegger mixes to move things along, including the president’s reelection bid. He even worked in a way to say “girlie men”—a line that brought delegates to their feet.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-arnold1sep01.story

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Europe, la grande hésitation, par Yves MényLE MONDE | 11.06.04 | 13h58

On peut se demander s’il sera possible de poursuivre l’intégration européenne en continuant la trajectoire héritée du passé.

Une fois de plus, l’Europe traverse une période d’inquiétudes, de tourments et d’interrogations. Le contexte bien entendu est là pour justifier et expliquer les états d’âme des Européens : conjoncture économique morose ; inquiétudes liées à l’émigration, à l’élargissement, au terrorisme international ; divisions profondes en matière de politique étrangère et de défense.

Et, se greffant sur cet éventail disparate de préoccupations économiques, politiques et sociales, la question de la Convention et de l’enfant qui en est né, le futur traité constitutionnel actuellement soumis aux chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement.

L’opinion publique n’a été mobilisée ni en faveur ni contre le projet de la Convention et la belle occasion des élections européennes a été perdue. Au mieux, le projet de Constitution ne sera adopté - s’il l’est - qu’après la consultation électorale.

Un ouvrage américain publié il y a quelques décennies avait parlé de l’élaboration de la Constitution américaine de 1787 (la fameuse Convention de Philadelphie) en la qualifiant de “moment constitutionnel” : un bref laps de temps durant lequel se crée l’histoire, se détermine l’évolution d’un pays ou d’une société pour les siècles à venir.

Cet instant est-il venu en Europe ? Rien n’est moins sûr. A ce jour, rien n’évoque l’agitation, le débat, les conflits qui agitent en général les périodes “constituantes”. Rares sont les Constitutions qui sont nées dans l’indifférence ou l’apathie. Au mieux, elles suscitent de forts conflits politiques ou idéologiques. Au pire - c’est l’hypothèse la plus fréquente - les Constitutions naissent aux fers, dans le trouble qui suit une révolution, la chute d’une dictature, la fin d’un conflit, l’achèvement d’une guerre civile, extérieure ou coloniale, l’effondrement d’une classe sociale.

La future et éventuelle Constitution européenne ne résulte donc pas d’une pression ou d’une obligation dramatique. Elle n’est pas le fruit d’une intense activité idéologique, politique ou émotionnelle. Bien au contraire, elle aurait pu être la victime d’un violent trauma externe survenu au milieu des paisibles délibérations conventionnelles, la guerre en Irak. Le monde est tragique, les défis globaux, mais la plupart des Européens ne relient pas ou pas encore ces secousses telluriques externes aux problèmes internes de l’Union européenne en tant que telle.

Le “moment constitutionnel” est resté une affaire de raison entre gens raisonnables, et il faudrait se réjouir de cette victoire conjuguée des Lumières et d’Habermas réunis si, malheureusement, cette situation ne manifestait la tragique absence ou indifférence du peuple, des peuples. Le “moment constitutionnel” ne sera atteint que lorsque la mobilisation politique - donc populaire - aura pleinement joué. Or cette mobilisation est difficile à mettre en œuvre pour plusieurs raisons :

- la première résulte de l’absence de perception d’un lien étroit entre les difficultés externes (économiques ou militaires) et la capacité interne à les résoudre. Non pas que l’opinion publique soit ignorante des faiblesses des Etats-nations dans ce domaine. Mais au constat des insuffisances ne vient pas s’opposer une solution alternative claire et crédible. Les institutions européennes, caractérisées par leur dépolitisation relative, leur consensus de bon ton, leur collégialité, ont une attractivité très faible, trop faible dans un univers marqué par le manichéisme, le leadership charismatique et la communication ;

- la deuxième réside dans l’apparente absence d’enjeux, matériels ou symboliques. Seuls les militants les plus mobilisés - pro ou antieuropéens - perçoivent le rejet ou l’approbation du futur traité comme un réel progrès (de l’intégration) ou comme la désolation des désolations (pour les souverainistes). Entre ces deux franges extrêmes, l’opinion publique se partage entre l’attente et l’indifférence, prête, le cas échéant, à se mobiliser si des enjeux précis lui sont offerts. Et là réside le problème : autant il est facile aux mouvements populistes et protestataires de détourner l’attention du pu- blic sur des problèmes symboles, autant il est difficile pour les gouvernements auteurs du traité d’en expliquer l’importance et la complexité.

Il est donc de première importance pour les promoteurs du projet de définir et proposer des enjeux compréhensibles et identifiables, en particulier en cas de ratification populaire. L’idéal eût été sans nul doute un référendum paneuropéen permettant d’indiquer clairement les conséquences d’un éventuel échec, soit pour l’Union dans son ensemble, soit pour tel ou tel Etat minoritaire. Mais ce ne sera pas le cas ;

- la troisième raison tient à la faiblesse ou à l’absence de courroies de transmission entre les élites européennes qui promeuvent le projet et l’électorat. Les partis européens n’existent pas. Il y a bien une transnationalité économique, une porosité des frontières, voire une “internationale” des mouvements sociaux, mais rien de tel au niveau politique en dépit de quelques efforts balbutiants.

On peut donc se demander s’il sera possible de poursuivre l’intégration européenne en continuant la trajectoire héritée du passé.

La constitutionnalisation de l’intégration est un processus qui, depuis le traité de Rome, s’est effectué par étapes et en combinant ensemble ou à tour de rôle la politique (les traités) et le juridique (la Cour de justice). C’est ce qui explique son caractère de chantier permanent mais inachevé et justifie frustrations et critiques qui préparent la vague de réformes successives.

En dépit de son caractère plus ambitieux et de la rationalisation qu’il introduit, le projet de Constitution confirme (pour la dernière fois ?) que le “code génétique” de l’UE reste déterminant. Elle s’est développée dans une grande mesure sous couvert d’un voile d’ignorance et cette stratégie l’a toujours contrainte à beaucoup d’ambiguïtés. Le projet en élimine un certain nombre mais en crée d’autres. Dans une Union à 25 où cohabitent les opinions les plus hétérogènes sur ce qu’est ou devrait être l’UE, la clarté des visions et des définitions est généralement réservée aux groupes les plus radicaux ou minoritaires quelles que soient leurs orientations ou préférences idéologiques.

Le premier élément de ce code est la quête constante du compromis sous peine de blocage et d’échec. Certes, ce choix est source de résultats heureux (une culture du consensus, le refus de passer en force par des mesures majoritaires non négociées préalablement, etc.). Mais la recherche du compromis systématique à travers des accords entre gouvernements ou des ententes parlementaires au sein d’une grande coalition centrale est lourde de périls potentiels. Les accords au sommet entre élites responsables sont une bonne chose à condition qu’elles ne finissent par être ou apparaître comme des cartels garantissant les princes contre le peuple. Les évolutions observables au sein des systèmes nationaux trop consensuels devraient inciter à la prudence : trop d’accords entre élites restreintes favorisent l’extrémisme radical ou le populisme. Il n’est pas surprenant que l’opposition la plus virulente à l’Europe épouse aujourd’hui avec quelque succès ces deux variantes du répertoire de l’action politique.

La seconde caractéristique stable du système communautaire - qui le différencie du mode de fonctionnement des systèmes politiques nationaux - est son “modus operandi” spécifique en matière de réformes. Dans les systèmes nationaux, le rythme et l’ampleur de la mise en œuvre des politiques sont en grande partie déterminés par la “respiration” du système démocratique : élections d’une part, mobilisations sociales d’autre part.

Rien de tel encore au niveau européen. Certes, l’élection du Parlement est censée proposer des perspectives européennes aux électeurs consultés nationalement. Mais dans la pratique, le découplage entre débats, programmes électoraux et politique européenne est presque total, à la fois en raison de la faiblesse - de l’inexistence, diraient certains - d’une opinion publique européenne, de la faiblesse du Parlement et de sa médiocre influence sur une partie de l’exécutif européen, de l’absence de lien entre l’organe conseil des ministres et l’électorat.

Quoi qu’on puisse dire de l’impact relatif des élections sur le gouvernement des démocraties, elles demeurent encore vitales tant d’un point de vue symbolique (légitimité) que substantiel (orientation des politiques). Faute de posséder cette ressource et ce moteur, la communauté européenne, puis l’Union se sont inventé une solution alternative fonctionnelle : la fixation de l’agenda politico-bureaucratique.

Puisque les élections ont un impact quasi nul sur les choix décisifs, puisque les mobilisations sont rares et principalement dirigées vers ou contre les gouvernements nationaux (à charge pour eux de faire pression sur Bruxelles), le moteur de l’action est à chercher ailleurs. Il résulte d’une complexe alchimie où interviennent le pouvoir de proposition de la Commission, les pressions plus ou moins articulées du Parlement et des groupes, les engagements ou paris pris par les présidences semestrielles des Etats membres, etc.

Ces différents facteurs qui mettent en jeu les bureaucraties, les groupes, les hommes politiques nationaux s’agrègent et s’articulent autour de la fixation de l’agenda. Le processus de décision, d’instance en instance, d’un semestre à l’autre se “durcit” peu à peu, passant de la déclaration à la résolution pour finir, au terme d’un processus lent et complexe, par une décision qui nécessitera encore beaucoup d’efforts pour être appliquée.

L’élargissement de l’Europe a suivi cette méthode. L’éventuelle adhésion de la Turquie prend le même chemin, au risque de prises des décisions souvent fondées sur le malentendu ou le quiproquo.

