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Avant la rencontre Blair-GW Bush de la mi-juillet (19 juillet), on a beaucoup parlé de la question des transferts de technologies entre USA et UK (les Britanniques très mécontents par ce qu'ils obtiennent, ou plutôt ce qu'ils n'obtiennent pas ; les Américains, immuables, qui laissent récriminer et ne changent rien à leur politique). A la veille de cette rencontre (le 15 juillet), le Financial Times (FT) a publié un très long article sur la question, et sur son aspect le plus dramatique qui est l'éventuelle “fusion” de BAE avec un partenaire US.
L’accès du quotidien britannique étant limité dans le temps, nous reprenons, avec les réserves d’usage, ce texte paru le 15 juillet 2003 dans le FT, sur la question des grandes fusions transatlantiques dans le domaine aérospatial et de défense, précisément le britannique BAE avec un “géant” US. Le titre complet de l’article est : « BAE looks west: why Britain’s leading defence company believes the moment is ripe for a transatlantic link-up » ; avec le sous-titre suivant : « The UK’s national champion’ is desperate to find a US partner to keep pace in a global technology race — and Tony Blair’s government may no longer want to stand in its way »
Notez l’emploi du terme “desperate”. On en retrouve d’autres, dans le texte, qui indiquent des états psychologiques extrêmes, qui en disent beaucoup plus sur le cas britannique que les arguments divers, qui sont souvent caractérisés par des contradictions ou des explications tordues qui en disent long. Nous avons rarement lu, sur un sujet d’habitude très sévère et soumis aux seuls arguments économiques, surtout dans le FT, un texte illustrant implicitement un tel désarroi, une incertitude si grande. Ce texte illustre, selon nous, un phénomène étonnant, qui est celui du suicide d’une nation, et d’une très grande nation, qui se fait sous nos yeux stupéfaits. Il est somme toute rassurant que, même chez ceux qui plaident le plus fortement pour suivre cette voie, il y ait un soupçon, et même plus qu’un soupçon d’incertitude, voire de tristesse, peut-être de désespoir. (Ce texte est sans doute une variante plus lucide, plus désenchantée, moins joyeusement suicidaire, de la démarche de Tony Blair que nous avons qualifiée de “servilité volontariste”, variante postmoderniste et nécessairement sophistiquée de la thèse de ce cher Étienne de La Boétie. On relira aussi avec intérêt un commentaire fulgurant de l’excellent historien William Pfaff sur le sujet de ce “suicide d’une nation”.)
D’ailleurs, arrêtez-vous à cette contradiction du titre et du sous-titre, du point de vue économique et rationnel qui est celui que privilégie le FT, et que doit privilégier BAE (on le suppose) ; cette contradiction entre le moment qui est ripe (“mûr”) pour une fusion avec les US, selon BAE, et ce même BAE décrit comme “desperate to find a US partner”, — entre un jugement qui voudrait se parer de la vertu de l’analyse rationnelle et un état d’esprit (le désespoir) qui mène à ce jugement, qui est en substance, quel que soit son fondement, complètement irrationnel. C’est cette sorte de contraste si révélateur qu’on relève dans le texte de FT. Voyons voir.
• L’argument fondamental pour que BAE recherche une fusion avec un géant US, dans tous les cas l’argument RP (de relations publiques), c’est le sempiternel “technological gap” avec les USA. On n’y va pas de main morte dans le commentaire : « Worse still, the widening technology gap could leave them a generation behind their US rivals when it comes to selling future equipment. » Plus loin dans le texte, les deux auteurs précisent tout de même, et sans une seconde mettre en cause la vision complètement inverse qu’ils rapportent : « Thales, a purely French defence contractor, also believes that with a decent increase in research and development spending, Europe can keep up with the US companies. In some fields, such as sensor technology and Europe's new, jointly produced cruise missile, Storm-
Shadow, the French believe they are even ahead of US technology. » Cette observation est extraordinaire et montre, à la fois l’hypocrisie instinctive du propos et la terreur que quelque phrase d’affirmation britannique puisse faire froncer des sourcils américains ; en effet, les Storm Shadow, développés par les Britanniques et les Français à partir du Scalp français, ont été utilisés en Irak par la RAF. Les Britanniques ont été les premiers à constater l’efficacité du système, à voir que les Américains étaient très impressionnés par ces performances qui dépassent leurs propres cruise missiles, à voir les Américains s’intéresser au Storm Shadow jusqu’à envisager d’en acheter. Ils n’osent même plus tirer la moindre gloire d’une prouesse technologique où ils sont partie prenante. (Étrange ou significatif : ils en oublient d’accabler les Français, comme ils font d’habitude, et il y a dans l’énoncé de la phrase qui suit comme une admiration cachée, une envie secrète pour ces Français qui ne se sentent pas liés par un devoir d’acquiescement à toutes les billevesées américanistes : « Such brave talk from the French defence establishment... »)
(On ne s’y trompera pas : la supériorité du Scalp/Storm Shadow sur les cruise US ne peut être tenue pour un accident, ou une exception. Un système si complexe requiert une base technologique générale à mesure, c’est-à-dire au moins équivalente à celle des USA. Après cela, et après bien d’autres exemples du même tonneau, parlons du “technological gap”)
• Il y a un étrange mélange dans ce texte. D’une part, il semble qu’on adopte par instants des arguments politiques. D’autre part, on sait que le FT, aussi bien que les dirigeants de BAE, et ceux des sociétés US, jugent en termes économiques, de masse financière, de profit, etc. D’où des contradictions qui semblent, à certains moments, détruire l’essentiel de l’argument, voire le tourner en complète dérision. Ainsi nous est-il annoncé d’abord que le moment est décisif, qu’il y a aujourd’hui une opportunité extraordinaire, à saisir certes, pour BAE, aux USA.
