Forum

Does the United States Have a European Policy?

by Gerard Baker | déc. 01 ‘03

Since the earliest days of the European Union, at the outset of the Cold War, it has been an axiom of U.S. foreign policy that an integrated Europe is in America’s global strategic interest. The central theater of world war twice in a generation and the expected theater of a third conflict, fractious Europe cost the United States more in blood and treasure than any region on earth in the republic’s history. What could better fit U.S. national security goals than the prospect of an ever closer union of a growing number of European states in which ancient enmities, national rivalries and ideological conflicts were submerged in a pan-European identity based on the same principles of democracy and free markets that have animated America’s own success? There is too, in the American geopolitical psyche, something gloriously redolent about the spectacle of Europeans coming together to forge a common entity, just as Americans themselves coalesced from fissiparous states nearly two centuries earlier.

It was Dwight D. Eisenhower, the liberator of Europe, who articulated this spirit most emphatically more than half a century ago. In a July 1951 speech in London-five years before the founding of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union-the general told an audience of diplomats and politicians of his dream of a unified Europe. In a letter a few days later to his friend and adviser Averell Harriman, Eisenhower observed, “I most fervently urged the formation of the United States of Western Continental Europe.” Eisenhower’s presidential successors never went quite so far in their enthusiasm, and the U.S. commitment to the European project has seemed more rhetorical than practical at times.

But Washington repeatedly stated its belief in a united Europe-a Europe “whole and free”, as President George H. W. Bush put it in 1991. It publicly applauded each move toward deeper European integration, as western Europe moved from coal and steel community to common market to single market to single-currency area. As the union acquired increasing political saliency and began to find a voice in foreign and security policy, the United States continued to welcome its role in world affairs. There were disagreements aplenty-over Vietnam in the 1960s, intermediate nuclear forces in the 1980s and the Balkans in the 1990s, to name just a few. But Washington never actively sought to foment disagreements within Europe.

All that changed this year with the explosion of transatlantic tensions over Iraq. As European nations themselves split apart on whether to support the U.S.-led military action, the Bush Administration happily highlighted the differences and pointed up the distinctions between “Old” and “New” Europe. As the French government enunciated a Gaullist vision of Europe acting as an alternative pole to the American superpower, the United States urged other European nations to reject France’s agenda for Europe. When the initial hostilities were over, U.S. officials lavished praise and new responsibilities on loyal allies such as Britain and Poland and talked of a new strategy of “punishing France and ignoring Germany.”

In Europe, powerful bureaucratic and political forces are pressing hard for a much tighter alignment of the member-states’ foreign and security policies. As Europe debates its first ever draft constitution that aims, among other things, to institutionalize more effectively a common European foreign policy, it does so in an atmosphere tinged indelibly by the Iraq debacle. A number of European political leaders are increasingly convinced that the Bush Administration is actively seeking to divide Europe, to undermine the institutions and relationships that underpin European unity. U.S. officials from the president down insist that the United States remains a friend to the European project, but not on any specific terms. Many questions thus arise about the present state of U.S.-European relations. Has U.S. policy toward Europe really changed? With the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks, have U.S. priorities become so altered and divergent from European goals that the United States no longer sees a strong interest in working with a Europe on its march to an ever closer union? Did the United States ever truly believe in a fully united Europe? These questions boil down to one fundamental query: Does the United States have a European policy?

What the Iraq debacle clearly demonstrated for U.S. policymakers was a proposition that had been tested in theory many times before but never in such stark reality. This proposition was that it may sometimes be better to have a Europe divided on a crucial issue of America’s national interest than one in which a wholly united Europe takes a hostile or critical line against the United States.

During the Cold War, European unity and transatlantic cohesion was so self-evidently critical to defeating communism that the United States could not for long have pursued a policy that had the effectof dividing Europe. In the immediate post-Cold War world, dealing with a potentially unstable post-communist empire in the east, enlarging the communities of free nations-NATO as well as the European Union-became the central priority of U.S.-European policy. Indeed, there were early tensions with European allies over the EU’s apparent eagerness to place deeper integration above expansion in its post-Cold War agenda. It was at least in part aggressive U.S. promotion of the enlargement case that gave impetus to the process that will result next year in the admission of ten new members to the union, most from the former communist countries.

Continuing EU integration also seemed to hold new potential benefits for the United States. The most obvious advantage was in the field of defense capabilities. With the changing nature of threats in the post-Cold War era, familiar U.S. complaints about “burden-sharing” took on new urgency. Greater defense cooperation among the Europeans would lead to improved interoperability, economies of scale and a division of labor that would greatly enhance the effectiveness of NATO and reduce dependence on U.S. forces in the old European theater.

But there were potential benefits for the United States from economic integration too. American companies seemed to have much to gain from the consolidation of the single market. The advent of the euro in the late-1990s was also widely welcomed by U.S. corporations. It was seen as a spur to inward investment by Americans and an opportunity to create the kind of large single currency area that was so instrumental in the U.S. economy’s successful performance over two centuries.

Now, in the immediate post-Cold War years, there are signs that the salience of European integration for U.S. policy were overstated-even in the relatively halcyon days for transatlantic relations of the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations. In economic terms, the arrival of the single market was by no means seen as an undiluted good for the United States. The year before the market’s completion in 1992, there was much angst in the United States that a protectionist “Fortress Europe” was possibility emerging. When the single market itself appeared less threatening, new questions arose about the next phase of economic union. The Clinton Administration’s senior economic policymakers harbored deep doubts about the viability and sense of monetary union. Though public expression of these doubts was muted, U.S. and European officials acknowledged at the time that the United States was not persuaded the eurozone would be an effective single-currency area.

More visibly, it was in the Clinton Administration that the first real doubts about a separate European defense identity emerged in the United States. Tensions multiplied as the European Union embarked on its European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) after 1997. The United States was deeply troubled by the prospect that a caucus within NATO of increasingly independent-minded Europeans might emerge and undermine the institution’s ability and political willingness to operate as a full transatlantic alliance. Clinton Administration officials upbraided their British counterparts when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit to push for a separate European military force.

Thus, by the final years of the Clinton Administration, the end of the Cold War was not only beginning to dissolve the glue of the transatlantic relationship but was also weakening the apparent advantages of European integration for the United States. It was no longer self-evidently in America’s national interest. Put simply, Europe was less central to U.S. national security. That meant inevitably that a single European voice was less important to U.S. policymakers. Then came George W. Bush.

Early expectations in Europe were edgy about what the new American president might make of the EU. Though not known to have any particularly strong views on the subject himself, Bush surrounded himself with advisers who were of a distinctly Euro-skeptic hue. At the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz were on record criticizing some European governments that repeatedly acted as an impediment to the U.S. pursuit of its global priorities. At the State Department, Colin Powell was liked and admired in Brussels, but the appointment of John Bolton as an undersecretary alarmed European integrationists. Known for his trenchant views on the virtues of European cooperation, Bolton had written that ESDI was a “dagger at the heart of NATO.” Finally, Vice President Dick Cheney was not viewed as especially attached to the Atlanticist agenda.

Nonetheless, when confronted with the opportunity to reject a key part of Europe’s ambitions at the start of his administration, Bush chose not to. At his Camp David summit in February 2001 with Tony Blair, Bush agreed to drop U.S. objections to European defense plans (now called ESDP). On the understanding that ESDP was fully compatible with NATO’s existing structures, President Bush showed himself to be more Euro-friendly than the Clinton Administration in this regard.

Four months later, on his first presidential trip to Europe, Bush again struck a conciliatory tone. Though his early months in office had been marked by tensions with the Europeans over missile defense and the Kyoto global warming treaty, Bush seemed willing to reaffirm America’s commitment to the virtues of pan-European policies and cooperation. In a June 2001 speech in Warsaw, Bush repeated his father’s pledge to help build a Europe “whole and free:”

My nation welcomes the consolidation of European unity, and the stability it brings. We welcome a greater role for the EU in European security, properly integrated with NATO. We welcome the incentive for reform that the hope of EU membership creates. We welcome a Europe that is truly united, truly democratic and truly diverse-a collection of peoples and nations bound together in purpose and respect, and faithful to their own roots. Administration-watchers assumed from these early pronouncements that the administration’s Atlanticists, led by Colin Powell at the State Department, had won an important round in their continuous battle with the more unilateralist Pentagon.

But this assumption proved false. In those first six months of the administration, it was already apparent that U.S. policy toward Brussels was shifting. In fact, the deal with Blair at Camp David demonstrated that European policy had already been downgraded by the administration. Bush was essentially prepared to treat his concerns about European defense cooperation as a bargaining chip to be exchanged for Britain’s support of America’s much greater goal: creating a missile defense system to protect the United States from threats emerging outside Europe.

In the destinations for that first trip, there was an intriguing sign of the already shifting priorities in the Bush team’s approach to Europe. Bush chose not to go to France or Germany, the pillars of what would soon be derided as “Old Europe”, but to Spain, Sweden, Poland and Slovenia (with merely a day trip to Brussels for a NATO summit). This was the “New Europe” the administration would soon demonstrate it was eager to encourage. In short, long before the Iraq crisis and even before the September 11 attacks, there were clear signs that the U.S. commitment to a united Europe was already attenuated. In part, this stemmed from the Bush team’s ideological lack of sympathy for the reality of a single European political approach. Mainly, however, it was because, again, a united Europe had ceased to have the salience it held in the Cold War.

Iraq crystallized these trends. First, America’s determination to deal with global threats as it perceived them after the terrorist attacks of 2001 meant it would seek allies where it could find them. The United States, under assault from terrorists and under potential assault from rogue states, was not likely to allow European unity to become a constraint on its actions.

William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard and a leading neo-conservative close to the Bush Administration, puts it as follows: Any serious policymaker cannot simply say “Well, as a matter of theology, we believe in a united Europe . . . and therefore that’s going to drive our policy.” It would be irresponsible.

This can be thought of as a kind of passive opposition to European integration. Insofar as the Europeans want to unite around a policy that supports us, it says, then we are happy to assist in the creation of a united Europe. But if the Europeans are divided, of course we will extend support to those who side with us and withhold it from those who do not. But this gives rise to a critical question: In addition to this passive opposition to European unity, does the United States now favor an active opposition? Does the United States now believe, after the experience of the last year, that a united Europe could actually not only cease to be a reliable source of assistance but might actually try to block the United States from achieving its goals? This was, after all, the more or less stated view of the Chirac government in France-to build an alternative source of global power. If that is how the United States sees the prospect of a united Europe, then the administration is likely to adopt a much more aggressive stance against European integration.

There are clearly those within the Bush Administration-John Bolton at the State Department, others at the Pentagon-for whom the events of the last year have confirmed all their suspicions that a unifying Europe is a menace to U.S. strategic objectives and should be blocked. But the drift of Bush Administration policy does not yet seem to be moving fully in this direction. Other senior policymakers at the fulcrum of the administration’s evolving debate insist that the Iraq experience does not necessarily suggest those who opposed the United States will prevail in an internal European debate and dictate the direction of a single European policy, should one ever emerge. These officials pin their faith in European virtue on a belief that a united Europe will adopt an approach to the United States that is closer to Tony Blair’s vision than Jacques Chirac’s. “It is no longer obvious that European policy is being driven by the historic engine of France and Germany”, a senior administration official told me in November. “Look at Britain, look at Spain, look at Italy, look at Poland, look at Denmark. France and Germany are not necessarily the future.” This same administration official adds that, in any case, America’s options are rather limited: “What am I going to do about [European integration] if I don’t like it? Scream and yell? That would have absolutely no effect. The chances are that efforts to undermine European unity would have the opposite effect.”

Neither of these assumptions seem watertight. Basing policy towards Europe on the hope that its steadily evolving foreign policy will be driven by a coalition of U.S.-friendly countries such as the UK, Poland and Spain looks like ahistorical, wishful thinking. The pattern of EU integration is that it is driven by the Franco-German alliance at its heart, aided and abetted by bureaucrats in Brussels. Nothing that has happened recently suggests this is changing.

Nor is it true that Washington lacks options-it need not passively stand by and watch this process unfold.2 After all, most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already been handed over to Brussels. European integration is being driven by political elites rather than popular pressure, and there is growing evidence pointing to the uneasiness among the general public.

So, what can the United States do?

First, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger European military capabilities. Americans may laugh at recently announced plans for a Franco-German-Belgian-Luxembourg core EU military alliance, but the United States should continue to oppose a separate European identity within NATO. This also means that the United States should strengthen its political and military ties with the new NATO members from central and eastern Europe,to offset any such developments.

Second, it should oppose any plans to permit a “single Europe” from taking the seats currently held in multilateral institutions by separate European countries. There should be no support for a UN Security Council seat for “Europe” or the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three to replace the G-8.

Finally, Washington should refrain from doing anything that might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for European integration than Britain’s joining this ill-starred project. It seems that passive disengagement from the cause of European integration is now firmly established as the United States looks beyond Europe to the challenges of a dangerous world. In the absence of a pressing security threat in Europe, and in the presence of much more pressing security threats outside Europe, the United States will regard the possibility of a unified European policy distinctly on the merits of what it offers the United States. Is this anything new? Probably not. It is hard to imagine any administration shifting from its conception of its vital national security interests in an effort to assist in building unity in Europe.

What is different in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world is that disagreements between the United States and Europe and among Europeans seems much more likely. So far, the United States does not seem to have concluded that European integration is inherently threatening to its interests. Despite the concerted efforts of some of its senior officials, the Bush Administration is not yet committed to destabilizing actively the process of European unification, in part because it believes the EU can still head in a broad direction beneficial to America’s national interests. But at the very least the last year should mean that we will hear far fewer encomiums from U.S. officials about the virtues of a United States of Europe.

Copyright © 2004 The National Interest All rights reserved.

Find this article at: http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/NationalInterest/2003/12/01/529065

Reorienting Transatlantic Defense

by Rep. Doug Bereuter and John Lis | juin 01 ‘04
NationalInterest

The future of NATO has been a subject of intense debate, including in the two most recent issues of The National Interest. In the Winter 2003/04 issue, E. Wayne Merry unveiled a picture of an Atlantic Alliance that is casting about in search of a mission, having outlived its usefulness with the demise of its original adversary. Indeed, he argued that NATO continues to keep Europe in a state of dependence, frustrating the rise of a European Union that can act as an equal partner to the United States. Yet even some of NATO’s defenders-such as John Hulsman, writing in the Spring 2004 issue-view NATO primarily as a useful toolbox from which the United States can draw as it undertakes military adventures far from Europe’s shores, cherry-picking allies on a case-by-case basis.

