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1604@SURTITRE = Friend or Foe ?
The Farnborough Show 2002 that took place at the end of July was marked by a rather strange atmosphere — one that was both fever-pitched and spellbinding, yet, at the same time, disenchanted and hesitant. In his editorial of 29 July, Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST) Editor in Chief David North noted: « Most of the industry officials responded to questions about their impression of the show, with words like “flat” and “indicative of an industry in survival mode.” As one long-time show observer said, “It reminds me of a person treading water fairly well. Unfortunately, the person cannot spot land, so does not know which way to swim.” » Further on in the same editorial, North emphasized what was clearly the predominant Anglo-American role: « This show appeared to be dominated by US and UK interests, with a strong showing by the Italian aerospace industry. » Putting the two quotes together, we conclude that the Farnborough Show showed the extent to which the plainly dominant Anglo-American influence in the aerospace industry is today undergoing a crisis of identification and orientation.
Throughout the show, acclamation of UK-US cooperation was far more in evidence than any homage paid to trans-Atlantic cooperation. Projects were reported on whose key virtue, from the UK standpoint, is found in this statement by a UK official, indicating complete alignment on American procedures, doctrines and strategies, since, in two major respects — what can be done and what must be done — the point of reference is inevitably and solely the Pentagon and the US: « We have to acknowledge we can’t do everything the US can. At the end of the day, it’s the Pentagon which is driving the technology forward. » It is superfluous to indicate that this admission was made to an American journalist from AW&ST, i.e. a representative of the power which the British seem to be saying they must remain close to at all costs, so close that we could speak of dependence. A European observer close to the Commission, who spent two days at Farnborough, provided his impression: « The Farnborough Show was an orgy of affirmation of British dependency on the US; of reaffirmation of the special relationship; of declarations of British alignment with the Americans. And alongside that, the British had the audacity on occasion to claim to be speaking for Europe, which is a bit much under the circumstances. »
More concretely, this atmosphere of reaffirmation of American-British links was marked by the announcement that the British are developing high precision guidance technology with the help of the Americans, in the redoubts where trials are conducted; by the confirmation that the British are becoming involved in the development of UAVs and UCAVs, pursuant to America’s recently renewed keen interest in this field. In our view, it is precisely in this frenetic rush by Britain’s defense industry and its MoD bureaucracy to get in lockstep with the Americans that we find the best illustration of David North’s remark: « It reminds me of a person treading water fairly well. Unfortunately, the person cannot spot land, so does not know which way to swim. » Thus, it is the United Kingdom itself, even more than Britain’s defense industry, which is “at sea” in search of strategic direction.
Farnborough 2002 was therefore a special edition: rather than being a show, it turned out to be a game of hide-and-seek — or, more aptly, trying to find a needle in a haystack. It was all « smoke and mirrors ». It was a non-show — a non-event. On the other hand, if we look at the broader picture, we discover that Farnborough 2002 merely reflected the situation of unease prevailing in the West generally. The categoric affirmations by the British barely dissimulate a disarray such as the country has not known since the period that preceded World War II; and that disarray is but the extreme expression of the climate that today pervades the West as a whole.
Let us continue our survey of the British outlook. AW&ST quotes an official from the MoD as saying: « MoD is faced with a precarious balancing act in its future equipment program as it attempts to retain an independent capability while trying to ensure coherence with emerging US developments ». What was said sounds reasonable enough; the situation it describes, however, is perhaps somewhat less so.
Our European source, when provided with the quote, describes the situation in these terms: « When the British say they are pursuing two goals, they are in fact describing two things: greater autonomy of action which they today no longer enjoy (an autonomy somewhat along the lines of France); and full interoperability with the US. Experience shows, however, that the latter comes only at the price of alignment with the procedures, tactics, doctrines and strategy of the Americans. In other words, the British want to be completely independent of the US and at the same time they are prepared to be completely dependent upon the US. Not easy. » It is a dilemma the British know well. In this case, not “To Be or Not To Be”, but “To Be and Not To Be”.