« ...the British defence establishment and its biggest contractor, BAE Systems, sense an opportunity that they cannot afford to miss.“There will never be a better moment to press home this issue [of technology transfert,” says Alex Nicoll, assistant director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “We are at a peculiar juncture in history with the US and UK relationship so strong because of Iraq and continental European companies unable to build their US businesses for political reasons.” »
... A côté de cela, ou, plutôt, au contraire de cela, on nous annonce, quelques colonnes plus tard, que les conditions de fusion de BAE avec un Américain sont très mauvaises, parce qu’aucun Américain n’est intéressé par BAE. Du coup, ce qui nous est présenté comme un trait de génie, comme une stratégie de superbe ampleur, peut apparaître aussi comme une tentative de la dernière chance, comme une sorte de bradage... Dès lors, ce qui est d’abord présenté comme une opportunité extraordinaire qui doit irrésistiblement renforcer la grande société britannique, s’avère être une triste opération de sauvegarde d’une société en train de couler irrésistiblement, et bientôt l’on ne serait pas étonné d’apprendre que BAE a été proposé à Boeing pour le penny symbolique. De qui se moque-t-on — ou, plutôt, de qui se moquent-ils sinon d’eux-mêmes ?
« A report drawn up by government appointed financial advisers also argues that BAE's chances of pulling off a deal with one of the big five US contractors could deteriorate as its share price languishes and the technology gap grows ever wider. Already BAE's market capitalisation is far short of the level needed for any of the US contractors to consider a true 50-50 merger.
» “The problem is likely to get worse before it gets better,” says one banker to have studied the prospects of a deal. “BAE will only fall further behind and the valuation gap is likely to grow rather than diminish over time.”
» But it is far from being a done deal. Many observers doubt whether BAE can pull off such an ambitious transatlantic deal in the next year. One problem is that the company holds few attractions for a prospective US buyer. »
• Certainement, le plus impressionnant dans ce texte est la légèreté avec laquelle est traité l'argument de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance nationale. Nul n'ignore qu'une vente de BAE à un grand groupe américain (même si le terme “fusion” est employé) signifierait en fait la cession de quelques-uns des domaines les plus essentiels de l'indépendance technologique du Royaume-Uni, c'est-à-dire sa souveraineté et son indépendance nationale. On reste stupéfait devant l'espèce de fatalisme qui semble accompagner le constat de la chose, comme s'il y avait dans ce renoncement quelque chose d'inéluctable.
« Britain's dominant defence company believes it will probably have to give up independence entirely and merge with a larger US rival in order to gain full access to new military technology.
(...)
» In different circumstances, BAE's quest for a US partner would be expected to hit a political brick wall. Few governments have been willing to give up strategic control of their defence industries; BAE's dramatic turn to the west threatens to undermine a series of European partnerships that Whitehall has been nurturing for decades.
» The post-Iraq mood in Downing Street has produced a surprising degree of support for BAE's ambitions. Some advisers believe that — once the issue of technology transfer was resolved — it might not be such a disaster to relinquish control of BAE, if it meant that the company's British factories could continue to make modern equipment at competitive prices.
(...)
» ...BAE has also resorted to tough tactics when negotiating contracts for new Hawk trainer jets, even sending forward-dated redundancy notices to factory workers to show the government the consequences of awarding the contract elsewhere.
