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Article lié : Le “besoin de France” de notre temps devenu fou

Citoyen français

  05/08/2006

Citoyen français saoulé de déclin à longueur de semaines et de colonnes par des gens qui rêvent d’accrocher la France et les Français à la remorque des USA, j’apprécie particulièrement, comme une bouffée d’air frais, la mise en perspective que vous nous offrez ici .
Alors merci pour cette relativisation de l’état de la France. On se dit qu’on n’a pas tort de croire dans la face vertueuse de notre identité.

Que de références à la Littérature !

Article lié : Le “besoin de France” de notre temps devenu fou

G.F.D.

  05/08/2006

Je vous cite :

“Mais les Français ont ce travers de l’intelligence dont ils croient avoir une disposition extrême, qui est de croire qu’ils se grandissent en prenant la liberté d’abaisser la France outre-mesure. C’est ‘la France éternelle’, qui vaut pour ses travers comme pour ses vertus. Passons.”

Allons bon ! Voilà que vous écrivez comme Rémy de Gourmont, à présent ? Alors que les pantins qui s\‘agitent autour de nous ignorent apparemment tout de leur propre littérature anglo-saxonne, par exemple \“Notre Grand William\” \‘sic) et E. A. Poe ?

\“Out, out, brief candle!
Life\‘s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.\”

Ca, pour être plein de bruit et de fureur, il l\‘est, notre monde (mais alors, QUI est l\‘idiot ?).

Par ailleurs, en référence à votre article
\“L’ambassade qui était une base
//www.dedefensa.org/article.php?art_id=2824 ,

j\‘extrais ceci de Poe :

<

< Mais le prince Prospero était heureux, et intrépide, et sagace. Quand ses domaines furent à moitié dépeuplés, il convoqua un millier d\'amis vigoureux et allègres de cour, choisis parmi les chevaliers et les dames de sa cour, et se fit avec eux une retraite profonde dans une de ses abbayes fortifiées. C\'était un vaste et magnifique bâtiment, une création du prince, d\'un goût excentrique et cependant grandiose. Un mur épais et haut lui faisait une ceinture. Ce mur avait des portes de fer. Les courtisans, une fois entrés, se servirent de fourneaux et de solides marteaux pour souder les verrous. Ils résolurent de se barricader contre les impulsions soudaines du désespoir extérieur et de fermer toute issue aux frénésies du dedans. L\'abbaye fut largement approvisionnée. Grâce à ces précautions, les courtisans pouvaient jeter le défi à la contagion. Le monde extérieur s\'arrangerait comme il pourrait. En attendant, c\'était folie de s\'affliger ou de penser. Le prince avait !
pourvu à tous le moyens de plaisir. Il y avait des bouffons, il y avait des improvisateurs, des danseurs, des musiciens, il y avait le beau sous toutes ses formes, il y avait le vin. En dedans, il y avait toutes ces belles choses et la sécurité. Au-dehors, la Mort Rouge.>

>

Même le mur est décrit !

Voilà. Beaucoup (sinon la plupart) de nos maux semblent résulter de l\‘ignorance de nos dirigeants, en particulier en Histoire et en Littérature (sans exclure des carences encore plus graves dans les autres domaines où l\‘esprit humain fait souvent merveille).

Refs :
http://www.online-literature.com/shakespeare/macbeth/26/
http://www.saltana.org/1/navg/103.htm

GFD.

PS : je dois avouer mon extrême honte suite à un message précédent, où j\’évoquais M. de Saussure alors que je voulais parler de ce bon Maurice Grevisse (qui, lui, est bien Belge, alors que je premier est Suisse, bien entendu ! Désolé...).

Un (modeste) suggestion

Article lié : Le “besoin de France” de notre temps devenu fou

Philippe

  04/08/2006

J’ai découvert votre site depuis peu et j’apprécie les textes que vous y publiez. Je constate néanmoins que vous considérez vos lecteurs comme bilingues français-anglais.
J’ai du mal à imaginer les contraintes qui vous imposent ce choix.
Je trouve cela bien dommage. Vous pronez l’échange d’idées, de débats et d’arguments et vous vous coupez (volontairement?) d’une bonne part de vos lecteurs potentiels.