Yet these visions of the alliance are at odds with the view of those who work on transatlantic security policy on a daily basis. The reality is that NATO is not a Cold War institution in search of a mission to keep itself alive, but remains an indispensable tool for the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic region to ensure their security against common threats.

For a few heady years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that the long-held dream of a Europe at peace had become a reality. The newly freed nations of central and eastern Europe aligned themselves definitively with the West, and even Russia developed a peaceful, non-adversarial relationship with its former rivals. Today, there is no risk of an invasion of western Europe, and it is tempting to conclude that a united Europe is now secure. However, the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11 horribly demonstrated the error of that belief. Europe still faces threats to its territory and to its citizens from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups. These are the same threats confronting North America, and the defense of our two continents remains indivisible.

NATO’s Three Ongoing Missions

When thinking about NATO’s primary purpose, many commentators fall into a geographic trap. Because NATO was founded to defend against the Soviet threat that was directed at Western Europe, it follows for some that NATO exists for the defense of this specific geographic area.

Instead, it is more useful to view NATO in functional terms, with three main and currently ongoing missions. First and foremost, the Alliance enables its members to provide collectively for the defense of their states against external threats, a role it has played for 55 years. Its second mission consists of peace-enforcement operations. The Alliance assumed this function nine years ago, when it became clear that only NATO (and not the United Nations, the OSCE or any other international organization) could actually enforce the peace agreement ending the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The third mission is political: maintaining and enhancing the partnerships that NATO has developed since the end of the Cold War with non-members in Europe and Eurasia. These partnerships have promoted cooperation and permitted the Alliance to enlarge the Euro-Atlantic zone of stability beyond the core of its member-states.

No one would ever have predicted that NATO’s first collective-defense mission- more than five decades after the Alliance was created and ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union-would be in response to an attack on the United States. But it is important to remember that collective defense applies not only to the European allies, but to the United States and Canada as well. After the September 11 attacks, the North Atlantic Council, comprised of representatives of the then-19 member countries, proclaimed that if those attacks were “directed from abroad”, they would be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s collective defense guarantee. The Council declared:

“The commitment to collective self-defense embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism.”

The Alliance itself sent AWACs aircraft to patrol the skies over the United States, and several countries sent special operations forces to Afghanistan to fight alongside U.S. troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. Since September 11, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have again struck against NATO members in Istanbul and Madrid, as well as targeting the citizens of NATO states elsewhere in the world. The Soviet threat may have vanished, but not NATO’s reason for existence. Recognizing this fact, NATO’s Strategic Concept notes that

“Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.”

One cannot predict where NATO will need to act in the future, which is all the more reason to ensure that it is able to operate wherever needed. The War on Terror is a multi-faceted struggle, but ongoing operations in Afghanistan show that there is an important military component.

The decision by NATO to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is helping to stabilize the region around Kabul, is an example of NATO’s growing second mission: peace enforcement operations. NATO first assumed this role in 1995, when the first military action in NATO history was carried out, not to defend a member state but to guarantee the Dayton Peace Accords that halted the civil war in Bosnia. Since then, NATO has also undertaken peace enforcement missions in Kosovo and in Macedonia. These missions demonstrated that NATO is the only international organization with the experience, organization, military capabilities and robust rules of engagement needed to compel adversaries to accept, or at least conform to, a peace agreement.

NATO’s third mission-its partnerships with non-member nations in Europe and the former Soviet Union-has enabled the Alliance to bring ten new members into the fold. The decade-old Partnership for Peace (PFP) program facilitated political and military cooperation with the nations of central and eastern Europe and Eurasia and helped former Soviet-bloc countries begin needed political and military reforms. By holding out the promise of eventual membership, PFP kept NATO’s door open and assisted aspirant nations in meeting the criteria for membership. Now, with most central and eastern European candidate countries having joined NATO, the geographic focus of PFP must move to Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, its functional emphasis will shift in part from preparing countries for NATO membership to engaging with countries that may never join the Alliance but which may become key security partners. The success of PFP in extending a zone of security to the east also needs to be replicated to the south, as recent events have underscored the importance of the non-European countries of the Mediterranean as well as those of the Persian Gulf to the security of NATO members. Therefore, the Alliance should enhance and expand its Mediterranean Dialogue. It currently brings seven nations-Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia-together with the NATO nations to discuss regional security issues such as civil emergency planning, crisis management, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Capabilities, Capabilities, Capabilities

While NATO remains committed to collective defense, many of its members have been slow to develop the forces needed to carry out the pledges that they have made to defend one another. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson often said: “When I took up my post as Secretary General, I said that I had three priorities: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.” Soon afterward, he noted that this became a mantra “which all of you will have heard-and some of you, in government, may have politely ignored.”

In order to fulfill their responsibility for carrying out collective defense, NATO members must continue to transform their forces to address today’s threats. No longer does NATO need heavy armored units with large numbers of conscripts arrayed in fixed sectors along the inter-German border. What is required today is a number of highly mobile professional units that can deploy quickly where they are needed in order to apply effective force to accomplish their mission. Allied countries have no shortage of military personnel, but NATO does lack units that can actually be used for the missions the Alliance now needs to conduct.

In November 2003 Robertson used his final address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to cite the need “to increase substantially the usability of European armed forces.” Robertson noted that the 18 allies outside of the United States have 1.4 million active duty troops, plus another 1 million reserves. He said,

“Yet with only 55,000 soldiers currently deployed on multinational missions, most of your countries plead that they are overstretched and can do no more. That is quite simply unacceptable.”

The first step toward increasing the usability of European forces has been the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This force has two tasks. First, the NRF is a vehicle to enable European and Canadian allies to join with the United States in developing forces that can rapidly deploy wherever they are needed and apply decisive power in combat or in less demanding missions. Second, the NRF can be an effective means to drive force transformation throughout the Alliance. Before national units are chosen to take part in the NRF, they will have to meet the tough standards of this elite NATO force. Then, when they train with other NRF units, they will be exposed to cutting-edge capabilities and procedures that they will take home and share with their nation’s armed forces, serving as a catalyst for change.

The NRF was set up in October 2003 as a small “prototype” intended to define requirements and to test procedures, doctrines and concepts. By October 2004 the NRF will have an “initial operational capability” that will allow it to carry out smaller-scale missions. It is to reach “full operational capability” by October 2006. At that time, it will consist of one enhanced combat brigade, roughly 5,000 ground troops. Maritime, air, command and support elements will bring the total strength to around 20,000 personnel. Some of those units will be kept at “very high readiness”, able to deploy within five days, with the rest of the force deployed within thirty days.

Unfortunately, the NRF has been plagued by the typical initial misunderstandings over what it is and what it is not, particularly by Europeans who fear that it is an American-led vehicle to undermine the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). It is important to put to rest this fallacy, which led one leading European defense analyst to conclude that “the creation of an NRF potentially holds devastating consequences for the further development of European capabilities” and “could effectively undermine the EU’s RRF. . . .”

In reality, the NRF is not designed to compete with, but rather to promote the further development of European capabilities. The NRF is designed for the full spectrum of missions, including combat operations; the RRF, to undertake the EU’s Petersberg tasks, which focus on crisis management and humanitarian operations. Nor is there any danger that the NRF would supplant the much larger RRF. The RRF is to facilitate the large-scale deployment of European forces to deal with crises and is expected to have a sixty-day deployment capability and to be comprised of roughly 15 small brigades, or 60,000 ground troops, with additional air and maritime components.

If the NRF is to succeed, the NATO allies must develop the capabilities that are necessary for effective combat operations. Unfortunately, NATO’s ability to compel its members’ actions has always been limited. While NATO does work with each member to set force goals, it is the responsibility of each state to fulfill those pledges. Often, a defense ministry’s good-faith promise to the Alliance is not fulfilled because that country’s defense budget request is later cut by the finance ministry in order to fund other government programs. A further difficulty arises because the NATO force goals are classified and not open to public scrutiny. In most countries, members of parliament-even those serving in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly-do not have either the required clearances or access through oversight; thus, they are often unaware of their government’s pledges to NATO, and they are unable to question whether defense budgets adequately fund their force goals and whether progress toward these goals is sufficient. While NATO force goals do contain some sensitive information and cannot be completely declassified, member states should strive to increase the transparency of the force planning process to the extent possible and to extend the required clearances to members of the parliaments responsible for defense oversight.

To ensure that NATO has the critical capabilities that it needs, its national leaders agreed in 2002 to the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). This initiative assigned lead nations for multinational working groups to rectify shortfalls in key areas like air-to-air refueling, strategic lift and precision- guided munitions. Despite some progress over the past year, the report card on this initiative continues to be mixed. Governments must fully fund the pledges that they have made under the PCC because a failure on this point will ensure that the PCC ends up on the trash heap with previous NATO capabilities initiatives.

More fundamentally, European forces must be streamlined to generate more deployable units. While several states, notably Britain and France, have an expeditionary capability, large numbers of European soldiers cannot be deployed on actual military missions. Given the absence of a massive land-invasion threat, this leaves them with little to contribute in the field to the Alliance. Reducing personnel levels in European militaries can free up money to develop more agile, more capable forces. For example, Germany has announced plans to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr from 285,000 to 250,000 personnel; Defense Minister Peter Struck said in mid-January 2004 that these cuts “will enable us to markedly reduce the amount of personnel costs in favour of new investments.” While the Bundeswehr today is strained by deploying 10,000 troops abroad, plans call for 105,000 troops to be available for intervention or stabilization operations.

While European armed forces must become more efficient, the two North American allies can also take steps to increase their defense cooperation. Since 1958 the air defense of North America has been a joint effort through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but maritime and land defenses have remained separate. The inauguration of U.S. Northern Command in 2002 provided an opportunity for closer defense integration between the United States and Canada. However, Canada declined an offer to include maritime and land defense in NORAD at that time. Instead, the two countries agreed to establish a Binational Planning Group (bpg), headed by the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, to improve bilateral cooperation to defend against common maritime threats and to respond to land-based attacks or natural disasters.

The new Canadian government of Prime Minister Paul Martin has demonstrated greater receptivity to closer defense cooperation with the United States. Already, Canada is negotiating terms for participation in the U.S. missile defense program, which could be headquartered at NORAD. Other options for closer cooperation include a “naval NORAD” that would integrate the maritime defense of North America; in this area, the BPG already has developed a binational maritime awareness and warning capability. Some Canadian opponents of greater integration argue that naval and land defense are different from air defense because the response times are greater, which allows Canada to maintain exclusive control of its naval and land forces. Proponents of including naval and land cooperation in NORAD argue that weapons like sea-launched missiles mean that naval defense is subject to the same time pressures as air defense. Similarly, they argue that a terrorist attack on land could come without warning.

The conventional wisdom is that the Martin government is unlikely to move forward in this area before federal elections, which could come as late as autumn 2004. If the victorious party appears amenable, then American officials should again offer closer defense ties to Canada in order to better protect both North American allies on land, sea and air.

An Organizational Division of Labor

There are too many folks in the corridors of the EU institutions who view defense as just another area for demonstrating, as one European commissioner put it, “a deeper commitment to our common political project.” Further reflecting this attitude, he added,

“I sincerely believe that defense issues . . . are crucial for the Union’s future. The future and credibility of the European body politic will hinge on the decisions which we will take on them.”

However, defense is different from many other political issues. As we saw a decade ago in Bosnia, when mistakes are made or when there is a failure to act, people die. When mistakes are made in defending your own territory, it is your own people who die. For those EU “true believers”, however, defense policy is no different from agricultural policy or trade policy. Their main concern is, as they would say, “building Europe”-not the vital responsibility to protect European citizens.

In line with this thinking, Finnish General Gustav Hagglund, then-chairman of the EU Military Committee, proposed in January of this year a European security arrangement in which “The American and European pillars would be responsible for their respective territorial defenses . . . .” This ill-conceived idea would undermine the fundamental commitment that lies at the heart of the North Atlantic Alliance and would render the citizens of all the Alliance’s member states less secure. Shocking as it seems, the proposal was not inconsistent with a provision in the proposed EU Constitution to have the European Union take on a mutual defense role that duplicates the very reason for NATO’s creation and its primary mission. If Europe creates a competitor to NATO, it will risk undermining the rationale for the Alliance, and it will risk undermining the support of the governments and people of the United States and Canada for participating in NATO.

Rather than trying to create a mutual defense commitment, the EU should assume primary responsibility for what could be characterized as intra-European crisis management; that is, for undertaking military operations in Europe when the security of the continent is threatened by domestic instability or civil war. In other words, there should be an organizational division of labor: While NATO deals with external threats to Europe’s security, the EU should take the lead in keeping the peace within Europe.

The Balkan conflicts, of course, are the best example of such crises that need to be addressed in a timely and forceful fashion. Such an effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as its work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. Included in this responsibility would be a commitment among the EU nations to assist one another in responding to terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters, as outlined in the “solidarity clause” of the draft constitution.4

Furthermore, the EU should assume command of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-perhaps at the beginning of 2005-and later in Kosovo. In fact, NATO leaders are expected to agree at Istanbul to end the Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia at the end of this year and turn over responsibility to the EU. The combination of improving EU capabilities and an improving security situation in Bosnia has created a situation in which NATO can withdraw without a large risk of an immediate return to violence. NATO should retain a small office in Sarajevo to work with the newly unified Bosnian military and to help track down indicted war criminals. In addition, the Alliance will maintain an “over the horizon” reinforcement capability in case the security environment should deteriorate.

To the south, Kosovo is a much more difficult case because it remains an integral part of Serbia, despite the desire of its ethnic Albanian majority for independence. The deplorable outbreak of ethnic violence in March 2004, much of it apparently orchestrated by ethnic-Albanian elements, underscored the instability in Kosovo. Therefore, NATO should retain command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), at least until the final status of the entity is resolved. The acceptance of the decision on final status and its implementation could be a difficult and volatile process. Once that danger passes, the EU should succeed KFOR. Even before that happens, the EU should actively guide the development of the entity’s institutions in keeping with European standards, with an eye toward the possibility of Kosovo’s eventual membership in the EU.

