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1099@SURTITRE = JSF Babel
In a way, the marketing campaign to internationalize the JSF program is an unprecedented success, a success that perhaps exceeds the hopes of its promoters. Eight countries – the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Canada, and Australia – have agreed to participate in the program’s final R&D phase. The UK, Italy and the Netherlands have made substantial commitments. Israel is engaged in advanced negotiations and Singapore has received a proposal.
A French industry source commented, with irony tinged with bitterness, that the European countries had commitments to the JSF program « to a level of $4 billion – an amount corresponding to the cost of the entire program, R&D included, for the Rafale in its “Air” version, whereas they have not invested a single euro in a European fighter aircraft program ». What we are confronted with is clearly a phenomenon that is without precedent in the history of military aviation, a phenomenon which, in our view, is in the process of changing the structure of the weapon systems export sales market in ways never before seen.
What we want to point out here – before examining and trying to understand the situation, and then exploring its effects – is what we would term (to coin a neologism for which we beg the indulgence of our readers) the “Babelization” of the JSF, harking back to the Tower of Babel of Biblical fame and the confusion of tongues that resulted from the effort to build a tower to heaven. Today, one would be more inclined to refer to it as a multicultural gathering. We readily admit that we are rather surprised by the phenomenon, not so much by virtue of its magnitude as by its fundamental characteristics.
“Babelization” of the JSF exists for two reasons:
• The growing number of participants, the timing of their commitments (well prior to commencement of the production phase), the haste with which the commitments seem to have been made.
• There is also the financial size of the commitments – an element that is assuming increasing importance as it expands ($2 billion for the UK and almost $1 billion for the Netherlands) – entailing active participation as partners entitled to their say and ever mindful of that right.
In other words, the “Babelization” of the JSF means that the program has become a true international program – not only trans-Atlantic (because of the number of European countries involved), but also global, because it takes in non-European partners (Turkey, Australia and probably Israel). And it is this internationalization or “Babelization” of the JSF program that carries with it a progressive, but accelerated, loss of the program’s American character.
“Cooperation” is a key word in the trans-Atlantic lexicon, especially in the armaments field, and this has been the case for the more than half century that the “Trans-Atlantic Community” has been in existence. The main problem posed by this conceptual evolution obviously concerns the issue of cooperation between Europe and the US, with the distinction between the enormousness of the American system compared to the much more reduced size of the European countries (viewed as so many national entities and not as a European entity in a field – armaments cooperation – where it is still possible to talk of a European entity).
The question that concerns us here is the following: Is there already real cooperation between the US and Europe – and, by the same token, real cooperation between the US and other regions of the world? The question can then be put in more basic terms: Has there ever been true cooperation in the armaments field with a non US player? (By “cooperation”, we mean joint work on a project or program where each party has a voice in decisions affecting its interest, extending up to 50 50 in a project where all decisions are taken jointly. By “cooperation”, we also mean work that is undertaken from the outset in the R&D field, or, in any event, sufficiently early in the development phase to effectively exercise an influence on the general orientation.) The answer, regrettably, is not far from being negative.
In the field of advanced aeronautics and in the field of major technologically and politically significant programs, we find only a single program in which such cooperation existed: the CFM56 engine which – irony of ironies – was a France-US project between SNECMA and General Electric (irony because France, with its traditional political position, is surely the last country that one would have expected to find in this position vis-à-vis the US). The other instances of “cooperative” projects, most often entailing US involvement in programs of European countries, embodied the assumption by the national industry of an element in a particular program, including the central element, for the national development of that element. The most meaningful example is the Hawker Siddey (BAE) Harrier, adopted by the US Marine Corps in a special version developed by McDonnell Douglas designated the AV-8A, which even parented an independent family of aircraft from the initial main trunk, with the AV 8B (BAE pursuing the development of the Harrier and of the Sea Harrier, up to the Advanced Harrier).
On the other hand, and aside from the pro forma declarations, we understand America’s policy perfectly. The power of American industry and its obvious self-sufficiency explain the fact that it in no way seeks true cooperation. The same holds for its partner in the military industrial complex, the Pentagon, whose continuing aim is to maintain control over all procurement sources.
Suddenly, the JSF bursts on the scene to disturb this all-too-cozy relationship. For the arrangements already in existence with numerous foreign countries, and the direct involvement of those countries in the program, offer the prospect that that the JSF may in fact turn out to be a program that embodies true cooperation.