» Fed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a “national champion” from foreign takeover. Some in the Treasury even question whether things could get any worse under new management. »
• Le mot le plus terrible, — ce sera le mot de la fin de ce commentaire qui n'a abordé que les parties les plus visibles de cet article si significatif d'un état d'esprit, — on le trouve dans l'extrait immédiatement ci-dessus, qui semble contenir l'explication centrale de cette position de complet abandon, comme devant une fatalité du renoncement. C'est le mot (l'expression) “Fed up” employé dans cette phrase terrible où il nous est dit qu'après tout, il n'importe plus guère à la bureaucratie du ministère de la défense de “protéger” BAE (« Fed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a “national champion” from foreign takeover »)
Comme on s'en doute, Blair est rentré de sa rencontre avec GW Bush sans beaucoup de gibier dans sa besace ; une promesse de mettre sur pied une commission anglo-américaine où l'on parlerait de ces problèmes de transfert de technologies. Entre-temps, le cirque Blair-Campbell & l'Irak avait repris à Londres, avec la mort du professeur Kelly... Aux dernières nouvelles, BAE attend toujours, avec sa sébile tendue.
The UK’s national champion’ is desperate to find a US partner to keep pace in a global technology race — and Tony Blair’s government may no longer want to stand in its way, write Dan Roberts and Peter Spiegel
Among the list of diplomatic requests Tony Blair will take with him to Washington this week, one item will be watched with special interest by arms manufacturers and governments on both sides of the Atlantic. For Mr Blair's trip has the potential to reshape the defence industry more dramatically than at any time since the end of the cold war.
The British prime minister is expected to press President George W. Bush for shared access to some of the Pentagon's hottest military secrets: technology ranging from the software source
codes at the heart of the latent fighter jets to electronic systems for controlling the digital battlefield.
Despite some encouragement from the White House — “The United Kingdom has earned the lasting gratitude of the American people for the enormous sacrifices it made,” Mr Bush said last week — Mr Blair's mission would test the charm of James Bond. The UK govermnent is asking for access to the kind of information that would instil panic among US spy chiefs if it were pursued with such vigour by any other figure. Republican hawks in Congress remain opposed to the idea of sharing military technology at a time of international insecurity. Recriminations between US and British intelligence communities following reports about Iraqi attempts to secure uranium supplies do not augur for closer ties.
Elsewhere in Europe, the prospect of closely military ties between the US and Britain is viewed with suspicion and envy. ln part, continental defence manufacturers fear being frozen out of the giant US market entirely — just at the moment it is growing fastest. Worse still, the widening technology gap could leave them a generation behind their US rivals when it comes to selling future equipment.
No event signalled this risk more clearly than last month's Paris air show, when many US defence contractors were happy to follow Pentagon requests for senior executives to stay
away, as relatively little business was expected to take place in Paris anyway.
Politically, if Britain and the US do integrate defence industries, further doubts would be raised about London's commitment to an European defense. Yet the British defence establishment and its biggest contractor, BAE Systems, sense an opportunity that they cannot afford to miss. “There will never be a better moment to press home this issue [of technology transfert,” says Alex Nicoll, assistant director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “We are at a peculiar juncture in history with the US and UK relationship so strong because of Iraq and continental European companies unable to build their US businesses for political reasons.”
BAE is convinced that Mr Blair will have to use this window of opportunity to encourage even greater cooperation. Britain's dominant defence company believes it will probably have to give up independence entirely and merge with a larger US rival in order to gain full access to new military technology.
Without such a change of control, Mike Turner, BAE's chief executive, believes the US will never be persuaded to hand over all the secrets and Britain's defence industry risks falling
permanently behind. “Somehow we've got to get that technology across the Atlantic,” he argues. “If you go back a few years, it was possible, even though Europe spent less money on technology, to stay relatively level with the US.
“But just prior to 9-11 and certainly after 9-11, it became clear the US was willing to spend a significant amount of money on defence technology, equipment systems and network centric
warfare, and Europe wasn't. The technology gap, which is so important to sustain our capability in the UK for the long term, became intolerable.”
In different circumstances, BAE's quest for a US partner would be expected to hit a political brick wall. Few governments have been willing to give up strategic control of their defence
industries; BAE's dramatic turn to the west threatens to undermine a series of European partnerships that Whitehall has been nurturing for decades.
The post-Iraq mood in Downing Street has produced a surprising degree of support for BAE's ambitions. Some advisers believe that — once the issue of technology transfer was resolved — it might not be such a disaster to relinquish control of BAE, if it meant that the company's British factories could continue to make modern equipment at competitive prices.