Mr Blair has done more damage to British interests in the Middle East than Anthony Eden

Article lié :

matthieu bultelle

  04/08/2006

La fronde anti-blair des diplomates s’etend a la ‘mainstream press’ (le Financial Times dans ce cas)...

Mr Blair should recognise his errors and go

By Rodric Braithwaite

Published: August 2 2006 19:27 | Last updated: August 2 2006 19:27

Aspectre is stalking British television, a frayed and waxy zombie straight from Madame Tussaud’s. This one, unusually, seems to live and breathe. Perhaps it comes from the Central Intelligence Agency’s box of technical tricks, programmed to spout the language of the White House in an artificial English accent.

There is another possible explanation. Perhaps what we see on television is the real Tony Blair, the man who believes that he and his friend alone have the key to the horrifying problems of the Middle East. At first he argued against a ceasefire in Lebanon. Then, after another Israeli airstrike killed dozens of Lebanese women and children, he finally admitted, in California – reluctantly, grudgingly and with a host of preconditions – that military force alone would not do the trick, and now seems to have told his people to look for something better.

The catastrophe in Lebanon is the latest act of a tragedy rooted in European anti-Semitism and in the expulsion of an Arab people from their ancestral home. Both sides claim the right to self-defence. Neither hesitates to use force to pursue aims it regards as legitimate. No single event is the proximate cause of the current mayhem – neither the Israeli onslaught on Lebanon, nor the Hizbollah rockets, nor the Israeli assassination of Palestinian leaders, nor the suicide bombings. The causes go back in almost infinite regression. In the desperate pursuit of short-term tactical gain, both sides lose sight of their own long-term interests.

The Israelis remember the Holocaust and the repeated calls from within the Muslim world for the elimination of their state, and they react strongly to real or perceived threats to their existence. Whether their government’s methods can achieve their ends is for them to judge. A liberal Israeli columnist has argued that “in Israel and Lebanon, the blood is being spilled, the horror is intensifying, the price is rising and it is all for naught” – a reminder that Israel remains a sophisticated and in many ways an attractive democracy.

But whatever our sympathy for Israel’s dilemma, Mr Blair’s prime responsibility is to defend the interests of his own country. This he has signally failed to do. Stiff in opinions, but often in the wrong, he has manipulated public opinion, sent our soldiers into distant lands for ill-conceived purposes, misused the intelligence agencies to serve his ends and reduced the Foreign Office to a demoralised cipher because it keeps reminding him of inconvenient facts. He keeps the dog, but he barely notices if it barks or not. He prefers to construct his “foreign policy” out of self-righteous soundbites and expensive foreign travel.

Mr Blair has done more damage to British interests in the Middle East than Anthony Eden, who led the UK to disaster in Suez 50 years ago. In the past 100 years – to take the highlights – we have bombed and occupied Egypt and Iraq, put down an Arab uprising in Palestine and overthrown governments in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf. We can no longer do these things on our own, so we do them with the Americans. Mr Blair’s total identification with the White House has destroyed his influence in Washington, Europe and the Middle East itself: who bothers with the monkey if he can go straight to the organ-grinder?

Mr Blair has seriously damaged UK domestic politics, too. His prevarication over a ceasefire confirms to many of our Muslim fellow citizens that Britain is engaged in a secular war against the Arab world and by extension, against the Muslim world. He has thus made it harder to achieve what should be a goal of policy for any British government – to build a tolerant multi-ethnic society within our own islands. And though he chooses not to admit it, he has made us more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are not achievements of which a British prime minister should be proud.

