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941Analysis, — From Context n°53, July 2002
The Pentagon is having its revolution It is now a matter of putting on the back-burner all the war -making capability in favor of communicating information on the war. This curious trend, which we see as inexorable, will yet come back to haunt its initiators.
Several articles in the specialized American press have been under discussion for some weeks. We are talking here primarily about the article that appeared in the 22 April 2002 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), « Pentagon Priorities Shift to Data and Networks ». That article spelled out the general thesis which is being developed and even applied in the Pentagon, according to which information is now the prime asset of modern warfare and according to which everything must be done to facilitate its circulation, its documentation and its exploitation. This observation stems primarily from two events:
• The development of the ideas in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) authored by Admiral Bill Owens, USN, back in 1994-95 (when he was assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and of the processes that grew out of that study. Since then, Owens, now retired, has distanced himself from the way in which the Pentagon is beginning to put his ideas into effect, as can be seen in his book Lifting the Fog of War.
• The air campaign in Afghanistan, in October-November, as interpreted by the Pentagon, was perceived as an impressive confirmation of the RMA thesis. Broadly speaking, the campaign was viewed as a brilliant success, primarily as a result of the exploitation of high-precision weapons whose effectiveness depends essentially on information and the accurate transmission of that information. Our own assessment of the campaign is quite different (see Context No. 52, Analysis, June 2002). But let us for now explore the changes taking place in the Pentagon.
The impact is considerable. It affects mainly the concepts and the organization of the Air Force, since that is the service that is in the forefront operationally in the US today, and the effective use of USAF assets, at very high speed and under circumstances very difficult to master because of the limited time available, depends primarily on the speed of the flow of information and on its accuracy.
From the article cited, it seems that the impact on organization and on the choice of military materiel is already making itself felt in the activity of American planners. The choice of equipment and the number of units are now highly influenced, at a time when the forces are being asked to make major long-term choices. This situation is due to various structural factors, but also to factors related to the economic situation. Moreover, the war against terrorism, with its attendant budgetary increases, requires adaptations and modifications of structures and of equipment, as well as of long term planning. That war is also the wedge whereby Rumsfeld is seeking to launch the major reform of the armed services which he had tried, without success, to launch in the period before 11 September.
We have already gotten reports of certain tendencies of this reformist campaign in the Pentagon, especially with the emphasis now placed on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs and UCAVs), unarmed and armed. Our inquiry is much broader, however. Contrary to what one of the observers quoted by AW&ST had to say (« That's not a philosophical question, it's a reality »), the evolution commented on here is truly a question of philosophy in that a philosophy expresses and influences the actions of people.
The general conclusion being drawn today in the Pentagon and by defense experts is that there currently are masses of information available and that the problem lies in the effective distribution of that information and of its intelligent exploitation. What all this means is that there is decreased interest in manned fighter aircraft as an aerial combat platform and therefore decreased interest in the major fighter aircraft programs. For some time, there have been heated polemics surrounding these major fighter aircraft development programs: the F-22 (USAF), the F-18E/F (US Navy) and the JSF/F-35. These polemics are now taking a new turn, however, with the focus centering on the interaction between information and the aerial combat platform itself.
It is also in this context that we must view the US Navy's recent proposal to reduce its order for the F-18E/F by 15% and, more particularly, its order for the JSF/F-35 by 30% (a cut that would affect primarily the Marine Corps vertical-short-takeoff-and- landing [VSTOL] version of the aircraft). Various analysts believe that the USAF will also reduce its JSF/F-35 order, in parallel with the US Navy, whereas the F-22 finds itself the target for further cuts in the number of units on order, if not the target for abandonment of the program. These latter developments are of particular concern to the USAF, with that service already taking a firm stance against the view that the costly F-22 (nearly $200 million per copy) is « an obsolete platform inherited from the Cold War », claiming instead that it must be considered as a key consumer of operational intelligence as well as a supplier of such intelligence.
The case of the JSF/F-35 is even more sensitive, especially when the international aspect of the program is taken into account. The program is strongly export oriented, but its success obviously will depend on its price which the Americans claim they will be able to keep at $30-$40 million a copy. This evaluation already seems compromised by the determination of the Navy and perhaps of the USAF to reduce their JSF orders. The only real argument in favor of the JSF under the new information revolution is set forth in the article in question, citing an industry source: « What often gets lost in this budget process is the international aspect. What's unique about the F-35 is that it adds the international dimension -- even more so than the UAVs. It will be tailored so that every country flying that aircraft will have access to the information being collected around the battlefield. The international customers are paying for that capability. If the [Pentagon] decision makers aren't considering that, we're not getting our money's worth out of them. And in addition to the other aircraft, it also will provide information to the guys on the ground and back in the combined air operations center. » The argument is therefore, from the point of view of the national interests of the buyers, completely paradoxical, if one keeps in mind that all the communications assets and information flows, as well as the information itself, will be controlled by the Americans.
From the American standpoint, the argument in favor of the JSF/F-35 today is that the aircraft is totally integrated into the operational architecture and depends exclusively on American control for both information and communications. This means that the non-US JSF aircraft will be entirely under US control operationally and therefore politically. This in turn translates into control exercised by the Pentagon, thereby adding a further dimension to the loss of political autonomy for the non-US aircraft, since the substantial power of the Pentagon bureaucracy means that central political control by the White House is increasingly attenuated.
What is broadly at stake in the revolution which is gathering speed in the Pentagon -- with the specific example of the JSF making it possible to focus on a substantive example -- is operational control in a process of centralization at all stages of operations. The political dimension of the problem is becoming very big and cannot be avoided as a subject for closer examination. It is a specifically American process - like the bureaucratic aspect which plays a fundamental role and which is directly linked to the culture of the Pentagon. In effect, as we indicated earlier, it is a matter of philosophy and of nothing else, contrary to what those at the heart of this revolution affirm.
Several points must be developed to better define the phenomenon and to give it its true dimensions.
• The first point entails a determined systematic human disengagement in favor of advanced technology systems whose employment in fact depends on information and communications. This shift is justified by a doctrine which makes the exploitation of technology a fundamental factor for effective centralized control, and, therefore, an ideal basis for replacing the human factor. Beyond that, it manages to satisfy the doctrine of ''zero fatalities'', so important to American planning. This point is advanced explicitly in the article referred to, citing DoD sources, pointing out Rumsfeld's systematic rejection of USAF and US Army requests to increase their forces in Afghanistan by 6,000 and 20,000 men, respectively.
• The second point entails the fact that this development directly supports the operational doctrine calling for the automatic projection of forces so essential to American military thinking. In a way, these information and communications technologies can be expected to facilitate even greater control over force projection: the greater the projection capability, the greater and more centralized the control. During the conflict in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, CINCCent (Central Command), theater commander, remained in Tampa, Florida, and visited Washington more often than he did Afghanistan. It is easy to understand how such a force structure coincides with the Bush Administration's strong unilateralist and isolationist tendencies.
• The third point involves the attempt to implement the doctrine by integrating the allies through the technical aspect (mastery of information), i.e. without entailing any political discussion on the decision. It is not a matter of alliance but simply of cooperation. In such a situation, American domination becomes absolute and the margin for maneuver by the allies who agree to enter into the system end up close to zero. We are confronted with a form of American unilateralism and American isolationism that seeks to achieve expansionist ends without ever having to leave the American heartland. This third point is more sensitive because it must be implemented through maximum distribution of JSF-type equipment, which, as we have seen, can run contrary to the interests of the armed services (reduction in the number of JSF aircraft, increased unit price, growing problems in selling the system outside the US).
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