Growing frustration with BAE's management has also played a part. In the post year, the company's share price bas fallen sharply after a series of clashes with the government over cost overruns and delays on big projects. BAE blames the problems on an older style of contracts that promised a fixed price and left much of the risk, in the event of programme snags, with the private sector.
Subsequent attempts to shore more of the risk with the Ministry of Defence threaten to sour the relationship even further. The latent negotiations over the cost of two new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy are likely to go on until March, amid mounting estimates for the final price. BAE has also resorted to tough tactics when negotiating contracts for new Hawk trainer jets, even sending forward-dated redundancy notices to factory workers to show the government the consequences of awarding the contract elsewhere.
Fed up with such behaviour, none in Whitehall worry much less than they used to about protecting a “national champion” from foreign takeover. Some in the Treasury even question
whether things could get any worse under new management.
A report drawn up by government appointed financial advisers also argues that BAE's chances of pulling off a deal with one of the big five US contractors could deteriorate as its
share price languishes and the technology gap grows ever wider. Already BAE's market capitalisation is far short of the level needed for any of the US contractors to consider a true 50-50 merger.
“The problem is likely to get worse before it gets better,” says one banker to have studied the prospects of a deal. “BAE will only fall further behind and the valuation gap is likely to grow rather than diminish over time.”
But it is far from being a done deal. Many observers doubt whether BAE can pull off such an ambitious transatlantic deal in the next year. One problem is that the company holds few attractions for a prospective US buyer. All the time Europe’s defence spending continues to fall behind the US, greater access to the European market looks distinctly unalluring.
European competitors also suggest that BAE is seeking to rush into a deal to disguise its weaknesses. Asked why he appears to have a different view on the ability of European companies to compete with American counterparts than BAE does, Rainer Hetrich, co-chief executive of Europeau Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS), the Franco.German joint owner of Airbus, laughs: “Maybe each company is in different shape.”
EADS maintains that Airbus's great success in competing with the US in the civil aerospace market shows that European. cooperation can work. Further partnerships between defence contractors such as Thales, EADS and Dassault could allow the technological gap to be closed with the help of greater economies of scale. “We must get better value for money, and that means stop the fragmentation, the parallel development,” Mr Hetrich says. “That does not mean one single European institution, but I think you could gain a lot.''
Thales, a purely French defence contractor, also believes that with a decent increase in research and development spending, Europe can keep up with the US companies. In some fields, such as sensor technology and Europe's new, jointly produced cruise missile, Storm-Shadow, the French believe they are even ahead of US technology.
Denis Ranque, Thales' chief executive, insists there are likely to be three main European defence companies (Thaler, EADS, BAE) for the foreseeable future, and does not believe in any more mega-mergers. At the most, he predicts “football-style” swaps of players, implying small parts of companies may go back and forth.
Such brave talk from the French defence establishment may succeed in casting doubt on BAE's motives for rushing into a deal but it cannot disguise the fact that a successful Anglo-American tie-up would leave Europe with enormous strategic challenges.
“Almost regardless of whether BAE does a deal, the French industry needs to consolidate; but especially if there is a deal there will have to be a reaction,” predicts Ben Fidler, an analyst at Deutsche Bank.
Just as Europe failed to present a united front to America during the diplomatic dispute before the Iraq war, there are already signs of traditional fault lines opening up. Yesterday, Finnmeccanica, the Italian defence manufacturer, said it was looking for US acquisitions to step on to the international stage.
Last month, Carlyle Group, the US private equity company, reciprocated the italian interest by buying FiatAvio, Fiat's military and space arm, for €l.5bn ($1.7bn).
Such deals are small by comparison with BAE's plans but hint at a return to normality in US relations with other parts of Europe.
Besides, some experts point to continued cooperation between Thales and Raytheon of the US as evidence that all is not lost in defence relations between the US and France. Augusta-Westland, an Anglo-Italian aerospace joint venture, even hopes to supply the US presidential helicopter. EADS has won orders to supply maritime patrol aircraft for the US coastguard.
“Eventually, the dust will settle,” says Mr Nicoll at the IISS. “It would be a mistake to make long-term strategic decisions on the basis of short-term peculiarities in the political climate.”
Nevertheless, the realities of US political anger towards much of Europe suggests that BAE's best chance of transatlantic consolidation lies with Mr Bush and Mr Blair when they meet this Thursday. If the political hurdles can be overcome, it will face only one remaining snag, persuading one of the leading US defence manufacturers that the company is worth buying.
James Albaugh, president and chief executive of Boeing's Integrated Defense Systems division, sums up the challenge: “I believe everyone understands [transatlantic deals] will take place at some point. What we don't understand is what they might look like. We have priorities to be global but global by itself is not a strategy. The strategy is to make money.”
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