But in spite of the disasters he has wreaked abroad, in spite of the growing scandal and incoherence of his performance at home, Mr Blair is still a consummate politician. How else can one explain the failure of his party to do the decent thing and get rid of him? Why else does it still appear as though he alone controls the timing and circumstances of his departure? One day we may feel sorry for Mr Blair for the damage he has done to his place in history and to himself. But that moment is not yet. For now, he should no longer attempt to stand upon the order of his going, but go. At once.

Sir Rodric Braithwaite, UK ambassador to Moscow 1988-92 and then foreign policy adviser to John Major and chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, is author of Moscow 1941 (Profile, 2006)

Article lié : Israël, tête baissée?

  04/08/2006

Une analyse géostratégique très intéressante à parti r d’une terrible situation…Une analyse qui détaille encore plus le rapport ambivalent entre USA et israël…qui est peut-être en train de donner naissance à des générations de “terroristes” (comme ils disent)  qui ne sont ni plus ni moins des résistants.
Cette israël ressemble à un millefeuille qui se décompose dans un frigo trop chaud…

L’amalgame entre résistance et terrorisme est tellement facile, si l’on disait cela des évangélistes du monde occidental, comment est-ce que les occidentaux réagirez?

Guardian from Ha'aretz : How Israel's gung-ho leaders turned victory into calamity, Nehemia Shtrasler.

Article lié :

Lambrechts Francis

  03/08/2006

There was one moment during the war when we had the upper hand. It was the moment when Israel had succeeded in striking Hizbullah with strong and surprising force, Haifa was peaceful and the number of casualties was small. That was the right moment to stop the war, declare victory and move on to the diplomatic track.
This opportunity came when the G8 convened in St Petersburg on July 14, two days after the fighting broke out. The G8 formulated a four-point plan, and nothing could have been better for Israel.
... The international atmosphere was also pro-Israel, even among the hostile media.

... But Olmert and Amir Peretz, the defence minister, did not know when to quit. They wanted to show the public that they, the “civilians”, were more courageous than their predecessors, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon. That is why they continued the war in order to attain goals that from the outset were unattainable.

...  It appears that, like a number of other Israeli leaders, they did not understand how much killing, poverty and distress people are willing to take, as long as their honour is not harmed, as long as they are not humiliated. And indeed, instead of demanding that Hizbullah be dismantled, the people of Lebanon want revenge, and they want it now.

... Soon we will start to long for the excellent agreement offered by the G8 at the beginning of the war.
· Today that, too, is unattainable.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,1835894,00.html

Les elections mexicaines

Article lié : La trouille révélatrice de la Pravda de Washington

ANDRÉS ANDRADE-BERZABÁ

  03/08/2006

Le wahington post a confirmé une fois de plus que l´alignement de presque tout la soi-disant la presse mondiale sur les these de la democratie “made in USA”. Ce qu´importe sont les resultats de la votation et pas le character fraudulent de la meme.

Debka.com: Israel’s Surprise Raid of Baalbek Is No Panacea for Tactical Ills

Article lié :

matthieu bultelle

  03/08/2006

Le site Debka.com est tres proche des milieux du renseignements Israeliens. Leurs critiques des erreurs de Tsahal est par consequent des plus interessantes. On peut y retrouver pas mal des idees avancees sur dedefensa concernant la philosophie militaire et l’empatement de l’armee israelienne.

Israel’s Surprise Raid of Baalbek Is No Panacea for Tactical Ills

DEBKAfile’s Update of DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s Exclusive Military Analysis of July 28

Israel’s audacious commando raid of a Hizballah stronghold near Baalbek more than 100 km north of the border recalled the old panache associated with Israeli military feats in the past. However the 22 days of the Lebanon war have shown an army hampered and slowed down by tactical and intelligence deficiencies which showed up in the costly Maroun er-Ras and Bin Jubeil operations in South Lebanon – and again this week in the Ayta a-Chaab battle. Those three engagements have claimed 17 lives. Between six and eight thousand troops and reservists are now deployed in South Lebanon fighting in Hizballah village-strongholds and positions along the Israeli border and plunging deeper for the mission assigned this week to push Hizballah out of the south as far as the Litani River. More such battles therefore lie ahead.