L’Union est plus que toute autre communauté politique dans une situation d’incertitude, d’inachèvement, d’interrogations sur son avenir et sur les formes de son organisation. En soi, cette situation n’a rien d’original sauf pour ceux - s’il en reste ! - qui croient encore en la fin de l’histoire. Mais cette angoisse constitutive de l’existence des individus et des institutions est sans doute encore plus grande quand il s’agit de créatures jeunes et fragiles. Les aléas de la Constitution (ou de la non-Constitution) européenne sont l’illustration de cette hésitation où la peur d’avancer est seulement neutralisée par la crainte encore plus grande de retomber dans l’abîme.

Yves Mény est président de l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence. • ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 12.06.04

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L’Europe apparaît menacée de paralysie après les élections du 13 juin

LE MONDE | 15.06.04 | 14h08 •  MIS A JOUR LE 15.06.04 | 17h17

Le désaveu massif infligé par les électeurs annonce de graves difficultés pour le fonctionnement de l’Union. Il rend plus hypothétique encore une possible ratification dans les vingt-cinq pays du projet de Constitution, sur lequel un accord est en voie d’être trouvé.

Peu de gouvernements ayant échappé, de quelque bord qu’ils soient, au vote-sanction de leurs électeurs lors des européennes qui se sont tenus du 10 au 13 juin, les dirigeants des vingt-cinq pays de l’Union comptent désormais sur un accord sur la Constitution européenne, lors du sommet qui les réunira les 17 et 18 juin à Bruxelles, pour tenter de repartir d’un nouveau pied.  “Il nous faut montrer que l’Europe fonctionne”, résumait le ministre irlandais des affaires étrangères, Brian Cowen, lors d’une réunion, lundi, à Luxembourg.

Le président français Jacques Chirac, allé rencontrer le chancelier Schröder à Aix-la-Chapelle, s’est inquiété de ce que les gouvernements n’aient pas été en mesure de “se mobiliser” pour mieux expliquer les enjeux de ces élections à leurs électorats. Cette autocritique revient à chaque scrutin sans qu’une réponse ait été trouvée.

Le chef de l’Etat a indiqué qu’il avait été particulièrement déçu par le taux d’abstention, qui bat tous ses records avec 56 % et des taux très élevés dans certains des nouveaux pays adhérents. Cela va poser dans les mois qui viennent des problèmes très difficiles à résoudre pour les dirigeants, qui vont avoir à faire accepter par leurs opinions réticentes une Constitution qui modifie profondément l’esprit dans lequel l’Union européenne doit fonctionner.“Si nous parvenons à une Constitution, ce que j’espère et ce que je crois, il faudra que nous ayons un débat à propos de l’Europe”, a curieusement déclaré le premier ministre britannique, vendredi 11 juin, au lendemain du vote en Grande-Bretagne, alors qu’il se trouvait aux obsèques de l’ancien président américain Ronald Reagan à Washington.

La montée des mouvements populistes et souverainistes antieuropéens dans une bonne partie des pays d’Europe, mais surtout en Grande-Bretagne et dans les pays d’Europe centrale, va poser un problème considérable pour la ratification du traité constitutionnel que les gouvernements auront approuvé à Bruxelles. Tony Blair a beau se dire confiant de gagner le référendum qu’il a promis à ses concitoyens sur la Constitution, les 21 % qu’ont obtenus à eux deux le Parti pour l’indépendance du Royaume-Uni (UKIP) et le parti d’extrême droite BNP, qui a frôlé son entrée au Parlement européen avec 4,91 % des voix, sont inquiétants pour la suite.

A l’est, le parti du président de la république tchèque, Vaclav Klaus, l’ODS, proche des conservateurs britanniques et grand vainqueur de l’élection avec 30 % des voix, a fait savoir, dès lundi, qu’il déniait au gouvernement la légitimité pour négocier la Constitution. “les citoyens ont retiré leur confiance au gouvernement Spidla, il a donc perdu le mandat de négocier quoique ce soit au nom de la République tchèque, particulièrement sur un sujet aussi sérieux que la Constitution européenne”, a déclaré la tête de liste aux européennes du principal parti de l’opposition, Jan Zahradil.

JEU DÉMOCRATIQUE

La situation va être encore plus compliquée en Pologne, où de probables élections législatives anticipées risquent fort, si l’on en croit le résultat de dimanche, d’amener au Parlement une majorité très eurosceptique qui posera de grands problèmes pour la ratification d’un accord. Deux partis violemment antieuropéen, la Ligue des familles polonaises, ultracatholique, et le parti populiste Samoobrona (Autodéfense), ont obtenu respectivement 15,9 et 10,7 % des voix. Le parti de droite eurosceptique PiS a obtenu 12,6 %. Même le parti actuellement donné favori en cas d’élections, la Plate-forme civique (PO), qui a obtenu 14 % le 13 juin, s’était opposé à ce que l’on revienne sur le traité de Nice.

“Les gens s’attendaient qu’après l’entrée dans l’UE, tout aille bien. C’était une illusion. Et il y a toujours un décalage entre les mentalités acquises sous quarante ans de communisme et l’économie de marché. Cela va prendre du temps”, estime Jan Kulakowski, qui a été un des principaux négociateurs de la Pologne dans la phase d’adhésion.

D’ici là, l’Union européenne doit se préparer à une phase très agitée, d’autant que d’autres problématiques très chargées politiquement vont être à l’agenda des prochains mois : la question de l’ouverture de négociations avec la Turquie sur son adhésion et surtout les négociations sur le financement de ses politiques.

Beaucoup de dirigeants se rendent compte qu’on ne remédiera au danger des populistes et de l’abstentionnisme qu’en renouvelant profondément le jeu démocratique dans l’Union. Tout le monde sent confusément, comme l’a exprimé Dominique Strauss Kahn, qu’il y a “une grande opacité de la mécanique démocratique de l’Union”. Les grandes formations politiques européennes, qui commencent tout juste à exister comme véritables partis politiques, vont devoir apprendre à mieux fonctionner entre le niveau européen et les niveaux nationaux.

Henri de Bresson
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 16.06.04

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Les Etats membres sont proches d’un accord sur la Constitution
LE MONDE | 15.06.04 | 14h08
Luxembourg de notre bureau européen

“S’il y a dans la salle des gens qui n’ont pas été battus hier, qu’ils lèvent la main.” C’est sur ce ton sarcastique que le ministre irlandais des affaires étrangères, Brian Cowen, a ouvert lundi 14 juin, à Luxembourg, l’ultime rencontre entre les chefs des diplomaties européennes avant le Conseil européen qui se tiendra à Bruxelles les 17 et 18 juin. 
Les ministres s’étaient réunis pour mettre la dernière main au projet de Constitution européenne avant de le soumettre à l’approbation des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. Mais au lendemain d’élections marquées par un fort taux d’abstention et la défaite de nombreux partis au pouvoir, ils ne pouvaient manquer de s’interroger sur la désaffection des citoyens, que la future Constitution a précisément pour ambition d’intéresser aux institutions communautaires.

“IMPLIQUER LES PEUPLES”

“Il y a de quoi être secoué par ces résultats”,a reconnu M. Cowen, qui s’est demandé “comment impliquer davantage les peuples”. Regrettant la prédominance des questions nationales sur les questions européennes dans l’esprit des électeurs, il a souligné que ce scrutin devait inciter les gouvernements à s’entendre sur le projet de Constitution pour “démontrer que l’Europe fonctionne”.

Dans le même esprit, le ministre français, Michel Barnier, a déclaré que “la nécessité politique d’un accord est peut-être plus affirmée” depuis le scrutin européen. Dans “le climat d’inquiétude” suscité par l’instabilité du monde, il faut, a-t-il ajouté, que “la maison européenne soit en ordre”. L’accord sur la Constitution sera “un signal” pour montrer que l’Europe est capable d’“affronter efficacement” les défis de la croissance et de la sécurité. Une des raisons du scepticisme des électeurs, a-t-il suggéré, est que l’“on n’a peut-être pas assez parlé de la Constitution”.

Plusieurs ministres - les représentants de l’Italie, du Portugal et des Pays-Bas - se sont également inquiétés du fossé qui s’est creusé entre l’Union et les citoyens. Ils ont invité les Etats à tenter de combler ce vide, notamment dans la perspective d’un référendum dans une partie de l’Europe sur la future Constitution.

Les discussions sur le texte de la Constitution ont porté presque exclusivement sur le champ du vote à la majorité qualifiée, qu’une partie des Etats veut étendre et qu’une autre partie souhaite restreindre. La présidence irlandaise avait remis, samedi soir, aux gouvernements des formules de compromis sur lesquelles le Conseil européen sera appelé à trancher. Les principales controverses portaient sur la fiscalité, la politique sociale, la coopération judiciaire en matière pénale, le budget, la politique étrangère.

Dans ces domaines, plusieurs pays, comme la Grande-Bretagne, veulent maintenir leur droit de veto, rendu possible par le système de vote à l’unanimité. D’autres, dont la France, l’Allemagne ou la Belgique, souhaitent que ces sujets puissent faire l’objet, dans certains cas, de votes à la majorité qualifiée. Pour tenter de concilier les points de vue, la présidence irlandaise suggère de mettre en place des mécanismes qui protègent les Etats les plus réticents sans bloquer la prise de décision. Des mesures d’harmonisation fiscale concernant la lutte contre la fraude et l’évasion pourraient ainsi être adoptées à la majorité qualifiée si elles n’affectent pas les régimes fiscaux des Etats.

De même, des lois sur la protection sociale des travailleurs migrants pourraient relever de la majorité qualifiée, mais les Etats disposeraient d’un droit d’appel devant le Conseil européen. Des procédures analogues seraient prévues en matière de coopération judiciaire et de politique étrangère.