The EU also aspires to play a role in operations outside of Europe, as demonstrated by the operation in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU should be encouraged to undertake crisis management and humanitarian tasks outside of Europe, provided that it has the necessary capabilities. Having the EU avoid duplicating NATO’s collective defense function in no way limits the geographic scope of EU operation. In fact, there are regions like Africa where European interests and historical relationships may lead to an EU operation. Given that 19 of the 26 NATO members are also EU members, the Berlin Plus agreements that are meant to facilitate NATO-EU military relations should be scrupulously followed. These seven agreements make NATO assets and capabilities, including operational planning, available to the EU, and they facilitate smooth coordination between NATO and EU missions. This allows two organizations to avoid conflicting calls on the same national assets.

That overlap in membership between the two organizations also means that the EU can take advantage of the interoperability that NATO has engendered among its member countries. By standardizing communication and doctrine among its 26 member states and by integrating officers from those nations in headquarters with a single operational language, NATO facilitates multinational operations. That cooperation has been extended to partner nations through the PFP and through on-the-ground collaboration in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Retooling NATO Partnerships

When NATO invited the seven newest members to join at the 2002 Prague Summit, it recognized that the emphasis of its PFP program would have to shift from helping candidate countries become members to cooperation between the Alliance and states that may never formally join the Alliance but may become close partners. The Alliance already has offered enhancements to PFP that range from improvements in interoperability and greater consultations with the twenty partner nations to individualized assistance with defense reforms. Russia is a special case, and the Alliance has already developed the NATO-Russia Council as a unique institution for a closer relationship.

At a minimum, NATO should engage in technical military cooperation with all nations of Europe and Eurasia which are at present members of the OSCE. Afghanistan should be included in the existing PFP programs, given its geographic proximity and cultural ties to the Central Asian members of PFP.

Several PFP nations are authoritarian dictatorships that are no closer to democracy than they were under Soviet rule. NATO must not lend such countries political legitimacy, but the realities of the international security environment mean that defense cooperation may advance the security of both Alliance members and a given partner nation. The most obvious example is Uzbekistan, a detestable dictatorship that nonetheless has offered invaluable assistance with military operations in Afghanistan. America and its allies should do nothing to sustain the oppressive rule of President Islam Karimov, but they should continue cooperation with Uzbekistan in counter-terrorism and at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. To the extent that NATO can enhance its ability to work with such countries through PFP, it should do so. It could also create benefits in the longer term, by exposing local officials to concepts like democratic control of the armed forces.

Beyond that, PFP assists nations that are moving toward democracy to reach Western norms, particularly in transforming their militaries from instruments of internal repression to guarantors of external security. Most notably, the Planning and Review Process enables the Alliance to help partners develop armed forces that can work alongside NATO forces. Some partners might never apply for NATO membership, but the Alliance nevertheless can assist them in developing the structures that are needed to ensure democratic civilian control over armed forces that are efficient, effective, and able to contribute to regional security alongside NATO forces.

Three aspirant countries-Albania, Croatia and Macedonia-currently remain in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, the process through which the Alliance helps countries prepare for full membership. At the Istanbul Summit this June, NATO leaders should act on the recommendation of the House of Representatives (H.Res. 558) and agree to hold a summit no later than 2007 to consider their applications and decide at that time whether they and perhaps others should be invited to begin accession negotiations. Already, these nations are acting as allies, with all three contributing to NATO’s ISAF operation, and Albania and Macedonia contributing troops to coalition forces in Iraq. Admitting these countries into NATO should cement their transformation from crisis zones to full membership in the Alliance’s zone of stability.

In addition, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue should be both enhanced and enlarged. Given today’s security threats, deeper cooperation with the region is imperative. A new partnership that incorporates elements of PFP would enable cooperation in counter-terrorism operations and could allow the Alliance to work with regional actors to increase their ability to work alongside NATO. It could assist them in defense planning and reforms, along the lines outlined above, and facilitate their transition to more representative forms of government. Moreover, it could help promote understanding and perhaps build confidence between Israel and some of the more moderate countries in the region with regard to security concerns.

Likewise, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Mediterranean Special Group should intensify its activities, particularly in assisting the parliaments of the region develop effective defense oversight. The Assembly should also consider extending associate status, heretofore reserved for PFP nations, to the members of this new partnership. This would allow their parliaments to gain a deeper understanding of the role of an independent legislature in a democracy and to build ties to their counterparts across the Mediterranean.

At the same time, this new partnership should be broadened, for example, to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). These six U.S. allies have experience working cooperatively on defense matters. A broader partnership with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries could facilitate this defense cooperation under a NATO umbrella. A democratic, sovereign Iraq should also be offered membership in this partnership, which would enable the NATO nations to work directly with nations of the Middle East on security issues of mutual interest.

The Future of Cooperation

Secretary of State Colin Powell recently wrote, “NATO is transforming itself from an Alliance whose main task was the defense of common territory to an Alliance whose main task is the defense of common principles.“5 No longer are NATO troops stationed along the Fulda Gap, prepared to halt a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The values that set the West apart have been embraced by former adversaries. Many of those states have become a part of NATO, and they have pledged their willingness to fight for our collective freedom. They recognize that there are those who seek to destroy democracies not because of what they may do, but because of what they are.

Collective defense has taken on a different manifestation, but at its heart, the principle remains the same: 26 democracies, standing together to defend one another against those who seek to do us harm. This mission requires new capabilities and new doctrines, but the same depth of commitment. Defending freedom requires more than military hardware; it requires keeping NATO’s door open to help bring freedom’s blessings to lands that have not known them. We must ensure security beyond our borders, and we must work alongside partners, some of whom may someday embrace our principles and become our allies.

Those who declare that NATO should be euthanized either misunderstand how the Alliance has transformed itself to confront today’s security threats or value institutional development above the safety of their citizens. Maintaining NATO’s primacy in transatlantic security is not a barrier to European integration. Rather, it is essential for the security of Europe and North America. No one nation alone can defend against today’s primary security threats: global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the states that support them. The United States needs allies in this effort, and NATO must remain the cornerstone of our common defense.

Copyright © 2004 The National Interest All rights reserved.

Find this article at: http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/NationalInterest/2004/06/01/529118

Think Again: Bush’s Foreign Policy
By Melvyn P. Leffler
September/October 2004 http://www.foreignpolicy.com
Not since Richard Nixon’s conduct of the war in Vietnam has a U.S. president’s foreign policy so polarized the country—and the world. Yet as controversial as George W. Bush’s policies have been, they are not as radical a departure from his predecessors as both critics and supporters proclaim. Instead, the real weaknesses of the president’s foreign policy lie in its contradictions: Blinded by moral clarity and hamstrung by its enormous military strength, the United States needs to rebalance means with ends if it wants to forge a truly effective grand strategy.

“George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Is Revolutionary”
No. Bush’s goals of sustaining a democratic peace and disseminating America’s core values resonate with the most traditional themes in U.S. history. They hearken back to Puritan rhetoric of a city upon a hill. They rekindle Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an empire of liberty. They were integral to Woodrow Wilson’s missive that “the world must be made safe for democracy.” They flow from Franklin Roosevelt’s four freedoms. They echo the noble rhetoric of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, to “oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.”

Nor is unilateralism new. From America’s inception as a republic, the Founding Fathers forswore entangling alliances that might embroil the fragile country in dangerous Old World controversies and tarnish the United States’ identity as an exceptionalist nation. Acting unilaterally, the United States could prudently pursue its own interests, nurture its fundamental ideals, and define itself in opposition to its European forbears. This tradition is the one to which Bush returns.

Critics argue that Bush’s “revolutionary” foreign policy repudiates the multilateralism that flowered after World War II and that served the United States so well during the Cold War. These critics have a point, albeit one that should not be exaggerated. The wise men of the Cold War embraced collective security, forged NATO, created a host of other multilateral institutions, and grasped the interdependence of the modern global economy. Nonetheless, they never repudiated the right to act alone. Although they reserved the option to move unilaterally, they did not declare it as a doctrine. They did precisely the opposite. Publicly, they affirmed the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism; privately, they acknowledged that the United States might have to act unilaterally, as it more or less did in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Third World.

The differences between Bush and his predecessors have more to do with style than substance, more to do with the balance between competing strategies than with goals, with the exercise of good judgment than with the definition of a worldview. The perception of great threat and the possession of unprecedented power have tipped the balance toward unilateralism, but there is nothing revolutionary in Bush’s goals or vision. The U.S. quest for an international order based on freedom, self-determination, and open markets has changed astonishingly little.

“The Bush Doctrine of Preemptive War Is Unprecedented”
Wrong. Preemptive strikes to eliminate threats are a strategy nearly as old as the United States. Securing the nation’s frontiers in its formative decades often required anticipatory action. When, for example, Gen. Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida in 1818, attacked Indian tribes, executed two Englishmen, and ignited an international crisis, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams told the Spanish ambassador that Spain’s failure to preserve order along the borderlands justified preemptive American action.

More overtly, President Theodore Roosevelt announced in 1904 that the United States would intervene in the Western Hemisphere to uphold civilization. Otherwise, he warned, the Europeans would deploy their navies to the hemisphere, seize national customs houses, and endanger U.S. security. Decades later, another president named Roosevelt renounced his distant cousin’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and declared a Good Neighbor Policy. But Franklin Roosevelt did not eschew the preventive use of force. After war erupted in Europe, he deemed it essential to supply the European democracies with munitions and food. When Nazi submarines attacked the U.S. destroyer Greer in September 1941, Roosevelt distorted the circumstances surrounding the incident and declared, “This is the time for prevention of attack.” Thereafter, German and Italian vessels traversing waters in the North Atlantic would do so “at their own peril.” In one of his trademark fireside chats, Roosevelt explained his thinking: “[W]hen you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.”

During the Cold War, preventive action in the Third World was standard operating procedure. If the United States did not intervene, falling dominos would threaten U.S. security. In other words, containment and deterrence in Europe did not foreclose unilateral, preventive initiatives elsewhere. The United States took anticipatory action to deal with real and imagined threats from Central America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. In each case, policymakers employed the same rhetorical justification that Bush uses now: freedom.

Contrary to the public caricature, the Bush administration does not use preventive military action as its only—or even principal—tool. It has hesitated to act preventively in Iran and North Korea, calculating that the risks are too great. It acts selectively, much as its predecessors did. Vietnam, like Iraq, was a war of choice.

“Bush’s Policies Are a Radical Departure from Clinton’s”
Lovely nostalgia. What is striking about President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy is that it actually increased U.S. military preponderance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. During the late 1990s, U.S. defense spending was higher than that of the next dozen nations combined. The overall goal, according to Clinton’s joint chiefs of staff, was to create “a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”

Neither liberals nor neoconservatives want to acknowledge it, but the Clinton administration also envisioned the use of unilateral, even preemptive, military power. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the last strategy paper of the Clinton administration spelled out the nation’s vital interests. “We will do what we must,” wrote the Clinton national security team, “to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.”

Clinton himself already had approved the use of preemptive force. In June 1995, he signed Presidential Decision Directive 39, regarding counterterrorism. Much of it remains classified, but the sanitized version is suggestive of a preemptive stance. The United States would seek to identify groups or states that “sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions.” And responding to al Qaeda attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, Clinton authorized the bombing in Sudan of the al-Shifaa chemical plant, which was suspected of manufacturing weapons for Osama bin Laden. Some in the White House raised concerns about the legality of preemptive bombings against a civilian target in a nation that had never threatened the United States. But National Security Advisor Sandy Berger made a compelling case: “What if we do not hit it and then, after an attack, nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then?”

President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talked nobly and worked tirelessly to preserve alliance cohesion and to enlarge NATO. Unlike Bush, they sought to contain and co-opt the mounting parochial nationalism in the United States, a nationalism that wavered between isolationism and unilateralism and that increasingly rejected international norms and conventions. But, notwithstanding these efforts, it was the Clinton administration, not Bush’s, that appointed the bipartisan U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. This commission was chaired not by neoconservatives, but by former Democratic Sen. Gary Hart and by former Republican Sen. Warren Rudman (who is a moderate internationalist). The commission ruefully acknowledged that “the United States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to carry out combined military operations.”

In short, the preemptive and unilateral use of U.S. military power was widely perceived as necessary prior to Bush’s election, even by those possessing internationalist inclinations. What Bush did after September 11 was translate an option into a national doctrine.

“September 11 Transformed the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy”
Yes. More than that, it transformed the administration’s worldview. Prior to September 11, the Bush team prided itself on a foreign policy that embraced realism. American power, future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice boldly declared during the 2000 presidential campaign, should not be employed for “second order” effects, such as the enhancement of humanity’s well-being. Bush argued that freedom, democracy, and peace would follow from the concerted pursuit of the United States’ “enduring national interests.” This foreign policy would reflect America’s character, “The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness.”

The changes in the Bush administration’s thinking and rhetoric after the terrorist attacks are therefore all the more striking. Heightened threat perception elevated the focus on ideals and submerged the careful calculation of interest. The overall goal of U.S. foreign policy, said the Bush strategy statement of September 2002, is to configure a balance of power favoring freedom. “Our principles,” says the strategy statement—not our interests—will “guide our government’s decisions…[T]he national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.”

In times of crisis, U.S. political leaders have long asserted values and ideals to evoke public support for the mobilization of power. But this shift in language was more than mere rhetoric. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington transformed the Bush administration’s sense of danger and impelled offensive strategies. Prior to September 11, the neocons in the administration paid scant attention to terrorism. The emphasis was on preventing the rise of peer competitors, such as China or a resurgent Russia, that could one day challenge U.S. dominance. And though the Bush team plotted regime change in Iraq, they had not committed to a full-scale invasion and nation-building project. September 11 “produced an acute sense of our vulnerability,” said Rice. “The coalition did not act in Iraq,” explained Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11.” Having failed to foresee and prevent a terrorist attack prior to September 11, the administration’s threshold for risk was dramatically lowered, its temptation to use force considerably heightened.