Matters took a dramatic turn in the Spring of 2001. The JSF had been primarily a Democratic program, a legacy of the Clinton Administration. The arrival of the Bush-Rumsfeld duumvirate in January 2001 was accompanied by tumultuous and insistent demands for reform of the Pentagon bureaucracy and its programs – the JSF was presented as one of the most vulnerable programs, targeted for massive cutbacks and even for elimination. These developments acquired a certain urgency in the Spring, to the point, according to a European source close to the program, that frantic calls for help were made by the programs industrial backers (mainly Lockheed Martin [LM]) to potential foreign partners. A clear indication of the climate of concern that prevailed at the time is to be found in the 12 March 2001 Washington Post (and International Herald Tribune) article, « Pentagon Sales Pitch to the Allies: This New Warplane Needs You ». The article left no doubt: « Led by the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin and rival Boeing Co are mounting an unprecedented marketing campaign to get foreign governments to help pay for development of Joint Strike Fighter… ». The article highlighted the totally unusual nature of the initiative of involving countries other than the US in a such a technologically advanced program at such an early stage in the program’s development. The European source cited earlier points out that it was « a decisive moment in which certain American private industry (supported by certain Pentagon factions) undertook commitments – unprecedented for the US – with potential foreign partners in the field of armaments cooperation ».
Indeed, it was a period of activity, unprecedented in its intensity. Some rushed to sign on the dotted line. In January 2001, the UK dealt itself in to the tune of $2 billion, carried away by the new climate in which, for the first time in a program of this size, the Americans acknowledged that they needed help from the “Rest Of the World”. The effect was not realized at the time, but it is beginning to be felt: America has for the first time entered into a truly cooperative program in the case of the JSF.
The need for cooperation has always been proclaimed, especially at the European level, since European affairs have generally been marked (starting in the fifties, around 1956 and the signature of the Treaty of Rome) by the need for cooperation, initially to create a rapprochement among European countries torn by centuries-long historical enmities. In the aerospace and defense sectors, the concept of cooperation has constituted a powerful and steady force, a concept according to which the greater the number of participating countries, the more successful the endeavor. The considerable excesses of the EFA Eurofighter in all areas, but beginning with the technical field, today lead, on reflection, to the contrary view.
The EFA seemed indeed to be the ideal example of European cooperation, with four countries involved, including two major European powers. (The only major European country not participating, France, had initially planned to participate; France’s withdrawal in 1984-85 took place under circumstances in which the other countries bear a heavy share of responsibility. Germany, in particular – with its Minister of Defense Manfred Wörner, later to become Secretary General of NATO, which wanted major responsibilities and which knew that such a role would be difficult to maintain if there was a UK-France lash-up – did much to render France’s continuation in the program impossible.) The sharing of the tasks and responsibilities, including technologies, was done within the EFA on the basis of economic and political considerations – if not considerations of prestige – where actual capabilities were not always the deciding factor. There were also costly duplications adopted to satisfy certain participating countries.
Finally, it emerged that cooperation as exemplified by the EFA, far from being an approach that makes it possible to maximize program efficiency, is, on the contrary, the open door to excesses and slippages, economic, as well as technological and operational. Today, in the light of the EFA experience, the concept of armaments cooperation is being rethought. Several conclusions can be drawn:
• The number of participants is not a guarantee of success but a factor of increased risk. The ideal number of participants for a cooperative project is situated toward the fewest possible, two participants often being the ideal number.
• Participants must, if possible, have comparable capabilities and comparable aspirations so that harmony and balance evolve naturally in the orientation and management of the project. Thus, in the history of European military cooperation, cooperative programs which fully achieved their purpose have often brought together two partners meeting these criteria (the Jaguar Anglo-French fighter aircraft, the Franco-German trainer/fighter AlphaJet, missile systems such as the Franco-German Roland, etc.).
A major review is in progress to examine the very concept of armaments cooperation, a review that is all the more necessary since today’s programs (fewer and fewer in number) are extremely complex and extremely costly. It is in this context of full-blown metamorphosis that the JSF program is beginning to take shape and to show its true face – albeit unexpectedly – that of being the first major international cooperation program under the aegis of the US, under the initial conditions that have been described.
The JSF program presents a very special situation. A comparison was made right of the bat with the F-16 program as it evolved as from the time that four European countries (Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway) ordered the aircraft in June 1975. (In this case, if the comparison is admitted, our affirmation that the JSF is the first true US military cooperation program would not be valid.)
On the contrary, the comparison is of interest in order to show what differentiates the two programs – and in a way that is both crucial and extremely significant. The comparison also serves to open a discussion on the future of the JSF program, using the F-16 as the standard since that program has stood the test of time as a major success. There can be no doubt that this perception is one of the factors pushing the three European countries that participated in the F-16 to opt for the JSF: Holland, Denmark and Norway are hoping to find in the JSF program the formula for success that they enjoyed with the F-16 program.
The conditions for the success of the F-16 program were the following:
• It was not an R&D and operational design cooperation program, since the technological and operational characteristics for the F-16 fighter aircraft (the former YF-16 Light Fighter having become the F-16 Air Combat Fighter) were specified in their entirety by the USAF. The four European countries, all four being NATO members like the US, agreed in advance on the specifications formulated primarily for the USAF, which operated massively on the Central European front. The match was perfect.