Le cadre financier pluriannuel serait adopté à l’unanimité, à la demande expresse des Pays-Bas, mais une clause permettrait, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, de passer à la majorité qualifiée.

A la demande des Suédois, les accords commerciaux sur les services d’éducation et de santé devraient être adoptés à l’unanimité, comme c’est le cas, à la demande de la France, pour les services culturels et audiovisuels.

Selon plusieurs participants, le ton était plutôt à la conciliation. “Personne ne sortira de ces négociations avec le résultat qu’il aurait aimé obtenir”, a déclaré M. Cowen, qui s’est dit confiant dans l’efficacité de la méthode communautaire. Il appartient désormais aux chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de régler les questions en suspens, en particulier les dernières questions institutionnelles (calcul de la double majorité, taille de la commission), que les ministres n’ont pas abordées. La question de la référence aux racines chrétiennes de l’Europe, que la Pologne a une nouvelle fois soulevée, sera également à l’ordre du jour.

En cas d’accord, il faudra ensuite mettre en route les procédures de ratification. “C’est en mettant en valeur le contenu de la Constitution qu’on pourra obtenir l’accord des peuples ou des Parlements”, a affirmé M. Barnier.
Thomas Ferenczi
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 16.06.04

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News Analysis: After EU election, ‘forget about reforms’
Katrin Bennhold/IHT IHT Wednesday, June 16, 2004

PARIS Two days after most European governments were dealt a stinging blow in elections for the European Parliament, France, one of the worst-hit countries, came face-to-face with one of the sources of its malaise.

The countrywide strikes Tuesday by workers of Electricité de France, to protest the utility’s planned privatization, are emblematic of widespread unease with economic reforms in the continent’s largest economies.

This unease may tempt the freshly bruised leaders in France, Germany and Italy who are preparing for the next round of national ballots to water down some key economic reform initiatives and to stall others, analysts said.

“Forget about reforms for the next few years,” said Lorenzo Codogno, economist at Bank of America in London. “After the elections, there is clearly a risk that the process is put on hold.”

One day before European leaders gather in Brussels in the hope of agreeing on a constitution for the European Union’s 25 members, much attention has focused on the political repercussions of Sunday’s record-low election turnout and humiliating defeat for ruling parties.

But the dismal outcome of the European ballot also holds a cautionary tale for the European economy.

Expansion has trailed that of the United States for the best part of the past decade as productivity growth fell behind. Unemployment on this side of the Atlantic remains almost twice as high as that in America.

Governments in Germany, France and Italy have all pledged to ease labor market restrictions and to lower taxes; they promised to overhaul their health and pension systems, which are under pressure from their aging populations, and all have said they would make the public sector more efficient to save taxpayers’ money.

To be sure, some measures already have already passed.

As part of its ambitious Agenda 2010 reform program, Germany has cut jobless benefits and introduced fees for doctor’s visits, while France last year pushed through a pension reform in spite of weeklong strikes. Both countries have cut income taxes in recent years. But while both Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany and President Jacques Chirac of France have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to continued reform since the election, plans to go further may simply lack credibility after Sunday, analysts said. In Italy, where Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi still has not delivered on a 2001 promise to cut taxes, attempts to resurrect that pledge have not inspired confidence among voters.

Schröder’s Social Democrats won 22 percent of the national vote, the party’s worst postwar election result. Chirac’s center-right Union for a Popular Movement party garnered only 17 percent. In neighboring Italy, voters gave Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party 21 percent.

The obstacles to reform differ somewhat in the three countries. In Germany, it is a loaded electoral calendar; in France, emboldened labor unions, and in Italy, coalition partners unfriendly to reform that may stall further efforts to overhaul Europe’s three biggest economies.

Schröder, who faces several other local elections this year, has a major electoral contest ahead of him next spring. Elections in Germany’s most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia, will be closely watched.

Some observers say that a resounding defeat in this Social Democrat heartland could force Schröder to step down. If the opposition Christian Democrats, who got 45 percent of the vote in Sunday’s European poll, win this state, they would hold a two-thirds majority in the upper house of Parliament. That majority would give them the power to block all prospective legislation. One government official said it would be very difficult to take any other unpopular measures before such a sensitive ballot. “It’s not just voters that would rebel, it’s the grass roots of the party itself,” said the official, who declined to be identified. In France, meanwhile, the Socialist Party’s triumph in the European elections may embolden the country’s already vocal labor unions and derail plans to overhaul the overburdened public health care system this summer.

Before last year’s pension reform, transport workers and other public sector employees repeatedly went on strike. “There is pressure to slow down with the reforms” after Sunday’s ballot, said Christian de Boissieu, president of the Council of Economic Analysis, which advises Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin of France on economic policy. “Maybe governments need to conduct the reforms more gradually - that would be a democratic response.”

Would it help if Chirac, Schröder and Berlusconi indeed backed off reform plans? According to Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies, being hesitant about reform does not necessarily win votes.

“Just look at Sunday’s results: In the countries where reforms are part of everyday life, governments were not punished,” he said, pointing to Spain and Belgium.

“Governments got punished in countries where they hesitated about reforms and only passed them half-heartedly,’ he said. “In a nutshell: They talked about reform all the time, but then didn’t do that much.” As far as electoral strategy is concerned, “that’s the worst of both worlds,” Gros said.

International Herald Tribune

Je vous convie à lire l’aricle très laudateur de Mr Adler dans le Figaro de ce 01042004 .
j’extrais : La possibilité qu’a laissée Bush aux membres de la famille royale saoudienne et à leurs proches, les Ben Laden, de quitter à la sauvette le territoire américain le 12 septembre 2001, apparaît avec le recul comme un ultime geste de politesse d’un vieil ami, présageant l’inévitable rupture bien davantage qu’une collusion impossible.

Il y a enfin chez George Bush les meilleures qualités d’un aristocrate de la Nouvelle-Angleterre : une courtoisie et une dignité sans failles, un respect de l’adversaire, un sens de l’humour et de l’autodérision que l’on semble ignorer en Europe, une tolérance pour les points de vue opposés aux siens propres, une grande loyauté envers tous les membres d’une équipe qui n’aura connu qu’une défection en quatre ans de crise – celle du premier ministre des Finances. Si Powell a perdu la bataille bureaucratique sur la question du Proche-Orient, il n’en a pas moins géré de main de maître les rapports avec l’Inde, le Pakistan, la Chine et le Japon.

Si Rumsfeld a fini par être coincé dans les cordes par une conspiration de généraux qu’il avait décidément trop humiliés et qui lui ont rendu la monnaie de sa pièce en dévoilant les tortures grand-guignolesques de la prison d’Abou Ghraïb, le président n’en a pas moins balayé d’un revers de main tous les conseils visant à le faire sauter tel un fusible avant l’élection présidentielle. Et le peu engageant Cheney, qui ne sera pas apparu comme un être humain aux Américains qu’à l’évocation des malheurs de sa fille lesbienne, aura, lui aussi, passé sans encombres la double barrière de son impopularité médiatique méritée et du scandale Enron. Ce sont là peut-être des décisions maladroites, elles n’en sont pas moins nobles et dénotent chez l’homme un mépris du quand dira-t-on et un courage moral vrai.

Alors me dira-t-on pourquoi une personne si admirable était-elle aujourd’hui menacée très sérieusement par la candidature de John Kerry ? Par une combinaison étonnante de ses meilleurs et de ses plus mauvais traits, tels qu’ils ont pu apparaître dans la politique intérieure. Mauvais traits, en effet, que l’obstination idéologique du président à refuser l’union nationale que lui offrait le Parti démocrate pour choisir la poursuite effrénée du reaganisme économique. Avec des crédits d’impôt que la situation économique ne justifiait pas tant que cela et une augmentation sans précédent des dépenses de sécurité de l’Etat, lesquelles s’ajoutent comme dans tout le monde développé au poids croissant des retraites et de la santé, Bush aura laissé à ses successeurs un déficit extrêmement préoccupant.

? Un aristocrate ?

Bonjour,

Dans votre article vous parlez du film U-539. Il s’agit en fait du film U-571 (capture de la chiffreuse Enigma).

On pourrait aussi parler de la série “Band of brothers” (frères d’armes), où dans le dernier des dix épisodes, on voit la 101ème aéroportée américaine entrée la première dans le nid d’aigle d’Hitler.
Or, c’est la 2ème DB Française qui est entrée la première dans Berchtesgaden.

Does the United States Have a European Policy?

by Gerard Baker | déc. 01 ‘03

Since the earliest days of the European Union, at the outset of the Cold War, it has been an axiom of U.S. foreign policy that an integrated Europe is in America’s global strategic interest. The central theater of world war twice in a generation and the expected theater of a third conflict, fractious Europe cost the United States more in blood and treasure than any region on earth in the republic’s history. What could better fit U.S. national security goals than the prospect of an ever closer union of a growing number of European states in which ancient enmities, national rivalries and ideological conflicts were submerged in a pan-European identity based on the same principles of democracy and free markets that have animated America’s own success? There is too, in the American geopolitical psyche, something gloriously redolent about the spectacle of Europeans coming together to forge a common entity, just as Americans themselves coalesced from fissiparous states nearly two centuries earlier.

It was Dwight D. Eisenhower, the liberator of Europe, who articulated this spirit most emphatically more than half a century ago. In a July 1951 speech in London-five years before the founding of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union-the general told an audience of diplomats and politicians of his dream of a unified Europe. In a letter a few days later to his friend and adviser Averell Harriman, Eisenhower observed, “I most fervently urged the formation of the United States of Western Continental Europe.” Eisenhower’s presidential successors never went quite so far in their enthusiasm, and the U.S. commitment to the European project has seemed more rhetorical than practical at times.