“Bush’s Foreign Policy Has Inflamed Anti-Americanism Worldwide”
Definitely. To be sure, anti-Americanism has plagued previous administrations. Violent demonstrations greeted Vice President Richard Nixon in various Latin American cities in 1958; so much rioting was expected in Tokyo in 1960 that President Dwight Eisenhower canceled his visit. In the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam aroused passionate anti-Americanism in Europe; so did President Ronald Reagan’s decision more than a decade later to deploy a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

But the breadth and depth of the current anti-Americanism are unprecedented. According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, favorable attitudes toward the United States in Europe plunged during the last two years, dropping from 75 percent to 58 percent in Britain, from 63 percent to 37 percent in France, and from 61 percent to 38 percent in Germany. It’s even worse in the Muslim world, where substantial majorities think the United States is overreacting to the terrorist threat and that Americans seek to dominate the world. Most worrisome of all is the reaction among “friendly” Muslim nations: 59 percent of Turks, 36 percent of Pakistanis, 27 percent of Moroccans, and 24 percent of Jordanians say that suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners are justified in Iraq.

In retrospect, these numbers are not surprising, given that heightened threat perception tempts U.S. officials to obfuscate interests and stake their policies on the universality and superiority of American values. Yet a careful calculation of interests is essential to discipline U.S. power and temper its ethnocentrism. There is no greater and sadder irony, perhaps even tragedy, that while Bush officials assert the superiority of American values, the overweening use of U.S. power breeds cynicism about its motives and distrust of its intentions. Indeed, preemption and unilateralism complicate the struggle against terrorism. Terrorism, at least in part, is spawned by feelings of revulsion against U.S. domination and by a sense of powerlessness and humiliation. Preventive wars and intrusive occupations intensify such sentiments and breed more terrorists. By elevating the hegemonic posture of the United States to official doctrine, these policies make the United States and its citizens even more attractive targets for terrorists. According to recent State Department data, terrorism is waxing, not waning.

“The Bush Administration Has the Right Strategy but Implements It Badly”
No. Strategy links means to ends, designing tactics capable of achieving goals. Bush’s foreign policy is vulnerable to criticism not because it departs radically from previous administrations, but because it cannot succeed. The goals are unachievable because the means and ends are out of sync.

Rice says the Bush administration’s strategy rests on three pillars: First, thwarting terrorists and rogue regimes; second, harmonizing relations among the great powers; third, nurturing prosperity and democracy across the globe. But the effort to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes through preemption, hegemony, and unilateralism shatters great power harmony and diverts resources and attention from the development agenda. An effective strategy cannot be sustained when the methods employed to erect one pillar drastically undermine the others.

Consider, for instance, Bush’s quest for a democratic peace. He says that peoples everywhere, including the Middle East, yearn for freedom and coexistence. The democratic peace theory, which postulates that democratic societies do not wage war against one another, is appealing. But the war on terrorism, as presently conceived, makes it more difficult to democratize the Arab world. Waging preventive wars requires basing rights throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. To satisfy its military needs, the United States must sign agreements with and support repressive, even heinous, regimes that despise democratic principles.

Democratizing the Middle East is a noble goal, but it is one unlikely to be achieved through unilateral initiatives and preventive war. Democratization requires far more resources, imagination, and patience than the Bush administration, or perhaps any U.S. administration, is willing to muster. The ends of Bush’s foreign policy cannot be reconciled with domestic priorities that call for lower taxes. A recent Rand Corporation study concludes that the most important determinants of a successful occupation are related to the “level of effort—measured in time, manpower, and money.” Bush’s domestic agenda simply does not allow for this level of effort, and he shows no inclination to alter his programs at home in order to effect his strategic vision abroad.

“Bush Is Reagan’s Heir”
Yes. But is that a good thing? Bush and his advisors love to identify themselves with Reagan. Bush, like Reagan, says Rumsfeld, “has not shied from calling evil by its name….” Nor has he been shy about “declaring his intention to defeat its latest incarnation—terrorism.” Moral clarity and military power, Bush believes, emboldened Reagan and enabled him to wrest the initiative from the Kremlin, liberate Eastern Europe, and win the Cold War.

Yet most scholars of that period interpret the past differently. They know that the most successful and far-reaching initiatives of the Cold War came in its early years, long before the Reagan military buildup. In 1947, President Harry Truman and his advisors grappled with agonizing trade-offs and chose to meet the Soviet threat in Europe with reconstruction rather than a massive arms buildup. They were initially guided by diplomat George F. Kennan, who warned against military thinking, overcommitments, and ideological rhetoric. He did not talk about remaking and refashioning other societies, but of containing and reducing Soviet power and invigorating U.S. domestic institutions.

In 1950, the national security document NSC-68 institutionalized the emphases on moral clarity and military prowess. Prompted by the Soviet acquisition of atomic capabilities, the onset of McCarthyism, and then the outbreak of the Korean war, NSC-68 accentuated the ideological war and accelerated the arms race. But moral clarity and ideological purity made it difficult to assess threats and understand the international environment. Blinded by ideology, U.S. officials found it difficult to discern the Sino-Soviet split and to grasp the roots of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. In the early 1980s, moral clarity prompted Reagan to assist repressive rightist regimes in Central America. Cold War thinking encouraged him to support Saddam Hussein in Iraq. And subsequent triumphalism over the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan led Reagan’s heirs to ignore the ensuing turmoil and the emergence of a Taliban theocracy.

Nor do scholars readily agree that Reagan’s arms buildup and rhetorical pronouncements brought victory in the Cold War. In fact, the most thoughtful accounts of Reagan’s diplomacy stress that what really mattered was his surprising ability to change course, envision a world without nuclear arms, and deal realistically with a new Soviet leader. And most accounts of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s diplomacy suggest that he was motivated by a desire to reform Communism, reshape Soviet society, and revive its economy, rather than intimidated by U.S. military power. Gorbachev was inspired not by U.S. democratic capitalism but by European social democracy, not by the self-referential ideological fervor of U.S. neoconservatives, but by the careful, thoughtful, tedious work of human rights activists and other nongovernmental organizations.

Bush and his advisors seek to construct a narrative about the end of the Cold War that exalts moral clarity and glorifies the utility of military power. Moral clarity doubtless helps a democratic, pluralistic society like the United States reconcile its differences and conduct policy. Military power, properly configured and effectively deployed, chastens and deters adversaries. But this mindset can lead to arrogance and abuse of power. To be effective, moral clarity and military power must be harnessed to a careful calculation of interest and a shrewd understanding of the adversary. Only when ends are reconciled with means can moral clarity and military power add up to a winning strategy.

Melvyn P. Leffler is Edward Stettinius professor of American history at the University of Virginia. He is the author of the prizewinning history of the early Cold War A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2671.php

L’homme qui a inventé Bush
LE MONDE | 28.08.04 | 13h25 •  MIS A JOUR LE 28.08.04 | 14h45

Dans l’ombre de George Bush père, puis du fils, Karl Rove, redoutable stratège, a été l’artisan de plusieurs victoires électorales. A la Maison Blanche depuis 2001, il travaille sans relâche à celle du 2 novembre.

Personne ne croit que George Bush ait pu arriver à la Maison Blanche par ses propres moyens. C’est impossible. Il a fallu l’aider, le pousser, le tirer jusque-là. Quelqu’un a dû inventer ce président improbable.

Ce tireur de ficelles, ce montreur de marionnettes, tout le monde, à Washington, connaît son nom : Karl Rove.  On lui prête d’autant plus d’intelligence qu’on en dénie à celui dont il n’est, officiellement, que le conseiller.

A trois jours de la réunion, à New York, de la convention du Parti républicain, qui va désigner officiellement le président sortant comme candidat à un nouveau mandat, trois salles de la ville ont été parmi les premières des Etats-Unis à programmer, vendredi 27 août, un film intitulé Bush’s Brain (“Le Cerveau de Bush”), calqué sur celui d’un livre paru il y a un an. Les auteurs de cet ouvrage, James Moore et Wayne Slater, connaissent bien leur sujet. En particulier Slater, qui dirige le bureau du Dallas Morning News à Austin, capitale du Texas, l’Etat où tout a commencé, à la fin des années 1970, pour Rove et pour son poulain.

La thèse de Bush’s Brain est simple : Karl Rove est le “coprésident” des Etats-Unis. Avec lui, la stratégie électorale est aux commandes de la plus grande puissance de la planète. Politique commerciale, fiscalité, politique sociale, environnement, éducation, et, par-dessus tout, politique étrangère et guerre sont dictés par un impératif qui domine tous les autres : gagner l’élection suivante, c’est-à-dire remplir les coffres de la prochaine campagne, plaire aux fermiers de l’Iowa et aux sidérurgistes de Pennsylvanie, attirer aux urnes les baptistes du Sud et les émigrés cubains de Floride. “Karl Rove a une influence sur la politique et l’action publique que les Américains n’ont jamais connue auparavant et qu’ils ont du mal à admettre”, écrivent Moore et Slater.

L’intéressé ne nie pas cette influence, mais il n’a jamais été pris en défaut de respect pour son patron. Il est trop avisé pour cela.

Surtout, il admire sincèrement l’homme qu’il a aidé à devenir président des Etats-Unis et dont il veut faire, dans deux mois, un président réélu. A ses yeux, George Walker Bush est le seul politicien républicain qui puisse installer durablement son parti à la Maison Blanche.

“Quand avez-vous commencé à songer à une campagne présidentielle ?”, a-t-on demandé, un jour, à Karl Rove. “Le 25 décembre 1950”, a-t-il répondu. C’est la date de sa naissance, dans un milieu très modeste de l’Ouest des Etats-Unis. Il est le fils d’un prospecteur de minerai et d’une femme qui se consacrait à son foyer et à ses cinq enfants. Le jour où Karl a eu 19 ans, son père a décidé de quitter définitivement la maison. Peu de temps après, le jeune homme a appris que son frère aîné et lui-même n’étaient pas les enfants de cet homme. Il en a conçu beaucoup de reconnaissance pour le géologue, qui les avait élevés comme s’ils étaient ses fils. Sa mère s’est suicidée au début des années 1980.

Ce qui frappe, chez Karl Rove, c’est la précocité de son intérêt pour la politique et de son adhésion au conservatisme. A l’âge de 9 ans, quand John Kennedy séduit beaucoup de jeunes Américains, il est, lui, pour Richard Nixon, ce qui lui vaut une bagarre avec une voisine plus costaude qui l’envoie au tapis d’un coup de poing. La mésentente de ses parents et leur absence de vie religieuse l’ont-elles incliné vers l’ordre ? En tout cas, s’il a choisi la droite, il n’a pas rencontré Dieu. A la différence de George Bush, qui dit que “Jésus Christ a changé son cœur”, le conseiller, pourtant attentif aux réactions des électeurs protestants et catholiques, ne cache pas qu’il n’est pas croyant. “Je ne suis pas sûr -d’avoir- jamais trouvé la foi”, a-t-il répondu, prudemment, à une question du New York Times.

Au gré des pérégrinations de son beau-père, le jeune Rove, né dans le Colorado et poussé en herbe dans le Nevada, a mûri à Salt Lake City, la capitale de l’Utah et des mormons. Au lycée, c’est un parfait nerd, un fayot, mais sans les bonnes notes et cela ne l’empêche pas d’être élu président des élèves, la seule élection qu’il ait jamais gagnée pour lui-même. En 1969, il entre à l’université d’Etat de l’Utah. Des universités, il va en fréquenter plusieurs, sans jamais décrocher le moindre diplôme. C’est qu’il est occupé ailleurs. Il s’est engagé chez les College Republicans, l’organisation étudiante du Parti républicain, et il en devient, dès 1971, l’un des principaux “permanents”, avec le titre de directeur exécutif.

Expédié dans l’Illinois, en 1970, pour participer à une campagne électorale, il s’est introduit dans les bureaux d’un candidat démocrate en se présentant comme un supporter, et il a dérobé du papier à en-tête. Il en a fait des invitations promettant “de la bière gratuite” et “des filles”, lors d’une réception organisée quelques jours plus tard, et il les a distribuées dans les quartiers borgnes de la ville. Marginaux et clochards ont envahi la party. Deux ans plus tard, lors d’une session de formation de militants dans le Kentucky, Rove s’est vanté de cette mauvaise plaisanterie et a expliqué aux participants d’autres “trucs” du même genre.

En 1973, le directeur exécutif des College Republicans se porte candidat à la présidence de l’organisation. Flanqué d’un autre spadassin, Lee Atwater, qui deviendra le conseiller de Ronald Reagan et de Bush père, il sillonne les routes du Sud, dans une vieille Ford, pour aller à la pêche aux voix, d’université en université. Une convention, dans un hôtel de montagne du Missouri, doit départager Rove et son concurrent, Robert Edgeworth, situé nettement plus à droite dans le parti.

La réunion ressemble trait pour trait aux congrès que tient l’UNEF, à la même époque, en France : batailles de procédure, truandages sur les mandats, coups tordus en tous genres. Au bout du compte, Edgeworth et Rove sont proclamés élus par leurs partisans respectifs.

Le différend est porté devant le président du Comité national républicain, qui n’est autre que George Herbert Walker Bush. Un allié d’Edgeworth décide alors de communiquer au Washington Post un enregistrement des propos tenus par Rove, l’année précédente, devant les militants du Kentucky. En pleine affaire du Watergate, on imagine l’effet. Non seulement la Maison Blanche, sous Richard Nixon, a fait cambrioler les locaux de la campagne présidentielle démocrate, mais, au même moment, un permanent du Parti républicain expliquait aux jeunes comment espionner le parti adverse ! On s’attend à ce que Rove soit écarté au profit d’Edgeworth, mais c’est le contraire qui se produit. Bush père donne la présidence des College Republicans à Rove et chasse son rival du parti pour avoir dénoncé un camarade à la presse.

LE lien qui se noue, alors, entre Karl Rove et la famille Bush ne sera jamais rompu. Marié à une héritière texane, qui le quittera trois ans plus tard, Rove s’installe à Houston et dirige le PAC (comité d’action politique) créé par Bush père, en conformité avec la législation post-Watergate, pour financer la candidature présidentielle à laquelle il se prépare pour 1980. Le jeune collaborateur de George H.W. Bush et de James Baker devient un expert de la carte électorale texane et un prophète de la conquête du Texas par les républicains. Il a compris que l’hégémonie démocrate, héritage de la guerre de Sécession, prend fin, dans cet Etat, comme dans tout le Sud. Nombre d’électeurs votaient démocrate par attachement au particularisme du Sud, à commencer par la ségrégation raciale. Devenu le parti des droits civiques, le Parti démocrate perd, inévitablement, une partie de sa base. En outre, la prospérité du Texas attire une population de cadres et d’entrepreneurs, qui votent républicain.