Let us take the case of the British aircraft carrier, a decision on which was to be taken this month, with the choice between a carrier tailored for Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft and a conventional attack carrier (50,000 ton CVA). The search for autonomy and effectiveness of intervention is driving the British toward a CVA (as recommended by their major Strategic Review of 1998), especially as they were the first to realize the importance of such naval platforms, in the absence of suitable land bases, in the course of operations in Afghanistan (CVAs have conventional aircraft with much greater range than VSTOL aircraft).
Let us put aside the speculation on the selection and take a look at certain earlier milestones:
• The selection of a CV/STOL was made in the sixties. In addition to the usual economic considerations (CV/VSTOL costing less than the CVA), it was noted that in NATO, where the Americans were assigned the main long-range missions, with their large CVAs, the British role could be limited to fleet air defense. The result was the selection of the CV/VSTOL. The ensuing situation created enormous difficulties during the Falklands War, and later, during the 1995-99 Balkans campaign, the Royal Navy was reduced by the Americans to a subsidiary role, while the main supporting role was assigned to the French, who, in furtherance of their policy of independence, had chosen the CVA. France’s CVA relieved the American carrier as the control center for the allied fleet when the Americans were obliged to withdraw their CVA.
• Thus, the choice of the CV/VSTOL stems from a position of cooperation and interoperability with the Americans within NATO. Today, the Royal Navy’s choice should be for a CVA.
• But in that case, what would become of the spirit of cooperation with and interoperability with the Americans? Industry sources have informed us that the Americans are bringing pressure to bear on the British for them to opt for the CV/VSTOL solution in order to facilitate a better sharing of strategic tasks, the British being relegated to the fleet-defense mission. According to our sources: « With the Americans, the search for interoperability and cooperation necessarily entails a search for the sharing of tasks, where the Americans, not surprisingly, have the central role. » Another argument — of even more narrow self-interest — for the Americans is that the CV/VSTOL solution bolsters the VSTOL version of the JSF and locks the British into the JSF program, the JSF/VSTOL being the only VSTOL aircraft available.
Still, we have not yet examined what in our view is the most important aspect — the general strategic and political backdrop against which the American initiative is set. On the one hand, we have the British effort to seek interoperability with the Americans, which necessarily forms part of a larger cooperation framework, and whose implementation presents, as we have seen, serious problems for the autonomy that the British are also seeking and that they even want to enlarge and reinforce. On the other hand, there is the problem of the strategic cause and of the political justification underlying this approach, a problem that is all the more critical when one takes into account the fact that the search for interoperability — entailing, as it does, operational cooperation — carries with it the almost inescapable effect of reducing strategic autonomy and political independence.
Since the terrorist attack of 11 September 2002, we have had a strategic situation that enables us to evaluate in real terms this issue of cooperation between allies, particularly between the US and the UK, especially since the British maintain a systematic policy of seeking cooperation with the Americans. What are the conclusions that can be drawn?
• On the ground, from a tactical standpoint, operational relations between the Americans and the British have never been as strained. Incidents between the two have mushroomed. The UK Chief of Staff, Admiral Sir John Boyce, was obliged to request early retirement after having severely criticized American « cowboy-type » tactical operations.
• In the field of strategy, the latent disagreement between the British and the Americans on attacking Iraq is deep and is becoming serious. On 8 August, the Guardian carried the following general assessment: « Senior British ministers are privately admitting to growing exasperation across government at the lack of a clear and coherent US policy towards Iraq. [...] It is said no coherent military or political strategy to oust Saddam Hussein has been presented to Downing Street, even though Britain is supposedly the closest ally of George Bush, the US president. »
• Politically, Tony Blair is today almost alone in favoring extensive cooperation with the US as being fundamental to UK policy in the current crisis. His government, although composed of party stalwarts, is reserved on the issue; politically, his party opposes the policy, with even a segment of the Conservatives sharing these reservations; the unions, the press, the Anglican church, and lastly, the public (64.6% versus 17.6%) — all are opposed to the American strategy and to an attack on Iraq.
It is easy to understand that the position of the Britain’s bureaucratic industrial complex (the defense establishment bureaucracy — not to be confused with the armed forces themselves) in favor of a shift in UK force structures toward greater interoperability and operational cooperation with the US, relies on the Blair government’s assumed axiomatic and immutable unreserved commitment to follow the US lead on major foreign policy issues. But that approach has today become a distinctly minority, and largely discredited, view in the UK. These inherently conflicting views are fated to pose ever more serious problems for the UK — including in the choice of major items of military equipment.