But Washington repeatedly stated its belief in a united Europe-a Europe “whole and free”, as President George H. W. Bush put it in 1991. It publicly applauded each move toward deeper European integration, as western Europe moved from coal and steel community to common market to single market to single-currency area. As the union acquired increasing political saliency and began to find a voice in foreign and security policy, the United States continued to welcome its role in world affairs. There were disagreements aplenty-over Vietnam in the 1960s, intermediate nuclear forces in the 1980s and the Balkans in the 1990s, to name just a few. But Washington never actively sought to foment disagreements within Europe.

All that changed this year with the explosion of transatlantic tensions over Iraq. As European nations themselves split apart on whether to support the U.S.-led military action, the Bush Administration happily highlighted the differences and pointed up the distinctions between “Old” and “New” Europe. As the French government enunciated a Gaullist vision of Europe acting as an alternative pole to the American superpower, the United States urged other European nations to reject France’s agenda for Europe. When the initial hostilities were over, U.S. officials lavished praise and new responsibilities on loyal allies such as Britain and Poland and talked of a new strategy of “punishing France and ignoring Germany.”

In Europe, powerful bureaucratic and political forces are pressing hard for a much tighter alignment of the member-states’ foreign and security policies. As Europe debates its first ever draft constitution that aims, among other things, to institutionalize more effectively a common European foreign policy, it does so in an atmosphere tinged indelibly by the Iraq debacle. A number of European political leaders are increasingly convinced that the Bush Administration is actively seeking to divide Europe, to undermine the institutions and relationships that underpin European unity. U.S. officials from the president down insist that the United States remains a friend to the European project, but not on any specific terms. Many questions thus arise about the present state of U.S.-European relations. Has U.S. policy toward Europe really changed? With the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks, have U.S. priorities become so altered and divergent from European goals that the United States no longer sees a strong interest in working with a Europe on its march to an ever closer union? Did the United States ever truly believe in a fully united Europe? These questions boil down to one fundamental query: Does the United States have a European policy?

What the Iraq debacle clearly demonstrated for U.S. policymakers was a proposition that had been tested in theory many times before but never in such stark reality. This proposition was that it may sometimes be better to have a Europe divided on a crucial issue of America’s national interest than one in which a wholly united Europe takes a hostile or critical line against the United States.

During the Cold War, European unity and transatlantic cohesion was so self-evidently critical to defeating communism that the United States could not for long have pursued a policy that had the effectof dividing Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War world, dealing with a potentially unstable post-communist empire in the east, enlarging the communities of free nations-NATO as well as the European Union-became the central priority of U.S.-European policy. Indeed, there were early tensions with European allies over the EU’s apparent eagerness to place deeper integration above expansion in its post-Cold War agenda. It was at least in part aggressive U.S. promotion of the enlargement case that gave impetus to the process that will result next year in the admission of ten new members to the union, most from the former communist countries.

Continuing EU integration also seemed to hold new potential benefits for the United States. The most obvious advantage was in the field of defense capabilities. With the changing nature of threats in the post-Cold War era, familiar U.S. complaints about “burden-sharing” took on new urgency. Greater defense cooperation among the Europeans would lead to improved interoperability, economies of scale and a division of labor that would greatly enhance the effectiveness of NATO and reduce dependence on U.S. forces in the old European theater.

But there were potential benefits for the United States from economic integration too. American companies seemed to have much to gain from the consolidation of the single market. The advent of the euro in the late-1990s was also widely welcomed by U.S. corporations. It was seen as a spur to inward investment by Americans and an opportunity to create the kind of large single currency area that was so instrumental in the U.S. economy’s successful performance over two centuries.

Now, in the immediate post-Cold War years, there are signs that the salience of European integration for U.S. policy were overstated-even in the relatively halcyon days for transatlantic relations of the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations. In economic terms, the arrival of the single market was by no means seen as an undiluted good for the United States. The year before the market’s completion in 1992, there was much angst in the United States that a protectionist “Fortress Europe” was possibility emerging. When the single market itself appeared less threatening, new questions arose about the next phase of economic union. The Clinton Administration’s senior economic policymakers harbored deep doubts about the viability and sense of monetary union. Though public expression of these doubts was muted, U.S. and European officials acknowledged at the time that the United States was not persuaded the eurozone would be an effective single-currency area.

More visibly, it was in the Clinton Administration that the first real doubts about a separate European defense identity emerged in the United States. Tensions multiplied as the European Union embarked on its European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) after 1997. The United States was deeply troubled by the prospect that a caucus within NATO of increasingly independent-minded Europeans might emerge and undermine the institution’s ability and political willingness to operate as a full transatlantic alliance. Clinton Administration officials upbraided their British counterparts when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit to push for a separate European military force.

Thus, by the final years of the Clinton Administration, the end of the Cold War was not only beginning to dissolve the glue of the transatlantic relationship but was also weakening the apparent advantages of European integration for the United States. It was no longer self-evidently in America’s national interest. Put simply, Europe was less central to U.S. national security. That meant inevitably that a single European voice was less important to U.S. policymakers. Then came George W. Bush.

Early expectations in Europe were edgy about what the new American president might make of the EU. Though not known to have any particularly strong views on the subject himself, Bush surrounded himself with advisers who were of a distinctly Euro-skeptic hue. At the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz were on record criticizing some European governments that repeatedly acted as an impediment to the U.S. pursuit of its global priorities. At the State Department, Colin Powell was liked and admired in Brussels, but the appointment of John Bolton as an undersecretary alarmed European integrationists. Known for his trenchant views on the virtues of European cooperation, Bolton had written that ESDI was a “dagger at the heart of NATO.” Finally, Vice President Dick Cheney was not viewed as especially attached to the Atlanticist agenda.

Nonetheless, when confronted with the opportunity to reject a key part of Europe’s ambitions at the start of his administration, Bush chose not to. At his Camp David summit in February 2001 with Tony Blair, Bush agreed to drop U.S. objections to European defense plans (now called ESDP). On the understanding that ESDP was fully compatible with NATO’s existing structures, President Bush showed himself to be more Euro-friendly than the Clinton Administration in this regard.

Four months later, on his first presidential trip to Europe, Bush again struck a conciliatory tone. Though his early months in office had been marked by tensions with the Europeans over missile defense and the Kyoto global warming treaty, Bush seemed willing to reaffirm America’s commitment to the virtues of pan-European policies and cooperation. In a June 2001 speech in Warsaw, Bush repeated his father’s pledge to help build a Europe “whole and free:”

My nation welcomes the consolidation of European unity, and the stability it brings. We welcome a greater role for the EU in European security, properly integrated with NATO. We welcome the incentive for reform that the hope of EU membership creates. We welcome a Europe that is truly united, truly democratic and truly diverse-a collection of peoples and nations bound together in purpose and respect, and faithful to their own roots. Administration-watchers assumed from these early pronouncements that the administration’s Atlanticists, led by Colin Powell at the State Department, had won an important round in their continuous battle with the more unilateralist Pentagon.

But this assumption proved false. In those first six months of the administration, it was already apparent that U.S. policy toward Brussels was shifting. In fact, the deal with Blair at Camp David demonstrated that European policy had already been downgraded by the administration. Bush was essentially prepared to treat his concerns about European defense cooperation as a bargaining chip to be exchanged for Britain’s support of America’s much greater goal: creating a missile defense system to protect the United States from threats emerging outside Europe.

In the destinations for that first trip, there was an intriguing sign of the already shifting priorities in the Bush team’s approach to Europe. Bush chose not to go to France or Germany, the pillars of what would soon be derided as “Old Europe”, but to Spain, Sweden, Poland and Slovenia (with merely a day trip to Brussels for a NATO summit). This was the “New Europe” the administration would soon demonstrate it was eager to encourage. In short, long before the Iraq crisis and even before the September 11 attacks, there were clear signs that the U.S. commitment to a united Europe was already attenuated. In part, this stemmed from the Bush team’s ideological lack of sympathy for the reality of a single European political approach. Mainly, however, it was because, again, a united Europe had ceased to have the salience it held in the Cold War.

Iraq crystallized these trends. First, America’s determination to deal with global threats as it perceived them after the terrorist attacks of 2001 meant it would seek allies where it could find them. The United States, under assault from terrorists and under potential assault from rogue states, was not likely to allow European unity to become a constraint on its actions.

William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard and a leading neo-conservative close to the Bush Administration, puts it as follows: Any serious policymaker cannot simply say “Well, as a matter of theology, we believe in a united Europe . . . and therefore that’s going to drive our policy.” It would be irresponsible.

This can be thought of as a kind of passive opposition to European integration. Insofar as the Europeans want to unite around a policy that supports us, it says, then we are happy to assist in the creation of a united Europe. But if the Europeans are divided, of course we will extend support to those who side with us and withhold it from those who do not. But this gives rise to a critical question: In addition to this passive opposition to European unity, does the United States now favor an active opposition? Does the United States now believe, after the experience of the last year, that a united Europe could actually not only cease to be a reliable source of assistance but might actually try to block the United States from achieving its goals? This was, after all, the more or less stated view of the Chirac government in France-to build an alternative source of global power. If that is how the United States sees the prospect of a united Europe, then the administration is likely to adopt a much more aggressive stance against European integration.