Le métier de base de Karl Rove, c’est la propagande et la collecte de fonds par courrier. Par la suite, il a ajouté à cette compétence première celles de sondeur, de stratège des médias, de planificateur de campagne. Mais son approche des électeurs consiste d’abord à les identifier socialement, à les distinguer les uns des autres et à concevoir le discours auquel ils seront sensibles. La formule qu’il a mise au point pour enlever le Texas aux démocrates s’est révélée imparable : cultiver les riches donateurs (et les riches Texans sont très riches), choisir de bons candidats (y compris en recyclant des démocrates), employer l’argent à adresser des messages différenciés à chaque groupe d’électeurs. Aujourd’hui, les 29 mandats pourvus par l’ensemble des électeurs de l’Etat sont détenus par des républicains, majoritaires, aussi, dans les deux chambres, à Austin.

Travailleur acharné, transportant dans sa tête une encyclopédie politique et électorale, Rove est entouré d’une réputation de tricheur et de tueur. Il est soupçonné d’avoir placé lui-même, dans son bureau, en 1986, un micro-émetteur dont la découverte a provoqué une tempête médiatique, mis sur la défensive le gouverneur démocrate sortant et aidé le candidat républicain à le battre. Quatre ans plus tard, il a joué un rôle essentiel dans la diffusion d’informations selon lesquelles le commissaire sortant à l’agriculture aurait organisé un système de pression sur des exploitants afin qu’ils contribuent au financement de la campagne pour sa réélection.

En 1994, quand George Bush s’est porté candidat au poste de gouverneur du Texas, une vague de rumeurs, alimentée par de faux appels téléphoniques d’instituts de sondage, a été menée contre la titulaire du poste, Ann Richards, accusée, entre autres choses, d’être lesbienne.

Lors des primaires républicaines pour l’élection présidentielle de 2000, John McCain, vainqueur dans le New Hampshire, a été la cible de calomnies sur sa santé mentale et sur sa sexualité. Quand un groupe d’anciens combattants a commencé à diffuser, il y a trois semaines, une publicité télévisée accusant John Kerry de mentir sur son service militaire au Vietnam, les démocrates y ont vu un nouveau coup bas de Karl Rove.

Bush, qui aime distribuer des surnoms, en a deux pour son conseiller. C’est tantôt Boy Genius (“Gamin génial”), tantôt Turd Blossom (“Fleur de fumier”). Comme si le président voulait garder une distance avec les méthodes de celui auquel il a dédicacé sa photo avec ces mots : “A Karl Rove, l’homme qui a un plan.”

Un plan pour quoi faire ? Pour gagner, simplement ? Ou pour changer l’Amérique ? Le modèle de Rove, c’est le président William McKinley, élu, en 1896, avec l’aide de Mark Hanna, alors “boss” du Parti républicain. Hanna avait compris - et fait comprendre à McKinley - que l’ère d’après la guerre civile était terminée et qu’il fallait exprimer, dorénavant, les aspirations des couches sociales nouvelles, nées du développement de l’industrie. Au cours des trente-six années qui ont suivi, les républicains n’ont perdu que deux élections présidentielles.

Aujourd’hui, Karl Rove pense que l’opposition entre démocrates et républicains, telle qu’elle a pris forme à partir de la crise économique des années 1930 et de ses suites, est révolue. Réactionnaire plus encore que conservateur, il estime que l’on est arrivé au terme d’une longue époque marquée par le règne de majorités abusives, enfermant l’individu dans toutes sortes de contraintes - fiscales, pour commencer - contraires à sa liberté fondamentale.

Le conseiller, qui a baptisé Andrew Madison le fils qu’il a eu avec sa seconde épouse, est un disciple fervent du fédéralisme de James Madison, l’un des auteurs de la Constitution américaine, et de son interprétation par Alexis de Tocqueville, l’auteur de De la démocratie en Amérique. La démocratie, selon Rove, c’est l’autonomie des “petits bataillons”, libres de vivre à leur guise dans une société protégée de la dictature du plus grand nombre.

George W. Bush et celui que l’on présente parfois comme son “gourou” ont les mêmes convictions. Bush fils a toujours pensé que l’un des grands dangers dont l’Amérique doit se garder est celui du “socialisme à l’européenne”. Le président et son conseiller sont les parfaits interprètes de la révolution conservatrice, lancée timidement, il y a cinquante ans, par quelques intellectuels minoritaires, portée par Ronald Reagan dans les années 1980, et par la majorité républicaine du Congrès depuis 1994. La réélection de Bush assurerait son triomphe.

Karl Rove y travaille sans relâche depuis 2001.

Patrick Jarreau
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 29.08.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3230,36-377020,0.html

August 28, 2004
Chirac Avoids Criticizing U.S. on Iraq; Praises U.N. Role
By ELAINE SCIOLINO

PARIS, Aug. 27 - Clearly the American election is on the mind of the president of France.

When President Jacques Chirac stood before his ambassadorial corps on Friday, there was no hint that the relationship between France and the United States had suffered one bit because of his fierce opposition to the American-led war in Iraq.
“The U.S. presidential election is due to take place in a few weeks’ time,” Mr. Chirac said toward the beginning of his speech.

“As a friend and ally of the United States for over two centuries now,” he said, “France believes that, today and tomorrow, a balanced and dynamic trans-Atlantic partnership is essential to meet our common challenges.”

He made no mention of either candidate, although it is no secret that he and President Bush are not at all close.

Nor did he criticize the war that overthrew Saddam Hussein last year, lavishing praise on the United Nations for restoring sovereignty to Iraq and portraying France as a participant in the process.

“France, which supported the restoration of a sovereign Iraq, fully integrated into its regional environment, wants to accompany it on its road to recovery,” he said.
The Security Council resolution transferring authority to a new Iraqi government “commits us all to the same objective: namely the forming of a democratically elected government and return to civil peace in a unified Iraq,” he added.

Mr. Chirac said nothing about the violence and terror in Iraq, except to say that the restoration of sovereignty was “merely the start of a long and what is proving to be an arduous and hazardous process. But at least we have embarked on it.”

By contrast, at a news conference with Mr. Bush before their dinner at Élysée Palace to celebrate the 60th anniversary of D-Day in June, Mr. Chirac described Iraq as a place where “disorder prevails,’’ adding that he did not share Mr. Bush’s view that the liberation of Iraq from Mr. Hussein was comparable to the liberation of Europe from the Nazis.

“History does not repeat itself,” he sniffed.

But Mr. Chirac is a thoroughly practical leader, and France was once one of Iraq’s largest trading partners and arms suppliers.

So in his speech on Friday, Mr. Chirac said that “with a view to elections scheduled for early 2005,” France was “open to dialogue with the Iraqi authorities on all subjects: the training of security forces, the debt and any other issue related to the reconstruction and well-being of the Iraqi people.”

He added that to this end, he would hold talks in Paris early next month with his Iraqi counterpart, Ghazi al-Yawar.

Mr. Chirac has described Iraq as a “potentially rich country” despite its debt and said France would be willing to support what he called a substantial reduction in the Iraqi debt, but only about 50 percent. The United States, by contrast, has urged a 90 percent debt reduction for Iraq, while Japan and Britain favor about 80 percent.
Mr. Chirac has opposed giving NATO a meaningful role in training the country’s military and police on the ground in Iraq.

France is not eager to see NATO personnel - perhaps including French troops - coming under United States command, nor does it want to further internationalize the current force in Iraq.

At a news conference at the summit meeting of the Group of 8 major industrial nations at Sea Island, Ga., in June, Mr. Chirac warned against the risks of NATO “meddling” in Iraq.

In his speech on Friday, he had harsh words for Iran, which has said it will resume producing parts for centrifuges used to enrich uranium. The enriched uranium can be used in nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons.

“Iran must imperatively understand that it is responsible for creating the conditions for confidence on the part of the international community, in particular by respecting its commitment to suspend enrichment,” he said.

Still, Mr. Chirac is eager to salvage an agreement that France, Germany and Britain made with Iran last year in which Tehran pledged to allow stricter inspections of nuclear sites and to suspend production of enriched uranium.

But Iran has accused the trio of breaking its part of the bargain by failing to end the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigations of its nuclear activities and not providing Iran with the advanced technology it said it had been promised.

Without mentioning the Bush administration, Mr. Chirac delivered a scathing criticism of the absence of a negotiating process to bring peace between Israelis and Palestinians, saying, “It is essential that the international community assume its responsibilities, that it acknowledge the disastrous results of its inaction.”
And without mentioning Israel, he criticized its policies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, saying, “Occupation and settlements are unacceptable and must stop.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/28/international/europe/28france.html?th
—-

Chirac sur tous les fronts planétaires

Le Président a égrené ses multiples priorités lors de la conférence des ambassadeurs.
Par Véronique SOULE
samedi 28 août 2004

De la crise du Darfour à celle du Proche-Orient, en passant par l’Afghanistan, l’Iran et le Maghreb, la France doit être sur tous les fronts. En clôturant vendredi la XIIe conférence annuelle des ambassadeurs, Jacques Chirac a égrené la longue liste des priorités diplomatiques. Le Président, qui affrontera l’an prochain un délicat référendum sur la Constitution européenne, s’est attardé sur sa vision d’une Europe puissance et sur l’urgence d’une solution au conflit israélo-palestinien.

«Combien de temps le monde acceptera-t-il cette tragédie ?» s’est-il exclamé, évoquant le Proche-Orient: «la paix est possible». Fustigeant «l’inaction» et les «fausses prudences» de la communauté internationale, le chef de l’Etat a de nouveau plaidé pour l’application de la feuille de route, ce plan de paix international aujourd’hui au point mort qui prévoit la création d’un Etat palestinien. Ces belles paroles risquent toutefois de résonner dans le désert alors que Washington est désormais obnubilé par la présidentielle de novembre.

Appelant les Français à «se rassembler» pour approuver la Constitution européenne, Chirac a défendu l’idée d’une «gouvernance économique» dans l’Union européenne afin de mieux affronter la concurrence internationale et a même appelé à s’inspirer des Etats-Unis. Sur la question sensible de l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE, il a réitéré sa position : «ce sera long et difficile» mais, «dans le monde de demain, l’intérêt de l’Union comme de la Turquie est d’emprunter un chemin commun».

Confirmant la réconciliation avec les Etats Unis «alliés et amis de toujours» , Chirac n’a tout de même pas renoncé à sa vision d’un monde «multipolaire» qui horripile Washington et Londres. Sur le développement mondial, autre thème cher au Président, il a annoncé qu’il se rendrait le 20 septembre à l’ONU à New York à l’invitation du président brésilien Lula pour chercher des réponses aux maux sociaux de la planète. La France devant vivre, le Président a aussi appelé les ambassadeurs à «s’engager totalement, pour favoriser le développement des exportations et des investissements français».
http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=234467

—-

Diplomatie : M.  Chirac fixe la ligne aux ambassadeurs

LE MONDE | 28.08.04 | 15h25

Le chef de l’Etat recevra dans quelques jours, à Paris, le président irakien Ghazi Al-Yaouar.

Comme tous les ans, la réunion des ambassadeurs de France à Paris, qui s’est achevée vendredi 27 août, a été l’occasion pour le président de la République d’une présentation générale de sa politique étrangère. Contrairement à ce qui s’était passé ces deux dernières années, l’Irak n’en a pas été le thème dominant.

Dans la phase précédente, la France était à la pointe de la contestation, et Jacques Chirac pouvait décliner l’ensemble de sa philosophie des relations internationales à partir de la critique de l’intervention américaine. Cette critique demeure, comme le président l’a signifié avec vigueur dans les rencontres internationales du mois de juin. Mais dans la phase intermédiaire actuelle, la France ne joue plus qu’à l’arrière-plan.

M. Chirac s’est borné à rappeler ce que sont ses disponibilités pour aider à la stabilisation de l’Irak : “La France est ouverte au dialogue avec les autorités irakiennes sur tous les sujets : sur la formation des forces de sécurité, sur la dette, comme sur tout autre sujet touchant à la reconstruction et au bien-être du peuple irakien.” Sur les deux premiers sujets cités, son approche entre en conflit avec celle des Etats-Unis. Il n’est pas surprenant que le président français souhaite s’en expliquer avec les autorités de Bagdad. M. Chirac a annoncé qu’il recevrait, dans quelques jours, le président irakien Ghazi Al-Yaouar, avec lequel il avait eu un contact, rapide mais bon, en marge du sommet de Sea Island, en juin.

L’expectative actuelle tient en partie à l’élection américaine. M. Chirac a évoqué cette échéance, avec la réserve obligée : “Alliée et amie de toujours des Etats-Unis, la France est convaincue que, demain comme aujourd’hui, un partenariat transatlantique dynamique et équilibré est indispensable pour répondre à nos défis communs”, a-t-il dit, ce qui doit se lire comme le souhait de voir rétabli un mode de relations disparu.

Discret sur l’Irak, le président s’est montré en revanche véhément à propos du Proche-Orient. “Il est indispensable que la communauté internationale -sous-entendu les Etats-Unis- assume ses responsabilités. Qu’elle constate les résultats désastreux de son inaction (...) Qu’elle dise enfin et sans ambages que le terrorisme et la négation de l’autre doivent être dénoncés et combattus sans faiblesse, mais que l’occupation, la colonisation, sont inacceptables et doivent cesser.”

A propos du Liban, Jacques Chirac a estimé que l’élection présidentielle devait avoir lieu “conformément à la Constitution actuelle”, désavouant ainsi le président Emile Lahoud, soutenu par la Syrie, qui cherche à se maintenir au pouvoir au moyen d’une révision de la Constitution.

Le chef de l’Etat a confirmé qu’il se rendrait à New York le 20 septembre pour animer avec le président brésilien Lula une réunion sur l’aide au développement. Cette question fait l’objet d’une “étroite collaboration” de la France et du Royaume-Uni, qui présidera en 2005 l’Union européenne et le G8.

