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... et réduites fortement, encore !

Les raisons de le penser n’ont que peu à voir avec des arguments politiques ou militaires. Il est bien évidemment permis de penser que d’ici cinq ans les Etats-Unis pourront et voudront réduire leur présence en Irak, et donc leurs dépenses, ou encore qu’ils jetteront l’éponge, quoique personnellement je n’y croie guère.

Non, la véritable limite aux dépenses militaires américaines pour l’occupation de l’Irak sera probablement économique. La forte récession de l’économie américaine que l’on peut craindre dans les prochaines années sur fond d’effondrement de la valeur extérieure du dollar américain ainsi que des bulles du crédit et de l’immobilier mettra une limite étroite aux dépenses que l’Amérique pourra consacrer à ses aventures extérieures. Il y aura bien d’autres choses à penser, et à financer !

A Daunting Search: Tracking a Deadly Virus in Angola
By SHARON LAFRANIERE and DENISE GRADY

UÍGE, Angola, April 11 - The staff in the pediatric ward of Uíge’s regional hospital suspected something was terribly wrong as early as October, when children who had been admitted with seemingly treatable illnesses began, suddenly and wrenchingly, to die.

But were those early deaths caused by the Marburg virus? If they were, and had they been diagnosed at the time, might the current epidemic have been averted?
The international health experts who have descended on Angola say they cannot pinpoint exactly when the largest outbreak of the deadly virus began.

“Nobody really has a sense of where or when it started,” said Dr. Thomas Grein, a medical officer in the World Health Organization. “The widespread belief that it began in October is speculation.”

But local officials in Uíge, the center of the outbreak, believe it began around that time, and then spread from the pediatric ward of the regional hospital, which has now been effectively closed except for emergency operations.

If they are correct and there was a delay in explaining the deaths, the reason may be that in Africa, sometimes the extraordinary is buried in the ordinary.

Children die at such an astonishing pace here and for any range of horrible reasons unknown to other parts of the world that it takes much more time for health workers to piece together if something as deadly as Marburg is at work.

In a country like Angola, where one in four children dies before the age of five, mostly from infectious diseases, crises like the one in the pediatric ward can easily be overlooked.

An outbreak of Marburg can look like a host of other illnesses to doctors and nurses who have never before encountered the disease.

“This is Africa,” said Dave Daigle, the spokesman here for the World Health Organization. To be a health official here, he said, “is like being a fireman in a village with the whole village on fire.”

Experts say at least 214 people have caught the virus and 194 have died. Marburg is spread by contact with bodily fluids, from blood to sweat, and kills with gruesome efficiency. Victims suffer from vomiting, diarrhea, high fever and bleeding from body orifices. Nine in 10 are dead within a week. There is no effective treatment.

When strange deaths first began to appear in October, mystified local health officials shipped samples of tissue and blood from four children to the United States.
In November, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention tested them for at least three different types of hemorrhagic fever, including Marburg.

The results, which nearly all agree were accurate, came back negative. But in the tumult of deadly diseases and other health issues that plague this continent, it remains possible that Marburg was present in Uíge even then.

By the end of December, at least 95 children were dead, local health workers say.
How many deaths were Marburg-related is unknown, but even by the grim standards of the continent, it was an alarming number of deaths.

“In October, November, December, we were seeing so many children dying - just children,” said Dr. Gakoula Kissantou, 31, the hospital’s acting administrator. “It was becoming scarier.”

He recalled the doctor in charge of the pediatric ward at the time, Dr. Maria Bonino of Italy, called a meeting with the staff and asked, “What is going wrong here in the hospital?” She herself died in March, a victim of the virus.

It was not until early March that the provincial health officials alerted a W.H.O. representative that they had found 39 suspected cases of Marburg. W.H.O. officials identified 60 possible cases. Angolan authorities then shipped more samples to the C.D.C. in Atlanta. On March 18, 9 of 12 came back positive for Marburg, which by then was claiming more victims by the day.