There are clearly those within the Bush Administration-John Bolton at the State Department, others at the Pentagon-for whom the events of the last year have confirmed all their suspicions that a unifying Europe is a menace to U.S. strategic objectives and should be blocked. But the drift of Bush Administration policy does not yet seem to be moving fully in this direction. Other senior policymakers at the fulcrum of the administration’s evolving debate insist that the Iraq experience does not necessarily suggest those who opposed the United States will prevail in an internal European debate and dictate the direction of a single European policy, should one ever emerge. These officials pin their faith in European virtue on a belief that a united Europe will adopt an approach to the United States that is closer to Tony Blair’s vision than Jacques Chirac’s. “It is no longer obvious that European policy is being driven by the historic engine of France and Germany”, a senior administration official told me in November. “Look at Britain, look at Spain, look at Italy, look at Poland, look at Denmark. France and Germany are not necessarily the future.” This same administration official adds that, in any case, America’s options are rather limited: “What am I going to do about [European integration] if I don’t like it? Scream and yell? That would have absolutely no effect. The chances are that efforts to undermine European unity would have the opposite effect.”

Neither of these assumptions seem watertight. Basing policy towards Europe on the hope that its steadily evolving foreign policy will be driven by a coalition of U.S.-friendly countries such as the UK, Poland and Spain looks like ahistorical, wishful thinking. The pattern of EU integration is that it is driven by the Franco-German alliance at its heart, aided and abetted by bureaucrats in Brussels. Nothing that has happened recently suggests this is changing.

Nor is it true that Washington lacks options-it need not passively stand by and watch this process unfold.2 After all, most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already been handed over to Brussels. European integration is being driven by political elites rather than popular pressure, and there is growing evidence pointing to the uneasiness among the general public.

So, what can the United States do?

First, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger European military capabilities. Americans may laugh at recently announced plans for a Franco-German-Belgian-Luxembourg core EU military alliance, but the United States should continue to oppose a separate European identity within NATO. This also means that the United States should strengthen its political and military ties with the new NATO members from central and eastern Europe,to offset any such developments.

Second, it should oppose any plans to permit a “single Europe” from taking the seats currently held in multilateral institutions by separate European countries. There should be no support for a UN Security Council seat for “Europe” or the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three to replace the G-8.

Finally, Washington should refrain from doing anything that might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for European integration than Britain’s joining this ill-starred project. It seems that passive disengagement from the cause of European integration is now firmly established as the United States looks beyond Europe to the challenges of a dangerous world. In the absence of a pressing security threat in Europe, and in the presence of much more pressing security threats outside Europe, the United States will regard the possibility of a unified European policy distinctly on the merits of what it offers the United States. Is this anything new? Probably not. It is hard to imagine any administration shifting from its conception of its vital national security interests in an effort to assist in building unity in Europe.

What is different in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world is that disagreements between the United States and Europe and among Europeans seems much more likely. So far, the United States does not seem to have concluded that European integration is inherently threatening to its interests. Despite the concerted efforts of some of its senior officials, the Bush Administration is not yet committed to destabilizing actively the process of European unification, in part because it believes the EU can still head in a broad direction beneficial to America’s national interests. But at the very least the last year should mean that we will hear far fewer encomiums from U.S. officials about the virtues of a United States of Europe.

Copyright © 2004 The National Interest All rights reserved.

Find this article at: http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/NationalInterest/2003/12/01/529065

Reorienting Transatlantic Defense

by Rep. Doug Bereuter and John Lis | juin 01 ‘04
NationalInterest

The future of NATO has been a subject of intense debate, including in the two most recent issues of The National Interest. In the Winter 2003/04 issue, E. Wayne Merry unveiled a picture of an Atlantic Alliance that is casting about in search of a mission, having outlived its usefulness with the demise of its original adversary. Indeed, he argued that NATO continues to keep Europe in a state of dependence, frustrating the rise of a European Union that can act as an equal partner to the United States. Yet even some of NATO’s defenders-such as John Hulsman, writing in the Spring 2004 issue-view NATO primarily as a useful toolbox from which the United States can draw as it undertakes military adventures far from Europe’s shores, cherry-picking allies on a case-by-case basis.

Yet these visions of the alliance are at odds with the view of those who work on transatlantic security policy on a daily basis. The reality is that NATO is not a Cold War institution in search of a mission to keep itself alive, but remains an indispensable tool for the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic region to ensure their security against common threats.

For a few heady years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that the long-held dream of a Europe at peace had become a reality. The newly freed nations of central and eastern Europe aligned themselves definitively with the West, and even Russia developed a peaceful, non-adversarial relationship with its former rivals. Today, there is no risk of an invasion of western Europe, and it is tempting to conclude that a united Europe is now secure. However, the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11 horribly demonstrated the error of that belief. Europe still faces threats to its territory and to its citizens from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups. These are the same threats confronting North America, and the defense of our two continents remains indivisible.

NATO’s Three Ongoing Missions

When thinking about NATO’s primary purpose, many commentators fall into a geographic trap. Because NATO was founded to defend against the Soviet threat that was directed at Western Europe, it follows for some that NATO exists for the defense of this specific geographic area.

Instead, it is more useful to view NATO in functional terms, with three main and currently ongoing missions. First and foremost, the Alliance enables its members to provide collectively for the defense of their states against external threats, a role it has played for 55 years. Its second mission consists of peace-enforcement operations. The Alliance assumed this function nine years ago, when it became clear that only NATO (and not the United Nations, the OSCE or any other international organization) could actually enforce the peace agreement ending the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The third mission is political: maintaining and enhancing the partnerships that NATO has developed since the end of the Cold War with non-members in Europe and Eurasia. These partnerships have promoted cooperation and permitted the Alliance to enlarge the Euro-Atlantic zone of stability beyond the core of its member-states.

No one would ever have predicted that NATO’s first collective-defense mission- more than five decades after the Alliance was created and ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union-would be in response to an attack on the United States. But it is important to remember that collective defense applies not only to the European allies, but to the United States and Canada as well. After the September 11 attacks, the North Atlantic Council, comprised of representatives of the then-19 member countries, proclaimed that if those attacks were “directed from abroad”, they would be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s collective defense guarantee. The Council declared:

“The commitment to collective self-defense embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism.”

The Alliance itself sent AWACs aircraft to patrol the skies over the United States, and several countries sent special operations forces to Afghanistan to fight alongside U.S. troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. Since September 11, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have again struck against NATO members in Istanbul and Madrid, as well as targeting the citizens of NATO states elsewhere in the world. The Soviet threat may have vanished, but not NATO’s reason for existence. Recognizing this fact, NATO’s Strategic Concept notes that

“Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”

One cannot predict where NATO will need to act in the future, which is all the more reason to ensure that it is able to operate wherever needed. The War on Terror is a multi-faceted struggle, but ongoing operations in Afghanistan show that there is an important military component.

The decision by NATO to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is helping to stabilize the region around Kabul, is an example of NATO’s growing second mission: peace enforcement operations. NATO first assumed this role in 1995, when the first military action in NATO history was carried out, not to defend a member state but to guarantee the Dayton Peace Accords that halted the civil war in Bosnia. Since then, NATO has also undertaken peace enforcement missions in Kosovo and in Macedonia. These missions demonstrated that NATO is the only international organization with the experience, organization, military capabilities and robust rules of engagement needed to compel adversaries to accept, or at least conform to, a peace agreement.

NATO’s third mission-its partnerships with non-member nations in Europe and the former Soviet Union-has enabled the Alliance to bring ten new members into the fold. The decade-old Partnership for Peace (PFP) program facilitated political and military cooperation with the nations of central and eastern Europe and Eurasia and helped former Soviet-bloc countries begin needed political and military reforms. By holding out the promise of eventual membership, PFP kept NATO’s door open and assisted aspirant nations in meeting the criteria for membership. Now, with most central and eastern European candidate countries having joined NATO, the geographic focus of PFP must move to Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, its functional emphasis will shift in part from preparing countries for NATO membership to engaging with countries that may never join the Alliance but which may become key security partners. The success of PFP in extending a zone of security to the east also needs to be replicated to the south, as recent events have underscored the importance of the non-European countries of the Mediterranean as well as those of the Persian Gulf to the security of NATO members. Therefore, the Alliance should enhance and expand its Mediterranean Dialogue. It currently brings seven nations-Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia-together with the NATO nations to discuss regional security issues such as civil emergency planning, crisis management, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Capabilities, Capabilities, Capabilities

While NATO remains committed to collective defense, many of its members have been slow to develop the forces needed to carry out the pledges that they have made to defend one another. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson often said: “When I took up my post as Secretary General, I said that I had three priorities: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.” Soon afterward, he noted that this became a mantra “which all of you will have heard-and some of you, in government, may have politely ignored.”

In order to fulfill their responsibility for carrying out collective defense, NATO members must continue to transform their forces to address today’s threats. No longer does NATO need heavy armored units with large numbers of conscripts arrayed in fixed sectors along the inter-German border. What is required today is a number of highly mobile professional units that can deploy quickly where they are needed in order to apply effective force to accomplish their mission. Allied countries have no shortage of military personnel, but NATO does lack units that can actually be used for the missions the Alliance now needs to conduct.

In November 2003 Robertson used his final address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to cite the need “to increase substantially the usability of European armed forces.” Robertson noted that the 18 allies outside of the United States have 1.4 million active duty troops, plus another 1 million reserves. He said,

“Yet with only 55,000 soldiers currently deployed on multinational missions, most of your countries plead that they are overstretched and can do no more. That is quite simply unacceptable.”

The first step toward increasing the usability of European forces has been the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This force has two tasks. First, the NRF is a vehicle to enable European and Canadian allies to join with the United States in developing forces that can rapidly deploy wherever they are needed and apply decisive power in combat or in less demanding missions. Second, the NRF can be an effective means to drive force transformation throughout the Alliance. Before national units are chosen to take part in the NRF, they will have to meet the tough standards of this elite NATO force. Then, when they train with other NRF units, they will be exposed to cutting-edge capabilities and procedures that they will take home and share with their nation’s armed forces, serving as a catalyst for change.