This bureaucratic-industrial drive toward greater cooperation with the US already constitutes an initiative that shows a real break with reality in the light of politico-strategic developments, with the opposition to the Prime Minister’s pro-US policy, favoring an attack against Iraq, so intense that, since early August, Tony Blair has himself begun to hesitate seriously.
In European affairs, the British have been increasingly distancing themselves from the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) process for over a year in order not to compromise their alliance with the US. A French military analyst offered the following comment on this state of affairs: « What the British have already accomplished in moving toward Europe is already remarkable for them. For the balance, we are not too concerned. We shall be waiting for them. We know that at one point or another, they will turn back toward the Europeans, when their experiment in cooperation with the Americans will have run its course and they will have had ample opportunity to measure just what they stand to lose in terms of their relations with Europe. » What our source is saying implicitly is that the British cannot have it both ways. They cannot be in lockstep with the Americans and at the same time expect to enjoy full credibility and acceptance as a Member State of Europe in good standing.
It is a truth that the British — and Tony Blair himself — are beginning to take on board, since opposition to the government’s pro-American policies on a possible war with Iraq is rising alarmingly. The Guardian of 8 August, citing government sources, made this unusually frank statement: « The sources added that Mr Blair had no desire to end up as the only prominent European supporter of an invasion of Iraq at a time when he is also considering a possible referendum on the euro. It is thought Mr Blair will be keen to avoid a foreign policy clash with Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who is facing re-election and could help pave the way to a smooth British entry into the euro. » The reference to Schröder stems from the fact that the German leader has come out strongly against any American “adventure” involving an invasion of Iraq.
The only conclusion possible — which brings us back to Farnborough 2002 — is that the swimmer who treads water so well but who « cannot spot land, so does not know which way to swim », finds himself in this predicament simply because he fails to take account of the trans-Atlantic political climate. The industrial policy on defense matters of the UK — and often that of other European countries — today finds itself swimming against the tide of political events. Our swimmer who treads water so well may discover, rather soon, that he has a weight attached to him that is dragging him under.
@SURTITRE = Friend and Foe
Nothing illustrates better the general situation described above than the existing situation between two fighter aircraft programs, the EFA Eurofighter Typhoon and the JSF. What hasn’t been said about the adroitness of the British, participants in the EFA (and certainly the technological lead nation for the project), and major non-US participant in the JSF: there they are firmly ensconced in two of the three major current fighter aircraft programs (the third being the Rafale); so adroit that here they are with one foot in Europe, with the EFA, and the other foot in the US, with the JSF. Let’s just see what the real situation is.
It is 11 July in Washington and “Pete” Aldridge is on hand as Number Three man in the Pentagon to preside over the signing ceremony for the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Turkey to mark Turkey’s participation in the JSF program. At the end of the press conference following the ceremony, one last question:
Q: What sort of reflections do you have now on the prospects for competition from the EuroFighter for foreign military sales?
Aldridge: No contest. [Laughter] Anybody who looks at the EuroFighter versus the Joint Strike Fighter will know the answer.
Thank you very much.
There we have it — “Pete” Aldridge at his best. The ceremony had been especially relaxed, the Americans having signed up their full quota of initially-targeted program participants. A Turkish journalist provided this impression gleaned from Turkish officials present at the ceremony: « Aldridge was at his best, he was totally relaxed, regaling the Turkish delegation with jokes about the EuroFighter and its claims to compete with the JSF, and about the British about whom he wondered aloud how they would manage to participate in both programs simultaneously. »
The British have a 33% interest in the EFA Eurofighter Typhoon program. Technologically and design-wise, they are the project managers. Today, the EFA constitutes the remaining heritage of Britain’s once great military aviation industry, and industry and government leaders alike have a major stake in the program’s success. The British have an 8% participation in America’s JSF program and are the Number One non-US partner. Of course, BAE is involved in both programs. The problem posed for the British — one replete with political overtones, as Aldridge sarcastically pointed out — is the competition for export sales between the two aircraft. It is that issue which exposes in practical terms the strategic dilemma that their position poses for the British.
