Netanyahou sans drone contre l’Iran...

Ouverture libre


Un commentaire est associé à cet article. Vous pouvez le consulter et réagir à votre tour.



Netanyahou sans drone contre l’Iran...

Nous donnons ici des extraits de deux textes de Richard Silverstein, sur son site, sur une situation particulièrement intéressante de la flotte des drones israéliens qui seraient appelés à jouer un rôle central dans toute attaque d’Israël contre l’Iran. Silverstein est un commentateur respecté et crédité de bonnes sources d’information, dans la presse antiSystème de l’internet. Il fut le créateur d’un des premiers sites “juifs progressistes” aux USA, Tihun Alam, en 2003, puis d’un autre, Israel Palestine Forum. Toutes ces activités montrent l’orientation “progressiste” de Silverstein, résolument critique de la politique agressive d’Israël sous la direction du Likoud, partisan d’une entente israélo-palestinienne, etc. Silverstein a également publié dans des médias de la presse-Système (Huffington Post, Guardian, Haaretz, Forward, Los Angeles Times, American Conservative).

Dans ces deux textes du 13 octobre 2013 et du 15 octobre 2013, Silverstein détaille la situation des drones israéliens que les Iraniens parviennent d’une façon répétée et malgré des modifications de modernisation, à intercepter et à contrôler. Les détails sont très nombreux et viennent d’une source dont Silverstein ne peut assurer de la complète véracité, mais à qui il donne un crédit important. (Il y a également des détails sur le déploiement de drones israéliens dans des pays étrangers, notamment l’Arabie et l’Azerbaïdjan, et des détails également sur la connexion Arabie-Israël.) Les tentatives faites, d’une façon assez chaotique, par un site (Fresh) proche des milieux de sécurité nationale israéliens pour discréditer ses informations semblent indiquer que Silverstein n’a pas tort de faire confiance à sa source.

Cette situation israélienne est particulièrement inquiétante selon Silverstein, parce que les drones ont à remplir, en cas d’attaque israélienne de l’Iran, la mission vitale de l’annihilation de la défense aérienne iranienne. S’ils ne peuvent mener à bien cette mission, comme cela paraît le cas, une attaque israélienne conventionnelle de l’Iran est quasiment impossible à cause des risques considérables qui seraient alors pris. Cette situation est jugée très dangereuse par Silverstein, dans la mesure où Netanyahou reste obsédé par l’attaque de l’Iran, qu’il est aujourd’hui abandonné par les USA sur ce terrain, et que la seule issue dans ce cas pour attaquer tout de même serait l’utilisation du nucléaire tactique contre l’Iran. Bien entendu, les textes de Silverstein suggèrent, ou confirment, la puissance des capacités de guerre électronique de l’Iran.

Voici des extraits des deux textes, essentiellement celui du 13 octobre, avec confirmation, avec des précisions supplémentaires, dans celui du 15 octobre.

• Le 13 octobre 2013. Dans ce texte, Silverstein reprend deux précédents textes qu’il a publiés sur ce même sujet avec notamment le détail de la destruction de quatre drones israéliens par les Iraniens, pour les compléter d’une manière substantielle.

«Regular readers will recall that in the post about the drone failures I quoted an anonymous Israeli source who appeared quite knowledgeable about Israel’s UAV program. The same source has offered a new report that is even more alarming than the first one he sent. He says that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, operating out of the Bekaa Valley, have so compromised Israel’s drone fleet that it cannot be used for the critical mission Israel has set for them: to disable Iran’s air defenses as preparation for an IAF assault on Iranian targets, including its nuclear program. Without UAV capability, Israel must use conventional means to knock out Iran’s anti-aircraft systems. That would be too costly considering distance and other technical challenges. All this leads to the possible conclusion that if Bibi attacks Iran he would have to consider very seriously using a nuclear weapon (or as the source calls it, ‘BVR tactical nukes’).

»He notes the latest sabotage of an Israeli drone occurred during Israel’s semi-secret war games over Greece simulating an attack on Iran. Imagine the drama and frustration of preparing for this momentous battle and the key element of your initial attack phase is neutralized.

»Another mind-blowing claim of this report is that Israel is collaborating with Saudi Arabia on a possible attack on Iran: that IDF personnel are stationed on Saudi soil and that Israeli drones which would attack Iran are based there. Note that Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, Prince Bandar, recently made a secret trip to Israel. What might be so important that it would require such an extraordinary trip (no senior Saudi official has ever visited Israel as far as I know)? Stationing Israeli personnel and armaments on Saudi soil and coordinating a potential attack on Iran warrant that.

