Comment Dannatt a monté son coup… Circonstances et conséquences

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On commence à relever les morts et les blessés du champ de bataille de cette fin de semaine, à Londres, avec l’interview explosive du chef d’état-major des forces armées britanniques, le général Sir Richard Dannatt. Le récit complet que fait The Observer de l’affaire révèle qu’il s’agit d’un traquenard que le CEM britannique a lui-même monté puisque, autorisé par son ministre à intervenir publiquement comme il l’a fait, il a “interprété” à sa façon les limites de l’autorisation qui lui avait été donnée.

The Observer décrit les conditions techniques de l’interview. Il apparaît que, loin d’avoir été “piégé” par la journaliste (Sarah Sands, du Daily Mail et ancienne du Daily Telegraph), c’est Dannatt lui-même qui orienta ses réponses de façon à en faire un message politique puissant et «the journalistic equivalent of gelignite».

Le passage ci-dessous est sans ambiguïté :

«Defence secretary Des Browne had only sanctioned the meeting on the understanding — by both sides — “that it would be strictly on military issues, not politics”. While the former Sunday Telegraph editor may have understood the message, Dannatt appeared to have his own interpretation of the instruction. Towards the end of their 90-minute chat the general seemed only too keen to drag the conversation into uncharted territory. It was the journalistic equivalent of gelignite.

»Perhaps, some speculated, the chief of the general staff had been dazzled by Sands's breezy, disarming manner. But the truth is that the 55-year-old general, described by colleagues as a cautious, cerebral character, knew what he was doing when he shattered the rule of silence that had concealed the concerns of his predecessors. Dannatt had seen first hand how Iraq was draining the spirit of his men. He had listened to troops who wondered how many more of their peers would die in a conflict that seemed to be getting worse by the day.»

Un autre passage intéressant est celui qui décrit les réactions à Downing Street et à Washington. Il y a une atmosphère de véritable panique qui, en se référant à l’impunité totale dont a finalement bénéficié le CEM au prix d’une post-interprétation grotesque de l’interview, mesure l’état d’immense faiblesse où se trouvent aujourd’hui les pouvoirs anglo-saxons. Les généraux, aujourd’hui, peuvent dire ce qu’ils veulent ; les pouvoirs politiques sont trop faibles, et leur cause est trop affreusement détestable (655.000 morts en Irak depuis 2003…) pour qu’ils puissent réagir avec autorité. La démonstration est concluante.

Voici donc, — “saynètes” transatlantiques à la découverte de l’interview du général.

«At 11.58pm Downing Street was forced to issue a statement saying that British troops were supported by the democratically elected Iraqi government. Across the Atlantic, the White House was in a state of apoplexy. Before the day was out, what had begun as a soft newspaper spread on a soldier had created a transatlantic rumpus. The most public chasm between the military and government in recent memory had once again entangled Blair in that most caustic of subjects: Iraq.

»They traipsed into the Ministry of Defence with a more sluggish stride than usual on Friday morning. The news across Sky and the BBC was about the army chief's comments. On the third floor, Dannatt's colleagues were uncertain whether to offer words of support for their boss's forthright comments or to lie low. Discretion won out.

»A Downing Street damage-limitation exercise had seen Dannatt endure a 14-minute radio interview on Radio 4's Today programme. Designed to play down his comments to Sands, the general actually chose to go one step further. Dannatt suggested Iraq might ultimately “break” his beloved British army. “I want an army in five years' time,” he said quietly to the nation.

»By the time the general reached his office, the atmosphere on the third-floor was as tense as a field headquarters before battle. Any doubt of the seismic repercussions of his remarks vanished with a phone call from the US embassy.

»“As you Brits say: ‘What the fuck is going on?’” hissed the diplomat. The Pentagon seemed baffled and bruised in equal measure. Days before, US military chiefs had suggested that current troop levels in Iraq would have to remain for the best part of a decade. Downing Street was incandescent, a dismal week had reached a desperate outcome. The first Prime Minister's Questions of the parliamentary year, the day after Sands met Dannatt, had seen Blair's famed surefootedness suddenly desert him.

»Could, asked some critics, the attention given by the morning papers to indications that the death toll in Iraq following the US-led invasion had topped 655,000, have been part of what rattled Blair? Such concerns had been overtaken by Friday. What should have been a historic announcement by the Prime Minister on a roadmap to restoring devolution to Northern Ireland had been hijacked by a row over a distant country mired in an ever-bloodier conflict.

»By now, the public controversy had made its way to Washington. Challenged by a reporter at his White House briefing, George Bush's spokesman claimed that Dannatt had been taken out of context. “He was misquoted?” prompted a journalist.

»“Yes, that's what he says,” retorted the president's aide.»


Mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2006 à 15H18