Such industrial and political interference is aggravated by a technological interference of which little is said — when it is known — but which is no less disturbing. The EFA includes certain stealth characteristics — more or less significant depending upon the version (the British version, of course, being the most stealthy). This stealth technology comes from the British, and the Americans have an oversight right in regard to it under a secret agreement whose terms are sufficiently vague — aside from the difficulties inherent in trying to dovetail technological developments — to render any British autonomy in this area extremely difficult. This means that the Americans are in a position to exercise an oversight right with respect to a significant technological matter for a program that the Americans are directly competing against. One independent European source observes that « even if the export version of the EFA offers only very few stealthy aspects compared to the British version, there remain sufficient so that, with a little bad faith, the Americans can justify interfering in one way or another and can, in any event, bring substantial pressure to bear. » In theory, this means that we could see the Americans objecting to a proposal for exporting the Typhoon to a country to which they are themselves seeking to sell the JSF.
In the week preceding Farnborough, Mike Turner BAE’s new CEO, spoke quite a bit about the EuroFighter. Turner wanted to show that he wanted to place the 2002 Show under the banner of BAE’s star program and, at the same time, show that his arrival at BAE meant a reaffirmation of BAE’s commitment to that program. His remarks, of course, had a very European tone, and EuroFighter was presented as a major European program: « Eurofighter is at the very beginning of coming into service and of its development programme. What we need to do is optimise the aircraft in the air-to-air role with the Meteor missile and in the air-to-surface role for a full multi-role capability. The key thing is that Europe continues to develop the aircraft. »
Turner could not avoid talking about export sales. He confirmed the analysis according to which the EFA program, at the current state of play, must absolutely be capable of generating substantial orders for export sales in order to be able to achieve a level that is industrially and financially viable. Currently, EFA export sales are looking forward primarily to a prospective sale to Greece and to an agreement in principle with Austria for an order for 24 aircraft (reduced to 18 planes following the recent floods). Turner provided the following details in this regard: « We have to develop aircraft to maximise exports during the gap until the JSF is available. The issue is when the JSF is available. I am sure Australia will want to fill gaps if JSF does not keep to its dates. »
Although these pronouncements are revealing, we shall scrutinize in particular the last one, since it, has the additional advantage of addressing a specific case. Turner cites the Australian case:
• Until recently, Australia had rejected the JSF as the choice to replace its fleet of fighter aircraft and was considering in particular the competing EFA and Rafale aircraft.
• Suddenly, on 25 June, Australia changed course. It committed itself to participate in the R&D phase of the JSF program and announced that it would order the JSF for its forces. The reason behind this sudden turn-around? Embittered British sources indicate that the Australians were « persuaded » by an American decision to exempt imports of Australian steel from the recently decreed 30% protectionist duties.
• The fact remains that, compared to the choice of the EFA or the Rafale, the Royal Australian Air Force will find itself — with the later delivery dates for the JSF — confronted with a gap in its readiness posture. It is that situation which Turner intends to turn to his advantage.
Turner tells us that Australia would like to fill the operational gap (pending the arrival of the JSF), and that he is hopeful that that will be done by buying EuroFighters; he also tells us that Australia would not only want to do so, but would absolutely have to do so, « if the JSF does not keep to its dates ». The phrase is significant when we remember the importance of the EFA for BAE’s new CEO and when we remember the importance of export sales for the EFA. We are led to the conclusion that a setback in the timetable of the JSF would be welcome by Turner, since that would give him a basis for hoping to be able to sell the EuroFighter. Already, it is being advanced in European aviation circles that BAE is at work in Canberra presenting not only the advantages of procuring the EuroFighter to « bridge the gap » pending the arrival of the JSF, but more importantly, describing the problems that the Americans are already encountering in the development of the JSF (with the possible setback in the timetable being an additional argument in favor of the EFA). And the British have a paradoxical advantage in advancing these arguments: they know what they are talking about when they talk about the JSF, since they are so fully engaged in the program.