It is therefore important to heed the senior Israeli officers who tell DEBKAfile that a single successful commando raid is not going to cure the deficiencies hampering its 22-day Lebanon campaign.

The officers direct most of their criticism at the Northern Command’s handling of the war, arguing that the IDF should have kicked off the entire campaign with a series of audacious assaults like Tuesday’s Baalbek operation so as to catch Hizballah off-balance. Without these tactics, the three battles against a tough enemy which refuses to break under sustained battering were bound to end as they did.

On July 28, DEBKA-Net-Weekly 263 cited its military analysts on the IDF’s six principal failings in the Lebanon war:

1. Israeli elected leaders, Olmert and defense minister Peretz, lack military experience and the skills required for managing a war.

2. The military leadership qualities of chief of staff Lt.-General Halutz, former commander of the air force where he grew up, are questionable.

3. Olmert’s predecessor left him with a flawed legacy. During his six and-a- half years as premier, Ariel Sharon shook up the top levels of the IDF’s general command, military intelligence and the Mossad (although not the Shin Bet) and stuffed them with appointees who subscribed to his political philosophy.

Israel’s top military and security echelons have never before been picked for their political outlook. Sharon’s axe created a monolithic establishment lacking in the motivation burning in their predecessors for developing brilliantly innovative methods of warfare.

4. In six years of counter-terror warfare against the Palestinians, the IDF focused on perfecting small-time tactics for keeping local terror fires under control, but failed to produce methods applicable to a transition from fighting terrorists to waging war. Hizballah has foisted this transition on the Israeli military.

5. Israeli war planners, like the US army in Iraq, came to rely too heavily on air power, firepower and hi-tech weaponry for combating terror. They neglected to draw the lessons of the three-year Iraq war.

6. Hizballah’s tacticians and their Iranian Revolutionary Guards mentors studied every Israeli move in its 2002 Defensive Wall Operation against the Palestinian terrorist stronghold of Jenin, which ended in all the towns of the West Bank falling to the Israeli military. Taking this battle as their master plan, they invented a new war doctrine to fit a Hizballah offensive against an Israeli army which had not revised its doctrines of war in the intervening four years.

The battle fought in Jenin’s refugee camp on April 14, 2002, was the only engagement in the entire Israel-Palestinian conflict in which Hizballah and al Qaeda terrorists fought Israeli forces face to face.

The Palestinians fielded a small number of fighters. The Israeli army won the day but paid dearly in casualties. Drawing on the Jenin lesson, Iranian and Hizballah war planners are hammering at the Jewish state’s most vulnerable point - military losses and loss of life in general. By maximizing Israeli casualties, they believe that Hizballah does not have to win the war; it will turn the tables sufficiently to achieve parity with the Israeli army. For a small militia dependent on two outside governments, Iran and Syria, for heavy weapons and permission to use them, this would be no mean feat – better in fact that any Arab army has ever achieved in the past.

Nasrallah is fond of boasting that he has surprised Israel and will again. But it must be said that, going back to the Yom Kippur shock, the Israeli army did in fact recover from its early setbacks and turned the tide. It is still early days, and Israel may have surprises of its own up its sleeve. The pressure of war on the country’s borders and their homes under attack has always goaded Israel’s army into flights of improvisation and stimulated its generals into using the war arena as a testing ground for ingenious new ideas. But much depends on Olmert, Peretz and General Halutz, giving them enough rein to succeed while restraining their own pointless and often damaging statements

Figaro : La culture de l'action commando de l'armée israélienne (... lutte depuis longtemps 'assymétrique')

Article lié :

Lambrechts Francis

  03/08/2006

... LES UNITÉS D’ÉLITE sont à la classe politique israélienne ce que l’ENA est à l’oligarchie française.