Since those new lab tests positively confirmed the virus, a growing number of epidemiologists, anthropologists, public health experts and emergency medical workers have descended on Uíge in a race to cut off the disease.

One thing is certain, scientists say: the epidemic began with just one infected person, and was then transmitted from one person to another.

That conclusion, based on finding only one strain of virus in all the samples tested, means the outbreak can be stopped if infected people are isolated.

Given the degree to which it has been contaminated, the regional hospital, which serves 500,000 people, has now been limited to emergency operations and an isolation ward where Doctors Without Borders, the international health charity, treats Marburg victims.
Eight pediatric nurses and the doctor in charge of the ward are dead, along with six other nurses and one other doctor, all Marburg victims. Every mattress, bed sheet and hospital uniform must be thrown out. Everything left must be disinfected.

On Monday, teams of soldiers and hospital personnel clad in bright yellow prowled the grounds, spraying grass, benches and dirt paths with a solution of diluted bleach. Afterward, they burned their uniforms.

At some point, said Dr. Kissantou, the hospital’s acting administrator, normal operations will resume. He refused to hazard a guess as to when.

“I am upset that we are not serving patients,” he said, plopping down on a wooden chair outside his office as two aides stood by. Barred from the hospital, he said, some of the sick are diagnosing their own illnesses and trying to treat themselves with medicine they buy at the local market, with disastrous results.

“Some people are dying because the medicine doesn’t fit the illness,” he said. “That’s why we are asking for help, so people can come here to get treatment.”

But to treat patients safely again, hospital officials need to address a range of problems. They must find ways to systematically isolate high-risk patients before they mix with other patients; to equip the medical staff with masks, gloves and other protective equipment; and to enforce sanitation measures, like proper hand-washing, even when there is no running water.

Dr. Kissantou, one of only two Angolan doctors at the hospital, says all that could be done, with enough money. The provincial governor has promised $1 million, he said, but more support is needed.

Yet the biggest challenge of all may be regaining the trust of the community after so many deaths. It is one reason why Dr. Kissantou, who took over the hospital after his predecessor was fired, still comes to work every day.

“I am a doctor,” he said. “I will not flee, because I prefer to give my life to another.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/12/health/12angola.html?th&emc=th

je rajoute un autre commentaire: l’inflation des dépenses oblige à un serrage de vis des budgets. Cela pose un double-problème:

- l’amputement des marges externes (appartenant au budget du pentagone ou de différents services secrets, notamment) nécessaires à la pérpetuation des projets secrets, coeur de la stratégie militaire US.

- soulève la question de réévaluer les dépenses de l’IRAQ à la baisse, ou en tout cas de modérer le train fictif de dépenses actuel. Fictif? Avec la sémantique de ce site, on dirait plutôt virtualiste. Mais ce serait vraiment trop la mise en abime! Je me fais comprendre. Pour 87 milliards budgetés et disons 100 dépensés. Sur ce total, 35 serviront réellement aux lignes inscrites dans le budget, 15 correspondront à des dépassements permettant de financer des black programs, et 50 iront dans la poche des partenaires, financiers et autres corrompus/corrupteurs, par le biais de cascades de marges de prestataires construits en sociétés poupées russes auto-gonflantes et multi-encastrables (des logiciels conçoivent et démêle des montages structurels aptes à réaliser ce genre d’opérations).

210 milliards, ce sont les dotations particulières. Une partie non négligeable là bas du budget de l’armée US qui est pour info de l’ordre de 350 ou 400 milliards de dollars annuel.. Sans compter tous les investissements privés et collatéraux: mercenaires des sociétés pétrolières, industrielles + services secrets etc. C’est tout simplement monstrueux le fric investit là bas. Mais honnêtement, tout le monde s’en fout. Les américains sont no more concerned des sous “américains” dépensés. Les seuls sous qui comptent, sont ceux de la spéculation sur les retombées économiques de leurs actes, et ça, même si ça ne rapporte pas fondamentalement plus, ça profite superbement à un petit nombre qui se repêtra d’autant plus gloutonnement du gaspillage réalisé avec l’argent public. Et disons le même simplement, de l’asservissement par strates de leurs gentils citizen.

