L’histoire récente, surtout celle qui se presse autour du 9/11, est aussi passionnante qu’elle reste à faire. Nous avons suivi le conseil de notre lecteur “Rakk”, le 4 mars 2007 sur notre ‘Forum’, et avons consulté l’interview du général Clark sur le point indiqué. Nous avons retrouvé la transcription sur Democracy Now ! le 2 mars 2007 (en effet, Clark est interviewé par Amy Goodman). Nous avons pensé que nos lecteurs aimeraient avoir immédiatement accès au passage concerné, — que voici :
AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a replay in what happened in the lead-up to the war with Iraq — the allegations of the weapons of mass destruction, the media leaping onto the bandwagon?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, in a way. But, you know, history doesn’t repeat itself exactly twice. What I did warn about when I testified in front of Congress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a state, it shouldn’t be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our administration, wanted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.
I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decision we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.”
So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” — meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office — “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it classified?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, “You remember that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!”
AMY GOODMAN: I’m sorry. What did you say his name was?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I’m not going to give you his name.
AMY GOODMAN: So, go through the countries again.
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, starting with Iraq, then Syria and Lebanon, then Libya, then Somalia and Sudan, and back to Iran. So when you look at Iran, you say, “Is it a replay?” It’s not exactly a replay…
L’intérêt dans l’interview de Clark, nous semble-t-il, se trouve dans les motivations des attaques et, d’une façon générale, dans le climat qui régnait au Pentagone dans les jours qui ont suivi 9/11. L’impression générale est d’une part d’une grande confusion (du style : pourquoi vont-ils attaquer l’Irak ? “I guess they don’t know what else to do.”) ; d’autre part, d’une réelle incertitude et de l’abdication de toute volonté devant la dynamique de moyens, — dynamique aux effets bien mal mesurés certes ( “It’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments”).
Il y a par contre l’extraordinaire certitude dans la puissance militaire US. Envisager 7 invasions en 5 ans, lorsqu’on mesure ce que nous dit la réalité depuis 5 ans, est édifiant. Dès ces premiers instants, toutes les faiblesses américanistes apparaissent : vanité, aveuglement, autisme, improvisation, lourdeur bureaucratique, absence d’imagination.
Mis en ligne le 5 mars 2007 à 05H50