The NRF was set up in October 2003 as a small “prototype” intended to define requirements and to test procedures, doctrines and concepts. By October 2004 the NRF will have an “initial operational capability” that will allow it to carry out smaller-scale missions. It is to reach “full operational capability” by October 2006. At that time, it will consist of one enhanced combat brigade, roughly 5,000 ground troops. Maritime, air, command and support elements will bring the total strength to around 20,000 personnel. Some of those units will be kept at “very high readiness”, able to deploy within five days, with the rest of the force deployed within thirty days.

Unfortunately, the NRF has been plagued by the typical initial misunderstandings over what it is and what it is not, particularly by Europeans who fear that it is an American-led vehicle to undermine the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). It is important to put to rest this fallacy, which led one leading European defense analyst to conclude that “the creation of an NRF potentially holds devastating consequences for the further development of European capabilities” and “could effectively undermine the EU’s RRF. . . .”

In reality, the NRF is not designed to compete with, but rather to promote the further development of European capabilities. The NRF is designed for the full spectrum of missions, including combat operations; the RRF, to undertake the EU’s Petersberg tasks, which focus on crisis management and humanitarian operations. Nor is there any danger that the NRF would supplant the much larger RRF. The RRF is to facilitate the large-scale deployment of European forces to deal with crises and is expected to have a sixty-day deployment capability and to be comprised of roughly 15 small brigades, or 60,000 ground troops, with additional air and maritime components.

If the NRF is to succeed, the NATO allies must develop the capabilities that are necessary for effective combat operations. Unfortunately, NATO’s ability to compel its members’ actions has always been limited. While NATO does work with each member to set force goals, it is the responsibility of each state to fulfill those pledges. Often, a defense ministry’s good-faith promise to the Alliance is not fulfilled because that country’s defense budget request is later cut by the finance ministry in order to fund other government programs. A further difficulty arises because the NATO force goals are classified and not open to public scrutiny. In most countries, members of parliament-even those serving in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly-do not have either the required clearances or access through oversight; thus, they are often unaware of their government’s pledges to NATO, and they are unable to question whether defense budgets adequately fund their force goals and whether progress toward these goals is sufficient. While NATO force goals do contain some sensitive information and cannot be completely declassified, member states should strive to increase the transparency of the force planning process to the extent possible and to extend the required clearances to members of the parliaments responsible for defense oversight.

To ensure that NATO has the critical capabilities that it needs, its national leaders agreed in 2002 to the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). This initiative assigned lead nations for multinational working groups to rectify shortfalls in key areas like air-to-air refueling, strategic lift and precision- guided munitions. Despite some progress over the past year, the report card on this initiative continues to be mixed. Governments must fully fund the pledges that they have made under the PCC because a failure on this point will ensure that the PCC ends up on the trash heap with previous NATO capabilities initiatives.

More fundamentally, European forces must be streamlined to generate more deployable units. While several states, notably Britain and France, have an expeditionary capability, large numbers of European soldiers cannot be deployed on actual military missions. Given the absence of a massive land-invasion threat, this leaves them with little to contribute in the field to the Alliance. Reducing personnel levels in European militaries can free up money to develop more agile, more capable forces. For example, Germany has announced plans to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr from 285,000 to 250,000 personnel; Defense Minister Peter Struck said in mid-January 2004 that these cuts “will enable us to markedly reduce the amount of personnel costs in favour of new investments.” While the Bundeswehr today is strained by deploying 10,000 troops abroad, plans call for 105,000 troops to be available for intervention or stabilization operations.

While European armed forces must become more efficient, the two North American allies can also take steps to increase their defense cooperation. Since 1958 the air defense of North America has been a joint effort through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but maritime and land defenses have remained separate. The inauguration of U.S. Northern Command in 2002 provided an opportunity for closer defense integration between the United States and Canada. However, Canada declined an offer to include maritime and land defense in NORAD at that time. Instead, the two countries agreed to establish a Binational Planning Group (bpg), headed by the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, to improve bilateral cooperation to defend against common maritime threats and to respond to land-based attacks or natural disasters.

The new Canadian government of Prime Minister Paul Martin has demonstrated greater receptivity to closer defense cooperation with the United States. Already, Canada is negotiating terms for participation in the U.S. missile defense program, which could be headquartered at NORAD. Other options for closer cooperation include a “naval NORAD” that would integrate the maritime defense of North America; in this area, the BPG already has developed a binational maritime awareness and warning capability. Some Canadian opponents of greater integration argue that naval and land defense are different from air defense because the response times are greater, which allows Canada to maintain exclusive control of its naval and land forces. Proponents of including naval and land cooperation in NORAD argue that weapons like sea-launched missiles mean that naval defense is subject to the same time pressures as air defense. Similarly, they argue that a terrorist attack on land could come without warning.

The conventional wisdom is that the Martin government is unlikely to move forward in this area before federal elections, which could come as late as autumn 2004. If the victorious party appears amenable, then American officials should again offer closer defense ties to Canada in order to better protect both North American allies on land, sea and air.

An Organizational Division of Labor

There are too many folks in the corridors of the EU institutions who view defense as just another area for demonstrating, as one European commissioner put it, “a deeper commitment to our common political project.” Further reflecting this attitude, he added,

“I sincerely believe that defense issues . . . are crucial for the Union’s future. The future and credibility of the European body politic will hinge on the decisions which we will take on them.”

However, defense is different from many other political issues. As we saw a decade ago in Bosnia, when mistakes are made or when there is a failure to act, people die. When mistakes are made in defending your own territory, it is your own people who die. For those EU “true believers”, however, defense policy is no different from agricultural policy or trade policy. Their main concern is, as they would say, “building Europe”-not the vital responsibility to protect European citizens.

In line with this thinking, Finnish General Gustav Hagglund, then-chairman of the EU Military Committee, proposed in January of this year a European security arrangement in which “The American and European pillars would be responsible for their respective territorial defenses . . . .” This ill-conceived idea would undermine the fundamental commitment that lies at the heart of the North Atlantic Alliance and would render the citizens of all the Alliance’s member states less secure. Shocking as it seems, the proposal was not inconsistent with a provision in the proposed EU Constitution to have the European Union take on a mutual defense role that duplicates the very reason for NATO’s creation and its primary mission. If Europe creates a competitor to NATO, it will risk undermining the rationale for the Alliance, and it will risk undermining the support of the governments and people of the United States and Canada for participating in NATO.

Rather than trying to create a mutual defense commitment, the EU should assume primary responsibility for what could be characterized as intra-European crisis management; that is, for undertaking military operations in Europe when the security of the continent is threatened by domestic instability or civil war. In other words, there should be an organizational division of labor: While NATO deals with external threats to Europe’s security, the EU should take the lead in keeping the peace within Europe.

The Balkan conflicts, of course, are the best example of such crises that need to be addressed in a timely and forceful fashion. Such an effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as its work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. Included in this responsibility would be a commitment among the EU nations to assist one another in responding to terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters, as outlined in the “solidarity clause” of the draft constitution.4

Furthermore, the EU should assume command of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-perhaps at the beginning of 2005-and later in Kosovo. In fact, NATO leaders are expected to agree at Istanbul to end the Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia at the end of this year and turn over responsibility to the EU. The combination of improving EU capabilities and an improving security situation in Bosnia has created a situation in which NATO can withdraw without a large risk of an immediate return to violence. NATO should retain a small office in Sarajevo to work with the newly unified Bosnian military and to help track down indicted war criminals. In addition, the Alliance will maintain an “over the horizon” reinforcement capability in case the security environment should deteriorate.

To the south, Kosovo is a much more difficult case because it remains an integral part of Serbia, despite the desire of its ethnic Albanian majority for independence. The deplorable outbreak of ethnic violence in March 2004, much of it apparently orchestrated by ethnic-Albanian elements, underscored the instability in Kosovo. Therefore, NATO should retain command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), at least until the final status of the entity is resolved. The acceptance of the decision on final status and its implementation could be a difficult and volatile process. Once that danger passes, the EU should succeed KFOR. Even before that happens, the EU should actively guide the development of the entity’s institutions in keeping with European standards, with an eye toward the possibility of Kosovo’s eventual membership in the EU.

The EU also aspires to play a role in operations outside of Europe, as demonstrated by the operation in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU should be encouraged to undertake crisis management and humanitarian tasks outside of Europe, provided that it has the necessary capabilities. Having the EU avoid duplicating NATO’s collective defense function in no way limits the geographic scope of EU operation. In fact, there are regions like Africa where European interests and historical relationships may lead to an EU operation. Given that 19 of the 26 NATO members are also EU members, the Berlin Plus agreements that are meant to facilitate NATO-EU military relations should be scrupulously followed. These seven agreements make NATO assets and capabilities, including operational planning, available to the EU, and they facilitate smooth coordination between NATO and EU missions. This allows two organizations to avoid conflicting calls on the same national assets.

That overlap in membership between the two organizations also means that the EU can take advantage of the interoperability that NATO has engendered among its member countries. By standardizing communication and doctrine among its 26 member states and by integrating officers from those nations in headquarters with a single operational language, NATO facilitates multinational operations. That cooperation has been extended to partner nations through the PFP and through on-the-ground collaboration in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Retooling NATO Partnerships

When NATO invited the seven newest members to join at the 2002 Prague Summit, it recognized that the emphasis of its PFP program would have to shift from helping candidate countries become members to cooperation between the Alliance and states that may never formally join the Alliance but may become close partners. The Alliance already has offered enhancements to PFP that range from improvements in interoperability and greater consultations with the twenty partner nations to individualized assistance with defense reforms. Russia is a special case, and the Alliance has already developed the NATO-Russia Council as a unique institution for a closer relationship.