M. Chirac a appelé les ambassadeurs à se mobiliser sur le plan économique, disant attendre d’eux “un engagement total” pour favoriser les exportations et les investissements français, notamment dans les pays émergents. Rappelant ses ambitions pour l’UE, il a annoncé qu’il appellerait en 2005 “tous les Français à se rassembler pour exprimer, à travers un référendum, leur adhésion à ce nouveau projet pour l’Europe” qu’est la Constitution.

Claire Tréan
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 29.08.04
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_articleweb/1,13-0,36-377033,0.html

Je Vous propose ce commentaire du “International Herald Tribune” du 29 aout

***
Unlikely alliance built on opposition to Iraq war raises questions
Katrin Bennhold/IHT IHT
Saturday, August 28, 2004

Almost two years after Russia, Germany and France forged an unlikely alliance around their opposition to the war in Iraq, the countries’ leaders are preparing for their second three-way summit meeting next week, even though the issue that drew them together no longer drives their agenda.

As with their first meeting - when President Vladimir Putin of Russia invited his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany in April last year to St. Petersburg - the Russian head of state is playing host to the talks Monday and Tuesday, this time at his summer residence in the Black Sea resort of Sochi.

But unlike the last meeting, this one lacks a clear focus, and some political experts wonder about its usefulness. Others have expressed outright cynicism about the leaders’ motives.

Officials in Moscow, Berlin and Paris say the alliance has moved past the common front against the American-led invasion of Iraq, which they refused to legitimize with a United Nations resolution in early 2003. Russia and France are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, while Germany stood by them as a temporary member of the 15-member body.

“The relationship emerged out of a special situation, but the meeting next week shows that this relationship has gone beyond Iraq,” said a German official close to the chancellor.

The talks in Sochi, officials say, will center on Russia’s strategic partnership with the European Union in fields as diverse as education, energy supply and border restrictions.

While Putin is expected to press hard for visa-free travel into the European Union, German and French officials signaled Friday that in their opinion Russia was not yet ready.

Ahead of the UN General Assembly, the three leaders are likely to exchange views on tactics on a wide variety of international issues, including violence in Iraq and the nuclear ambitions of Iran.

While Germany may seek support for its effort to become a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has said it wants to push for reform of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It could also delay its plans to join the World Trade Organization.

But according to experts like Katinka Barysch of the London-based Center for European Reform, none of those issues warrant a three-way summit.

“There is no real glue holding the three together – past opposition to a war that has long been over just isn’t enough,” she said.

At a time when Russia’s democratic structures are perceived to be weakening, the five-year-old war in Chechnya continues to rage and Moscow is supporting rebel governments in the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it may have been wiser for Germany and France to avoid talks with Russia and instead operate from a European Union platform, analysts say.

In addition, Western European efforts to rub shoulders with Russia may cause rifts with the EU’s new member states in Eastern Europe, whose past under Soviet rule makes them wary of Russian ambitions in Europe.

“If you sit in Warsaw or Prague the last thing you want to hear is that Russia, Germany and France are building a new power triangle,” said Dominique Moisi, a senior fellow at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris. In a sense, it is France that is the odd one out. Germany and Russia are drawn together by geography and significant commercial relations: Germany is Russia’s largest trading partner.

The two countries’ relationship intensified with the reportedly warm friendship between Putin, who speaks fluent German and was the only leader invited to Schrdöer’s 60th birthday in April, and Schröder, who this summer adopted a 3-year-old Russian orphan.

Meanwhile, as signs mount that France is losing authority in an enlarged EU with Germany at its geographical center, a senior German official said France was somewhat suspicious of close ties between Russia and Germany. Chirac had to push for an invitation to last year’s St. Petersburg summit meeting.

“France is trying to stick close to Germany’s side because it knows it is losing influence in Brussels,” Barysch said. Some say the talks in Sochi represent something that cannot last and that the real power-triangle in Europe is to be found elsewhere.

“It’s a pale imitation of a 19th-century type imperial club, devoid of political standards,” Moisi said. “The real, natural, logical club of three in Europe is Berlin, Paris, London. That is the future.”

International Herald Tribune

mea culpa..
maintenant qu ils sont installes la bas, faire l autocritique c un peu facile..
qu elle soit de plus d une hypocrisie sans limite, n arrange pas l affaire..

malheureusement tous (meme vous, dedefensa? :D ) oublient de profiter de ces (faux) “mea culpa” qui fusent, pour faire le raprochement avec le traitement aussi peu professionel des evenements du 11 septembre en 2001 2002,  date du commencement de la fin des medias critiques a l echelle planetaire.
(l agenda irak si pratique pour ce genre d amnesie)..

La diplomatie française au diapason européen

Michel Barnier a donné le ton de sa politique étrangère aux ambassadeurs réunis hier à Paris.

Par Véronique SOULE vendredi 27 août 2004 (Liberation - 06:00)
Le discret Michel Barnier, qui a succédé au flamboyant Dominique de Villepin à la tête de la diplomatie, entend bien y laisser son empreinte et celle-ci sera européenne. Ouvrant hier à Paris la XIIe conférence annuelle des ambassadeurs, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, qui fut durant cinq ans commissaire à Bruxelles, a plaidé pour une diplomatie qui tienne davantage compte de la dimension européenne. «L’Union européenne est désormais le cadre naturel et le démultiplicateur de notre influence, a-t-il affirmé. En mutualisant leurs actions et leurs initiatives, les pays européens se donnent une capacité d’intervention bien supérieure à leurs contributions nationales isolées.»

«Collectif».

S’exprimant devant les ambassadeurs, qui deux jours durant vont plancher sur les «stratégies d’influence», le ministre a souhaité insuffler un nouvel état d’esprit. «Nous devons jouer collectif», a-t-il expliqué, reconnaissant que ce n’était guère dans la tradition française. «La France n’est pas grande quand elle est arrogante. Elle n’est pas forte si elle est solitaire, a-t-il lancé. Je vous engage à faire que notre pays, et d’abord notre diplomatie, ajoute à sa culture traditionnelle de souveraineté une culture d’influence et de partenariat.»

La diplomatie française est appelée à retrouver un peu de modestie là où souvent elle préférait de brillants solos. «Nous ne connaissons par toujours bien les moyens d’action européens alors que, si nous agissons ensemble, sur les sujets où nous arrivons à trouver un accord à vingt-cinq, il y a un formidable effet démultiplicateur», commentait un ambassadeur.

Barnier entend ainsi forcer une évolution tout en se situant dans la continuité. Malgré les critiques qui se multiplient à l’encontre du moteur franco-allemand dans l’Europe élargie, la France y reste attachée : «Que personne n’en doute. Nous continuerons à faire vivre la parole franco-allemande.» Mais ce dialogue doit s’élargir, au Royaume-Uni, à l’Espagne et à l’Italie, et aux nouveaux comme la Pologne. Barnier n’a par ailleurs pas caché son agacement devant «les campagnes de presse» sur le déclin de la France, cette «étrange psychanalyse collective», allusion aux récents articles sur la perte d’influence française à la Commission européenne.

Crédits. Dans son style mesuré et sans brio, aux antipodes des envolées lyriques de Villepin, Barnier a reconnu que le budget de son ministère, dont les amputations avaient provoqué une grève historique l’an dernier, restait encore insuffisant dans certains secteurs, notamment l’aide publique au développement. Mais il a assuré avoir l’engagement que les crédits manquants figureraient dans la loi de finance rectificative en 2005. Il a rassuré ses troupes sur un autre sujet d’angoisse : «Les indemnités de résidence [à l’étranger] ne seront pas taxées», a-t-il promis.
http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=234104

—
Michel Barnier : la diplomatie de la France passe par l’Europe
LE MONDE | 26.08.04 | 13h09

Selon le ministre des affaires étrangères, l’UE doit être “le démultiplicateur de notre influence”.

“Jouer collectif” : c’est l’invite de Michel Barnier, le ministre des affaires étrangères, pour contrer le sentiment d’inquiétude qui domine la rentrée politique hexagonale sur la perte d’influence française en Europe. Ouvrant sa première conférence annuelle des ambassadeurs de France, jeudi 26 août à Paris, le chef de la diplomatie a cherché à répondre aux critiques qui ont fusé cet été, de toutes parts, après la constitution du nouveau Parlement européen et l’annonce de la composition de la future Commission européenne dans laquelle le représentant français, Jacques Barrot, détiendra le portefeuille des transports.

Tout en regrettant “cette étrange psychanalyse collective” sur le thème du déclin et de la perte d’influence, Michel Barnier estime néanmoins que la France doit réagir au changement d’environnement européen et mondial en revoyant son mode d’action. “Je vous engage à faire que notre pays, et d’abord sa diplomatie, ajoute à sa culture traditionnelle de souveraineté une culture d’influence et de partenariat”, a-t-il déclaré, en appelant les ambassadeurs à se mobiliser. “La première réponse, je le dis sans détour, doit être européenne. Je sais que cette évolution n’est pas inscrite dans la longue et prestigieuse histoire de notre ministère. Mais il y va de l’influence de notre pays”, leur a-t-il dit.

Evoquant la ratification de la Constitution européenne, qui va être un des grands enjeux de l’année politique, le ministre souligne que l’Union européenne “est désormais le cadre naturel et le démultiplicateur de notre influence”. C’est “en mutualisant leurs actions et leurs initiatives” que les Européens, et donc les Français, seront “un acteur qui compte”. “Cette perspective, ajoute-t-il, ne rend que plus nécessaire la ratification de la nouvelle Constitution et justifie la campagne d’explication, pluraliste, démocratique et citoyenne, que le gouvernement entend mener au cours des prochains mois.”

La France entend peser dans le débat européen “pour rechercher l’équilibre entre la liberté et la régulation. Proposer un libéralisme sans entrave, c’est méconnaître le modèle économique et social européen”, estime M. Barnier.

BUDGET “INSUFFISANT”

Concernant les crédits du ministère, Michel Barnier a indiqué que, en dépit de certains aspects positifs, le budget alloué au Quai d’Orsay pour 2005 “ne sera pas suffisant”, notamment en matière d’aide publique au développement bilatérale et multilatérale et pour les contributions de la France aux organisations internationales. Il dit avoir obtenu des “assurances” pour “y revenir en loi de finances rectificative en 2005”.

Peu après son arrivée à la tête de la diplomatie française, M. Barnier avait fait connaître son projet de regrouper les différents locaux du ministère à Paris sur un site unique. “Rien n’est décidé à ce stade”, a-t-il affirmé jeudi, en annonçant le lancement d’études qui devraient permettre de prendre une décision au printemps.

En toute hypothèse, “le Palais des affaires étrangères reste au quai d’Orsay”, a déclaré le ministre, semblant indiquer que cet immeuble historique demeurerait le lieu d’une partie des activités du ministère.

Henri de Bresson
• ARTICLE PARU DANS L’EDITION DU 27.08.04

http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-376747,0.html

—
Taking over in France: The anti-de Villepin

Elaine Sciolino/NYT NYT Friday, August 27, 2004
PARIS Everyone knew that Dominique de Villepin, the perma-tanned, America-obsessed poet-diplomat, would be a tough act to follow as foreign minister of France.

Certainly, Michel Barnier’s appearance on Thursday at the annual conference of French ambassadors left many of them perplexed.

In a speech intended to give his 150 footsoldiers their marching orders for the coming year, Barnier never once mentioned the United States.

Nor did the words Russia, NATO, Israel, Palestinan, the trans-Atlantic alliance or Sept. 11 emerge from his lips.

He said almost nothing about the crisis in Iraq, except to list the country as one of the “open conflicts” in the world and a target of terrorist acts. There was no discussion of how France should help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, which de Villepin often called the most urgent regional problem facing the world.

The fact is that Barnier was once the Quai d’Orsay’s point man on Europe and served for four years as the European Union’s commissioner for regional policy and institutional reform before becoming foreign minister. He tends to see the world through the lens, not of France, but of Europe.

He told his envoys that the only way to maximize their influence around the world was to think European. “The first reflex, I say bluntly, must be European,” he said. “I know that this evolution is not inscribed in the long and prestigious history of our ministry. But the influence of our country depends on it.”

In a tonal shift, Barnier called for a France that is humble. That adjective was not normally associated with de Villepin, who once was described in a profile in the French magazine Le Point as “a silver wolf with burning eyes” and who became Europe’s most vocal critic of the Bush administration’s march to war against Iraq.

“France is not great when it is arrogant,” said Barnier, a former deputy in parliament in the Savoy region. “France is not strong if it is alone.”

His performance, the first time a number of ambassadors have seen their minister in action, caught many unprepared. “He is at base a local politician coming from the Savoy, not a traditional Gaullist at all,” said one ambassador. “He came across as the anti-de Villepin.”

De Villepin, by contrast to his successor, seemed determined to revive the historic greatness of France. It was a romantic view articulated in his book on Napoleon, “The Hundred Days,” that described the emperor’s philosophy as “Victory or death, but glory whatever happens.

So the omission of a reference to the worlds only superpower by Barnier was striking.

“The minister is presenting his new ideas for diplomacy rather than covering old ground,” said one aide to Barnier, defending his world view. “There was no need to talk about the United States.”

A number of ambassadors described Barnier as an exceptionally cautious man who wanted to avoid making news and upstaging President Jacques Chirac, who will deliver his own state-of-the-world speech to French ambassadors on Friday.

Other ambassadors noted that when Barnier took over the Foreign Ministry portfolio in a cabinet reshuffle five months ago, part of his mandate was to repair France’s tattered relationship with the United States - but not to ignore it.

“Perhaps the minister went a bit far in not mentioning the United States,” one retired ambassador said drily.

Barnier’s presentation underscored just how much the Foreign Ministry has changed since the cabinet reshuffle last March that made de Villepin Minister of the Interior.

Last year, before the same audience, de Villepin spoke at length about Frances relationship with the United States, saying that it would be “useless” to deny the differences between the two countries and sharply criticizing Washington’s refusal to grant Iraq soverignty.

Barnier opened his speech by describing what he called the greatest diplomatic challenges facing France today: attacks on the global environment, health epidemics like AIDS and poverty.

A number of ambassadors who serve in countries where wars are waging or where French troops are deployed worry that diplomatic meat-and-potatoes issues like war and peace have been sidelined and time-sensitive decisions are not being made.