... Pour des raisons historiques comme géopolitiques, l’action commando est au coeur de la tradition Tsahal.
... La lutte depuis longtemps «asymétrique» entre Israël et ses ennemis a favorisé le recours aux forces spéciales et cette culture du raid. Plus que d’affronter conventionnellement des armées arabes stratégiquement bien inférieures, Tsahal a dû relever les défis de la lutte «antiterroriste».

http://www.lefigaro.fr/liban/20060803.FIG000000075_la_culture_de_l_action_commando_de_l_armee_israelienne.html

Figaro : 'Votre incompétence nous tue' ... Maison-Blanche à israél.

Article lié :

Lambrechts Francis

  03/08/2006

... Seule certitude en tout cas : les Américains qui avaient jusqu’à présent laissé faire Israël manifestent désormais une certaine impatience.

... Selon les médias israéliens, les responsables américains sont très déçus des «médiocres performances» de l’armée israélienne. «Votre incompétence nous tue», ont expliqué des responsables de la Maison-Blanche à leurs interlocuteurs israéliens.

... Reste à savoir quelle tendance va l’emporter au sein d’un gouvernement israélien qui a de plus en plus de mal à présenter un front uni. D’un côté les «faucons» soutenus par l’armée pensent qu’il faut gagner du temps pour poursuivre les opérations militaires afin d’éviter un «match nul» qui serait interprété comme une victoire de Hassan Nasrallah, le chef du Hezbollah. De l’autre, ceux qui se veulent «réalistes» et estiment qu’un cessez-le-feu rapide paraît inévitable, mais ne constituerait pas une catastrophe pour l’Etat hébreu.

Entre «faucons» et «réalistes», Jérusalem balance
http://www.lefigaro.fr/liban/20060803.FIG000000078_entre_faucons_et_realistes_jerusalem_balance.html

la guerre au liban

Article lié : De quelle guerre parle-t-on ?

mathamore

  02/08/2006

quel beau texte, bravo, vraiment c`est exactement ma vision des choses.

La conclusion de ce représentant

Article lié : Murtha et sa différence

PHR

  02/08/2006

n’est autre que celle de Pyrhhus.

“Encore une victoire comme celle-ci et nous sommes perdus”

Ces gens sont des malades.

Article lié : La grande offensive d’Israël : pompe et circonstances

PHR

  02/08/2006

Pas d’autre commentaires.

Monde nouveau

Article lié : L’insurrection civique paralyse Mexico

PHR

  02/08/2006

“Voici que je fais un monde nouveau. Il règne déjà, ne le voyez-vous pas” (Jérémie)

“Fils dd’homme, j’ai fait de toi un guetteur” (ezéchiel)

Bush, Ukraine, Pologne, Mexique, .. de plus en plus les élections sont contestées en se jouant à 50 50. Nous assistons à un changement de monde qui s’étend à la planète entière. C’est la révolted e petits sontre les élites dominantes judéo-protestantes ou assimilées qui depuis trente ans sacrifient l’homme à l’argent.

Hirsh: Can the U.S. Afford to Stay in Iraq ∫

Article lié :

Lambrechts Francis

  01/08/2006

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14122053/site/newsweek/?nav=slate
...
The Army’s budgetary squeeze raises questions about whether the United States can “stay the course” in Iraq even if it wants to. While the world has focused on Lebanon, Iraq has been sliding downhill fast. U.S. officials battling the counterinsurgency who were positive six months ago are now far more skeptical that the center can hold.
...
Officials worry that behind the Army’s lack of readiness lies a titanic mismatch between the Bush administration’s dream of resurrecting American prestige in the region through the use of hard power and the scant resources they have devoted to it.
...
As Ron Suskind writes in his new book, “The One Percent Doctrine,” quoting sources who attended National Security Council briefings in 2002, the main reason for the Iraq war was “‘to make an example”’ of Saddam Hussein. Bush sought to ‘create a demonstration model to guide the behavior of anyone with the temerity to acquire destructive weapons or, in any way, flout the authority of the United States.’