At a minimum, NATO should engage in technical military cooperation with all nations of Europe and Eurasia which are at present members of the OSCE. Afghanistan should be included in the existing PFP programs, given its geographic proximity and cultural ties to the Central Asian members of PFP.

Several PFP nations are authoritarian dictatorships that are no closer to democracy than they were under Soviet rule. NATO must not lend such countries political legitimacy, but the realities of the international security environment mean that defense cooperation may advance the security of both Alliance members and a given partner nation. The most obvious example is Uzbekistan, a detestable dictatorship that nonetheless has offered invaluable assistance with military operations in Afghanistan. America and its allies should do nothing to sustain the oppressive rule of President Islam Karimov, but they should continue cooperation with Uzbekistan in counter-terrorism and at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. To the extent that NATO can enhance its ability to work with such countries through PFP, it should do so. It could also create benefits in the longer term, by exposing local officials to concepts like democratic control of the armed forces.

Beyond that, PFP assists nations that are moving toward democracy to reach Western norms, particularly in transforming their militaries from instruments of internal repression to guarantors of external security. Most notably, the Planning and Review Process enables the Alliance to help partners develop armed forces that can work alongside NATO forces. Some partners might never apply for NATO membership, but the Alliance nevertheless can assist them in developing the structures that are needed to ensure democratic civilian control over armed forces that are efficient, effective, and able to contribute to regional security alongside NATO forces.

Three aspirant countries-Albania, Croatia and Macedonia-currently remain in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, the process through which the Alliance helps countries prepare for full membership. At the Istanbul Summit this June, NATO leaders should act on the recommendation of the House of Representatives (H.Res. 558) and agree to hold a summit no later than 2007 to consider their applications and decide at that time whether they and perhaps others should be invited to begin accession negotiations. Already, these nations are acting as allies, with all three contributing to NATO’s ISAF operation, and Albania and Macedonia contributing troops to coalition forces in Iraq. Admitting these countries into NATO should cement their transformation from crisis zones to full membership in the Alliance’s zone of stability.

In addition, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue should be both enhanced and enlarged. Given today’s security threats, deeper cooperation with the region is imperative. A new partnership that incorporates elements of PFP would enable cooperation in counter-terrorism operations and could allow the Alliance to work with regional actors to increase their ability to work alongside NATO. It could assist them in defense planning and reforms, along the lines outlined above, and facilitate their transition to more representative forms of government. Moreover, it could help promote understanding and perhaps build confidence between Israel and some of the more moderate countries in the region with regard to security concerns.

Likewise, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Mediterranean Special Group should intensify its activities, particularly in assisting the parliaments of the region develop effective defense oversight. The Assembly should also consider extending associate status, heretofore reserved for PFP nations, to the members of this new partnership. This would allow their parliaments to gain a deeper understanding of the role of an independent legislature in a democracy and to build ties to their counterparts across the Mediterranean.

At the same time, this new partnership should be broadened, for example, to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). These six U.S. allies have experience working cooperatively on defense matters. A broader partnership with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries could facilitate this defense cooperation under a NATO umbrella. A democratic, sovereign Iraq should also be offered membership in this partnership, which would enable the NATO nations to work directly with nations of the Middle East on security issues of mutual interest.

The Future of Cooperation

Secretary of State Colin Powell recently wrote, “NATO is transforming itself from an Alliance whose main task was the defense of common territory to an Alliance whose main task is the defense of common principles.“5 No longer are NATO troops stationed along the Fulda Gap, prepared to halt a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The values that set the West apart have been embraced by former adversaries. Many of those states have become a part of NATO, and they have pledged their willingness to fight for our collective freedom. They recognize that there are those who seek to destroy democracies not because of what they may do, but because of what they are.

Collective defense has taken on a different manifestation, but at its heart, the principle remains the same: 26 democracies, standing together to defend one another against those who seek to do us harm. This mission requires new capabilities and new doctrines, but the same depth of commitment. Defending freedom requires more than military hardware; it requires keeping NATO’s door open to help bring freedom’s blessings to lands that have not known them. We must ensure security beyond our borders, and we must work alongside partners, some of whom may someday embrace our principles and become our allies.

Those who declare that NATO should be euthanized either misunderstand how the Alliance has transformed itself to confront today’s security threats or value institutional development above the safety of their citizens. Maintaining NATO’s primacy in transatlantic security is not a barrier to European integration. Rather, it is essential for the security of Europe and North America. No one nation alone can defend against today’s primary security threats: global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the states that support them. The United States needs allies in this effort, and NATO must remain the cornerstone of our common defense.

Copyright © 2004 The National Interest All rights reserved.

Find this article at: http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/NationalInterest/2004/06/01/529118

Think Again: Bush’s Foreign Policy
By Melvyn P. Leffler
September/October 2004 http://www.foreignpolicy.com
Not since Richard Nixon’s conduct of the war in Vietnam has a U.S. president’s foreign policy so polarized the country—and the world. Yet as controversial as George W. Bush’s policies have been, they are not as radical a departure from his predecessors as both critics and supporters proclaim. Instead, the real weaknesses of the president’s foreign policy lie in its contradictions: Blinded by moral clarity and hamstrung by its enormous military strength, the United States needs to rebalance means with ends if it wants to forge a truly effective grand strategy.

“George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Is Revolutionary”
No. Bush’s goals of sustaining a democratic peace and disseminating America’s core values resonate with the most traditional themes in U.S. history. They hearken back to Puritan rhetoric of a city upon a hill. They rekindle Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an empire of liberty. They were integral to Woodrow Wilson’s missive that “the world must be made safe for democracy.” They flow from Franklin Roosevelt’s four freedoms. They echo the noble rhetoric of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, to “oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.”

Nor is unilateralism new. From America’s inception as a republic, the Founding Fathers forswore entangling alliances that might embroil the fragile country in dangerous Old World controversies and tarnish the United States’ identity as an exceptionalist nation. Acting unilaterally, the United States could prudently pursue its own interests, nurture its fundamental ideals, and define itself in opposition to its European forbears. This tradition is the one to which Bush returns.

Critics argue that Bush’s “revolutionary” foreign policy repudiates the multilateralism that flowered after World War II and that served the United States so well during the Cold War. These critics have a point, albeit one that should not be exaggerated. The wise men of the Cold War embraced collective security, forged NATO, created a host of other multilateral institutions, and grasped the interdependence of the modern global economy. Nonetheless, they never repudiated the right to act alone. Although they reserved the option to move unilaterally, they did not declare it as a doctrine. They did precisely the opposite. Publicly, they affirmed the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism; privately, they acknowledged that the United States might have to act unilaterally, as it more or less did in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Third World.

The differences between Bush and his predecessors have more to do with style than substance, more to do with the balance between competing strategies than with goals, with the exercise of good judgment than with the definition of a worldview. The perception of great threat and the possession of unprecedented power have tipped the balance toward unilateralism, but there is nothing revolutionary in Bush’s goals or vision. The U.S. quest for an international order based on freedom, self-determination, and open markets has changed astonishingly little.

“The Bush Doctrine of Preemptive War Is Unprecedented”
Wrong. Preemptive strikes to eliminate threats are a strategy nearly as old as the United States. Securing the nation’s frontiers in its formative decades often required anticipatory action. When, for example, Gen. Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida in 1818, attacked Indian tribes, executed two Englishmen, and ignited an international crisis, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams told the Spanish ambassador that Spain’s failure to preserve order along the borderlands justified preemptive American action.

More overtly, President Theodore Roosevelt announced in 1904 that the United States would intervene in the Western Hemisphere to uphold civilization. Otherwise, he warned, the Europeans would deploy their navies to the hemisphere, seize national customs houses, and endanger U.S. security. Decades later, another president named Roosevelt renounced his distant cousin’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and declared a Good Neighbor Policy. But Franklin Roosevelt did not eschew the preventive use of force. After war erupted in Europe, he deemed it essential to supply the European democracies with munitions and food. When Nazi submarines attacked the U.S. destroyer Greer in September 1941, Roosevelt distorted the circumstances surrounding the incident and declared, “This is the time for prevention of attack.” Thereafter, German and Italian vessels traversing waters in the North Atlantic would do so “at their own peril.” In one of his trademark fireside chats, Roosevelt explained his thinking: “[W]hen you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.”

During the Cold War, preventive action in the Third World was standard operating procedure. If the United States did not intervene, falling dominos would threaten U.S. security. In other words, containment and deterrence in Europe did not foreclose unilateral, preventive initiatives elsewhere. The United States took anticipatory action to deal with real and imagined threats from Central America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. In each case, policymakers employed the same rhetorical justification that Bush uses now: freedom.

Contrary to the public caricature, the Bush administration does not use preventive military action as its only—or even principal—tool. It has hesitated to act preventively in Iran and North Korea, calculating that the risks are too great. It acts selectively, much as its predecessors did. Vietnam, like Iraq, was a war of choice.

“Bush’s Policies Are a Radical Departure from Clinton’s”
Lovely nostalgia. What is striking about President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy is that it actually increased U.S. military preponderance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. During the late 1990s, U.S. defense spending was higher than that of the next dozen nations combined. The overall goal, according to Clinton’s joint chiefs of staff, was to create “a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”

Neither liberals nor neoconservatives want to acknowledge it, but the Clinton administration also envisioned the use of unilateral, even preemptive, military power. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the last strategy paper of the Clinton administration spelled out the nation’s vital interests. “We will do what we must,” wrote the Clinton national security team, “to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.”