he oui, et même si ça pétait grave là bas, ça ne changerait pas l’axe de l’opinion: s’il y a gouvernement, manifestants, c’est une démocratie. sécuritairement insalubre, mais une magnifique démocratie plein d’un formidable goût de voter (parce que ne l’oublions pas: c’est ça la démocratie).

j’ignore ce qu’est votre groupe “Defensa” mais je lis régulièrement vos articles avec grand intérêt : noter l’absence (significative) de la Russie (rien à voir avec l’orthodoxie) et de la Chine qui a fait célébrer des offices funèbres par son Église officielle ! cel aprête à réfléchir : effectivement nous sommes à un tournant, dangereux comme tel ! meilleurs sentiments…

2 commentaires:
1) Notre civilisation occidentale vit dans une aversion grandissante du risque. Au nom du principe de précaution, on nous obligera bientôt à mourir de faim plutôt que d’avaler de la nourriture non certifiée. Cette aversion du risque est encore bien plus grande de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique. Elle est en soi indicatrice et génératrice de décadence, mais aussi génératrice de violence: pour éviter le risque, on est prêt à tout, y compris détruire l’Irak.
2) Partenariat Europe/Chine: de Gaulle nous parlait de l’Europe de l’Atlantique à l’Oural: il avait peut-être les idées un peu courtes. Je me réfère aux théories géostratégiques de Mackinder (disponible sur stratisc.org). La perspective d’une alliance continentale Europe-Chine est la principale menace à long terme pour la puissance des Etats-Unis. Dans un cycle précédent, la discorde France-reste du continent fut longtemps la ligne directrice fondamentale de l’Angleterre, pour les mêmes raisons: la puissance maritime dominante devient “irrelevante” (comme disent nos amis anglo-saxons) en cas de concorde continentale: en effet, les communications terrestres deviennent possibles, sont plus rapides et plus directes que par voie maritime et la maîtrise des mers n’apporte plus qu’un avantage marginal.
La Chine essaie de développer les communications terrestres (initiatives sur la nouvelle route de la soie par chemin de fer, par exemple). Je me demande si la constante de la politique US depuis la fin de la guerre froide n’est pas d’entretenir les tensions au centre de l’Eurasie afin d’empêcher la réalisation de leur pire cauchemar: Canton-Hambourg via le centre de l’Europe (toutes les voies physiques existent) plutôt que via le détroit de la Sonde et le Cap de Bonne Espérance.

“Le constat doit être fait que la religion, sous tous ses aspects, est impliquée, de force s’il le faut, dans l’immense débat idéologique, politique et stratégique déclenché par l’activisme belliciste des Etats-Unis.”
Nil novum sub sole. Religion et Politique ont toujours été intimement mêlées. Voter étonnement m’étonne…
Ou bien vous êtes vraiment naïf et mal informé (ce qui m’étonnerait) ou alors vous essayez de faire passer un message entre les lignes. J’estime beaucoup votre site, et vous nous avez habitué à éviter la langue de bois. Qu’avez vous vraiment voulu dire?

Votre optimisme est un peu prématuré. À mon avis, les Britanniques essayent de mieux contrôler l’Europe en se posant comme défenseurs d’Airbus. Attention à la méprise

bravo..

Bravo pour “de defensa” qui fait amende honorable quant au “populisme” de Chavez.

Bravo à Federico, qui laisse entendre qu’un superétat fédéral ferait le jeu des USA.

Un bémol : ce serait vrai dans le cas d’une Europe giscardienne.
Mais on peut écrire une autre constitution, plus claire, surtout plus nette,
et non basochienne comme celle qu’on veut nous imposer sous la menace d’un chaos en cas d’échec du oui, qui est
digne de Croquemitaine.

