Il n'y a pas de commentaires associés a cet article. Vous pouvez réagir.
A recueillir les échos de la rencontre du “Groupe de Contact”, en fin de semaine ànkara, prévaudrait l’impression d’avancées ordonnées dans la crise libyenne, au profit du bloc BAO, avancées répondant évidemment à des améliorations sur le terrain (en faveur des rebelles du CNT). Le “évidemment” est largement de trop, – comme le reste finalement...
Un très long article des deux correspondants du Daily Telegraph en Libye, Adrian Blomfield et Richard Spencer, ce 16 juillet 2011, en même temps que triomphait le “Groupe de Contact”, donne une très édifiante image de la situation sur le terrain. Deux points émergent, d’une part le désordre dominant cette situation, d’autre part l’inorganisation et l’incompétence des rebelles.
«If they are truly the Libyan rebels' most promising vanguard, the fighters poised on the front line in the Nafusa mountains hardly inspired confidence. Sheltering from the beating sun in the shadow of a Second World War Italian guardhouse, a gaggle of dishevelled men sipped sweet tea to shake off the exhaustion of a 24-hour shift.
»A solitary rebel trained a telescope on a ridge, a mile distant, on which soldiers of Col Muammar Gaddafi's elite 32nd Brigade peered back, watching and waiting. Behind him, a bearded insurgent revved the engine of a pickup truck, mounted with an anti-aircraft gun, that kicked and spluttered but refused to start.
»With no more than two dozen lightly armed men, their position defended by a toppled lamppost laid across the road, the front line seemed dangerously exposed. And so it proved. Just a week after it was captured in a fierce battle, the village of Qawalish was easily overrun on Wednesday, its defenders killed, wounded or forced to flee. […]
»“It is difficult to control a revolution,” said Col Juma Ibrahim, a senior rebel commander. “It is a difficult situation and we wouldn't know how to stop it. But I think it will only last for a short time. At first people will be angry but then they'll start to calm down.” First of all, of course, they have to win the war. Men like Col Ibrahim admit a lack of co-ordination and an inability to establish a chain-of-command is hampering progress.
»Huge logistical difficulties also confront the rebels, chief among them a shortage of fuel, cash and weapons. Rifts in the rebels' own ranks do not help. The towns and villages of the Nafusa are by no means united in their sympathies, and often compete with each other.
»There are persistent reports that an arms drop by the French, trumpeted in the Paris media, was taken by one faction and not shared. “What I want to know is where these French weapons are,” said one fighter, Abu Moussa. “Nobody has seen any sign of them. Some of us are fighting with rifles our grandfathers used against the Italians. How does Nato expect us to win like this?”»
…Ce qui conduit (cette dernière phrase) à observer qu’un autre domaine continue à poser de très nombreux problèmes, qui est la coordination et la coopération entre les rebelles et l’OTAN. Et l’insatisfaction des rebelles vis-à-vis de l’OTAN est plus forte que jamais, si elle reste discrète en apparence.
«Superficially at least, the residents of the Nafusa mountains, which are largely in rebel control, remain grateful to Nato. “Thanks Nato, you saved our lives,“ one sign, scrawled on a wall in the Berber town of Nalut, declares. "Thanks Sarkozy,” reads another. But beneath the surface, anger towards the alliance is growing, with rebel commanders saying they are bewildered by its contradictory messages.
»“What Nato says and does often makes no sense,” one said. “If we are attacking, they bomb Gaddafi forces so we can advance more easily, but if we are defending, they do nothing. Then some of them say we have to negotiate with Gaddafi, that maybe he can stay in Libya, and others say Gaddafi must go.”»