Clinton himself already had approved the use of preemptive force. In June 1995, he signed Presidential Decision Directive 39, regarding counterterrorism. Much of it remains classified, but the sanitized version is suggestive of a preemptive stance. The United States would seek to identify groups or states that “sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions.” And responding to al Qaeda attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, Clinton authorized the bombing in Sudan of the al-Shifaa chemical plant, which was suspected of manufacturing weapons for Osama bin Laden. Some in the White House raised concerns about the legality of preemptive bombings against a civilian target in a nation that had never threatened the United States. But National Security Advisor Sandy Berger made a compelling case: “What if we do not hit it and then, after an attack, nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then?”

President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talked nobly and worked tirelessly to preserve alliance cohesion and to enlarge NATO. Unlike Bush, they sought to contain and co-opt the mounting parochial nationalism in the United States, a nationalism that wavered between isolationism and unilateralism and that increasingly rejected international norms and conventions. But, notwithstanding these efforts, it was the Clinton administration, not Bush’s, that appointed the bipartisan U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. This commission was chaired not by neoconservatives, but by former Democratic Sen. Gary Hart and by former Republican Sen. Warren Rudman (who is a moderate internationalist). The commission ruefully acknowledged that “the United States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to carry out combined military operations.”

In short, the preemptive and unilateral use of U.S. military power was widely perceived as necessary prior to Bush’s election, even by those possessing internationalist inclinations. What Bush did after September 11 was translate an option into a national doctrine.

“September 11 Transformed the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy”
Yes. More than that, it transformed the administration’s worldview. Prior to September 11, the Bush team prided itself on a foreign policy that embraced realism. American power, future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice boldly declared during the 2000 presidential campaign, should not be employed for “second order” effects, such as the enhancement of humanity’s well-being. Bush argued that freedom, democracy, and peace would follow from the concerted pursuit of the United States’ “enduring national interests.” This foreign policy would reflect America’s character, “The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness.”

The changes in the Bush administration’s thinking and rhetoric after the terrorist attacks are therefore all the more striking. Heightened threat perception elevated the focus on ideals and submerged the careful calculation of interest. The overall goal of U.S. foreign policy, said the Bush strategy statement of September 2002, is to configure a balance of power favoring freedom. “Our principles,” says the strategy statement—not our interests—will “guide our government’s decisions…[T]he national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.”

In times of crisis, U.S. political leaders have long asserted values and ideals to evoke public support for the mobilization of power. But this shift in language was more than mere rhetoric. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington transformed the Bush administration’s sense of danger and impelled offensive strategies. Prior to September 11, the neocons in the administration paid scant attention to terrorism. The emphasis was on preventing the rise of peer competitors, such as China or a resurgent Russia, that could one day challenge U.S. dominance. And though the Bush team plotted regime change in Iraq, they had not committed to a full-scale invasion and nation-building project. September 11 “produced an acute sense of our vulnerability,” said Rice. “The coalition did not act in Iraq,” explained Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.” Having failed to foresee and prevent a terrorist attack prior to September 11, the administration’s threshold for risk was dramatically lowered, its temptation to use force considerably heightened.

“Bush’s Foreign Policy Has Inflamed Anti-Americanism Worldwide”
Definitely. To be sure, anti-Americanism has plagued previous administrations. Violent demonstrations greeted Vice President Richard Nixon in various Latin American cities in 1958; so much rioting was expected in Tokyo in 1960 that President Dwight Eisenhower canceled his visit. In the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam aroused passionate anti-Americanism in Europe; so did President Ronald Reagan’s decision more than a decade later to deploy a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

But the breadth and depth of the current anti-Americanism are unprecedented. According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, favorable attitudes toward the United States in Europe plunged during the last two years, dropping from 75 percent to 58 percent in Britain, from 63 percent to 37 percent in France, and from 61 percent to 38 percent in Germany. It’s even worse in the Muslim world, where substantial majorities think the United States is overreacting to the terrorist threat and that Americans seek to dominate the world. Most worrisome of all is the reaction among “friendly” Muslim nations: 59 percent of Turks, 36 percent of Pakistanis, 27 percent of Moroccans, and 24 percent of Jordanians say that suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners are justified in Iraq.

In retrospect, these numbers are not surprising, given that heightened threat perception tempts U.S. officials to obfuscate interests and stake their policies on the universality and superiority of American values. Yet a careful calculation of interests is essential to discipline U.S. power and temper its ethnocentrism. There is no greater and sadder irony, perhaps even tragedy, that while Bush officials assert the superiority of American values, the overweening use of U.S. power breeds cynicism about its motives and distrust of its intentions. Indeed, preemption and unilateralism complicate the struggle against terrorism. Terrorism, at least in part, is spawned by feelings of revulsion against U.S. domination and by a sense of powerlessness and humiliation. Preventive wars and intrusive occupations intensify such sentiments and breed more terrorists. By elevating the hegemonic posture of the United States to official doctrine, these policies make the United States and its citizens even more attractive targets for terrorists. According to recent State Department data, terrorism is waxing, not waning.

“The Bush Administration Has the Right Strategy but Implements It Badly”
No. Strategy links means to ends, designing tactics capable of achieving goals. Bush’s foreign policy is vulnerable to criticism not because it departs radically from previous administrations, but because it cannot succeed. The goals are unachievable because the means and ends are out of sync.

Rice says the Bush administration’s strategy rests on three pillars: First, thwarting terrorists and rogue regimes; second, harmonizing relations among the great powers; third, nurturing prosperity and democracy across the globe. But the effort to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes through preemption, hegemony, and unilateralism shatters great power harmony and diverts resources and attention from the development agenda. An effective strategy cannot be sustained when the methods employed to erect one pillar drastically undermine the others.

Consider, for instance, Bush’s quest for a democratic peace. He says that peoples everywhere, including the Middle East, yearn for freedom and coexistence. The democratic peace theory, which postulates that democratic societies do not wage war against one another, is appealing. But the war on terrorism, as presently conceived, makes it more difficult to democratize the Arab world. Waging preventive wars requires basing rights throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. To satisfy its military needs, the United States must sign agreements with and support repressive, even heinous, regimes that despise democratic principles.

Democratizing the Middle East is a noble goal, but it is one unlikely to be achieved through unilateral initiatives and preventive war. Democratization requires far more resources, imagination, and patience than the Bush administration, or perhaps any U.S. administration, is willing to muster. The ends of Bush’s foreign policy cannot be reconciled with domestic priorities that call for lower taxes. A recent Rand Corporation study concludes that the most important determinants of a successful occupation are related to the “level of effort—measured in time, manpower, and money.” Bush’s domestic agenda simply does not allow for this level of effort, and he shows no inclination to alter his programs at home in order to effect his strategic vision abroad.

“Bush Is Reagan’s Heir”
Yes. But is that a good thing? Bush and his advisors love to identify themselves with Reagan. Bush, like Reagan, says Rumsfeld, “has not shied from calling evil by its name….” Nor has he been shy about “declaring his intention to defeat its latest incarnation—terrorism.” Moral clarity and military power, Bush believes, emboldened Reagan and enabled him to wrest the initiative from the Kremlin, liberate Eastern Europe, and win the Cold War.

Yet most scholars of that period interpret the past differently. They know that the most successful and far-reaching initiatives of the Cold War came in its early years, long before the Reagan military buildup. In 1947, President Harry Truman and his advisors grappled with agonizing trade-offs and chose to meet the Soviet threat in Europe with reconstruction rather than a massive arms buildup. They were initially guided by diplomat George F. Kennan, who warned against military thinking, overcommitments, and ideological rhetoric. He did not talk about remaking and refashioning other societies, but of containing and reducing Soviet power and invigorating U.S. domestic institutions.

In 1950, the national security document NSC-68 institutionalized the emphases on moral clarity and military prowess. Prompted by the Soviet acquisition of atomic capabilities, the onset of McCarthyism, and then the outbreak of the Korean war, NSC-68 accentuated the ideological war and accelerated the arms race. But moral clarity and ideological purity made it difficult to assess threats and understand the international environment. Blinded by ideology, U.S. officials found it difficult to discern the Sino-Soviet split and to grasp the roots of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. In the early 1980s, moral clarity prompted Reagan to assist repressive rightist regimes in Central America. Cold War thinking encouraged him to support Saddam Hussein in Iraq. And subsequent triumphalism over the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan led Reagan’s heirs to ignore the ensuing turmoil and the emergence of a Taliban theocracy.

Nor do scholars readily agree that Reagan’s arms buildup and rhetorical pronouncements brought victory in the Cold War. In fact, the most thoughtful accounts of Reagan’s diplomacy stress that what really mattered was his surprising ability to change course, envision a world without nuclear arms, and deal realistically with a new Soviet leader. And most accounts of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s diplomacy suggest that he was motivated by a desire to reform Communism, reshape Soviet society, and revive its economy, rather than intimidated by U.S. military power. Gorbachev was inspired not by U.S. democratic capitalism but by European social democracy, not by the self-referential ideological fervor of U.S. neoconservatives, but by the careful, thoughtful, tedious work of human rights activists and other nongovernmental organizations.

Bush and his advisors seek to construct a narrative about the end of the Cold War that exalts moral clarity and glorifies the utility of military power. Moral clarity doubtless helps a democratic, pluralistic society like the United States reconcile its differences and conduct policy. Military power, properly configured and effectively deployed, chastens and deters adversaries. But this mindset can lead to arrogance and abuse of power. To be effective, moral clarity and military power must be harnessed to a careful calculation of interest and a shrewd understanding of the adversary. Only when ends are reconciled with means can moral clarity and military power add up to a winning strategy.

Melvyn P. Leffler is Edward Stettinius professor of American history at the University of Virginia. He is the author of the prizewinning history of the early Cold War A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

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