• On the other hand, the program called for cooperative production between two partners since the four European countries banded together and placed their joint order for 346 aircraft with their US partner. The commitment of the four countries covered an actual order and not participation in an R&D phase, the cooperation being limited to the production phase and relating directly to the aircraft ordered by the European partners.
• The chronology of the F-16 program effectively highlights this difference: the first delivery of an operational F-16 to Belgium took place in 1979, four years after signature of the agreement. In the case of the JSF, no specific aircraft order has been placed and the delivery times, if orders are forthcoming, will take place starting n 2010, i.e. in eight years rather than four. The vagueness surrounding forecasts and orders, delivery times and costs, contrasts singularly with the certainties of the F-16 program in these respects.
There is a big difference between the two programs, once one gets beyond the aspect of appearance. Behind a spectacular presentation, the F-16 program was in reality a well-thought-out program, but one limited in scope to production, thereby finessing the more delicate R&D cooperation aspect and establishing, by virtue of the organization put in place, two partners (the US and the four European countries) and not five different nations.
Taking the F-16 Program as a standard, it is possible to detail the characteristics of the JSF program and to specify what differentiates it – to our mind, with devastating effect – from the F-16 program.
• Of course, the JSF is a cooperative program in the sense that the current commitment of the countries other than the US covers the R&D phase and that no order for any production-run aircraft has so far been placed. The question then posed is what the R&D commitment will confer on the non-US participants in terms of oversight rights or license rights. Nowhere is that specified. Some would say “necessarily so”, since there is no way of knowing what, within the JSF program, can be the subject of cooperative effort and what is excluded because of US constraints regarding classified matter and since there is no way of knowing what each of the parties can contribute to the joint effort – assuming they have something to contribute.
• There are really nine countries with commitments (the eight plus the US) and no planning, no coordination among them (not even among the three of the old F-16 consortium). The participants are sometimes in different regions (Australia, and quite probably Israel), where operational requirements are not the same.
The unifying approach that was present in the F-16 program that united both the participants and their activity within the consortium – that unifying approach seems to be totally lacking in the case of the JSF and in its place we have a centrifugal force that appears to be preventing any semblance of rational structure from emerging.
@SURTITRE = Signs of “Babelization”
The above analysis of armaments cooperation in general and in the JSF program in particular is not just a theoretical exercise. Certain recent developments show that the JSF program has in fact entered into a new phase that corresponds to what we are calling the “Babelization” of the JSF program.
First, there is the statement made 11 July by Giorgio Zappa, Chairman of Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica that the « European partners in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program should establish a European final assembly, logistics and armaments center for the aircraft. » Zappa noted that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Italy and the US « left the door open » for such an arrangement.
In an 11 July interview with Defense News published 22 July, Zappa provided his views on the outlook for JSF production as well as on the climate for cooperation between Europeans and Americans involved in the program: « Zappa also said European partners will have reduced access to JSF technology due to tightened US security controls in the wake of Sept. 11, and he cast doubt on industry predictions of the sale of 3,000 JSFs to the US and British militaries and 3,000 elsewhere, saying a more realistic figure would be 1,500 and about 1,000 aircraft, respectively. »
The concerns voiced in Zappa’s statement are echoed by others, especially in the UK, demanding the advantages of making the JSF, at least its non US portion, a sort of “international program” detached from the central US program. The suggestion is for the JSF program to adopt one of the features of the F 16 program – the establishment of a production line in Europe (in Belgium and in the Netherlands) for a portion of the aircraft ordered. It is proposed that this be done in a different way, however. The difference is mainly chronological (a difference in the stage of design and development), as well as a difference in the assessment of the technologies involved.
• First, the chronological difference, as we have already seen in the case of the F-16 program. When the commitment to the F-16 program was made, the aircraft characteristics and the production program were known, having been formulated by the Americans and proposed by them to their potential European customers. The Americans were clearly in charge of the project and had only to persuade the Europeans to become their subcontractors, with a promise of technology transfers. In the case of the JSF, the problem is not the same: the proposal, which is not yet official, comes from the Europeans (from one European for the moment) and already constitutes interference in the planning of a program which is far from being brought under control by its American designers and developers. It is an attempt by the European partners to gain some degree of control over the program.
• The other aspect, the protection by the Americans of their technology seems like one more interference in the Zappa proposal. It makes very complex the prospect of establishing a production line in Europe, which should, after all, enjoy a certain independence. The task is rendered all the more difficult since Zappa presents the request on behalf of the European participants as a group, whereas the individual countries are treated differently by the Americans for purposes of access to advance technologies (maximum access for the British, reduced access for the Dutch and still less for the Italians).