Au sujet de l’excellent analyse du Dr. Weinstein sur le bolivarisme de M. Chavez, il faut remarquer la très utile synthèse de l’auteur de l’article.

Chavez utilise une combinaison de moyens: sur le plan économique, un “mix” de nationalisation, participation et “tolérance” de l’initiative privée. Sur le plan géopolitique, il réaffirme la souveraineté nationale du Vénézuéla tout en primant pour la formation d’un bloc sud-américain d’Etats coopérants.

Or, cela est d’après moi la seule solution réaliste pour mettre en place des blocs de puissance alternatifs aux USA. Des “super-états” fédéraux comme l’on hypotise ici en Europe (par des gens comme J. Delors ou V. Giscard d’Estaing) signifie jouer en faveur de Washington: l’on crée des macro-régions favorables à la liberté des capitaux et on met en place des souverainetés faibles (Commission, Parlement, Etats nationaux, etc.).

Un souverainisme intélligent est en revanche celui de Chavez. Il rappelle sous certains aspects un “gaullisme sociale”, d’ailleurs.

Qu’en pensent les lecteurs de “De Defensa”?

merci

Voici un rapport de “Strategic Forecasting”, dirigé par M. George Friedman, sur des récentes découvertes des services de reinseignements allemands et israéliens:

“Europe faces potential attack threats from European-looking Islamist
militants. Sources in German intelligence and the Israeli government say the
militants in question, Muslim Albanians from Kosovo’s Orahovac region, are
getting advanced training in Kosovo.

The information, if correct, suggests that a certain group of international
militant Islamists have developed an intricate global network, operating
basic training camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border and advanced training
programs in the Balkans—where they are relying on the advanced skills of
combat-tested veterans from the Chechen and Iraqi wars. This particular
network, according to the sources, aims to conduct operations in Europe and
Israel, though other similar networks also likely exist in Germany and North
America. It is unclear whether such networks are linked to each other—or
to al Qaeda.”

L’on se demande donc: la guerre meurtrière contre la Serbie en 1999 ne devait-elle pas “sécuriser” la région? C’était en tous cas ce que l’on nous raccontait… Evidemment, selon les interets américains, tout peut changer… combattre les “jihadistes” en Afghanistan mais les pousser aux Balkans…

la morale de l histoire resterait toujours la meme..

washington declanche des guerres a la legere, malgre le manque de serieux de ses informations.

ce qui n a rien de reluisant.

bien sur comme vous le faites remarquer cela n est que fallacieux puisque la facon de faire venait directement de cheney rumsteack & co.

April 1, 2005
NEWS ANALYSIS
A Final Verdict on Prewar Intelligence Is Still Elusive
By TODD S. PURDUM
ASHINGTON, March 31 - It found no evidence that intelligence had been politically twisted to suit preconceptions about Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs, and made no formal judgments about how top policy makers had used that intelligence to justify war. Yet in its own way, the presidential commission on intelligence left little doubt that President Bush and his top aides had gotten what they wanted, not what they needed, when they were told that Saddam Hussein had a threatening arsenal of illicit weapons.

“It is hard to deny the conclusion that intelligence analysts worked in an environment that did not encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom,” the commission said. But that understated indictment is about the extent of the commission’s effort to explain the responsibilities of the nation’s highest officials for one of the worst intelligence failures of modern times.

So the latest and presumably the last official review of such questions leaves unresolved what may be the biggest question of all: Who was accountable, and will they ever be held to account for letting what amounted to mere assumptions “harden into presumptions,” as Judge Laurence H. Silberman, chairman of the commission, put it.

A full accounting awaits the work of historians. But already some people have been judged, albeit it indirect ways, while others have been rewarded, even promoted. Some who foresaw potential disaster were punished or pushed aside, while the president and vice president were given new terms.

President Bush’s election-year order creating the commission (and a schedule that assured it would report well after the election) did not authorize it to investigate how policy makers had used the intelligence they received. In the end, the commission reserved by far its sharpest criticism for the agencies that provided the intelligence, blaming them over and over again in its 601-page unclassified report for “poor tradecraft and poor management.”

