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Affinons nos comptes… $16.000.000.000.000, cela fait un peu court. Une nouvelle étude venue du Levy Economics Institute, du Bard College, nous remet les yeux en face des trous en nous demabdant d’être plus réalistes. L’étude, faite par Jalmes Felkerson, est titrée : «$29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bail-out by Funding Facility and Recipient». Elle fixe l’intervention totale de la Federal Reserve dans la crise financière, au 10 novembre 2011, à $29.616.000.000.000… (Pour tout le monde, on arrondit à $29.000.000.000.000, en se disant qu’on ne doit plus être très loin des $30.000.000.000.000.)
C’est le site The Big Picture, le bien nommé pour la circonstance, qui présente cette étude le 9 décembre 2011. Une autre source (Economonitor.com ) présente cette étude, également le 9 décembre 2011.
«There is a fascinating new study coming out of the Levy Economics Institute  of Bard College. Its titled “$29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bail-out by Funding Facility and Recipient” by James Felkerson. The study looks at the lending, guarantees, facilities and spending of the Federal Reserve. The researchers took all of the individual transactions across all facilities created to deal with the crisis, to figure out how much the Fed committed as a response to the crisis. This includes direct lending, asset purchases and all other assistance. (It does not include indirect costs such as rising price of goods due to inflation, weak dollar, etc.)
»The net total? As of November 10, 2011, it was $29,616.4 billion dollars — (or 29 and a half trillion, if you prefer that nomenclature). Three facilities—CBLS, PDCF, and TAF— are responsible for the lion’s share — 71.1% of all Federal Reserve assistance ($22,826.8 billion).
«One comment about some of the folks pushing back against this massive total: Yes, there is a big difference between a $100 lent for 3 days, and a $100 lent overnight rolled over 2 more times. And there is an enormous difference when temporary overnight lending lasts for three years.
»Overnight lending, by its definition, is temporary, short term, lower risk, modest impact. It exists to allow slightly over-extended banks to meet their reserve requirements. But rolling overnight lending repeatedly for 3 years is none of those things. And it makes a mockery of these same reserve requirements, and the protective purposes they are supposed to serve.
»The amount of overnight lending reflects how broken our financial system really is. A well capitalized, moderately leverage system does not require this massive liquidity from a central bank — interbank lending should be sufficient. What the data reveals is that the financial sector remains dangerously under-capitalized and overleveraged.»