Other signs of “Babelization” of the JSF program have emerged, like the Australian request for a reconnaissance version of the JSF (or to have recon capabilities integrated into the JSF), or the likelihood that Israel will join the program. Various indicia have shown that the European countries, or, in any case, certain European countries, are very hostile to Israel’s joining the JSF program. The explanation is simple and can be summarized under two heads:
• Israel is a very advanced military power and has a very specific idea of the type of aircraft that it needs, requirements that do not at all match European requirements.
• Israel has an enormous influence on the Americans and could plausibly impose some of its conditions under certain circumstances.
As a result, the European countries are very apprehensive of being confronted with a particularly insistent involvement by the Israelis, who might succeed in imposing their own design priorities. This prospect is taken quite seriously, and a Belgian industry source, who was involved in the F-16 program, who follows the development of the JSF program and who also knows the Israelis well, holds the view that « it is potentially a very serious problem. The Israelis want very special aircraft, which do not correspond to our requirements, and that was one of the reasons for which the idea of producing F-16s here for Israel was discarded. It comes as no surprise to me that the prospect of Israeli participation in the JSF program is creating very strong tensions among the Europeans. »
This point is critical. It boils down to the question of whether a single aircraft can be produced for such a diverse range of customers and for such demanding customers. At best, the prospect opened by this particular case promises serious confrontations, as well as untold bureaucratic and political difficulties – so much so that politics are destined to play a major role. The prospects are, according to our source, so complex and so constricting that it is possible to envisage the case where it would be necessary to have different versions, depending upon the participant, in order to avoid program gridlock and confrontations capable of seriously interfering with the program timetable. The same Belgian source expresses the view that the JSF will end up with « four or five different versions. There will surely be an English JSF and an Israeli JSF – specific versions – perhaps an Australian JSF, and a JSF for the others… » This may be a valid forecast. If so, what will become of the costs and the delivery schedule?
In a way, it can be said that the JSF is beginning to encounter reality. With this event, one can expect various key questions to be raised. Such questions of course relate to the JSF, but will also concern weapon system development in general, especially that of more advanced systems which integrate more recent technologies, with the systems of the combat/fighter aircraft embodying the paradigm.
A quarter of a century ago, the future development of these weapons systems was considered as unavailing unless it involved cooperation bringing to bear all the industrial and technological capability that could be mustered. In general, the generation of fighter aircraft then under development (F-16, F-18, Mirage 2000) was considered as the last combat aircraft to be developed on a national basis.
Various factors have interfered with this prediction coming to pass and for the fourth generation of advanced fighter aircraft – in which would be included mainly the EFA, the JSF and the Rafale – only two of these three systems are being implemented on a cooperative basis, with one of those two being pursued on the basis of full cooperation (the EFA) and the other (the JSF), on the basis of a highly specific and evolving cooperative approach because of the power of the US and the evolution of the relationship between the US and the non-US program partners. The surprise is obviously that at the current stage, only one of the three programs has not experienced some incident or some delay of its own making (the Rafale was set back five years because of French budgetary constraints). It is also something of a surprise that the Rafale M is starting its embarked service on board the aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle in a highly flexible and satisfactory manner. The new policy of the French government – guaranteed for a period of five years, barring unexpected economic developments – means an upward shift in French military expenditures, with a second Charles-de-Gaulle class aircraft carrier, which can be expected to translate into a further bolstering of the status of the Rafale. The situation of the two other programs have already been covered at some length.
As we have seen, the constantly deteriorating situation of the EFA and the uncertain situation of the JSF as regards its current arrangements also constitute an indictment against the cooperative approach (in any event, cooperation involving more than two nations). The success of the Rafale, on the contrary, shows that the day of the nationally-developed and nationally-produced fighter aircraft is not necessarily behind us. The absence of political problems, the cost-effectiveness of having a single project manager, the relative stability of financing – all of these have combined to produce a situation in which the nationally-developed and nationally-produced aircraft – in addition to having the advantages already enumerated – costs less than the EFA, but the quantity of orders for the Rafale is less than a third of the theoretical number of EFAs on order.
These simple facts and reasonable assumptions constitute key background factors in posing a fundamental question with respect to the doctrines which have dominated the development of the aviation industry for the past three decades. The special status of the Rafale, the problems of the other fighter aircraft programs, the reexamination of the cooperation-at-any-cost doctrine – all of these have led to the question being asked of whether the development of combat systems integrating advanced technologies does not depend upon reasonable and prudent choices being made; advanced technological capabilities being expertly employed; integration capabilities being applied with equal deftness – rather than upon the race that we have witnessed until now in pursuit of power at any price, and in pursuit of numbers and weight. In this case too, as in the case of major company mergers, we can start to question the validity of the premise “Big Is Beautiful”.
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