These statements by Mike Turner and the rumors that abound cannot fail to arouse even greater mistrust on the part of the American partners of the British in the JSF program. It is therefore beginning to appear that if such an initiative were undertaken by the British (offering the Eurofighter to Australia to « bridge the gap » with the JSF), it would constitute a serious nub of discord between the British and the Americans. The situation is one that is destined to repeat itself, each time giving rise to the same scenario for sewing discord amid the partners of the special relationship. For example, there is the case of Greece, which had initially made a firm commitment to procure 60-80 Eurofighters for 2006-2007, and which subsequently postponed its decision until 2004. In the interim, the Americans, who had, until recently, been involved in the Greek competition only with the F-16, have reemerged with the JSF. In Eurofighter circles, suspicions are running high that it is the Americans who brought pressure on the Greeks to postpone their decision.
Britain’s two-game approach involves dealing with ambiguity in ways that carry a certain degree of risk. During the Farnborough Show, the 24 July issue of The Independent carried an article by Kim Sengupta entitled: « US and Europe duel over fighter sales worth billions ». The article set forth an interesting analysis of the situation and of its implications. For the author, « US » is synonymous with the JSF, while « Europe » is synonymous with the EuroFighter and nothing but the Eurofighter. The article presents the point of view of British industry sources eager to defend the EuroFighter, clearly considered as primarily a product of British R&D genius, and deemed to be the sole hope for Europe’s industry in the face of the JSF/F-35 — implying that only the UK appears today to have the determination to defend Europe’s aerospace industry against the shenanigans of the Americans. We read: « What was dreamt of as Europe's state-of-the-art front-line aircraft has been dogged by delays, and is now facing fierce competition from the American-built rival, and the battle to grab the major slice of defence budgets of more than a dozen countries is now relentless. The Eurofighter's future is also under threat from the twin missiles of political expediency and budgetary constraints. »
The author vigorously develops his argument against the JSF and in favor of the EuroFighter (and in support of Britain’s BAE): « Supporters of the EuroFighter say the price of the JSF may substantially rise by the time it comes into production. They also maintain that its much-vaunted multiplicity has yet to be tested. »
Throughout the article, a certain ambiguity was maintained, refusing to draw the obvious conclusion from the evidence at hand: if the JSF is a formidable competitor in Europe for European industry — and therefore for the EFA — it is because of the double role played by the UK itself. The EFA, subject to « fierce competition from the American-built rival » both in Europe and on export markets, is somehow a victim of this bizarre situation: « BAE Systems, while the leading partner in the Eurofighter, is also the biggest foreign subcontractor for the JSF, securing about 15 per cent of the work, including part of the aircraft body and the onboard electronic system. »
The author is finally obliged to recognize the facts, although he refuses to draw the logical conclusions: « A number of European countries have now got a foot in both camps. While the Ministry of Defence has pulled in a sizeable portion of the $15bn (£96bn) total budget of the Typhoon, it has also been the biggest European contributor to the JSF with $2bn. »
Finally, Sengupta provides us with the key to the enigma: « The RAF, given the choice [i.e. Eurofighter versus JSF], would choose the Eurofighter because, they say, it is better. However, air chiefs also accept that the British investment in the JSF is part of Tony Blair’s trans-Atlantic trapeze act and will continue. » So there we have it, the UK selection of the JSF boils down to no more than being part of Prime Minister Blair’s « trans Atlantic trapeze act ».
When the same Kim Sengupta writes that « there is also the warning that for Europe to abandon the Eurofighter at this stage would surrender the military industry to the US and be a huge waste of money », he is dramatizing, or he is succumbing to the penchant for disinformation in this field that afflicts the Anglo-American press. Despite all his rhetoric, he seems to forget that France’s Rafale fighter aircraft is European; that it is more than a match for EuroFighter (the Royal Netherlands Air Force, which assessed all the contenders and whose objectivity is beyond reproach, having rated the Rafale as highly superior); that the price of the Rafale is equivalent to or below that of the EuroFighter (and surely below what the JSF will end up costing); that the Rafale is already deployed operationally (on board France’s Charles-de-Gaulle aircraft carrier) and that the Rafale has demonstrated to the Americans, during simulated-combat exercises with the US Navy, that it is vastly superior to US fighter aircraft currently in service.
Still, in a way, from the European viewpoint, this dramatization is not necessarily negative. It tends to reinforce growing pressures being exerted for initiatives to be taken at the European level to strengthen protection for Europe’s aviation industry so badly shaken after the JSF offensive of last spring, and to intervene with those EU Member States which appear to be giving the nod to the JSF.
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