Some diplomats who just a few months ago were complaining about de Villepin’s impetuousness, quick temper and relentless demands are now saying they miss him.

De Villepin was said by friends to have resisted the move to the Ministry of the Interior, which is considered a more important post that Foreign Minister but deprives him of the world stage.

His political future is unclear. The low standing of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in the polls and the political ascendancy of Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Economy and a fierce rival of Chirac, has fueled speculation that Chirac may name de Villepin, perhaps his closest confident in government, as Prime Minister.

Asked in an interview with the radio station RTL early this month whether he was preparing to move into the Prime Minister’s office, de Villepin replied, “Listen, that’s not an issue on the table.”

The New York Times

http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=535973.html

washingtonpost.com
Rumsfeld’s War Plan Shares the Blame

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, August 25, 2004; Page A01

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s leadership of the Pentagon has been weighed by a jury of his peers and found somewhat wanting.

A report by a blue-ribbon panel he appointed to review the military establishment’s role in creating and handling detainee abuse problems at Abu Ghraib prison said that the Iraq war plan he played a key role in shaping helped create the conditions that led to the scandal.

In addition, the four-member panel, which was led by one former defense secretary, James R. Schlesinger, and included another, Harold Brown, found that Rumsfeld’s slow response when the Iraqi insurgency flared last summer worsened the situation.

But the report does not appear to threaten Rumsfeld’s position as defense secretary, especially because all four panel members emphatically rejected the idea of calling for his resignation yesterday at a Pentagon news conference to release their conclusions.

The panel’s findings do, however, provide new support for two central criticisms of the Rumsfeld team’s approach in Iraq last year: that the invasion plan called for too few troops, half as many as were used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and that the Pentagon failed to plan smartly for occupying the country after the United States defeated the Iraqi military.

Before the war, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, said publicly that he thought the invasion plan lacked sufficient manpower, and he was slapped down by the Pentagon’s civilian leadership for saying so. After Baghdad fell, Rumsfeld dismissed reports of widespread looting and chaos as “untidy” signs of newfound freedom that were exaggerated by the media. And some State Department officials complained that their attempts to plan for postwar Iraq were largely disregarded by the Pentagon.

The concerns about troop strength expressed by retired generals during the war provoked angry denunciations by Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In April 2003, Rumsfeld, for example, commented that, “people were saying that the plan was terrible, and . . . there weren’t enough people, and . . . there were going to be, you know, tens of thousands of casualties, and it was going to take forever.”

Now a version of that criticism has been made by a panel appointed by Rumsfeld himself. One of the major factors leading to the detainee abuse, Brown said yesterday, was “the expectation by the Defense Department leadership, along with most of the rest of the administration, that following the collapse of the Iraqi regime through coalition military operations, there would be a stable successor regime that would soon emerge in Iraq.”

As Schlesinger, the panel’s chairman, tartly put it, the leaders of the military establishment “did look at history books. Unfortunately, it was the wrong history.” He said they tended to focus on the refugee problems that followed the 1991 war, rather, he implied, than on other conflicts in which internal turmoil has followed an invasion.

Strikingly, given that Rumsfeld has made agility, adaptability and speed his bywords in pushing the military to transform itself, the panel also faulted the Pentagon’s leadership for a flat-footed response to the outbreak of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq last summer.

“Any defense establishment should adapt quickly to new conditions as they arise,” Schlesinger said. “And in this case, we were slow, at least in the judgment of the members of this panel, to adapt accordingly after the insurgency started in the summer of 2003.”

He added, “There was a failure to reallocate resources once it was seen that there were severe problems at Abu Ghraib.”

In delivering its mixed verdict, the Schlesinger panel endorsed Rumsfeld’s handling of the scandal once it broke. “If there’s something to be commended on this whole operation, it’s the way the secretary of defense has approached the investigations,” said retired Air Force Gen. Charles A. Horner, the third member of the panel.

“I think that overall, Secretary Rumsfeld has handled this extremely well,” Brown added. “If the head of a department had to resign every time anyone down below did something wrong, it would be a very empty Cabinet table.”

Indeed, although some members of Congress criticized Rumsfeld yesterday, there were no calls for him to step down. The harshest statement came from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), who said, “Secretary Rumsfeld and other civilian leaders in the Pentagon bear significant responsibility for the fundamental failures that led to the torture and other abuse at Abu Ghraib. At a minimum, there was gross negligence at the highest levels in the Pentagon.”

The report showed Rumsfeld’s top uniformed brass did not help him out much in rapidly pivoting from the peacekeeping they expected to be conducting to fighting the guerrilla war that confronted them.

The panel repeatedly faulted the judgments and actions of the entire chain of senior generals involved: Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who for most of the time was the top U.S. commander on the ground in Iraq; his two bosses, Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who stepped down as chief of the U.S. Central Command last summer as the insurgency was breaking out, and Franks’s successor, Army Gen. John P. Abizaid; and Myers, the nation’s top military officer.

“It would have been better had greater supervision been exercised . . . [and] there is failure at the senior levels of the Pentagon to exercise that supervision,” Schlesinger said. “I think that more of that falls upon the . . . uniformed military than on the Office of the Secretary of Defense.”

The report struck a tone of dismay in analyzing the sluggish response of the military bureaucracy to events in Iraq last summer and fall. It noted, for example, that a personnel plan for Sanchez’s headquarters “was not finally approved until December 2003, six months into the insurgency.” The result, the report concludes, was that Sanchez and his undermanned staff were overwhelmed and unable to take needed actions. In addition, the report blamed Sanchez for setting up a confused chain of command that made it difficult to determine the responsibilities of certain commanders.

The pervasive lack of troops, especially those with specialized skills, had a cascading effect that helped lead to the abuse, the report said. As the insurgency took off, frontline Army units, lacking interpreters, took to rounding up “any and all suspicious-looking persons—all too often including women and children,” it said. This indiscriminate approach resulted in a “flood” of detainees at Abu Ghraib that inundated demoralized and fatigued interrogators, it continued.

When asked whether anyone should resign over those findings, the panel members tended to sidestep the question, saying they were more interested in preventing the abuse from recurring than in fixing blame. But Brown made it clear that he expects some officers to suffer the consequences of their missteps. “At various levels, there was some dereliction of duty,” he said. “At other levels, there were mistakes.”

The bottom line, Brown said, is that, “A lot of careers are going to be ruined over this.”

Researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30099-2004Aug24.html?referrer=email

L’intégration de la Turquie à la politique européenne de Défense

Les institutions turques sont partagées entre un pouvoir civil, détenu par un gouvernement musulman-démocrate, et un pouvoir militaire, laïque mais lié aux États-Unis et à Israël, qui font parfois douter de leur caractère réellement démocratique.
C’est pourquoi beaucoup craignent que l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne ne soit une source de problèmes confessionnels et un cheval de Troie de Washington. Cependant, compte-tenu de l’importance que revêtent désormais les questions militaires face à l’OTAN, l’entrée de la Turquie dépendra de sa capacité à intégrer une Défense européenne indépendante. Vecdi Gönül, ministre turc de la Défense, présente ici le point de vue de son gouvernement.

—————————————-

La Turquie occupe une position unique dans la communauté européenne des nations. Mon pays est en effet le seul membre de l’OTAN qui soit candidat à l’adhésion à l’UE tout en étant membre de l’Organisation de la conférence islamique. Notre modèle démocratique séculaire est un défi à ce que l’on nomme le choc des civilisations.

La majorité écrasante de la population turque est de confession musulmane. Mais nous sommes étroitement imbriqués dans le tissu politique, économique et culturel de l’Europe occidentale. Mon pays a toujours fait partie de l’Europe sur les plans historique, géographique, politique et économique, et il continuera de le faire. C’est en tant que membre de l’Union européenne que la Turquie envisage son avenir. Nous partageons avec l’Union son système de valeurs. La société turque fait déjà partie intégrante du monde moderne et contribue à ses valeurs et à son fonctionnement.

Nous tenons à prouver et à confirmer qu’une société musulmane peut être démocratique, ouverte, transparente, pluraliste et contemporaine - en un mot européenne - tout en préservant son identité.

L’adhésion de la Turquie à l’UE empêchera l’apparition de nouvelles lignes de démarcation en Europe. Elle ancrera profondément la démocratie turque dans les normes européennes.

Cette adhésion procurera à l’UE des gains stratégiques indispensables pour son architecture de sécurité et son influence économique. Elle sera mieux à même de garantir la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité dans les zones toujours fragiles des Balkans et de la Méditerranée orientale, au Moyen-Orient, dans le Caucase et l’Asie centrale. Par sa politique étrangère et de sécurité multirégionale et multidimensionnelle, la Turquie contribuera à renforcer le rôle de l’UE sur la scène internationale, ce qui permettra l’exercice des relations transatlantiques.

Les élections de novembre dernier ont vu la victoire écrasante de mon parti. La politique du Parti Justice et Développement concernant l’intégration de la Turquie dans l’UE a été des plus limpides. Nous nous sommes engagés sans partage vis-à-vis de notre peuple et de l’opinion publique européenne à accélérer les réformes et leur mise en œuvre, ce que nous faisons donc avec détermination, constance et vigueur.

L’UE a tenu son sommet à Copenhague en décembre 2002, peu après l’accession au pouvoir de mon parti. Le Conseil européen de Copenhague a pris la décision suivante : ” Si, en décembre 2004, le Conseil européen décide, sur la base d’un rapport et d’une recommandation de la Commission, que la Turquie satisfait aux critères politiques de Copenhague, l’Union européenne ouvrira sans délai des négociations d’adhésion avec ce pays. ”

Mon gouvernement est pleinement conscient de ses responsabilités et obligations, des défis qu’elles représentent et des chances qui s’offrent à lui. Nous acceptons bien volontiers d’assumer cette tâche.

Les réformes politiques continuent d’occuper une place de choix dans notre ordre du jour. La priorité de notre gouvernement est de développer et d’approfondir la démocratie en Turquie. Nous nous sommes fixé deux objectifs majeurs à cet égard : premièrement, appliquer pleinement et de façon appropriée les dispositions juridiques existantes ; deuxièmement, prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour garantir un alignement total sur les critères politiques de Copenhague. J’espère que le sérieux de nos démarches engendrera des réactions positives de la part de l’Union et que les négociations d’adhésion s’ouvriront début 2005.

La paix et la stabilité apportées par les relations transatlantiques à l’Europe pendant la Guerre froide sont devenues encore plus importantes dans l’environnement sécuritaire incertain et instable de l’après-Guerre froide. C’est pourquoi nous pensons que la sécurité de l’Europe est indivisible et que les liens transatlantiques demeurent son pilier essentiel. Lorsque nous nous efforçons de contrecarrer ces risques et menaces qui pèsent sur notre sécurité et nos valeurs communes, nous devons éviter les doubles emplois. La Turquie soutient depuis le début les initiatives destinées à développer la sécurité et la défense européennes. L’offre significative que nous avons faite en novembre 2000, pendant la conférence d’engagement de capacités, de fournir des forces pour l’objectif global vaut toujours. De même, nous suivons de près les travaux menés au sein de l’UE sur l’amélioration des capacités européennes et étudions les possibilités de combler au mieux les déficits capacitaires existants.

Je pense à cet égard, compte tenu notamment de la nouvelle phase d’élargissement, qu’il vaudrait sans doute mieux que toutes les offres de contributions soient examinées dans le cadre du même groupe de forces et selon les mêmes critères.

Bien que d’importants progrès aient été faits grâce au document relatif à la mise en œuvre des décisions de Nice, qui définit le cadre qui nous permettra d’apporter des contributions significatives à la PESD, nous estimons qu’il y a toujours des lacunes dans trois domaines.
Premièrement, les arrangements en vue de la représentation permanente de nos officiers dans les structures militaires de l’UE n’ont pas encore été mis au point de façon satisfaisante.
Deuxièmement, c’est à titre d’observateurs que nous sommes invités aux réunions de planification internes de l’UE dans le cadre du premier exercice OTAN-UE, alors que d’autres alliés européens non-membres de l’UE - la Pologne, la Hongrie et la République tchèque - ont droit à la parole lors de ces réunions.
Enfin, nous attendons la mise en place des arrangements qui nous permettront de contribuer aux démarches de l’UE dans le domaine de l’amélioration des capacités et de participer aux travaux des groupes de projet institués à cette fin.

Nous suivons de près les répercussions de l’initiative prise par quatre pays de l’UE afin de renforcer et d’intensifier la coopération entre les membres de l’Union européenne sur la sécurité et la défense européennes, ainsi que les travaux en cours à la Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe et les résultats du Conseil informel Affaires générales et relations extérieures tenu à Rhodes et Castellorizo. Nous pensons à cet égard que les implications de ces différentes démarches pour les relations transatlantiques et la sécurité européenne élargie doivent être examinées de près, et que les engagements et obligations dont nous nous sommes acquittés jusqu’ici doivent être compatibles entre eux.

La Turquie attache une grande importance à la préservation des arrangements conclus par l’UE sur la participation des alliés européens non-membres de l’UE à la PESD. Nous pensons qu’ils doivent être maintenus et respectés par la Convention. Nous nous réjouirions d’avoir un échange de vues régulier sur l’avenir de la PESD, conformément au caractère ouvert de cette politique telle qu’elle est définie dans les conclusions de la présidence du Conseil européen de Nice. Nous devrions aussi pouvoir faire entrer les nouveaux domaines d’intérêt commun tels que la planification civile d’urgence, la lutte contre le terrorisme et les projets concrets de collaboration sur les capacités militaires dans le cadre de la coopération stratégique entre l’OTAN et l’UE sur la sécurité européenne. La coopération fructueuse qui existe déjà entre l’OTAN et l’UE dans les Balkans constitue un terrain d’entente amplement suffisant pour une approche concertée dans la région. Les Balkans continueront à cet égard de servir de ballon d’essai.

Il faudra aussi une concertation entre nos partenaires européens, ainsi qu’entre l’OTAN et l’UE, pour reconstruire l’Irak. Nous saluons à ce propos l’adoption par le Conseil de sécurité de la Résolution 1483 sur l’Irak, que nous considérons comme un élément déterminant pour combler le fossé apparu dans les relations transatlantiques.