By comparison, the commission made a tantalizing but oblique reference to the president. It came in a passage criticizing the vaunted President’s Daily Brief, the super-secret intelligence document that Mr. Bush and his predecessors have received each morning, complaining that its “attention-grabbing headlines and drumbeat of repetition” left misleading impressions, and no room for shadings. “In ways both subtle and not so subtle, the daily reports seemed to be ‘selling’ intelligence,” the commission found, “in order to keep its customers, or at least the First Customer, interested.”

The clearest casualties of the Iraq intelligence failures - and the most direct targets of the commission - were the top leaders of the C.I.A., beginning with George J. Tenet, who resigned as director of central intelligence last summer in the face of rising criticism. President Bush later awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

After he left, Mr. Tenet’s top leadership team was effectively replaced by his designated successor, Porter J. Goss. Among those to go were Mr. Tenet’s deputy, John McLaughlin; James L. Pavitt and Stephen R. Kappes, top officials in the agency’s clandestine service; and Jami Miscik, the deputy director for intelligence.

The old C.I.A. leadership is portrayed by the commission as either troublingly unaware or disturbingly dismissive of deep concerns within the agency that the principal source of prewar intelligence about Mr. Hussein’s chemical and biological weapons programs was reported to have problems with drinking, reliability and truthfulness. At the same time, warnings unnamed analysts within the agency who questioned this information before the war were disregarded. Others who sought after the invasion to correct the informant’s lies were branded as troublemakers and pushed out of their jobs, the commission found.

President Bush himself has never publicly blamed anyone in his administration, and some officials intimately involved in the review and public discussion of prewar intelligence including Condoleezza Rice, now secretary of state, and Stephen J. Hadley, now national security adviser, have since been promoted. Others, like Paul D. Wolfowitz, the former deputy defense secretary and now president of the World Bank, have been publicly praised and rewarded.

Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, the Republican majority leader, called the report “a forceful reminder of the need to transform America’s intelligence community to improve intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, including its communication to policy makers.”

Former Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who was one of the few leaders in either party before the war to vigorously and publicly question the administration’s assertions about Iraq’s capacities, was considerably more critical.

“Thus far, this administration has been characterized by a stunning amount of indifference to what has occurred,” he said, adding: “This administration has held nobody accountable for anything, unless you count Tenet’s resignation. Of course, he then turned around and received the nation’s highest civilian award. They have been less than fully cooperative with the nonexecutive agencies which have attempted to find out what happened. It’s inexplicable to me, at a pure level of management, why the administration has not held people accountable.”

That is arguably so. But there may be another measure. With the exception of Mr. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, there has now been considerable turnover in many of the administration officials most involved with prewar intelligence. At the Pentagon, Douglas J. Feith, the under secretary for policy who was deeply involved in intelligence matters, is leaving to return to private life soon.

While acknowledging the intelligence agencies’ past success maintaining the status quo, the commission’s co-chairman, former Senator Charles Robb, Democrat of Virginia, said the shifts in leadership that had already occurred, including Mr. Bush’s nomination of John D. Negroponte to be the first director of national intelligence, meant it would be “a whole lot easier to instigate change.”

Mr. Robb said that the commission had kept an open hot line for complaints, and “ran to ground” every report or rumor that came its way about potential political interference with intelligence-gathering and analysis, including reports that some C.I.A. analysts felt pressured by Mr. Cheney’s repeated personal visits to the agency. But he said it had found “absolutely no instance” of anyone reporting pressure to change a position.

For his part, Judge Silberman noted that the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies had vigorously disputed any suggestion of a link between Mr. Hussein and Al Qaeda, but had not resisted the consensus opinion that Iraq had unconventional weapons. “They pushed that position,” he said of the intelligence agencies, but were “absolutely uniform and uniformly wrong.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/01/politics/01policy.html?th&emc=th