»Before reading this, note that Israel’s Harpy UAVs are built to (among other things) attack air defenses. I’ve done some minor editing of the message below for clarity and comprehension’s sake): The real story behind the Israeli UAV crash landing into the Mediterranean Sea, last week off the shores of Ashdod, is more complicated and worrisome than I first told you.

»Last Wednesday (October 9th), the IAF conducted a long-range exercise to rehearse the executing of an attack on Iran. The opening move on behalf of the IAF calls for a large-scale drone strike against Iranian air-defense batteries in the vicinity of the different Iranian main targets. [....]

»The drones are […] to be launched from a few countries located to the north and west of Iran. That is due to [the] UAV’s range and number of targets. I think they are talking about Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. The location in Saudi Arabia is the city of Khafji. A few of my colleagues, have been there recently. The Heron UAV is [tasked with] intelligence coverage and relay services and the Hermes 450 and Harpy drones…provide weapon delivery. Although the Heron has the ability to carry its own weapon systems, the required [payload for this mission exceeds its capacity]; the plan calls for the use of the Hermes and Harpy UAVs as the main weapon delivery-systems.

»All three UAVs (Heron, Hermes 450 and Harpy) share the same guidance system. On January 28th 2012, a Heron UAV crashedoutside of Tel-Nof Air-Base in the center of Israel. The formal cover up story in the news was that its wing broke off. The real story was that the Control Center lost control over the UAV and ‘someone’ else flew the UAV and mistakenly crashed it. Electronic evidence led to an Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) unit stationed in the Bek’aa Valley in Lebanon. The IAF decided to decommission the entire Heron fleet for 8 months. During this time, Israel Air Industries (IAI) allocated a team of 50 engineers to secure the guidance system and make it un-hackable.

»Last Tuesday, when the Hermes was deliberately brought down, it was during the final phases of testing the new guidance system. The disappointment in Israel is huge. Electronic analysis carried as part of a post-mortem…led to the same IRG compound in the Bak’aa Valley and to another unit stationed near Beirut. [...]

»[The] situation is very dangerous at the moment, since there is no real option [for] eliminating the Iranian air-defense batteries using UAV’s. Other conventional means bear too much risk.

»Israel is being pushed [to] launch BVR [Beyond Visual Range] tactical nukes as the main way to attack Iran. I don’t know if you read Bib’s comparisons, but the lunatic is comparing himself to Churchill, and with Israel’s isolation growing I fear he’s losing it and will attack. Ronen Shoval, one of Bibi’s proxies, published an op-ed calling for a tactical nuclear attack, Shoval would have never stated that without Bibi’s specific instruction.

»To be very clear, I do not know the source’s identity. I have done as much due diligence as I can to verify the information he offered. I have not been able to debunk or discredit it. But since I don’t know the source, I can’t confirm its authenticity. All that being said, anyone who derides this report without seriously weighing its substance will look awfully stupid if Bibi does decide to ‘do the Slim Pickens’ and take a ride on an ICBM to Natanz.

• Dans son texte du 15 octobre 2013, Silverstein confirme le précédent en y ajoutant des précisions. Ce même texte contient les précisions sur la façon dont le site israélien Fresh a tenté de discréditer ses informations.

«The Israeli source who conveyed to me the crisis in Israel’s drone fleet has added that the Iranians have hacked Azerbaijan’s Israeli-made drone fleet as well: Using [a nearly identical drone] to the fallen Hermes 450, several months ago IAF […] drones also failed in Azerbaijan. [They were] using the Azery Hermes control units with some temporary modifications [paralleling those of] Israeli drones signals. The training exercise failed after similar concerns of successful Iranian penetration were raised.

»Iran’s media even crowed about the failure. It could put a dent in the billions of dollars Azerbaijan’s dictator is spending on Israeli military hardware and depress (ever so slightly) the revenue forecast for Israel’s weapons industry.

»The Azeri failure means that virtually none of the drones Israel has stationed in countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and elsewhere are likely to be able to attack Iran should Israel decide to do so. As this source wrote in my last published post, this means that Israel cannot neutralize Iran’s anti-aircraft systems using its drone force as it had planned to do. While Israel may have other means to try to do this, it was relying on its drones to do the primary heavy-lifting...»