La mise en place au sein de l’UE d’une agence de développement et d’acquisition de capacités militaires, c’est-à-dire de l’Agence européenne de l’armement, ne peut que favoriser la coopération, et notamment la gestion de programmes en collaboration. La Turquie, qui participe déjà activement à la coopération européenne en matière d’armements et fait partie du Groupe Armement de l’Europe occidentale (GAEO) et de l’Organisation de l’armement de l’Europe occidentale (OAEO), est prête et disposée à s’impliquer également dans les activités de la nouvelle agence.

Nous pensons que toute coopération européenne en matière d’armements doit suivre la composition du GAEO, qui constitue le meilleur cadre puisqu’il regroupe tous les membres de l’UE et les alliés européens de l’OTAN non-membres de l’UE qui contribuent à l’objectif global dans le cadre de la PESD et au processus de développement des capacités de l’OTAN et de l’UE.

Nous saluons la conclusion fructueuse de la première phase du Plan d’action européen sur les capacités (ECAP), qui va maintenant aborder une deuxième phase plus dynamique, mettant l’accent sur la mise en œuvre de projets concrets confiés à des groupes de projet. Nous souhaitons vivement participer à ces travaux par le biais d’accords restant à élaborer, qui nous permettraient de mieux évaluer cette démarche et d’y apporter la contribution idoine.

Vecdi Gönül
Ministre turc de la Défense nationale

Ce texte est adapté d’une intervention prononcée devant l’Assemblée parlementaire de l’UEO, le 1er décembre 2003.

http://www.reseauvoltaire.net/article11382.html

désolé ...

U.S. News & World Report
August 30, 2004

Washington Whispers

Baghdad Mutiny

There’s trouble in Baghdad. Seems the brass assigned to the headquarters
palace next to Baghdad’s airport like to take a break from the 120-degree
summer days with a few laps in Saddam Hussein ‘s old pool. But for the past
two weeks, the pool has been off limits even for generals. Reason: Somebody
gave all the lifeguards two weeks of R&R. Now, we won’t even ask how one
gets a job as a military lifeguard, but how could all of them be given leave
at once? We’re told several officers are very angry, so much so that one
colonel told our tipster he was going to swim despite the orders. “What are
they going to do,” he said. “Send me to Iraq?”

Sur cette adresse
http://www.strategic-road.com/intellig/ieconclass.htm

une évaluation de la fréquentation des sites consacrés aux questions de “stratégie/renseignement/ ... “

Et DDF arrive en 19ème position !

J’avoue que je n’ai guère de sympthie pour les dirigeants de la Corée du Nord.
Mais quand ceux-ci traient Bush d’“imbécile politique”, je dois reconnaître qu’une certaine sensation de plaisir m’envahit. Mais pourquoi “imbécile politique” là ou “imbécile” tout court eut mieux convenu ? Pourquoi une telle restriction ? Ah, le langage diplomatique!....

SEOUL (AFP) - La Corée du Nord a exclu de nouvelles négociations avec les Etats-Unis sur son programme nucléaire, traitant le président George W. Bush de tyran pire que Hitler et d’“imbécile politique”.

Dans une attaque particulièrement virulente contre le dirigeant américain, un porte-parole du ministère nord-coréen des Affaires étrangères l’a qualifié de “tyran qui relègue Hitler dans l’ombre”.

Pourquoi le pétrole est revenu au centre de la géopolitique mondiale
LE MONDE | 20.08.04

Il n’est pas si lointain le temps où le magazine britannique The Economist, réputé pour la qualité de ses analyses, annonçait le prix prévisible du futur baril de pétrole : 5 dollars. C’était en mars 1999, et le prix de l’or noir qui en valait alors à peine le double ne pouvait que baisser, assurait-on. C’est le contraire qui s’est produit, et dans quelles proportions !

Aujourd’hui, le cours du baril, qui, séance après séance, améliore son record historique à Londres et à New York, s’approche peu à peu des 50 dollars sans que quiconque se hasarde à prédire où et comment pourrait s’arrêter cette envolée. Qualifiée d’“irrationnelle” par l’Agence internationale de l’énergie (AIE), elle a des raisons multiples.

Elles proviennent autant des lois du marché dictées par une demande industrielle croissante que de facteurs non économiques : la guerre d’Irak, bien sûr, et l’insécurité accrue sur les approvisionnements en provenance du Moyen-Orient, qui détient 75 % des réserves mondiales prouvées, le dépeçage politico-financier du géant russe Ioukos, qui assure 20 % des exportations du pays et 2 % de la production mondiale, les aléas liés au brut vénézuélien, qui demeurent en dépit de l’issue récente favorable au président Hugo Chavez à propos du “référendum révocatoire”.

Ces éléments apparemment disparates mais qui ont pour enjeu commun la matière première la plus convoitée au monde, assurant à elle seule 40 % des besoins en énergie de la planète, contribuent à dessiner un nouvel ordre pétrolier à la géographie mouvante, de l’Afrique à la région de la Caspienne, au gré des intérêts de Washington et de Moscou, qui s’affrontent à présent sur des territoires longtemps gelés par la guerre froide. De plus, la perspective de voir se tarir ces gisements d’énergie fossile, après un déclin de la production envisagé dès 2010-2015, renforce la perspective d’un pétrole moins abondant et durablement cher.

Tout cela explique la flambée des prix du brut sur les marchés boursiers et la difficulté à les faire baisser. L’appel à ouvrir davantage les robinets lancé aux membres de l’Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole avant sa prochaine réunion le 15 septembre, comme aux autres producteurs non membres qui assurent le reste des 82 millions de barils pompés chaque jour dans le monde, risque d’avoir peu d’effet à moyen terme. L’OPEP tourne à 96 % de sa capacité et aura du mal à satisfaire les 2 millions de barils/jour supplémentaires qui lui sont réclamés, un chiffre qui correspond à l’accroissement mondial de la demande en pétrole escomptée en 2004, la plus forte augmentation des quinze dernières années.

A l’origine de cette boulimie énergétique figure la Chine, dont les besoins, selon l’AIE, passeront de 5,5 à 11 millions de barils/jour d’ici à 2025 et dont le pétrole provient désormais en grande partie de Russie. L’“atelier du monde” contribue à lui seul à 40 % de l’accroissement de la demande mondiale, et d’autres pays en développement industriel - les économies émergentes d’Asie et l’Inde notamment - figureront bientôt parmi les gros consommateurs alors que, signe des temps nouveaux, le Royaume-Uni est devenu, en juin, importateur net de pétrole pour la première fois depuis dix ans.

Sur la base de cette demande en progression constante et d’un retour de la croissance mondiale qui a entraîné une hausse de la consommation de brut d’environ 3,5 millions de barils/jour depuis deux ans, ce sont 120 millions de barils/jour qu’il faudra produire en 2025, 50 % de plus qu’aujourd’hui ! Où les trouver ? Potentiellement, l’Irak, qui figure au deuxième rang mondial en termes de réserves avec 15 milliards de tonnes derrière l’Arabie saoudite (36 milliards), joue un rôle-clé dans l’amélioration de l’offre. Mais le climat insurrectionnel sur le terrain oblige à revoir les schémas de production. La même prévention sécuritaire vaut pour l’ensemble du golfe Arabo-Persique. Il faut donc se tourner vers d’autres sources d’approvisionnement.

Les Etats-Unis l’ont bien compris. Tout en surveillant de près des fournisseurs “historiques” parfois indisciplinés, tels que le Venezuela et le Mexique, et après avoir lancé l’idée d’un Grand Moyen-Orient démocratique susceptible de sécuriser une partie de leur approvisionnement énergétique, ils sont décidés à réduire leur dépendance à l’égard des pays et régions par trop instables. C’est là, par exemple, la justification de l’offensive diplomatique et économique lancée par l’administration américaine en direction du golfe de Guinée, d’où elle compte importer, d’ici à 2015, 25 % du pétrole consommé aux Etats-Unis contre 15 % aujourd’hui. Avec pour effet d’encourager le boom pétrolier escompté pour l’Afrique subsaharienne, dont la production de brut devrait passer de 4 millions de barils/jour actuellement à 9 millions en 2030 grâce, notamment, aux efforts de l’Angola, de la Guinée-Equatoriale, du Nigeria et du Tchad.

NOUVEAU SOUFFLE

Mais c’est surtout dans la région de la Caspienne, en proie elle aussi à un essor pétrolier et gazier dont bénéficient surtout l’Azerbaïdjan, le Kazakhstan et le Turkménistan, que le pétrole se trouve replacé au centre de la géographie mondiale. D’après diverses études, ces trois ex-Républiques soviétiques disposeraient d’environ 30 milliards de barils de réserve de pétrole prouvée, soit l’équivalent des gisements de la mer du Nord, rapporte Laurent Ruseckas, du Cambridge Energy Research Associates, dans la revue Sociétal.

La réalisation de l’oléoduc Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (BTC), destiné à acheminer le pétrole d’Azerbaïdjan vers un port turc de la Méditerranée via la Géorgie, illustre les passes d’armes auxquelles se livrent Américains et Russes dans une région étroitement surveillée par les Iraniens, les Turcs et les Chinois. Parmi tous ces acteurs, la Russie revendique le rôle qu’autorise sa puissance pétrolière, à savoir près de 8 millions de barils/jour, autant que l’Arabie saoudite, mais aussi gazière, ce vaste pays détenant 45 % des réserves mondiales de gaz contre 36 % pour le Moyen-Orient. Ces deux données expliquent la reprise en main par le président Vladimir Poutine de la politique énergétique russe auprès d’oligarques soupçonnés d’avoir bradé les intérêts de la nation. Ou de l’ancien empire.

Parallèlement, explique Catherine Mercier-Suissa, maître de conférences à l’IAE de Lyon-III, face à la volonté de Washington de renforcer sa présence économique et stratégique en Asie centrale et en Géorgie - où elle dispose depuis le 11-Septembre de bases militaires - en favorisant la création d’une organisation régionale indépendante de Moscou, le GUAM, qui regroupe la Géorgie, l’Ukraine, l’Ouzbékistan, l’Azerbaïdjan et la Moldavie, le Kremlin a riposté en redonnant un nouveau souffle à deux structures. L’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective, qui lie quelques-unes des anciennes Républiques d’Asie mineure, est en passe d’être renforcée, de même que l’Organisation pour la coopération de Shanghaï. Celle-ci comprend, outre la Russie, le Kazakhstan, le Kirghizstan, l’Ouzbékistan et le Tadjikistan, un allié de poids : la Chine. Celle-ci est aussi un client de choix pour la Russie, qui envisage la construction d’un gigantesque oléoduc permettant de fournir en abondance du pétrole à partir du lac Baïkal non seulement à l’empire du Milieu, mais aussi aux deux Corées et au Japon. De quoi anticiper de nouvelles guerres de l’or noir.

Serge Marti
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_articleweb/1,13-0,36-376102,0.html

Une dépêche d’Associated Press du 20/8/04 nous informe qu’une majorité d’Américains continue à croire que l’Irak de Saddam avait effectivement des armes de destruction massives. La moitié d’entre eux continue à croire que l’Irak avait des liens avec Al Quaeda et était impliqué dans les attentats du 11 septembre…

Décidément le virtualisme a trouvé outre-Atlantique un terreau particulièrement fertile. Le moins qu’on puisse dire c’est que quand il y croît, c’est avec une belle vigueur et une remarquable longévité.

Difficile, à partir de là, de ne pas conclure que ce peuple américain a décidément des caractéristiques psychologiques bien particulières, en l’occurence tout particulièrement une crédulité ahurissante, surtout quand il s’agit de croire en l’existence de forces du mal. Que l’on se souvienne par exemple de l’extraordinaire epidémie de prétendues personnalités multiples (Multiple personality Disorders, rebaptisées Dissociative Identity Disorders dans le DSMIV)pendant les années 1970-80. Ces troubles dont l’étiologie alléguée aurait été des incestes répétés, des abus sexuels monstrueux, des cultes sataniques effroyables étaient allègrement diagnostiqués par des milliers de psychiatres et de psychologues, tandis qu’en Europe on n’en diagnostiquait aucun (sauf un petit peu aux Pays-Bas qui avaient été quelque peu contaminés par ce délire psychatrique américain).

Là encore il semble que la psychologie US ait réagi avec une sensibilité toute particulière à l’existence d’un mal supposé. Puritanisme, quand tu nous tiens…

Il est remarquable également de constater à quel point il est difficile aux Américains de reconnaître qu’ils ont pu se tromper. Toute leur étonnante fatuité semble y faire obstacle. Quand un jou l’épidémie de personnalités multiples s’est enrayée, c’est à cause des procès intentés par des familles de patients aux thérapeutes qui avaient induits chez ceux-ci de faux-souvenirs d’abus sexuels. Sans les gros problèmes professionnels que ces procès ont entraînés chez ces thérapeutes, il y a gros à parier qu’ils y croiraient toujours et avec eux les médias et la grosse majorité du public…

C’est à se demander comment ils ont fait pour cesser de pratiquer la chasse aux sorcières (les vraies ou plutôt les supposées vraies) comme au bon vieux temps de Salem (dans les années 1690)...
————————————————————————————————————————————————

WASHINGTON - More than half of Americans, 54 percent, continue to believe Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or a program to develop them before the United States invaded last year, according to a poll released Friday.
 

Evidence of such weapons has not been found.

Half believe Iraq was either closely linked with al-Qaida before the war (35 percent) or was directly involved in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on this country (15 percent).

The poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found the numbers on both questions have dropped in the face of evidence that both pre-war claims may have been false.

President Bush consistently equates the war on terrorism with the war in Iraq, though he has replaced his claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction with claims that Iraq had the “capability” of building such weapons.

Both the Sept. 11 commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee have raised doubts about pre-war claims by the Bush administration before the Iraq war.

Seven in 10 in the poll say they believe the United States went to war in Iraq based on false assumptions. A similar number say the war in Iraq has given the United States a worse image in the world.

A majority, 55 percent, say they don’t think the war in Iraq will result in greater peace and stability in the Mideast. In various polls, people have been evenly split on whether the war in Iraq was the right or wrong thing to do — a sharp drop from last winter.

The poll of 733 adults was conducted by Knowledge Networks from Aug. 5-11 and has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 percentage points.